once vast trans-Atlantic empire, the desire for independence was not wholly dormant even in Cuba. Between 1823 and 1830 a number of revolutionary schemes were hatched, though all proved abortive. In 1844 a threatened insurrection of slaves was stamped out in a savage fashion. We have already noted the failure of the Lopez expedition. Not until 1868 did the first serious revolt on the island break out.

The causes of the so-called Ten Years' War-the insurrection dragged along in a desultory fashion for about that length of time-are not hard to discover. In the first place, Spain regarded the island merely as a source of revenue. In the year 1868 the revenue from the island approximated $26,000,000, and virtually none of it was used for Cuba's benefit. The public offices in the island carried very good salaries, but all were in the hands of Spaniards. The corruption among officials was notorious, the "perquisites" in some cases reaching as high as 70 per cent. of the total receipts. In the second place, Spain virtually monopolized not only Cuba's exports but also its imports, and the duties were laid just as heavily upon necessities as upon luxuries. Flour was taxed so heavily that wheat bread almost ceased to be an article of food for the common people. Finally, representation in the Cortes, which at one time had been granted, only to be withdrawn later, was felt to be essential to any permanent improvement in the government of the island.

When Isabella II was driven from the throne of Spain by the revolution of 1868, the Cubans seized the opportunity to declare their independence and to organize to maintain it. Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, a wealthy planter and an ardent patriot, raised a body of some 15,000 men, and at the outset the patriots were generally successful. A constitution was promulgated April 10, 1869, and the legislature, which met in accordance with its provisions, elected Céspedes president. But without assistance the

patriots could not hope to withstand the well equipped troops that Spain continued to send against them; and finally, upon promises of a general amnesty, representation in the Spanish Cortes, and a few other reforms, peace was brought about by the treaty of El Zanjon, February 10, 1878.1

From the beginning, the United States took a keen interest in the war. On March 27 the captain-general of the island, Domingo Dolce, issued a proclamation declaring that any vessels carrying men, arms, or ammunition found in the waters near the island, whatever their destination, should be seized, and persons on board immediately executed. The United States protested immediately and emphatically. On April 4 the Count of Valmaseda, in command at Bayamo, issued a proclamation to the effect that every man above fifteen found away from his home without a reason would be shot and that unoccupied habitations and those not floating a white flag would be burned. Mr. Fish, Secretary of State under President Grant, wrote the Spanish plenipotentiary: "In the interest of Christian civilization and common humanity, I hope that this document is a forgery. If it be indeed genuine, the President instructs me in the most forcible manner to protest against such mode of warfare."' 4

President Grant, who from the beginning of his term of office showed a decided friendliness to the Cubans, authorized General Sickles, the American minister to Spain, to tender the good offices of the United States to bring to a close the civil war ravaging the island. The bases suggested were: the independence of Cuba; an indemnity to Spain; the abolition of slavery in the island; an armistice pending the negotiations for the settlement." Al

Text may be found in Sen. Doc. No. 79, 45th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 16. 'Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 7, 41st Cong., 2nd sess., p. 12.

• Ibid., p. 20.

Ibid., p. 21.

House Ex. Doc. No. 160, 41st Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 13-16.

Filibuster

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154 LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

though some of the leaders of the Spanish government were willing to accept, public opinion opposed and the proffer was withdrawn.

The affair, however, which most aroused the United States against Spain, bringing the two nations to the brink of war, was the seizure of the steamer Virginius and the execution of her captain and crew. The Virginius was a merchant-vessel sailing under the American flag and registered in New York as an American-owned vessel. However, her cargoes consisted principally of contraband of war destined for Cuba; and for several years she had been successful in landing them, despite the vigilance of the Spanish cruisers. On October 23, 1873, she cleared from Kingston, Jamaica, for Puerto Limón, Costa Rica, though her actual intention was to land men and arms in Cuba. On October 31 she was captured on the high seas by a Spanish cruiser and taken into Santiago de Cuba. The Spanish commandant, General Burriel, summoned a courtmartial, and within a week's time fifty-three of the passengers and crew were summarily condemned and shot, despite strong protests upon the part of the American and British consuls. Such a performance was not merely "a dreadful, a savage act," but it was directly contrary to international law, because the vessel was a neutral lawfully provided with papers; even if she were engaged in blockade-running or in carrying contraband, the maximum penalty should have been confiscation of the ship and cargo.

General Sickles, the American minister at Madrid, was instructed to demand the restoration of the Virginius with the survivors, a salute to the flag of the United States, and punishment of the guilty officials. At first Spain seemed inclined to support the United States in its stand, but later Castilian pride came to the front, and a curt and most unsatisfactory reply was returned. Spain could not consent to be thus addressed by the representatives of a foreign nation, and if reparations were to be made

CUBA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 155

it would be only after a thorough investigation had been carried out by her representatives.1 Recriminations became mutual, and it was only after General Sickles had asked for his passports that Spain agreed to consider the American demands. Owing either to the uncompromising attitude of General Sickles, or to the Spanish government's fear of a popular uprising, the negotiations were transferred to Washington. A protocol was finally reached, whereby Spain agreed to restore the Virginius, together with the surviving passengers and crew, and to salute the flag of the United States, unless she could prove before December 25, 1873, that the Virginius was not entitled to carry the American flag. The Madrid government actually succeeded in furnishing proof that the vessel was both owned and controlled by Cubans; therefore the salute was waived. The vessel and survivors were turned over to the United States. But on its way north, under convoy, the ship foundered off Cape Hatteras. Spain also admitted the illegality of the capture and the summary execution of the crew, and finally paid an indemnity of $80,000 to the families of those executed. But the Spanish commandant guilty of the execution not only escaped punishment, but was later promoted to a higher grade.2

Meanwhile the Cuban insurrection dragged along, and the United States continued to look for means of putting an end to the devastating struggle. The whole situation, as far as the United States was concerned, was summed up in a long, carefully worded despatch from Secretary Fish to Caleb Cushing, the new American representative at Madrid, on November 5, 1875. In this state paper Mr. Fish enumerated the cases of arbitrary seizure, confiscation of American property, and arrest and execution of

The complete diplomatic correspondence regarding this incident may be found in the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1874, pp. 922-1117; 1875, Part II, pp. 1144-1256.

For the trial of General Burriel see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1876, pp. 486-535.

American citizens without trial, and protested vigorously against the continuance of a struggle on the very borders of the United States, disturbing to its tranquillity and commerce and conducted in a most barbarous fashion. "It will be apparent that such a state of things can not continue. . . . In the opinion of the President, the time has arrived when the interests of this country, the preservation of its commerce, and the instincts of humanity alike demand that some speedy and satisfactory ending be made of the strife that is devastating Cuba. . . . The President hopes that Spain may spontaneously adopt measures looking to a reconciliation and to the speedy restoration of peace and the organization of a stable and satisfactory system of government in the island of Cuba. In the absence of any prospect of a termination of war or of any change in the manner in which it has been conducted on either side, he feels that the time is at hand when it may be the duty of other governments to intervene, solely with a view of bringing to an end a disastrous conflict, and of restoring peace in the island of Cuba.1

A copy of this note was sent to the American representatives in Europe, and when its content became known it provoked considerable discussion, which was increased by President Grant's message of December 7, 1875. Great Britain, whose coöperation was particularly desired, decided, in the words of Lord Derby, that "if nothing were contemplated beyond an amicable interposition having peace for its object, the time was ill chosen and the move premature." 2 The other powers were no more willing to intervene than Great Britain, particularly at a time when the young Alfonso was struggling manfully against the revolution of Don Carlos. Owing to the superlative ability of Mr. Cushing and the high esteem in which he was held,

1

1 Report of Sen. Com. on For. Relations Relative to Affairs in Cuba, No. 885, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 44-52.

'Ibid., p. 162.