construction of any ship-canal across the isthmus.1 Urged on by similar sentiments, Mr. Evarts attempted to make a treaty with Colombia whereby any concession for an interoceanic canal hitherto made, or to be made in the future, by Colombia should be subject to the rights of the United States, as guarantor of the neutrality of the isthmus and of the sovereignty of Colombia, over isthmian territory.2 The Colombian government, however, was unwilling to concede any such rights to the United States; so that our government was forced to rest content with such powers as the treaty of 1846 guaranteed. At the same time, renewed interest was manifested in other trans-isthmian routes, particularly that by way of Tehuantepec, where Captain James B. Eads proposed to construct a great ship-railway, by which the largest ships could be transported from one ocean to the other by rail. The House Committee reported favorably but no guaranties from the government could be obtained.3

The idea grew that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was hampering the legitimate aspirations of the United States for a canal under its own control, and President Garfield, who came into office in 1881, directed his Secretary of State to take measures looking to the abrogation of the treaty. Instead of taking up the matter directly with the British government, Mr. Blaine sent a circular despatch to the United States ministers in Europe, outlining the American attitude towards the proposal to establish a trans-isthmian canal under European guaranty. He pointed out that such a guaranty was entirely unnecessary, because by the treaty of 1846 the United States had already guaranteed the neutrality of the isthmus, and this guaranty required reinforcement, accession, or assent by no other power. Furthermore, he said that the proposed European guaranty would

3

1 Sen. Mis. Doc. No. 42, 46th Cong., 3d sess.

Sen. Doc. No. 237, 56th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 473-499.

For the favorable report on this scheme see House Report No. 322, 46th Cong., 3d sess.

be offensive to the United States, since the proposed canal would be the chief means of transportation between the Atlantic and Pacific states and would be, to all intents and purposes, a part of our coast-line. This being the case, the passage of armed vessels of a hostile power during any war to which the United States or Colombia might be a party would be no more admissible than over the railway lines joining the Atlantic and Pacific shores of the United States or of Colombia.1

The remarkable feature of this communication was not so much its expression of principles, which showed, after all, no radical departure from former statements on the subject, but the fact that, although a copy of it was sent to the British Foreign Office as well as to the other European chancelleries, no mention was made, even in the British copy, of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. This was the more surprising in that the statement on the passage of armed ships was in direct violation of the second article of that treaty. At first, Great Britain ignored the despatch. But at length, about four months after it was received, Lord Granville pointed out that the position of the United States and Great Britain with reference to the canal was determined by the convention commonly known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and that her Majesty's government relied with confidence upon the observance of all the engagements of that instrument.2

Shortly before this reply was received, Mr. Blaine, apparently realizing that a formal treaty could not be disposed of in this cavalier fashion, sent a special despatch to the British government through Mr. Lowell, dated November 19, 1881, in which he attempted to show that the conditions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were no longer existent. In the first place, the treaty had been drawn up more than thirty years before, when the position of the United States Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1881, pp. 537-540.

• Ibid., p. 549.

on the Pacific coast was entirely different. Again, whereas the intention of the treaty was to put Great Britain and the United States on an equal basis in respect to the canal, the present arrangements insured control by Great Britain, on account of her superior naval strength, unless the United States should be allowed to fortify the canal. In the third place, now that other nations had become interested in a canal project, the United States, by the terms of this treaty, was prohibited from asserting the rights acquired by the treaty with Colombia signed earlier than the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Finally, the treaty had been made on the implied understanding that both nations would immediately subscribe funds for undertaking the work; now that nothing had been done, and the United States no longer needed outside aid, there was no reason for either side to regard itself as bound by the treaty's terms.1

Lord Granville had little difficulty in exposing the weakness of Mr. Blaine's arguments, both in this despatch and in one of November 29 which followed it. The British possessions in North America had also shown considerable development, and it could hardly be supposed that the statesmen who were parties to the treaty had not envisaged certain changes of condition." Neither was Mr. Frelinghuysen, who followed Mr. Blaine as Secretary of State, more successful than his predecessor, although he was on more familiar ground when he based his objections on the Monroe Doctrine and the traditional policy of the United States in opposing European intervention in American political affairs. The weak point, of course, was the fact that the Monroe Doctrine had not been regarded as a bar to making the treaty; therefore it could hardly be advanced as a reason for abrogating it. Needless to say, the diplomatic correspondence of the United States during this period did 'Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1881, pp. 554-559.

2 British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. LXXIII, p. 873.

'Ibid., p. 892; or see Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 194, 47th Cong., 1st sess., for correspondence.

very little to improve the country's position; in fact, so easily and completely were its arguments refuted that its position diplomatically was even weaker than before. Nor did Great Britain confine her activities to the exchange of notes with the United States. At the first intimation of American action against the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the British government protested that Nicaragua had never paid the indemnity promised to the Mosquito Indians by the treaty of 1860, and forced the case to arbitration before the Emperor of Austria. The award was wholly favorable to the British, not only in that it was declared that Mosquitia was not subject to the regulations of Nicaragua, but in that it gave Great Britain the right, in case the terms of the treaty were not strictly observed, to intervene to protect her own interests.1

Mr. Frelinghuysen also attempted direct action by negotiating a treaty with Nicaragua in December, 1884, which provided for the construction of a canal by the United States under the joint protection of the United States and Nicaragua, the United States agreeing to guarantee the territorial integrity of Nicaragua.2 But when Grover Cleveland became President in 1885, he recalled this treaty from the Senate, and declared in his first annual message that whatever highway should be constructed joining the two oceans "must be for the world's benefit, a trust for mankind." There was no change in this attitude until 1899, when John Hay undertook to obtain the abrogation of the troublesome Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and succeeded quite as brilliantly as his predecessors had ignominiously failed.

In the meantime de Lesseps had made a spectacular beginning upon his stupendous undertaking. The actual work of construction was started February 1, 1881, and a veri'British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. LXXII, p. 1212.

256-260.

J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VIII, pp. 'Ibid., p. 324.

table army of engineers and laborers was employed. Unfortunately for the success of the enterprise, de Lesseps remained in France, apparently failing to realize the prodigal and extravagant methods that were being employed. Useless and expensive equipment was purchased; the officers and directors were housed magnificently; an expensive campaign of propaganda was maintained to stimulate enthusiasm for the undertaking; and no matter how rapidly money flowed in, it was used up even more rapidly. The Engineering Congress at Paris had originally estimated the cost of the canal at $114,000,000 and had figured that it could be built in seven or eight years. At the end of eight years almost $400,000,000 had been spent and the work was not one third completed. The company went into bankruptcy, and the investigation that followed showed that the undertaking had been managed in a most corrupt and wasteful manner. The scandal was so great that all hope of ever constructing the canal by private means seemed eliminated.1

In the United States, where the Nicaragua route still seemed preferable, various attempts to organize companies to construct a canal by this route met with varied success. In 1890 the Maritime Canal Company, which held a concession from Nicaragua, was chartered by Congress and began work at Greytown. After three years' work, its capital was used up and the company went into the hands of a receiver. In 1895 Congress authorized a commission to report on the cost of completing the abandoned canal, and the original estimate of $67,000,000 was raised to $133,000,000. Under these conditions, the government was not willing to back a resumption of work.2 Various proposals were made in Congress to purchase the Maritime Company's franchise and property, but nothing came of them.

For an excellent summary of the reasons for the French failure see W. F. Johnson, Four Centuries of the Panama Canal (N. Y., 1907), Chap. VII; see also Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1884, p. 119, for report on difficulties encountered.

2

For complete report see House Report No. 2126, 54th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 122-129.