must be careful consideration of the wisdom or lack of wisdom of proposals made by the various offices and departments. These are interested in the development of their own services. But, if responsibility is to be defined and enforced all plans should "clear" through the chief executive-the one who must stand or fall on his record. To become effective, therefore, as a budget-maker, the chief executive must be provided with a specialized staff free from administrative burdens and responsibilities that it may approach consideration of executive policy and needs and the expenditure of public money objectively a staff which is both adequate and competent independently to advise the chief executive on every matter of state business.

The Budget-Making Staff Should be Responsible to the

Executive

Accepting the budget as an executive document, there is the same reason for making the "staff" which prepares it an executive agency, responsible to the governor. This is supported not only in reason, but in experience. In England, for example, the responsible head of the government is the Prime Minister. He usually chooses the portfolio of the treasury, because this is not a department of public service. Under the Prime Minister in the treasury is an executive officer corresponding roughly to our Secretary of the Treasury. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is himself largely detached from the various public-service departments and is in position independently to review their action. But below him are various staff agencies which have been set aside for the specific purpose of auditing and reviewing the transactions of departments, preparing reports and formulating plans for financing the government's needs. Although there are differences in organization for accomplishing the result, the same principle obtains in all European countries. It is a peculiar fact that although we have been developing staff agencies in this country in various departmental service relations no staff agency has been developed around the work of planning the government's business as a whole, except the recently established staff agencies

of the board of estimate and apportionment of the city of New York and a few other cities; and in various civil service commissions, which later have had the negative purpose of standing in the way of the exercise of executive power instead of being of service to the executive in the development of an efficient personnel.

An Effective "Opposition" Necessary to Enforce Responsibility Reference has been made to the procedure in the House of Commons for giving the "opposition" a chance, especially in discussion of authorizations to the administration to raise and spend money. To this end departmental estimates are submitted to Parliament long before the budget is sent in. Parliament then decides what time will be given to the consideration of these estimates. After this has been fixed, the House regularly under its rules resolves itself into a committee of the whole to give the "opposition" an opportunity to ask questions about the items requested. When submitted, the estimates have already been gone over by representatives of the majority. In other words, through caucus and committees the chief executive takes the steps necessary to find out what will be the attitude of the supporters of the administration. The chief executive and the country as well have the advantage of developing the "opposition" on the floor of the house. Contrast this with our own method. Our whole legislative practice has developed on the principle of "gag rule." The purpose has been to smother the opposition, giving no opportunity for intelligent criticism before measures are passed. The administration and the majority party, therefore, go ahead blindly until the next election when they wake up to find that they have been relegated to the political junk-heap; men who have tried to serve their constituency well have been given a vote of "lack of confidence," with no opportunity to adjust themselves and their policies to public opinion. The effect of our system is, therefore, not only to deprive the government of the benefit of criticism on the part of those who have opposing views, but to defeat all effort toward establishing responsible government. While we have developed more orderly methods, the

result is essentially the same as in Spanish American countries. The people are always in the attitude of wanting a change. They do not pass on issues which arise in the course of business with a view to enforcing responsibility; they follow a leader who promises well, then sit by and wait on the committee on rumor till another candidate presents himself with new promises. Under such circumstances there can be no continuity of policy; and an irresponsible bureaucracy subservient to irresponsible legislative committees is the only thing that can survive.

Recommended Changes in the Constitution

Since the purpose of this meeting is to develop concrete, constructive recommendations as well as discussion of constitutional principles I have the following to propose:

1. That in the part of the constitution dealing with the executive, it be required of him that he shall each year and not later than one week after the beginning of the regular legislative session submit departmental estimates with an appropriation bill in such form and with such conditions attached as shall be deemed desirable to promote the efficiency of the public service and the economy of expenditures; and that, not later than sixty days after the beginning of the regular session, he shall submit to the legislature a budget which shall contain a financial plan for the next fiscal year, supported by summary statements setting forth (a) the actual and estimated revenues and expenditures for a period beginning not less than two years prior to the period to be financed; (b) the present assets, liabilities and surplus or deficit, and the estimated conditions as of the beginning and the end of the period to be financed; (c) the present condition of funds and the estimated condition of funds as of the beginning and end of the period to be financed; (d) such revenue bills as are deemed necessary to meet the financial needs and ratably and equitably to distribute the public charges; (e) such measures for borrowing and refunding the public debt as may be deemed expedient; and (f) a message in support of the measures and explanatory of the proposals submitted.

2. That in the part of the constitution dealing with the legislature, the following provisions be made: That upon receiving the departmental estimate of expenditures with the appropriation bill the assembly shall resolve itself into a committee of the whole house not less than one day each week, at which time the governor and heads of departments may have the privilege of the floor to present the estimates submitted, to explain the appropriations requested, and to answer such questions as may be raised with respect to items or proposed conditions to be attached to items of the appropriation bill; that upon receiving the budget with any amendments which the governor may propose to the appropriation bill previously submitted and discussed, the assembly may take such further time in discussion of items and conditions as may be determined, but no amendment shall be in order except an amendment to reduce, and no new subject or item may be appropriated for except by separate bill which may be independently vetoed by the governor, whose veto shall be final; that in case the legislature is unable to agree on the appropriation bill as submitted by the governor, or as reduced by the assembly, the several established departments, bureaus and offices shall be authorized to expend the same amounts and under the same conditions as were previously authorized; that all appropriations for the legislature, and all appropriations for the courts and for officers not under the jurisdiction of the governor, shall originate in separate bills, which shall be subject to the veto of the governor as other legislation, and the legislature and the courts and other officers not under the jurisdiction of the governor shall be required to submit to the governor their estimates within one week after the regular session begins.

3. That an office and department of auditor-general be created, the head of which shall be elected from the state at large, and in this part of the constitution it be made the duty of the auditor-general to audit revenues and expenditures and the receipts and disbursements as well as the property and other accounts and reports of the treasurer, and of each of the departments, bureaus and offices; the powers of the auditor-general to be confined entirely to the function of independent

audit and report, such reports to be made to the legislature and printed for public distribution.

4. That in the new constitution provision be made for the establishment of a bureau of executive control under the governor, at the head of which would be a comptroller who would be appointed by the governor and under whom would be organized the following divisions:

I. A division of legal advice on matters of administration. 2. A division of planning and standardization, the purpose of which would be: to prepare constructive recommendations to the governor; to review and advise the governor with respect to the laws of the departments; to review and recommend action on allotments; to promulgate procedures governing the methods of transacting public business, in so far as these may not be delegated by the governors to the departments; to develop unit standard specifications and standards for judgment of the efficiency and economy of the administration; and to promulgate methods of accounting and reporting.

3. A division for the compilation of reports and statistics, one of the functions of which would be to coöperate with the division of planning and standardization in the preparation of the annual budget.

4. A bookkeeping division, the duties of which would be to keep central and controlling accounts of the government, and to prepare current reports therefrom, in accordance with standards promulgated.

5. A division of inspection, the purpose of which would be to inspect independently and to prepare reports for the controller to the governor on work and methods of the several departments, bureaus and offices for which he is responsible.

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