when committed on board a ship of the United States, unless it appears that the vessel was sailing under no national flag. But it is no

was

defense to the indictment that the vessel was never legally registered or enrolled, if she was owned by a citizen of the United States. U. S. v. Plumer, (1859) 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 28. See U. S. v. Holmes, (1820) 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 412. Committed within foreign jurisdiction. When, by treaty with another country, the place where a crime was committed within the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of that country, the shooting of a person on board an American vessel within such exclusive territorial jurisdiction, resulting in the death of such person within the United States, does not give the federal courts jurisdiction of the offense. People v. Tyler, (1859) 7 Mich. 161. See (1856) 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 721. Within state waters. - In U. S. v. Bevans, (1818) 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 336, it was held that the bay in which the murder on a United States ship of war was alleged to have been committed was within the original territory of the state of Massachusetts, and the Circuit Court was not authorized by section 8 of the Act of April 30, 1790, to take cognizance of the offense, as there had been no cession of the jurisdiction of the locality to the United States. To bring the offense within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Union, it must have been committed in a river, etc., out of the jurisdiction of any state. It is not the offense, but the place in which it is committed, which must be out of the jurisdiction of the state. And although the offense should be one of which the state could take no cognizance, yet unless the place itself were out of its jurisdiction, Congress had not, under the existing statutes, given cognizance of that offense to the courts. See also U. S. v. Grush, (1829) 5 Mason (U. S.) 290.

An indictment alleging that the crime of murder was committed on board a United States battleship, while moored at Cob Dock, in the waters of Wallabout Bay, in the East River, charges an offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, when the territory, within which was embraced the land covered with the waters of, the East River, at Wallabout Bay, had been ceded to the United States by the state of New York, and the premises were being used by the United States at the time of the alleged homicide for the very purposes specified in the state statutes and deeds of cession. U. S. v. Carter, (1897) 84 Fed. Rep. 622. Case not provided for by statute. - The attorney-general advised, (1848) 5 Op. Atty.Gen. 55, that a military officer could not be tried by the United States courts on a charge of murder, alleged to have been committed by him on the person of another military officer during the war with Mexico, at a place which was occupied by United States troops, and was under the jurisdiction of the United States, a military and civil governor having been appointed; as the courts could not exercise a common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases and have no jurisdiction until conferred by Act of Congress.

both by military and general law, it is subject to be tried either by a military or a civil court, and a conviction or acquittal by the military authorities does not discharge the accused from liability to answer in the civil courts for the offense against the general law involved in the same facts. U. S. v. Clark, (1887) 31 Fed. Rep. 710.

This statute does not give the civil courts jurisdiction over the crime of murder committed on board a ship of war, but such offense is triable before a naval court-martial. U. S. v. Mackenzie, 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 371, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,313, (1843) 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 227, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,690.

Lands held for national cemeteries are not within the jurisdiction of the United States where the purchases have been made or the lands appropriated without the consent of the state legislature. (1875) 14 Op. Atty.-Gen. 559; (1869) 13 Op. Atty.-Gen. 131.

A military reservation, within the territorial boundaries of a state, is within the jurisdiction of the United States when there has been a valid cession of jurisdiction by the state to the national government, and such jurisdiction is not limited to such portions of the reserve as are actually used for military purposes, but extends to parts within the reserve used solely for farming purposes. Murder committed within the reservation is within the jurisdiction of the federal court. Benson v. U. S., (1892) 146 U. S. 325. See also U. S. v. King, (1888) 34 Fed. Rep. 302; U. S. v. Lewis, (1901) 111 Fed. Rep. 630; State v. Kelly, (1884) 76 Me. 331.

A military reservation, within the boundaries of a state, which was so used before the territory was admitted as a state, is not a place "under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States," where there was no reservation of sovereignty over any part of the public lands when the territory was admitted as a state into the Union. U. S. v. Bateman, (1888) 34 Fed. Rep. 86. See also U. S. v. Stahl, (1868) Woolw. (U. S.) 192.

An Act of Congress authorized the President to fortify several harbors and ports, and to receive from any state, in behalf of the United States, a cession of the lands on which any of the fortifications with the necessary buildings might be erected, or be intended to be erected; or, where such cessions should not be made, to purchase such lands, not being the property of a state, on behalf of the United States. A state statute (Rhode Island), in furtherance of this object, authorized any person or town in the state, by and with the consent of the governor, to sell to the President, for the use of the United States, all such lands as it should be deemed necessary to erect fortifications upon, with ? proviso that all civil and criminal processes issued under the authority of the state might be executed on the land so ceded. Lands acquired by the United States, under such statutory provisions, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, under the constitutional provision giving Congress "exclusive legislation over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be. U. S. v. Cornell, (1819) 2 Mason (J. S.) 60, (1820)

i

2 Mason (U. S.) 91. See also U. S. v. Meagher, (1888) 37 Fed. Rep. 875.

- The

Indian reservation Within a state. Circuit Court of the United States has no jurisdiction of an indictment against a white man for the murder of a white man within an Indian reservation when jurisdiction was not reserved by the Act of Congress admitting, as a state of the Union, the territory within whose limits the reservation was embraced. U. S. r. McBratney, (1881) 104 U. S. 621. See also Ex p. Sloan, (1877) 4 Sawy. (U. S.) 330; U. S. v. Bailey, (1834) 1 McLean (U. S.) 234; U. S. v. Ward, (1863) Woolw. (U. S.) 17.

In U. S. v. Barnhart, (1884) 22 Fed. Rep. 285, it was held that the United States Circuit Court had jurisdiction in the case of white men charged with the murder of an Indian, committed on the Umatilla Indian reservation. The Umatilla reservation was made and set apart for the "exclusive use of the Indians, by a treaty negotiated with the Indians, ratified by the Senate twentytwo days after the admission of Oregon as a state of the Union.

In U. S. v. Berry, (1880) 4 Fed. Rep. 779, it was held that the United States courts have jurisdiction of a charge of murder of an Indian by white men, committed on an Indian reservation, when the Indian treaty antedated the admission of the state into the Union.

Murder of a white man by Indians is within the jurisdiction of the state courts when the offense is committed within the territorial limits of the state and outside the reservation. U. S. v. Yellow Sun, (1870) 1 Dill. (U. S.) 271, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 377.

The courts of the United States have jurisdiction to try and punish an Indian belonging to an Indian tribe for committing the crime of murder upon another Indian belonging to the same Indian tribe, both sustaining the usual tribal relations, when the crime was committed upon an Indian reservation made and set apart for the use of the Indian tribe to which said Indians both belonged, within the limits of a state. U. S. v. Kagama, (1886) 118 U. S. 375.

Within a territory. - As to the jurisdiction in cases of homicide in an Indian reservation within a territory, see section 2145, R. S., Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. L. 385, ch. 341, § 9; murder of a white man by an Indian, see Gon-shay-ee, Petitioner, (1889) 130 U. S. 343; Captain Jack, Petitioner, (1889) 130 U. S. 353; U. S. v. Martin, (1883) 14 Fed. Rep. 817; U. S. v. Monte, (1884) 3 N. Mex. 126; of an Indian by an Indian, see Ex p. Crow Dog, (1883) 109 U. S. 556.

Indian Territory. — Murder of an Indian by an Indian, see Talton v. Mayers, (1896) 163 U. S. 376; of" a white man and not an Indian," where the testimony offered by the government had no legitimate tendency to prove that he was not an Indian, by an Indian, see Smith v. U. S., (1894) 151 U. S. 50; in "No Man's Land," see In re Jackson, (1889) 40 Fed. Rep. 372; Cook v. U. S., (1891) 138 U. S. 157. And see U. S. v. Rogers, (1846) 4 How. (U. S.) 567.

The words "high seas mean any waters

on the seacoast, which are without the boundaries of low-water mark, although such waters may be in a roadstead or bay within the jurisdictional limits of a foreign government. U. S. v. Ross, (1813) 1 Gall. (U. 624. See U. S. v. Gourlay, (U. S. Cir. Ct. 1823) 2 Wheel. Crim. (N. Y.) 102, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 15,241.

The words "in any river, haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state," refer to such places without any of the United States and not without foreign states. U. S. v. Ross, (1813) 1 Gall. (U. S.. 624.

Under third clause. - In the Guiteau case, the accused was found guilty of murder under this section, in the courts of the District of Columbia, when the wound, from which President Garfield died, was inflicted in the city of Washington, and death resulted about three months afterward in the state of New Jersey. U. S. v. Guiteau, (1882) 1 Mackey (D. C.) 498.

Indictments founded on this statute must allege that the offense was committed out of the jurisdiction of any particular state as well as that it was committed upon the high seas. U. S. v. Plumer, (1859) 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 28.

An allegation that the ship is owned and belongs to certain citizens of the United States is sufficient as an averment that the ship was a vessel of the United States within the meaning of the statutes giving jurisdiction to the Circuit Courts in criminal cases. U. S. v. Plumer, (1859) 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 28.

Locality on the high seas where the offense occurred. An indictment alleging the offense to have been committed on the high seas and within the jurisdiction of this court, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the said United States of America, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state of the said United States of America, in and on board of a certain American vessel," is sufficient to show the locality of the offense. Andersen v. U. S., (1898) 170 U. S. 481. See also St. Clair . U. S., (1894) 154 U. S. 134.

Aiding and abetting. An indictment is good which charges the prisoners with murder by doing acts aiding and abetting its perpetration in their presence. See under section 5323, R. S., vol. 1, p. 361. U. S. r. Douglass, (1851) 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 207. See U. S. v. Ross, (1813) 1 Gall. (U. S.) 624.

Accessory before the fact. This statute does not punish the offense of being accessory before the fact. The federal courts have no common-law jurisdiction and are only author. ized to try and punish such crimes as Congress expressly or by necessary implication has visited with known and certain penalties. U. S. v. Ramsay, (1847) Hempst. (U. S.) 481.

Corpus delicti. In the trial of an indictment for murder, alleged to have been committed on the high seas, on an averment that the deceased was thrown into the sea and drowned, direct and positive evidence as to the corpus delicti is not required. Evidence that for several days before and after the night the deceased was missing no vessels were seen, is competent, as the jury might be left in doubt as to whether he was rescued

statute, and must be construed according to its own terms, without reference to any other statute, so far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned." U. S. v. Holtzhauer, (1889) 40 Fed. Rep. 76.

Constitutional limit.

The section does not limit the offense to the navigable waters of the United States, and is in terms without limit, but the restriction in the constitutional grant of power to Congress limits the application of the law. An indictment is sufficient which avers that the defendant was captain of a steamboat engaged in navigation, and describes that navigation to have been upon the Chesapeake bay, which is, to the judicial knowledge of the court, one of the navigable waters of the United States. U. S. v. Beacham, (1886) 29 Fed. Rep. 284. See also U. S. v. Collyer, (1855) 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,838.

A state court, under an appropriate state statute, has jurisdiction of an offense charged against a pilot which is also an offense under this section, when the acts complained of were within the county. The federal courts have no exclusive jurisdiction of such an offense under section 711, as jurisdiction of offenses under this title is saved to state courts by section 5328, R. S. People v. Welch, (1894) 141 N. Y. 266. See In re Welch, (1893) 57 Fed. Rep. 576.

The word "vessel" must be given the definition prescribed by section 3, R. S., and includes sailing vessels. U. S. v. Holmes, (1900) 104 Fed. Rep. 884.

Foreign vessels. This section and section 4463, R. S., are not applicable to foreign vessels, as appears from the explanatory and declaratory Act of Aug. 7, 1882, 22 Stat. L. 346. La Bourgogne, (1900) 104 Fed. Rep. $23.

66

A pilot is not liable and cannot be convicted under the last clause of the statute, which applies only to an owner, inspector, or other public officer." U. S. v. Holtzhauer, (1889) 40 Fed. Rep. 76.

The indictment need not expressly charge the defendants with manslaughter. "Whether or not the defendants are guilty of manslaughter would be a conclusion of law from the proof of the facts alleged." U. S. v. Holtzhauer, (1889) 40 Fed. Rep. 76.

An averment that the absence of the deck rail left a portion of the deck unguarded, and, by reason and in consequence of the absence of the rail, a passenger stepped upon the unguarded part of the deck and fell into the water, whereby her life was destroyed, sufficiently avers facts which connect the duty of the captain to see that the rail was in place with his negligence in permitting it to be absent. U. S. v. Beacham, (1886) 29 Fed. Rep. 284.

An indictment is not sufficient which merely follows the words of the statute. Facts upon which the government relies to prove misconduct," negligence," or "inattention to his duties," should be described. "These words and phrases are vague, and may be subject to different meanings and interpretations." U. S. v. Holtzhauer, (1889) 40 Fed. Rep. 76. But see U. S. v. Collyer, (1855) 25 Fed. Cas, No. 14,838.

Must show jurisdiction. The indictment must show on its face that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court in which the indictment was found. In re Doig, (1880) 4 Fed. Rep. 193. Charges violation of a public law. An indictment is sufficient which charges a violation of a public law, namely, section 4465, R. S., which forbids the taking on board any steamer "a greater number of passengers than is stated in the certificate of inspection," though the facts may not be set forth with that fullness which may be found in some forms of indictments. U. S. v. Holtzhauer, (1889) 40 Fed. Rep. 76. See also U. S. v. Beacham, (1886) 29 Fed. Rep. 284; U. S. v. Farnham, (1853) 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 528.

-

Criminal intent. In order to constitute the offense it is not necessary to charge and prove that the acts were done with criminal intent, maliciously done, or with the purpose to take the life of any person, but it is sufficient, within the terms of this statute, if the government charge and prove the misconduct, negligence, or inattention which results in the loss of human life. U. S. v. Holmes, (1900) 104 Fed. Rep. 884. See also U. S. v. Keller, (1884) 19 Fed. Rep. 633; Charge to Grand Jury, (1846) 1 Newb. Adm. 323; U. S. v. Warner, (1848) 4 McLean (U. S.) 463; The Henry Clay, (Charge to Grand Jury, 1852) 11 Fed. Cas. No. 6,375.

Misconduct must be the cause of death.Misconduct, however gross, is innocent under this section unless it be the cause of the manslaughter. In re Doig, (1880) 4 Fed. Rep. 193.

"By misconduct, negligence, or inattention in the management of steamboats, mentioned in the statute, is undoubtedly meant the omission or commission of an act which may naturally lead to the consequences made criminal; and it is no matter what may be the degree of misconduct, whether it be slight or gross, if the proof satisfies you that the explosion of the boiler was the necessary or most probable result of it." U. S. v. Farnham, (1853) 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 528. See also U. S. v. Collyer, (1855) 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,838.

A mere error of judgment is not such misconduct or negligence as is contemplated by the statutes. U. S. v. Collyer, (1855) 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,838.

Incompetence or ignorance. - Every one who assumes to perform certain duties, as captain, pilot, or other responsible duty on board a steamboat, is made responsible for any act done through ignorance or negligence, without reference to his fitness for such duty. Any individual who, being incompetent, assumes to discharge the duties of engineer, is guilty, though the act which destroys life was done through ignorance. "It is no mitigation of the offense that the engineer erred through a want of knowledge. He should not have engaged in a duty so perilous as that of an engineer, when he was conscious that he was incompetent." U. S. v. Taylor, (1851) 5 McLean (U. S.) 242.

Errors of others. The death must be attributable to misconduct, negligence, or inattention to his duties on the part of the