the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice of the Lords, spiritual and temporal, and the Commons," so long it was a real necessity in that struggle to establish the sovereignty of the people.

But now that that struggle has been won, now that that power has been transferred, now that there is no longer any question of the universal recognition of the source of power; now that the executive magistrate is merely the representative of the people, is not the problem considerably changed? It is now not so much a question of putting limitations on the power of the sovereign from above, as it is of making it perfectly certain that when your agent acts wrongly you will know it. Instead of putting limitations on the public officer, the real problem now is to have his action as clear and as public as possible. There is no longer any real danger in giving your agent power, now that the people have power to replace him if they find out that he has done wrong. The danger is they may be cajoled and deceived, and may not know who is responsible. Does there not, therefore, come in by slow degrees the necessity of a new principle which, with the conservative tendency of our race to cling to old traditions, we have not yet fully recognized?

There were keen observers in the very beginning of this country who noticed this new difference in principle. In 1778, only two years after the states became independent, and when they were in the very midst of adopting their first constitutions, that great French statesman, Turgot, in a letter to Dr. Price, in London, made a searching and interesting criticism of our methods. Speaking of our state constitutions, he said:

I see in the greatest number an unreasonable imitation of the usages of England. Instead of bringing all the authorities into one, that of the nation, they have established different bodies. A house of representatives, a council, a governor, because England has a House of Commons, Lords, and a King. They undertake to balance these different authorities as if the same equilibrium of power which has been thought necessary to balance the enormous preponderance of royalty could be of any use in republics, formed upon the equality of all citizens, and as if every article which constitutes different

bodies was not a source of divisions. By striving to escape imaginary dangers they have created real ones.

When we consider, too, the position which our state governments occupy in the federal system, we find that the principle of irresponsibility is peculiarly subject to criticism. The central government exercises such tremendous power that it is a conceivable and fair argument that unless care is taken, although you have destroyed the old king, yet another may be unwittingly created in his place by the people. But it is pretty hard to get up any excitement over one forty-eighth part of a despot; it is pretty hard to be worried over a gubernatorial tyrant. And on the other hand, from the very fact that our states are part of a federal system, their powers are necessarily so limited that if any further division of official responsibility takes place they are likely to be brought to a condition where they cannot attract the service of good men.

What is the main tonic of an independent state which keeps up the character of the personnel in its legislative body? Is it not its relations with foreign states-the right and power to make peace and war, and to conduct diplomatic relations with those states? Those are the matters which make for the dignity of our Congress, and which attract to that body the services of the best men in the country. But in the case of our states those powers do not exist. They are taken away from them. The states are guaranteed not only against foreign difficulty, but even against civil disorder. If the state authorities are unable, through their posse comitatus, or their national guard, to suppress even home disorders, they can call on the President for regular troops. As one writer has expressed it, they are somewhat in the condition of a rich annuitant who has sold the control of his own property in return for an assured income. In the face of these limitations which necessarily exist in our state governments, the problem would seem to be particularly urgent to provide adequate and simplified powers, which will be worthy the attention and the work of the best men in those states, and not to further separate, divide and minimize those powers.

The difficulty with irresponsible government is that it breeds more irresponsible government, and that it has always done So. There seems to be a tendency to run in a vicious circle. The more complicated we make our government the more difficult we make it to work, and the more necessary we make the services of a professional who spends his life in the work. The minute a man makes a thing his life-work he tends to make his living out of that work; and as soon as a man is getting his living out of political work, corruption inevitably comes in. As soon as that stage is reached, the people are tempted to ask for more checks and more limitations in order to put an end to such corruption. And so we go around and around and around, each new step producing more results in the same circle. In recent years the irresponsibility of our legislation and the consequent corruption of some of our state legislatures have produced a demand that even the powers left in the legislature shall be limited by the compulsory referendum and that the people themselves shall attempt to do their own law-making directly.

I have never known the case to be more tersely or clearly summed up than by Professor Ford, of Princeton, in his book on The Rise and Growth of American Politics:

So long as our constitutional system provides that an administration chosen to carry out a party policy shall be debarred from initiating and directing that policy in legislation, just so long is the party machine a necessary intermediary between the people and their government, and just so long will party management constitute a trade which those who have a vocation for politics cannot neglect, and those who make a business of politics will make as profitable as possible. As Burke wisely said: "Whatever be the road to power, that is the road that will be trod."

The approaching convention has an opportunity to meet and break that vicious circle. I am glad that I was elected on a platform which declared for responsible government. It takes courage to meet the existing situation. It takes courage to face the people and try to persuade them that the sugarcoated remedy which they have been in the habit of taking will

only make the disease worse. It takes courage to follow the opposite road from the easy one of the demagogue who clamors for more direct government by the people, ignoring the fact that only through the concentration of responsibility can we insure effective democracy. I hope and believe that the delegates of the state of New York in its coming constitutional convention will have the courage and the leadership to take such a course.

(26)

THE ADAPTATION OF A CONSTITUTION TO THE

NEEDS OF A PEOPLE'

FRANK J. GOODNOW

President of Johns Hopkins University, legal adviser to the President of China

THE

HE end of the eighteenth century was marked by the formulation and almost universal acceptance by the educated classes of the European world of general political principles. These were regarded as of almost universal application at all times and under all conditions. Among them may be mentioned the sovereignty of the people, the separation or distribution of the powers of government, and the existence of natural rights which were inherent in man.

It was believed at that time that no good government could be established except on these principles. It was of course admitted that in some countries conditions were such that these principles could be applied with greater immediate advantage than was possible in the case of others. But it was on the whole considered to be true that in all countries the application of these principles should be made because of the educational effect upon the people, who would learn much even from the failures and mistakes which they might make.

Perhaps in no country of the western world was there at the end of the eighteenth century greater confidence held in the universal application of general political principles than in the United States. It is almost certain that there is no other country in which this general idea has been retained with so little modification.

The reasons for this attitude in the United States are not far to seek. The revolution which broke out in this country and the changes in the form of government made necessary by its successful conclusion forced upon the people of the United States the formulation of principles upon which the new polit

1 Address at the dinner meeting of the Academy of Political Science, November 19, 1914.