the services to the Haitian government of the American officials appointed under the treaty of 1915. There can be no abrogation of the treaty, and at this time no diminution of the small force of marines."1 In these circumstances, the United States should formulate a definite policy in regard to these unwilling and troublesome wards and carry it out in a firm but conciliatory fashion. Military government, although perhaps the most efficient, will not do. The American people have a firmly intrenched belief in the desirability of civil government except in times of real emergency, and they feel that their possessions and protectorates should have the benefit of it. Furthermore, the problem of the United States is not to crush, but to coöperate. Left to themselves, both Haiti and Santo Domingo must either be governed despotically or follow the revolutionary road to bankruptcy. Former experiences have also shown that the first possibility does not necessarily obviate the second. Between the Scylla of foreign intervention and the Charybdis of hostility on the part of the natives, the path of the United States is a difficult one. But the situation must be faced. If some policy of regulation is essential, the best one should be sought; and, that settled, men should be appointed to the positions of responsibility who are equal to the task. A glance at the British methods in the neighboring islands, and at the type of men employed, would not be without value. Senator McCormick's suggestion that a high commissioner be appointed by the President, in whom should be vested the usual diplomatic powers of an envoy, and to whom both the American officials under the treaties and the officers of the marines should look for direction and guidance, is a proper step towards the centralization of responsibility. If such an official could win the confidence 1 New York Times, Dec. 25, 1921. For Haitian opinion on the investigation see the address of Prof. Pierre Hudicourt in Washington, Feb. 2, 1922, Cong. Record, Vol. LXII, p. 7857 (May 19, 1922). The detailed findings and recommendations are found in Sen. Rep. No. 794, 67th Cong., 2nd sess. of the native authorities to such an extent that they would coöperate with him effectively, a result might be achieved which would be beneficial in the highest degree to both parties. But, whatever the solution of the problem, the present situation clearly imposes a moral duty on the United States to face the facts and realize the responsibilities which they impose. SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS J. N. Léger, Haiti: Her History and Her Detractors (N. Y., 1907). G. H. Blakeslee [ed.], Mexico and the Caribbean (N. Y., 1920), pp. 184-276. C. Lloyd Jones, Caribbean Interests of the U. S. (N. Y., 1916), Chaps. Stephen Bonsal, The American Mediterranean (N. Y., 1912), pp. 47-138. P. M. Brown, "Armed Occupation of Santo Domingo," Amer. Jour. of Int. Carl Kelsey, "American Intervention in Haiti and Dominican Republic," Annals of Amer. Acad., Vol. C, No. 189 (March, 1922). R. G. Adams, "Santo Domingo," South Atlantic Quar., Vol. XX, p. 10 (Jan., 1921). Hearings on Haiti and Santo Domingo (Wash., 1922). CHAPTER XII INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA OUTH of Mexico, stretching some six hundred miles SOU in a southeasterly direction to the Isthmus of Panama, lie the five republics of Central America-Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. The combined area of these states is about 175,000 square miles, or virtually that of Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Their aggregate population is about five and one half millions.1 The climate varies from that of the humid and suffocating coastal plains on the Atlantic side to that of the comparatively cool regions of the plateaus and mountain valleys, and again to that of the hot, dry, but healthful coast of the Pacific. The population is predominantly Indian, although it varies considerably in the different states. Guatemala, for example, is almost completely Indian, while in Costa Rica the white population predominates. In spite of the fact that the Central American states are for the most part possessed of extremely fertile soil, have considerable mineral resources, and, with the exception of Salvador, have outlets on both oceans, they must still be regarded as among the more backward regions of the western hemisphere. Spain's policy of selfish exploitation kept them in this condition while they were under her control; since they achieved independence, mutual jealousies and revolutions have produced a similar result. Before taking up the relations of the United States with Central America, it might be well to point out the more For specific data on the individual states, see Statistical Abstract of the United States (1920), p. 838. |