He also made it clear that the United States would be safer in disclaiming all intention of interfering with European concerns, and in issuing a declaration made solely by the United States for an American cause.1 His views finally prevailed, and it was at length agreed that inasmuch as the South American states were free and independent, they, and not Great Britain and the United States, had the right to dispose of their condition.

President Monroe issued his famous message on December 2, 1823, and although considerable space was given to the expression of the policy of the United States in regard to the attitude and intentions of Europe, the gist of the doctrine may be summed up in two sentences. The first concerned colonization, and was in answer to the Russian ukase of 1821. It declared that "the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." The second answered the threat of the Holy Alliance, and asserted that "the political system of the allied powers is essentially different . . . from that of America.... We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we shall consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." 2 As was to have been expected, a message that so simply and so completely phrased a true American policy based upon the firm foundation of self-protection, was received enthusiastically in both North and South America. Speaking in behalf of the Panama Mission, April 14, 1826, in the House of Representatives, Daniel Webster declared that "one general glow of exultation, one universal feeling of

'J. Q. Adams, Memoirs (Phil., 1874-77), Vol. VI, pp. 177 ff.

For full text see J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. II, p. 209.

the gratified love of liberty,. pervaded all bosoms.”1 In the words of Señor de Manos Albas, "It [the pronouncement] rang through the world like a peal of thunder; it paralyzed the Holy Alliance, and defined, once and for all time, as far as Europe is concerned, the international status of the newly constituted American republics." 2 Even though its enunciation was due primarily to the realization upon the part of the United States that the preservation of the independence and democratic systems in the South American countries was closely bound up with the protection of her own independence, nevertheless the nations of South America realized clearly that such a policy, maintained by their more firmly established neighbor on the north, was precisely the bulwark needed until they could strengthen themselves sufficiently to stand entirely alone. It is not surprising that Colombia proposed that this doctrine be ratified at the projected Congress of Panama as one of the bases of Pan-Americanism; for such a policy well represented "the gospel of the new continent." 3

If the American doctrine as laid down by President Monroe could have been forever confined to the two fundamental concepts just outlined, perhaps to-day this policy would be the unanimously accepted basis of a true Pan-American policy. But the doctrine as laid down by Monroe was merely an attempt to meet the situation that confronted him by a policy whose aim was safety for the United States. It contradicted two principles of international law generally accepted at the time: the right of intervention, and the right of taking possession of unoccupied territory. The statesmen of Europe were not slow in expressing their dis

The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster, J. W. McIntyre [ed.], (Boston, 1903), Vol. V, p. 203.

'Joseph Wheless, "Monroe Doctrine and Latin America," in Annals of Amer. Acad., Vol. LIV, p. 66 (July, 1914).

For an excellent account of contemporary opinion of the doctrine in Hispanic America see J. B. Lockey, Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings (N. Y., 1920), Chap. VI; see also W. S. Robertson, "South America and the Monroe Doctrine, "Polit. Sci. Quar., Vol. XXX, p. 82 (Mar., 1915).

dain and contempt for these new and presumptuous principles. Châteaubriand declared that such a doctrine "ought to be resisted by all the powers possessing either territorial or commercial interest in that hemisphere"; while Canning, who boasted publicly that he had called into existence the New World to redress the balance of the Old, in his private correspondence expressed himself in an entirely different vein.1 Even Congress was unwilling to commit itself unreservedly to the new principles, especially as Henry Clay, who introduced a joint resolution doing so, interpreted the doctrine to mean that the United States was ready to insure the independence of the South American republics.2 Therefore, although the doctrine was to remain the basis of our foreign policy henceforth, it was not recognized as a principle of international law.

Nor, on the other hand, was its interpretation to be rigidly circumscribed by the original limits laid down by Monroe. Rather, it was to be shaped in accordance with the conditions that successive presidents were called upon to confront. As a result, the original doctrine has been expanded as circumstances demanded, and this expansion has been the result of two forces, "American interest and American power." A brief consideration of the important occasions when the doctrine has been invoked will give evidence of its changing character.

In 1827 the Argentine Republic, which was then at war with the Empire of Brazil, sent an inquiry to Henry Clay, asking that he outline the scope of the declarations made by President Monroe. Clay replied that the war between the two states could in no way be considered analogous to the conditions that provoked President Monroe's message, since it was a war "strictly American in its origin and its objects. "A few years later, in 1833, when Great Brit

1 W. S. Robertson, "The Monroe Doctrine Abroad, 1823-1824," in Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., Vol. VI, p. 546 (Nov., 1912).

For text of resolution see J. B. Moore, Digest of Int. Law, Vol. VI, p. 404. 'Ibid., p. 434.

ain resumed occupation of the Falkland Islands, Buenos Aires protested that the action of Great Britain was a clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Inasmuch as the United States had already been forced to take action against the treatment accorded American fishermen by the Argentinians during their brief possession of the islands, and as the British could lay title to a claim antedating the seizure by Buenos Aires, the United States acknowledged the British sovereignty.1

The first enlargement of the doctrine so as to preclude the transfer of American territory from one foreign country to another seems to have been made in connection with Cuba. In 1825 Mr. Clay, in a letter to the American minister to France, declared that the United States could not consent to the occupation of Cuba or Porto Rico "by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever," and the same sentiments were repeated by Mr. Van Buren in 1829 and 1830 in notes to the American minister to Spain. Mr. Forsythe, in 1840, declared that the United States would prevent at all hazards any voluntary transfer on the part of Spain of her title to Cuba, whether it be temporary or permanent, just as she would assist Spain with both military and naval resources in preserving it or recovering it. This enlargement of the doctrine was just as advantageous to the free republics of Latin America as to the United States, for any transfer of colonies would most likely be from a weak power, such as Spain, to one of the stronger and more dreaded European states, and therefore an event to be feared equally by the United States and Latin America.

The earliest enlargement of the doctrine that seemed to be aimed at the Latin-American nations as well as at Europe J. B. Moore, Digest of Int. Law, Vol. VI, p. 435. See also infra, Chap. XIV.

'Ibid., p. 447.

Ibid., pp. 448-449.

Ibid., p. 450. For a more detailed discussion of the Cuban question see infra, pp. 141-151.

came with the first message of President Polk. Up to 1845, the United States, when insisting upon a maintenance of the status quo in the western hemisphere, had, it is true, alluded only to Europe. But there was no reason to believe that the inhibition was not equally applicable to the United States herself. Directly after the annexation of Texas, however, Polk declared that "the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny"; and that "should any portion of them, constituting an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to determine without any foreign interposition";1 and the declaration was followed by the annexation of New Mexico and California. Well might the Latin-American states now begin to wonder whether the Monroe Doctrine was an unmixed blessing. In his message of April 29, 1848, President Polk went even farther in his free interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine by urging the annexation of Yucatan, which at that time was so upset by an Indian insurrection that the authorities offered to transfer the "dominion and sovereignty of the peninsula" in return for immediate aid. Inasmuch as similar proposals had been made to Great Britain and Spain, President Polk seized the occasion to assert that the United States could not consent to a transfer of this colony to any European power.2 Under the circumstances, Polk's assertion could mean nothing else than that the United States interpreted the Monroe Doctrine to prevent a Latin-American state from accepting the dominion of a European nation, even if the Latin-American state desired such a transfer of sovereignty. However, Yucatan soon withdrew its offer, so that Polk was not forced to put his interpretation to the test.

Following Polk's administration, the doctrine to a certain

J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. IV, p. 398. 1 Ibid., p. 582.