extent disappeared from view. Mr. Clayton, Secretary of State through President Taylor's short presidency, struggled against admitting British rights in Central America, but he was finally forced by circumstances to give Great Britain joint rights in any inter-oceanic canal that might be constructed on the isthmus. It may be conceded that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty did not constitute an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine. But a situation was soon to arise in Mexico which was to provoke a serious violation of the doctrine on the very borders of the United States.

After the disastrous war with the United States, the rival factions struggling for power in Mexico brought the unfortunate country into bankruptcy and anarchy, and the attention of the United States was finally called to the fact that Spain, Great Britain, and France were about to employ strong measures to protect the interests of their citizens on Mexican soil. In a despatch to our minister to Mexico, dated September 20, 1860, Secretary Cass thus indicated the general position of the United States: "While we do not deny the right of any other power to carry on hostile operations against Mexico, for the redress of its grievances, we firmly object to its holding possession of any part of that country, or endeavoring by force to control its political destiny. This opposition to foreign interference is known to France, England, and Spain, as well as the determination of the United States to resist any such attempt by all means in its power. President Buchanan, who had already recognized the Juarez government in Mexico in 1859, intimated in his annual message of 1860 that his position was the same, to the point "of resisting, even by force should this become necessary, any attempt by these governments to deprive our neighboring

2

For a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine in its relation to the Panama Canal see Chap. III; also Sen. Doc. No. 194, 47th Cong., 1st sess. 'J. B. Moore, Digest of Int. Law, Vol. VI, p. 481.

republic of portions of her territory-a duty from which we could not shirk without abandoning the traditional and established policy of the American people."1

When the European powers decided upon armed intervention in Mexico, the United States was, unfortunately for the maintenance of this traditional policy, at the very brink of the war for the Union. A convention was signed October 31, 1861, by Great Britain, France, and Spain, outlining their plan of action. The United States was invited to accede to it, but it was made very clear that operations would be begun regardless of our adherence. Secretary Seward realized the difficulty of the situation, and, while refusing to depart from our traditional policy by entering into a European alliance, he was unable to protest very vigorously against the joint intervention.2 The British and Spanish, however, whether because they were desirous of respecting our wishes after their claims had been met, or whether because they were dissatisfied with the attitude of the French, withdrew their forces early in 1862. The French, while disclaiming any ulterior motives, pushed forward their forces, seized the city of Mexico, took control of the government, and had the assembly change the government to a monarchy and offer the crown to Archduke Maximilian of Austria. Even when Maximilian had been persuaded to accept, Mr. Seward was unable to do more than declare that the permanent establishment of a foreign and monarchical government in Mexico would be found neither easy nor desirable. The House of Representatives was not so diplomatic, and voiced a vigorous protest by a resolution unanimously carried April 4, 1864. But Mr. Seward informed the French ambassador that the President had not departed in any way from his previous policy.*

1 J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. V, p. 646. For text of the note and Secretary Seward's reply see House Ex. Doc. No. 100, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 185-187.

'J. B. Moore, Digest of Int. Law, Vol. VI, p. 495.

'Ibid., pp. 496-497.

However, with the close of the Civil War the tone of the Secretary's protests changed, and his note of December 16, 1865, boldly asserted that the sincere friendship between the two nations would be brought into imminent jeopardy unless France desisted from "the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico to overthrow the domestic republican government existing there." Louis Napoleon was now more interested in the European situation arising out of the growing dispute between Austria and Prussia than in his Mexican enterprise, and in the spring of 1866 he decided to withdraw his troops. With the withdrawal of the French the power of Maximilian began to crumble, and, in less than a year after the departure of the first detachment of French troops, the unfortunate prince paid for his ill-fated Mexican expedition with his life.

The principles of the Monroe Doctrine were vindicated once more in the most serious attempt that had yet been made to impose European domination upon the independent republics of the western hemisphere, although nowhere in the diplomatic correspondence is the doctrine mentioned by name. From the standpoint of Latin America, no objection could possibly be raised to the Seward doctrine in regard to Mexico. The United States, torn by the Civil War, could not protest effectively against European intervention, but the United States, reunited, could and did make her protest effective.

Secretary Seward's well considered policy had to some extent lulled the latent fear in the Latin-American states that the United States was preserving their independence for its own advantage, but the ill considered expressions of President Johnson again aroused their resentment. In his fourth annual message, dated December 9, 1868, Johnson delivered himself of these astonishing sentiments: "Comprehensive national policy would seem to sanction the acquisition and incorporation into our Federal Union of the 1 J. B. Moore, Digest of Int. Law, Vol. VI, p. 501.

several adjacent continental and insular communities as speedily as it can be done peacefully, lawfully, and without violation of national justice, faith, or honor. . . . The conviction is rapidly gaining ground in the American mind that, with the increased facilities for intercommunication between all portions of the earth, the principles of free government as embraced in our Constitution would prove of sufficient strength and breadth to comprehend within their sphere and influence the civilized nations of the world." 1 This was either a most extraordinary extension of the Monroe Doctrine, or else the promulgation of a new and allembracing Pan-American doctrine, with the United States as the chief beneficiary. Fortunately for future Pan-American relations, President Johnson was at the close of his term, and, in view of the fact that he had been estranged from Congress throughout the greater part of it, his statements did not receive the attention which they would otherwise have demanded.

President Grant and his Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, returned to the common interpretation of the doctrine, as aiming to protect the feeble powers of America against European intervention, but in such a way as to secure and maintain their confidence. Secretary Fish was careful to make it clear to the neighboring states that the United States did not covet their territories and was ready to aid them to the fullest extent in any steps which they might take to protect themselves against anarchy. But, while emphasizing the unselfish attitude of the United States in offering its protection against Europe, he was careful to safeguard the interests of his country in regard to the proposed isthmian canal. It was his expressed opinion that the canal was an American enterprise, to be undertaken under American auspices.2 Secretary Evarts took the same stand, declaring that the paramount interest of the

J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VI, p. 688. For. Rel. of the U. S., 1870, pp. 254 ff.; see also Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 112, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 48.

United States in the project of interoceanic communication seemed indisputable.1 When the French company under the direction of de Lesseps indicated its intention to start construction of a canal, President Hayes pointed out that "the policy of this country is a canal under American control; it will be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coast-line of the United States." 2

Secretary Blaine, in Garfield's administration, opposed the idea of a joint guaranty and control of an interoceanic canal by the European powers as a direct infringement of the Monroe Doctrine, but when communicating his views to Great Britain he put himself in a very weak position by omitting to mention the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850.3 When the British Foreign Minister called his attention to this lapsus memoriæ, Mr. Blaine attempted to prove that the situation had so changed that the treaty was no longer of value. Needless to say, Great Britain disagreed with this doctrine, and had little difficulty in supporting her position. Unsuccessful here, Blaine turned his attention to strengthening the bonds of friendship between the republics of the two Americas by a Pan-American conference, though before he could bring his plans to fruition he was no longer Secretary of State.

Up to this point the Monroe Doctrine had been interpreted, with very few exceptions, as protective of American institutions and territory against Europe. Now a new and disturbing extension of the doctrine was at hand. It was preceded by a period of strained relations between the United States and Chile. The protection accorded President Balmaceda and refugees of his party by the United States minister, and the unfortunate Baltimore incident, provoked feelings of bitterness on both sides. President

1 Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 112, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 18.

'J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VII, p. 585. 'For. Rel. of the U. S., 1881, p. 537.

'Ibid., p. 554.