and that the same rights and privileges be accorded to a citizen of that country that are given to a citizen of the United States under like circumstances, gives to a citizen of that country such rights and liberties as are accorded by the several states to their citizens. Storti v. Massachusetts, (1901) 183 U. S. 138. Indian treaty. A state game law is operative within its territorial limits notwithstanding an Indian treaty giving hunting privilege on unoccupied land. Ward v. Race Horse, (1896) 163 U. S. 504. To bring into court to testify. A commissioner of the Circuit Court has not the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus, to take from jail a person committed by the authority of the United States, and bring him before the commissioner, for the purpose of giving his deposition before such commissioner, to be used in a cause pending in the District Court. E p. Barnes, (1846) I Sprague (U. S.) 133. Sec. 754. [Application for the writ of habeas corpus.] Application for writ of habeas corpus shall be made to the court, or justice, or judge authorized to issue the same, by complaint in writing, signed by the person for whose relief it is intended, setting forth the facts concerning the detention of the party restrained, in whose custody he is detained, and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known. The facts set forth in the complaint shall be verified by the oath of the person making the application. [R. S.] Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. L. 385. Allegations must be specific. It is not enough, in order to require the court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, that the petition alleges that the prisoner is held in violation of the Constitution of the United States, or of a treaty with a foreign nation. That is a mere formal allegation, covering conclusions of law as well as of fact, and the petition must present specific allegations raising an issue. In re Storti, (1901) 109 Fed. Rep. 807. See also King v. McLean Asylum, (C. C. A. 1894) 64 Fed. Rep. 325. "If the detention is claimed to be unlawful by reason of the invalidity of the process or proceedings under which the party is held in custody, copies of such process or proceedings must be annexed to or the essential parts thereof set out in the petition, and mere averments of conclusions of law are necessarily inadequate." And when copies of the information, the verdict, and the judgment thereon are not attached to the petition, nor the essential parts thereof stated, nor any cause assigned for such omission, the petition is wholly insufficient. Craemer v. Washington, (1897) 168 U. S. 128. See also Whitten v. Tomlinson, (1895) 160 U. S. 231; Kohl v. Lehlback, (1895) 160 U. S. 293; Cuddy, Petitioner, (1889) 131 U. S. 280; Andersen v. Treat, (1898) 172 U. S. 24. Facts duly alleged may be taken to be true, unless denied by the return, or controlled by other evidence. But no allegation of fact in the petition can be assumed to be admitted unless distinct and unambiguous. Whitten v. Tomlinson. (1895) 160 U. S. 231. See also Kohl v. Lehlback. (1895) 160 U. S. 293. Who may be petitioner. That an applica tion for a writ of habeas corpus is not 66 signed by the person for whose relief it is intended," nor affirmatively shows that the application is made at his instance or request, would justify a refusal of the writ. In re Craig, (1895) 70 Fed. Rep. 969. See also In re Chavez, (1896) 72 Fed. Rep. 1006; Gusman v. Marrero, (1901) 180 U. S. 81. The language of section 760, infra, seems to contemplate that the petitioner may be one person and the party restrained another. In re Hoyle, (1879) 1 Crim. L. Mag. 472, 12 Fed. Cas. No. 6,803. "Person" includes an Indian. The habeas corpus acts nowhere describe the persons entitled to the benefits of the writ as "citizens," nor is citizenship in any way or place made a qualification for suing out the writ. U. S. v. Crook, (1879) 5 Dill. (U. S.) 453. The relator, a deputy marshal, had a commissioner's warrant for the arrest on extradition proceedings for forgery in a foreign country of a person in jail. The return of the jailer showed that the prisoner was committed to his custody on two executions and two writs of attachment in civil actions against the body of the prisoner as an absconding debtor. The relator had sufficient interest to authorize him to move for this writ, as he had the right, and was under the duty, to take the body of the prisoner, and bring him before the commissioner, to be dealt with in extradition proceedings. In re Mineau, (1891) 45 Fed. Rep. 188. State statute. A proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus is not governed by the provisions of a state statute which allows the writ to issue on the petition of the person detained, or that of any one on his behalf, but must conform to the requirements of this section which requires the application to be made and verified by the prisoner. Hibbs, (1886) 26 Fed. Rep. 421. Ex P. Oath taken before magistrate. An application for the writ should be supported by oath, taken before some person competent to administer the same. An affidavit taken before one who certifies himself as justice of the peace of another state cannot be received, where there is no proof of any kind to show that the person was in fact a justice of the peace. Matter of Keeler, (1843) Hempst. (U. S.) 306. Sec. 755. [Allowance and direction of the writ.] The court, or justice, or judge to whom such application is made shall forthwith award a writ of habeas corpus, unless it appears from the petition itself that the party is not entitled thereto. The writ shall be directed to the person in whose custody the party is detained. [R. S.] Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. L. 385. Duty to issue writ." It is not a question, at the time of the application for the writ, whether or not the facts alleged in the petition are true or false. They are to be verified by the oath of the petitioner, and if he sets out in his petition what is necessary to give a federal court jurisdiction, the writ must issue, and the truth or falsity of the facts alleged must be determined at the hearing." Electoral College's Case, (1876) 1 Hughes (U. S.) 571. See also In re Greenwald, (1896) 77 Fed. Rep. 590. The writ When writ need not be awarded. need not be awarded where it appears upon the showing made by the petitioner, that if brought into court, and the cause of commitment inquired into, he would be remanded to prison. Ex p. Terry, (1888) 128 U. S. 289. See also In re Greenwald, (1896) 77 Fed. Rep. 590; Ex p. Murray, (1895) 66 Fed. Rep. 297; In re Haskell, (1892) 52 Fed. Rep. 795; In re King, (1892) 51 Fed. Rep. 434; In re Jordan, (1892) 49 Fed. Rep. 238; In re Barry, (1844) 42 Fed. Rep. 113; In re Jung Ah Lung, (1885) 25 Fed. Rep. 141; Ex p. Vallandigham, (1863) 5 West. L. Month. 37, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,816; Ex p. Davis, (1851) 14 Law Rep. 301, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3,613; Ex p. Kinney, (1879) 3 Hughes (U. S.) 9; Ex p. Milligan, (1866) 4 Wall. (U. S.) 2; Matter of Winder, (1862) 2 Cliff. (U. S.) 89; Matter of Keeler, (1843) Hempst. (U. S.) 306. Decision clearly right. The application for the writ will be denied if it appear from the face of the record that the decision of the federal question which is complained of was so clearly right as not to require argument. In re Boardman, (1898) 169 U. S. 39. No common-law jurisdiction. The writ will be denied when, if granted, and a return made admitting the facts stated in the petition, the court would discharge the petitioner, an infant, on the ground that the court cannot exercise the common-law jurisdiction over the matter. In re Barry, (1844) 42 Fed. Rep. 113. To determine state boundary. When it appeared from the petition itself, that the question raised related to the jurisdiction over the ground upon which a territorial prison was located, the petition was dismissed. A dispute in respect to the true boundary between a state and a territory cannot be determined upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of one duly convicted and sentenced and imprisoned by the government establishing and maintaining the prison. In re Chavez, (1896) 72 Fed. Rep. 1006. Sec. 756. [Time of return.] Any person to whom such writ is directed. shall make due return thereof within three days thereafter, unless the party be detained beyond the distance of twenty miles; and if beyond that distance and not beyond a distance of a hundred miles, within ten days; and if beyond the distance of a hundred miles, within twenty days. [R. S.] Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. L. 385. "This section was taken almost literally from the Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 2 of the 31st Car. II., which was designed to remedy procrastination and trifling with the writ. Prior to that Act the mode of compelling a return was by taking out an alias, and then a pluries writ, and thereafter issuing an attachment. A reasonable time has always been allowed for making the return, and it is not to be presumed that one will not be made." Ex p. Baez, (1900) 177 U. S. 388. Sec. 757. [Form of return.] The person to whom the writ is directed shall certify to the court, or justice, or judge before whom it is returnable the true cause of the detention of such party. [R. S.] Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. L. 385. A return should be signed by the person to whom the writ is directed, or should be accompanied by an explanation why that is not done. Seavey v. Seymour, (1871) 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 439. Verity of return. Where a case is heard upon exceptions or demurrer to the return, its averments must be taken as true. Crowley r. Christensen, (1890) 137 U. S. 86. Sufficiency of return.. - A return by a United States marshal, that the petitioner had been arrested and carried out of the district by order of the war department, and that the mandate of the writ could not be obeyed, was a sufficient return. Ex p. Benedict, (1862) 4 West. L. Month. 449, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1,292. A return stating that petitioner was held by the chief of police of the city under a commitment stating that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to pay a fine, with the alternative of imprisonment, but not stating under what particular ordinance he was convicted, was held sufficient where the defects complained of were supplied by the allegations of the petition and proofs offered by the petitioner. In re Ah Toy, (1891) 45 Fed. Rep. 795. Sec. 758. [Body of the party to be produced.] The person making the return shall at the same time bring the body of the party before the judge who granted the writ. [R. S.] Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. L. 385. Sec. 759. [Day for hearing.] When the writ is returned, a day shall be set for the hearing of the cause, not exceeding five days thereafter, unless the party petitioning requests a longer time. [R. S.] Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. L. 385. Sec. 760. [Denial of return, counter-allegations, amendments.] The petitioner or the party imprisoned or restrained may deny any of the facts set forth in the return, or may allege any other facts that may be material in the case. Said denials or allegations shall be under oath. The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of the court, or justice, or judge, before or after the same are filed, so that thereby the material facts may be ascertained. [R. S.] - Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. L. 385. Collateral attack on judgments. This section does not change the well-settled rule of law in relation to the conclusive effect of a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction as to all matters properly before the court, and embraced in its judgment, as against a collateral attack. In re Tsu Tse Mee, (1897) 81 Fed. Rep. 702. The averments of the answer to the return will be taken as denied by the respondent, as no further pleading is required by the statute. Matter of Leary, (1879) 10 Ben. (U. S.) 197. Sec. 761. [Summary hearing; disposition of party.] The court, or justice, or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice require. [R. S.] Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. L. 385. This statute is applicable to the Supreme Court, whether it is exercising its original or appellate jurisdiction. Storti v. Massachusetts, (1901) 183 U. S. 138. When discharge as of course. This section "of course means that if he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution or a law of the United States, or for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, he must be discharged." In re Neagle, (1890) 135 U. S. 41. See also In re Anderson, (1899) 94 Fed. Rep. 487. Stay of execution. The Circuit Court of Appeals will stay the issuing a mandate of affirmance of a dismissal by the Circuit Court of a petition for habeas corpus pending the decision of the Supreme Court upon an application for a certiorari. The execution of a sentence should be stayed pending the final determination, unless very exceptional circumstances justify the court in refusing to do so. Rose v. Roberts, (C. C. A. 1900) 99 Fed. Rep. 952. "Facts of the case." Where a person is held on process on a final judgment, after conviction on a trial on an indictment, and a habeas corpus is issued, and the return to the writ states the process as the cause of detention, the facts the court is required to determine, either on such return alone or by the aid of a certiorari, are the final judgment, the conviction, the fact of a trial, and the indictment. The particulars of the evidence which led to the conviction are no part of such "facts." In re Stupp, (1875) 12 Blatchf. (U. S.) 501. --- Reference to guardian ad litem to find facts. This provision, as it now stands, apparently governs all proceedings based on a petition conforming to section 754, R. S., and an order of the court, referring the case to a guardian ad litem of the petitioner, to determine the law and facts on such evidence as he might choose to hear and consider, may properly be made, when the order does not direct a discontinuance of the suit, or give the guardian ad litem an absolute right so to discontinue, or conclude the court to act on his election. King v. McLean Asylum, (C. C. A. 1894) 64 Fed. Rep. 331. "Dispose of the party as law and justice require." — In proceedings upon habeas corpus the authority of the courts is not so restricted as to compel them in every instance either to discharge the prisoner absolutely or to remand him to the custody of the person producing him, but the provision empowering and requiring the court to " dispose of the party as law and justice require," authorizes the court to commit the custody of the party to any one showing a right thereto. Motherwell v. U. S., (C. C. A. 1901) 107 Fed. Rep. 437. See also Medley, Petitioner, (1890) 134 U. S. 160. Discretion of court. "The injunction to hear the case summarily, and thereupon 'dispose of the party as law and justice require' does not deprive the court of discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it. That discretion should be exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the states, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unneces sary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution." Ex p. Royall, (1886) 117 U. S. 251. See also Minnesota v. Brundage, (1901) 180 U. S. 499. When a sentence pronounced was in violation of the statutes of the United States, the action of the court was in that matter in excess of its jurisdiction and void, but the Supreme Court may delay the discharge of the petitioner for such reasonable time as may be necessary to have him taken before the court where the judgment was rendered, that the defects of jurisdiction which are the subject of complaint may be corrected. In re Bonner, (1894) 151 U. S. 242. See also Medley, Petitioner. (1890) 134 U. S. 160; Ex p. Davis, (1901) 112 Fed. Rep. 139; De Bara v. U. S., (C. C. A. 1900) 99 Fed. Rep. 942; In re Gut Lun, (1897) 84 Fed. Rep. 323; In re Christian, (1897) 82 Fed. Rep. 199. Removal for resentence. The petitioner was held by a United States marshal for removal to the district in which he had been indicted or convicted in order to be resentenced. The court said that while section 1014, R. S., does not authorize the removal of a party for any other purpose than for trial, the court might make an order for removal under this section. In re Christian, (1897) 82 Fed. Rep. 885. Sec. 762. [In cases involving the law of nations, notice to be served on State attorney-general.] When a writ of habeas corpus is issued in the case of any prisoner who, being a subject or citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein, is committed, or confined, or in custody, by or under the authority or law of any one of the United States, or process founded thereon, on account of any act done or omitted under an alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, claimed under the commission or order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations, notice of the said proceeding, to be prescribed by the court, or justice, or judge at the time of granting said writ, shall be served on the attorney-general or other officer prosecuting the pleas of said State, and due proof of such service shall be made to the court, or justice, or judge before the hearing. [R. S.] Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. L. 539. Sec. 763. [Appeals in cases of habeas corpus to circuit court.] From the final decision of any court, justice, or judge inferior to the circuit court, upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus or upon such writ when issued, an appeal may be taken to the circuit court for the district in which the cause is heard: 1. In the case of any person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any law or treaty of the United States. 2. In the case of any prisoner who, being a subject or citizen of a foreign state, and domiciled therein, is committed or confined, or in custody by or under the authority or law of the United States, or of any State, or process founded thereon, for or on account of any act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up or claimed under the commission, order, or sanction of any foreign state or sovereignty, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations, or under color thereof. [R. 8.] Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. L. 539; Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. L. 385; Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. L. 44. Appeals to Circuit Court. See under the title JUDICIARY the Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517 (the Circuit Court of Appeals Act), which provides (section 4) that "no appellate jurisdiction shall hereafter be exercised or allowed by said existing Circuit Courts." Case removed by appeal. Where a peti tion is filed and the case heard in the District Court, the case can be removed into the Circuit Court only by appeal, and in that state of the case the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is wholly appellate. Such jurisdiction must be exercised upon the same evidence as that introduced in the District Court, except where competent evidence was offered and excluded; errors of the District Court may be corrected. Seavey v. Seymour, (1871) 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 439. Taking appeal to next term. Nothing in this section requires an appeal from the final decision of the District Court, or judge thereof, to be taken, as in ordinary cases at law or suits in equity or admiralty, to the next term of the Circuit Court thereafter to be held. The subject is regulated by section 765, infra. Roberts v. Reilly, (1885) 116 U. S. 80. No bill of exceptions is required in cases brought up on appeal, especially when the errors assigned are matters appearing in the record. Solomon r. Davenport, (C. C. A. 1898) 87 Fed. Rep. 319. Heard before circuit justice at chambers. An objection that the hearing of the appeal from the District Court was had before the circuit justice at chambers, and not in open court, if it could ever have been properly interposed and insisted on, cannot be made for the first time in the Supreme Court where it appears "that the order to that effect was made without objection taken at the time, or afterwards, in the District or Circuit Court, or at the hearing before [tne justice]; that the appellant appeared at the time and place by counsel and was heard; that the arrangement was made for the convenience of the parties and to avoid delay; and that it does not seem to have involved any hardship or injustice to the party now complaining." Roberts v. Reilly, (1885) 116 U. S. 80. Facts as well as law. The decision of the District Court may be reviewed on the facts as well as on the law by appeal. Virginia v. Paul, (1893) 148 U. S. 124, citing Horner v. U. S., (1892) 143 U. S. 570; In re Neagle, (1890) 135 U. S. 1. See also In re Henrich, (1867) 5 Blatchf. (U. S.) 414. Mandamus. - But the decision of the District Court cannot be reviewed or controlled by writ of mandamus. Virginia v. Paul, (1893) 148 U. S. 124, citing In re Morrison, (1893) 147 U. S. 14; Ex p. Morgan, (1885) 114 U. S. 174; Ex p. Perry, (1880) 102 U. S. 183; Ex p. Schwab, (1878) 98 U. S. 240. It was held, before the revision, that circuit courts possessed no power under the Act of 1789 (see section 753, supra), to re-examine a decision of the District Court, in cases within the provisions of that Act, as the Act made no provision for the removal of such cases from the District to the Circuit Court by writ of error or appeal. Seavey v. Seymour, (1871) 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 439. Sec. 764. [Appeal to Supreme Court.] From the final decision of such circuit court an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court in the cases described in the preceding section. [R. S.] Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. L. 539. This section was amended to read as above given by the Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. L. 437. Originally this section was as follows: "SEC. 764. From the final decision of such circuit court an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court in the cases described in the last clause of the preceding section." The Supreme Court will affirm the decision of a District Court remanding the petitioner to custody, where it is made to appear to the Supreme Court that an objection to the custody existed at the time when the writ issued, though it did not so appear when the order of the District Court remanding the petitioner was entered. Iasigi v. Van De Carr, (1897) 166 U. S. 391. The Circuit Court has no discretion in the matter of granting an appeal to the Supreme Court, but the right is absolute. In re Sun Hung, (1885) 24 Fed. Rep. 723. But in In re Durrant, (1898) 84 Feb. Rep. 317, the court, commenting on the Sun Hung case, last above cited, said: "That, however, was a case clearly involving questions arising under the Constitution and treaties of the United States, and in which the good faith of the proceedings was not doubted, and the proceeding itself not one in any way obstructing the execution of the criminal laws of the state. In such a case it is clear that the denial of an order allowing the appeal would be a gross abuse of discretion, and the question of the power of the court to refuse an appeal, in a case where it was clearly apparent that the process of appeal was being used solely for the purpose of obstructing the execution of the judgment of a state court, the validity of which had already been sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States, was not presented to or in the mind of the judge delivering that opinion," and in commenting on the Jugiro case, supra, the court further said: "Notwithstanding our respect for the learning |