Mr. Fish's communication was received by Spain in the friendly spirit in which it was sent, and in his reply Señor Calderon, the Spanish Foreign Minister, emphasized the recent satisfactory progress in putting down the revolution, and promised the abolition of slavery and the introduction of administrative reforms leading to representation of the inhabitants in the Spanish Cortes. In conclusion, he asked for a frank statement concerning the precise things which the United States would wish Spain to do.1 After emphatically disclaiming any intention on the part of the government of the United States to annex Cuba, Mr. Fish summed up the President's desires under four heads: first, mutual and reciprocal observance of the treaty obligations, with a friendly interpretation of the doubtful provisions; second, the establishment of peace, order, and a liberal government in Cuba; third, gradual but effectual emancipation of the slaves; fourth, improvement of commercial facilities and the removal of the obstructions now existing in the way of trade and commerce.2 Spain's acceptance of these proposals eliminated, for the time being, any further discussion of intervention. However, the Madrid government urged that before there could be any hope of improvement the revolution must be put down, and a new general and additional troops were forthwith despatched to the island. In October, 1877, a number of the Cuban leaders surrendered, and early in February, 1878, the Ten Years' War came to an end. The terms of peace gave promise of a real improvement in the situation of the Cubans. Yet the habits of centuries can not be broken up by the good intentions of a day. The Spanish system of exploitation had become part and parcel of the island's administration, and Spanish officials were still employed to look out for Spanish interests. But two results of the revolution were manifest to the world: the germ of independence had taken firm root in the island of Cuba, and the United States could not remain an impartial witness to any attempts to prevent its growth. SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS J. M. Callahan, Cuba and International Relations (Balt., 1899). F. E. Chadwick, The Relations of the U. S. and Spain, Diplomacy (N. J. H. Latané, The United States and Latin America (N. Y., 1920), C. H. Forbes Lindsay, Cuba and her People of To-day (Boston, 1911). R. Cabrera, Cuba and the Cubans (Phil., 1896). W. F. Johnson, The History of Cuba (5 vols., N. Y., 1920). I. E. Canini, Four Centuries of Spanish Rule in Cuba (Chicago, 1898). R. T. Hill, Cuba and Porto Rico (N. Y., 1899). Z. Zaragoza, Las insurreciones en Cuba (2 vols., Madrid, 1872). G. W. Crichfield, American Supremacy (2 vols, N. Y., 1908), Vol. I, Chap. Chas. Morris, Our Island Empire (Phil., 1899), Sect. I. Stephen Bonsal, The American Mediterranean (N. Y., 1912), Chap. IL CHAPTER VIII THE INDEPENDENCE OF CUBA Sa result of the Ten Years' War, there was some improvement in the attitude of Spain towards Cuba, but little change in the actual conditions. The island was granted representation in the Spanish Cortes, but, owing to the limited suffrage, the majority of the delegates represented the Peninsulares, or Spanish element. Even when, in 1892, the tax qualification for the suffrage was reduced from twenty-five dollars to five dollars, the Spanish authorities who controlled the elections saw to it that the results were virtually the same. Seventeen years of comparative peace followed; yet it was the apathy of exhaustion rather than the tranquillity of satisfied hopes. In fact, the promises held out by the Spanish government were never realized. The sole noteworthy reform was the gradual abolition of slavery. In summing up the situation, Estrada Palma declared that the parliamentary representation was illusory, all officials of the island were Spaniards, taxes were levied upon everything conceivable, and about 95 per cent. of the amount collected was devoted to the maintenance of the army and navy in Cuba, to the interest of the public debt, and to the salaries of the Spanish officeholders. The Cubans had no security of person or property; nor was there freedom of speech, press, or religion.1 These were the underlying causes of the outbreak of the revolution in 1895. The passage of the Abarzuza law in February, 1895, by the Spanish Cortes, creating a farcical council of administration, seemed to bring matters to a 'Sen. Rep. No. 885, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 1 ff. head. The economic crisis engendered by the termination of reciprocity relations with the United States in 1894, thus closing Cuba's principal market for sugar, undoubtedly aided materially in strengthening the discontent. The revolutionists were under the general command of Maximo Gomez, and they were financially supported by the juntas organized in the United States. The revolution spread rapidly, and from the outset the insurgents ruthlessly destroyed all property and plantations that might be useful to the enemy. Spain spared no effort to check the revolution, and when Governor-General Campos failed to put down the insurgents, General Weyler was placed in command. The struggle on the Cubans' part soon degenerated into guerrilla warfare. They gave notice that they would destroy all the resources of the island rather than surrender. General Weyler retaliated by forcing all the inhabitants of certain provinces to concentrate in the towns held by the Spanish troops or be considered rebels.2 Great numbers of non-combatants were thus brought together, and, as no adequate provision for feeding and housing them had been made, the brutal nature of the decree was soon apparent. The innocent women and children were forced to starve in the towns, while the able-bodied men largely escaped and joined revolutionary bands. On June 12, 1895, President Cleveland issued a proclamation recognizing that a state of insurgency existed in Cuba, and insisting upon the maintenance of American neutrality. However, as the horrors of the struggle increased and the American press took up the campaign in Cuba's behalf, Congress also was drawn into the affair, and early in 1896 a resolution passed both houses urging that the President recognize Cuban belligerency. This, Cleveland refused to do. But public opinion steadily grew more 1 Hannis Taylor, "A Review of the Cuban Question," North Amer. Rev., Vol. CLXV, pp. 610-635 (Nov. 1897). Text of decree in Sen. Rep., op. cit.. p. 549. •Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, p. 1195. hostile towards Spain; and the destruction of American property on the island, together with the great falling off of American trade, added fuel to the flames. Although the President refused to recognize Cuban belligerency, he authorized Secretary Olney to give the Spanish ambassador some words of admonition. In this way, Spain was given to understand that the United States could not contemplate with complacency another ten years of Cuban insurrection; and the good offices of the United States were tendered, with all assurance that the offer was prompted only by the friendliest feeling towards Spain. "The United States," it was specifically asserted, "has no designs upon Cuba and no design against the sovereignty of Spain." 1 The Spanish reply was a courteous refusal of the offer, and the United States was forced to let the matter drop temporarily, although, in his message to Congress in December of the same year, Cleveland declared that future American action would be determined when Spain's inability to deal successfully with the insurrection had become manifest, and that, although American conduct would be guarded by right and not by might, a situation might be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain would be superseded by higher obligations.2 Hardly had the McKinley administration assumed office before it was compelled to take action; for the situation was growing steadily worse. In May, 1897, the President asked Congress to appropriate $50,000 for the relief of destitute Americans in Cuba, and in December he issued a public appeal for funds to aid in combating the Cuban famine. A slight gleam of hope for better conditions appeared when the new Sagasta ministry recalled General Weyler and promised Cuba a new constitution, with a local parliament and a fair share of autonomy. In his annual 3 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897, p. 540. 1 Ibid., 1896, p. xxix. |