large estates, and a reform in the judicial system, it was too late. To prevent further bloodshed, he resigned, May 25, and early on the following day he left for Europe. A provisional government was set up, and Madero entered Mexico City in triumph on June 8. In the election held in October of the same year he was elected president by an overwhelming majority.

Even if the new executive had possessed the organizing ability and the will to achieve of Diaz, it would have been very difficult to put into effect the socialistic clauses of the San Luis manifesto. To expect such action from the visionary theorist who now held the reins of government was futile. It was not sufficient that Madero honestly desired to give Mexico a truly democratic government, since he lacked every attribute that would have rendered the accomplishment of his program possible. Before the inauguration, Zapata was stirring up trouble against the new administration, and Orozco quickly followed suit. The situation soon became so critical that the United States was forced to send a warning to the Madero government that American property must be protected, and to make the warning doubly sure a similar warning was sent to General Orozco.2 The situation of Americans in Mexico throughout the period when Madero held office was so critical that the United States was forced to keep extra troops on the border constantly, in anticipation of emergencies, and an American transport was sent to bring back Americans desiring to leave.

Madero's inability to keep in check the revolutionary movements was not so detrimental to his success as his failure to remain popular. He soon fell under the control of a set of politicians with members of his own family at their head. He was accused of lending more than half a million dollars to his brother Gustavo from the funds of the

1

1 Ibid., p. 445.

'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912, p. 787.

public treasury; of failing to comply with the promises made to the working classes; of filling all the important public offices with members of his own family; finally, of permitting the same exploitation of the nation's natural resources by foreign capitalists that had gone on under Diaz, save that now the chief operator was the Standard Oil Company rather than the Pearson Syndicate.1 In a long despatch dated August 28, 1912, Mr. Henry Lane Wilson, the American ambassador, thus summed up the situation, after noting the wide area given over to devastation and slaughter:

"In the midst of this appalling situation in the north and in the south, the federal government sits apathetic, ineffective, and either cynically indifferent or stupidly optimistic. This peculiar phase of the situation I believe to be largely due to the character of the president, who is one day a Diaz come again and the next day an apostle of peace, the apologist for important bandits and criminals and the enemy of monopolies, land-holders, and privileged characters and classes. To such an extent has this wavering and unsettled policy been carried that it has lost the president the confidence and support of all classes, and to-day he stands practically alone, sustained only by the sympathy of his numerous family, the administration office-holders, and the useful and established apprehension that the evils which exist are less than those which might be anticipated with his downfall.'' 2

A brief period of respite was obtained by the Madero government through the recapture, with little difficulty, of Vera Cruz, which Felix Diaz, nephew of the former president, had seized. But the day of settlement was merely postponed. On February 8, 1913, the younger Diaz started a revolt in Mexico City, and throughout the next ten daysthe decena trágica-the capital was the scene of continuous

1 For a critical account of this period see E. I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico (N. Y., 1914).

'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912, p. 830.

fighting. Civilians were in constant danger, and the situation finally appeared so hopeless that Ambassador Wilson called a conference of the foreign ministers, and it was unanimously decided that President Madero be asked to resign to avert further bloodshed. But the president was firm in his resolve to maintain his position, and replied that if necessary he would die in defense of his rights as legally elected president.1 On February 18, General Huerta, in command of the government forces, suddenly turned against the president and ordered his arrest. A truce was patched up, and on February 20 a provisional government was established, with General Huerta in control. The American ambassador urged immediate recognition of this government. But before the negotiations were completed the situation was altered by the murder of both President Madero and Vice-President Suarez while being conducted from the National Palace to the penitentiary. The official version of the affair as given out by the Huerta government was that two groups of armed men attempted to release the prisoners, and in the fight that ensued both the president and vice-president lost their lives.2 Other accounts, however, indicated that the two prisoners were placed against a wall and shot. Whatever the truth may be, a strong reaction immediately set in against the provisional government, particularly in the states of Sonora and Coahuila. Foreign recognition was also delayed, notably that of the United States and Great Britain, although Ambassador Wilson urged the Taft administration to grant recognition to prevent worse confusion. But President Taft, at the end of his term, was unwilling to bring possible embarrassment upon his successor by inaugurating a policy that the latter would not be able to carry out. Hence the matter was turned over intact to the Wilson administration.

3

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913, p. 711. 'Ibid., p. 732.

'Ibid., p. 741.

SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS

E. D. Trowbridge, Mexico To-day and To-morrow (N. Y., 1919). G. L. Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848 (2 vols., N. Y., 1913).

W. R. Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico (Balt., 1916).

J. H. Smith, The War with Mexico (N. Y., 1919).

U. B. Burke, A Life of Benito Juárez (Lond., 1894).

J. F. Ramirez, México durante su guerra con los Estados Unidos (Mexico, 1905).

Miguel Rebolledo, México y Estados Unidos (Mexico, 1917).

J. H. Cornyn, Díaz y México (2 vols., Mexico, 1910).

David Hannay, Díaz (N. Y., 1917).

José F. Godoy, Porfirio Diaz (N. Y., 1910).

J. H. Latané, The United States and Latin America (N. Y., 1920), Chap. V.

H. H. Bancroft, History of Mexico (N. Y., 1914).

C. R. Enock, Mexico, (N. Y., 1909).

A. H. Noll, From Empire to Republic (Chicago, 1903).

R. S. MacHugh, Modern Mexico (Lond., 1913).

Matiás Romero, Mexico and the United States (N. Y., 1898).

CHAPTER VI

OUR RECENT RELATIONS WITH MEXICO

HE advent of the Wilson administration found the situ

TH

ation virtually unchanged. In Sonora, opposition to the Huerta régime continued strong; while in Coahuila, Governor Venustiano Carranza declared his intention of inflicting summary vengeance upon the usurping government. His "Constitutionalist" movement was soon supported by other well known leaders, among whom were two destined to play very important parts, Francisco Villa and Alvaro Obregon. However, as General Huerta continued to strengthen his authority, the European governments, Spain and Great Britain taking the lead, extended recognition. In a long despatch to Washington, dated May 15, 1913, the American ambassador, Mr. Henry Lane Wilson, strongly urged that the United States also extend recognition to the established Mexican government. On June 9 he wrote that, "at the risk of being considered intrusive and insistent, I must again urge upon the President that on the highest grounds of policy—which in this case I understand to be the conserving and the extension of our material interests in Mexico, the restoration of peace, and the cultivation of sentiments of friendship and respect with a neighboring and friendly nation-we should, without further delay, follow the example of all governments accredited here but two, and accord official recognition to the present provisional government."'1

President Wilson preferred to follow a policy of "watchful waiting," but, in order to show his friendly intentions. 1Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913, p. 807.