The century came to an end with one more attempt on the part of the Central American states to form a federation. Nicaragua, Honduras, and Salvador signed the treaty of Amapala, June 20, 1895, by which they were to form a single political organization for the exercise of their external sovereignty; and the agreement was ratified in September of the following year. The federal powers were to be exercised by a diet consisting of one member and one substitute elected by each congress for a term of three years. Costa Rica and Guatemala were to be invited to join.1 President Cleveland extended recognition to this Greater Republic of Central America, discerning in the articles of association "a step towards a closer union of Central American States in the interest of their common defense and general welfare," and he welcomed it as "the precursor of other steps to be taken in the same direction, and which it is hoped may eventually result in the consolidation of all the states of Central America as one nation for all the purposes of their foreign relations and inter Costa Rica and Guatemala did not join, but in 1898 the other three states adopted a permanent constitution establishing a federal republic and made plans for the election of a president. Before the successful culmination of these plans, however, a revolution in Salvador detached this state from the group, and the other two thereupon resumed their independence of action.3 The close of the century found the five independent republics at peace with the world and with each other, but apparently as far as ever from the union that had so long been the goal of their endeavors. 3 For full text see For. Rel. of the U. S., 1896, p. 390. Ibid., p. 370. For. Rel. of the U. S., 1898, pp. 173-178; also J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. X, p. 178, and W. F. Slade, "Federation of Central America," Journal of Race Development, Vol. VIII, pp. 210-218 (Oct., 1917). SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS D. G. Munro, The Five Republics of Central America (N. Y., 1918). C. W. Domville-Fife, Guatemala and the States of Central America (N. Fernandez Guardia [H. W. Van Dyke, trans.], Discovery and Conquest of Costa Rica (N. Y., 1913). P. F. Martin, Salvador of the Twentieth Century (London, 1911). L. M. Keasby, The Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe Doctrine (N. Y., 1896). W. O. Scroggs, Filibusters and Financiers (N. Y., 1916). William Walker, The War in Nicaragua (N. Y., 1860). G. H. Blakeslee [ed.], Latin America (N. Y., 1914), pp. 245-262. W. H. Koebel, Central America (London, 1917). W. F. Slade, "The Federation of Central America," Jour of Race Devel., Vol. VIII, p. 79 (July, 1917). CHAPTER XIII RECENT RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL AMERICA HE events outlined in the preceding chapter indicate a fairly continuous policy of friendly coöperation on the part of the United States with the Central American republics, particularly in their efforts to obtain a successful federal system of government. American citizens had been guilty of various audacious attempts to obtain special privileges and autocratic powers in these republics, but the American government never failed to frown upon them, even when a different policy might have redounded to the country's advantage. The war with Spain, however, was destined to place the United States in a new position with regard to the Caribbean region, and a greater interest in Central America and its problems was to be expected. The first intervention of the United States in the affairs of the Central American republics, except in the collection of a few private claims, occurred in 1906. In July of that year a war broke out between Guatemala and Salvador, and Honduras, as usual, was drawn in, this time on the side of Salvador. The American minister used every effort to avert it; when he failed, President Roosevelt, after securing the coöperation of President Diaz of Mexico, stepped in. He sent identical notes to Presidents Escalon of Salvador and Cabrera of Guatemala urging the immediate cessation of hostilities, and offering the deck of the American war-ship Marblehead as a neutral place where terms of an agreement might be drawn up.1 Both sides accepted, and on board the Marblehead, on July 20, 1906, a conven 1 For. Rel. of the U. S., 1906, Part I, p. 837. tion of peace was signed which provided that within two months a general treaty of peace, amity, and navigation should be arranged for by a meeting, in Costa Rica, of the representatives of the three republics. The convention also provided that new differences should be submitted to arbitration, with the presidents of the United States and Mexico serving as arbitrators.1 In appreciation of this just and peaceful settlement of the controversy, the Third PanAmerican Conference, which was then in session at Rio de Janeiro, passed a resolution of gratification over the successful mediation by the two presidents.2 The meeting in Costa Rica was participated in by representatives of all the Central American republics except Nicaragua. The results were a general treaty of peace and amity, arbitration, extradition, commerce, etc., between the four republics; also two conventions, the first establishing an International Central American Bureau in the city of Guatemala, and the second establishing a Central American Pedagogical Institute in San José, Costa Rica. Copies of these were sent to the United States by Costa Rica "as an act of courtesy to the government of the United States for an equal interest in the welfare of the Central American states."' 3 Although Nicaragua had not sent representatives to the conference, copies of the treaty and conventions were sent to her, inviting her adherence. Nicaragua replied that she did not care to adhere, inasmuch as the treaty seemed to ratify the treaty of Marblehead, whose terms she was not willing to accept. The inference was that President Zelaya of Nicaragua, known to be hostile to the United States, was unwilling to accept the President of the United States as an arbitrator in case a dispute should arise to which Nicaragua was a party. Hardly had Nicaragua thus announced her attitude be fore a situation arose which demanded arbitration. Honduras claimed that certain revolutionists and disturbers of the peace had fled across the border into Nicaragua, and that in order to suppress them its troops had been forced to cross the line. Nicaragua immediately got its forces in readiness and demanded indemnity for the infringement of its territorial rights. An attempt to settle this dispute by arbitration having failed, President Roosevelt wrote, on February 11, 1907, to the presidents of both states, expressing the strong hope that some means might be found to settle the dispute without resorting to war.1 Receiving favorable responses from both, President Roosevelt thereupon offered his assistance. President Diaz acted in a similar fashion, but Nicaragua insisted upon reparations as a basis of arbitration, and, when Honduras refused, began operations. Hostilities did not last long, but Salvador was drawn in against Nicaragua, and to avoid complications the United States once more offered its good offices. With the United States minister present during discussions, a treaty of peace was signed at Amapala, April 23, 1907, between Nicaragua and Salvador. The third article of this treaty provided that "any difference that may arise in the future between El Salvador and Nicaragua that might alter their good relations shall be adjusted by means of the obligatory arbitration of the presidents of the United States and of Mexico, conjointly." 2 When trouble again threatened, in August of the same year, President Roosevelt, coöperating with President Diaz of Mexico, sent identic notes to each of the five Central American republics,-tendering the good offices of the United States to bring about a peace conference of the representatives of the several states. This overture received a very favorable response, and on September 17, 1907, the 3 1 For. Rel. of the U. S., 1907, Part II, p. 616. 'Ibid., p. 633. 'Ibid., p. 638. |