which commission he produced, and prayed that a summons might be issued requiring the witnesses to attend and testify. The petition was denied, as this act is confined to the taking of testimony to be used in a suit for the recovery of money or property depending in a court of a country with which the United States are at peace, and in which the government of such a foreign country is a party or has an interest. Matter of Spanish Consul, (1867) 1 Ben. (U. S.) 225. Investigation as to smuggling. This section provides that the testimony of any witness residing in the United States may be obtained by commission or letters rogatory, to be used in a suit (a) for the recovery of money or property; (b) depending in any court in a foreign country, with which the United States are at peace; (c) where the government of that country is a party to such suit, or interested therein. It does not permit the taking of testimony for the court of Vera Cruz for the purpose of clearing up the details of" a certain importation, where it does not appear that the "proceedings relating to the investigation as to the smuggling amount to "a suit for the recovery of money or property." In re Letters Rogatory, (1888) 36 Fed. Rep. 306. دو Sec. 4072. [Witness need not criminate himself.] No witness shall be required, on such examination or any other under letters rogatory, to make any disclosure or discovery which shall tend to criminate him either under the laws of the State or Territory within which such examination is had, or any other, or any foreign state. [R. S.] Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 245, 17 Stat. L. 581. Sec. 4073. [Punishment of witness for contempt.] If any person shall refuse or neglect to appear at the time and place mentioned in the summons issued, in accordance with section forty hundred and seventy-one, or if upon his appearance he shall refuse to testify, he shall be liable to the same penalties. as would be incurred for a like offense on the trial of a suit in the district court of the United States. [R. S.] Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, 12 Stat. L. 769. Sec. 4074. [Fees and mileage of witnesses.] Every witness who shall so appear and testify shall be allowed, and shall receive from the party at whose instance he shall have been summoned, the same fees and mileage as are allowed to witnesses in suits depending in the district courts of the United States. [R. S.] Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, 12 Stat. L. 769. SEC. 5. [Books, invoices, and papers required in civil suits under revenuelaws.] That in all suits and proceedings other than criminal arising under any of the revenue-laws of the United States, the attorney representing the Government, whenever, in his belief, any business-book, invoice, or paper, belonging to or under the control of the defendant or claimant, will tend to prove any allegation made by the United States, may make a written motion, particularly describing such book, invoice, or paper, and setting forth the allegation which he expects to prove; and thereupon the court in which suit or proceeding is pending may, at its discretion, issue a notice to the defendant or claimant to produce such book, invoice, or paper in court, at a day and hour to be specified in said notice, which, together with a copy of said motion, shall be served formally on the defendant or claimant by the United States marshal by delivering to him a certified copy thereof, or otherwise serving the same as original notices of suit in the same court are served; and if the defendant or claimant shall fail or refuse to produce such book, invoice, or paper in obedience to such notice, the allegations stated in the said motion shall be taken as confessed unless his failure or refusal to produce the same shall be explained to the satis faction of the court. And if produced, the said attorney shall be permitted, under the direction of the court, to make examination (at which examination the defendant or claimant, or his agent, may be present) of such entries in said book, invoice, or paper as relate to or tend to prove the allegation aforesaid, and may offer the same in evidence on behalf of the United States. But the owner of said books and papers, his agent or attorney, shall have, subject to the order of the court, the custody of them, except pending their examination in court as aforesaid. [18 Stat. L. 187.] This, and the following section 8, are from the Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, 18 Stat. L. 186. See for the other sections of this Act title CUSTOMS DUTIES, vol. 2, p. 754. See R. S. sec. 860, supra. This section unconstitutional. In actions for penalties or forfeitures of goods, this section is unconstitutional, as being opposed to articles 4 and 5 of the Constitutional Amendments. Boyd v. U. S., (1886) 116 U. S. 616. See also U. S. r. Hughes, (1875) 8 Ben. (U. S.) 29, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,416, holding that this section, so far as it applies to a suit pending at the time of the passing of the Act, is unconstitutional and void, as being ex post facto, and therefore, in a suit by the government before the passage of the Act for forfeiture of goods on account of alleged fraudulent importations, an order calling upon the claimants to produce a certain invoice proposed to be admitted as evidence was declared void. This Act is not limited to cases arising under the customs revenue laws, but applies also to proceedings under the internal revenue laws. U. S. v. Distillery No. TwentyEight, (1875) 6 Biss. (U. S.) 483, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,966. SEC. 8. [Officers and persons claiming compensation and defendants may be witnesses.] That no officer, or other person entitled to or claiming compensation under any provision of this act, shall be thereby disqualified from becoming a witness in any action, suit, or proceeding for the recovery, mitigation, or remission thereof, but shall be subject to examination and cross-examination in like manner with other witnesses, without being thereby deprived of any right, title, share, or interest in any fine, penalty, or forfeiture to which such examination may relate; and in every such case the defendant or defendants may appear and testify and be examined and cross-examined in like manner. L. 188.] See note to section 5 above. [18 Stat. EXAMINATIONS. In Army, see WAR DEPARTMENT AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. In Navy, see NAVY. In Civil Service, see CIVIL SERVICE, vol. 1, p. 808. In Patent Office, see PATENTS. In Customs, see CUSTOMS DUTIES, vol. 2, p. 372; FOOD And drugs. EXCEPTIONS BILL OF. See JUDICIARY. 43 Volume III. EXECUTION. R. S. 916. Executions in Common-law Causes, 44. 985. Executions to Run in All the Districts of a State, 44. 986. Executions in Favor of United States to Run in Every State and Territory, 45 987. Execution Stayed on Conditions, 45. 988. When Judgment Debtor Entitled to a Continuance of One Term, 46. 990. Imprisonment for Debt, 48. 991. Discharge from Arrest or Imprisonment on Mesne or Final Process, 50. 992. Privileges of Fail Limits, 51. 993. Goods Taken on a Fieri Facias, How Appraised, 51. 994. Death of Marshal After Levy or After Sale, 52. 3470. Purchase on Execution, 52. 3471. Discharge of Poor Debtor by Secretary of the Treasury, 52. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 225, 54. Sec. 1. Real Estate, How Sold under Order or Decree of Court, 54. 2. Personal Property, 54. 3. Publication, 54. CROSS-REFERENCES. On Review of Judgment of State Court by Supreme Court, see JUDICIARY. On Judgments for Fines, see FINES, PEÑALTIES, AND forfeitures. Marshal's Fees, see JUDICIAL OFFICERS. Sec. 916. [Executions in common-law causes.] The party recovering a judgment in any common-law cause in any circuit or district court, shall be entitled to similar remedies upon the same, by execution or otherwise, to reach the property of the judgment debtor, as are now provided in like causes by the laws of the State in which such court is held, or by any such laws hereafter enacted which may be adopted by general rules of such circuit or district court; and such courts may, from time to time, by general rules, adopt such State laws as may hereafter be in force in such State in relation to remedies upon judgments, as aforesaid, by execution or otherwise. [R. S.] Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. L. 197. This section is repeated under the title JUDICIARY, and the cases construing it will be found under that title. Sec. 985. [Executions to run in all the districts of a State.] All writs of execution upon judgments or decrees obtained in a circuit or district court, in any State which is divided into two or more districts, may run and be executed in any part of such State; but shall be issued from, and made returnable to, the court wherein the judgment was obtained. [R. S.] Act of May 20, 1826, ch. 124, 4 Stat. L. 184. "May" means at the plaintiff's option. "He has a right to concurrent execution all over the state. It is impossible to give the words of the statute effect unless every writ is allowed to run in all the districts in the same state. The formal direction to one marshal is of no consequence, since the same Act of Congress which enlarges the territorial power of the writ enlarges the direction correspondingly." Prevost v. Gorrell, (1877) 25 Pittsb. Leg. J. (Pa.) 125, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11.402. See also Treadwell v. Seymour, (1890) 41 Fed. Rep. 579. The lien of a judgment obtained in one of the districts of a state operates from the date of the judgment upon real estate situated in all parts of the state. Prevost . Gorrell, (1877) 25 Pittsb. Leg. J. (Pa.) 125, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,400. Suit brought outside district of residence. The provisions of this statute do not give a corporation complainant the right to bring suit in a district in which it is a nonresident without giving security for costs, as required by state statute adopted by the rules of the court. Lyman Ventilating, etc., Co. V. Southard, (1875) 12 Blatchf. (U. S.) 405. See also Miller v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., (1891) 47 Fed. Rep. 264. Sec. 986. [Executions in favor of United States to run in every State and Territory.] All writs of execution upon judgments obtained for the use of the United States, in any court thereof, in one State, may run and be executed in any other State, or in any Territory, but shall be issued from, and made returnable to, the court wherein the judgment was obtained. [R. S.] Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 20, 1 Stat. L. 515. District of Columbia. "Its sphere of operation was, originally, co-extensive with the limits of the United States, and was manifestly intended by Congress so to be; and I think it may with propriety be taken to have the like operation throughout the entire bounds of the United States, and accordingly to extend to the District of Colum bia, at least until a different interpretation (1874) Must be authority of law. - Process of a Circuit Court cannot be served outside of the district in which it is established without the authority of law. Toland v. Sprague, (1838) 12 Pet. (U. S.) 300. Sec. 987. [Execution stayed on conditions.] When a circuit court enters judgment in a civil action, either upon a verdict or on a finding of the court upon the facts, in cases where such finding is allowed, execution may, on motion of either party, at the discretion of the court, and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as it may judge proper, be stayed forty-two days from the time of entering judgment, to give time to file in the clerk's office of said court a petition for a new trial. If such petition is filed within said term of forty-two days, with a certificate thereon from any judge of such court that he allows it to be filed, which certificate he may make or refuse at his discretion, Execution shall, of course, be further stayed to the next session of said court. If a new trial be granted, the former judgment shall be thereby rendered void. [R. S.] Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. L. 83; Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, 13 Stat. L. 501. Time to file motion. This section relates only to method of staying execution pending new trial, and does not limit the time in which motions for new trial may be otherwise filed." Felton v. Spiro, (C. C. A. 1897) 78 Fed. Rep. 581. See Rutherford v. Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co., (1880) 1 Fed. Rep. 456; Emma Silver Min. Co. v. Park, (1878) 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 411. The trial court has no jurisdiction to grant a motion for a new trial and to avoid a judgment rendered, after the expiration of the term at which it was rendered, in the absence of any motion or notice of motion or other proceeding looking to its vacation during that term. Manning r. German Ins. Co., (C. C. A. 1901) 107 Fed. Rep. 52. See also Den r. M'Allister, (1823) 4 Wash. (U. S.) 393. Rules of court, prescribing the time and mode in which motions for new trial must be made, must be observed. Henning v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1890) 41 Fed. Rep. 864. A bill of exceptions may be allowed and filed at the term when the motion for a new trial is finally acted on, even though such action is taken at a term subsequent to the entry of judgment. Woods v. Lindvall, (C. C. A. 1891) 48 Fed. Rep. 73. 'An order granting or refusing a new trial which the court has the jurisdiction or power to make, is discretionary, and cannot be reviewed by writ of error or appeal in the federal courts. But the question whether or not the court had the jurisdiction or power to make an order granting or refusing a new trial and avoiding a former judgment is always reviewable in the federal courts by a writ of error or an appeal chal lenging the order, because it goes to the effect and finality of the judgment itself." Manning v. German Ins. Co., (C. C. A. 1901) 107 Fed. Rep. 52. On a reference by consent, the consent and the order providing that the cause be referred to a referee to hear and determine all the issues thereof, and that the report of the referee have the same effect as a judgment of the court, the court has no authority to grant a motion for a stay of proceedings under this section after judgment has been duly entered upon the report of the referee, notwithstanding the consent and order provide that judgment shall be entered "the same as if the cause had been tried before the court." The scope of this section is limited to cases where there has been either a verdict or a finding of the court upon the facts. Neafie v. Cheesebrough, (1877) 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 313. See Chicago Fourth Nat. Bank v. Neyhardt, (1876) 13 Blatchf. (U. S.) 393. But see Robinson v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co., (1879) 16 Blatchf. (U. S.) 194. Judgment, pending motion, not final. While a motion to stay execution is pending, the court has not lost its jurisdiction over the case, and having power to grant the motion, the judgment is not final for the purpose of taking out a writ of error. Kingman v. Western Mfg. Co., (1898) 170 U. S. 675. See Cambuston v. U. S., (1877) 95 U. S. 285; Brown v. Evans, (1883) 18 Fed. Rep. 56. Sec. 988. [When judgment debtor entitled to a continuance of one term.] In any State where judgments are liens upon the property of the defendant, and where, by the laws of such State, defendants are entitled, in the courts thereof, to a stay of execution for one term or more, defendants in actions in the courts of the United States, held therein, shall be entitled to a stay of execution for one term. [R. S.] Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. L. 281. Sec. 989. [Execution not to issue against officers of revenue in cases of probable cause, etc.] When a recovery is had in any suit or proceeding against a collector or other officer of the revenue for any act done by him, or for the recovery of any money exacted by or paid to him and by him paid into the Treasury, in the performance of his official duty, and the court certifies that there was probable cause for the act done by the collector or other officer, or that he acted. under the directions of the Secretary of the Treasury, or other proper officer of the Government, no execution shall issue against such collector or other officer, but the amount so recovered shall, upon final judgment, be provided for and paid out of the proper appropriation from the Treasury. [R. S.] Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 76, 12 Stat. L. 741. Notice to the government. A judgment and certificate, under this section, properly obtained, create under the law an obligation against the government, for, by relieving the officers from liability, in effect and practically, a judgment is rendered against the United States. If, for irregularity or other cause, payment is refused, the Court of Claims may take jurisdiction. Where an action was brought against late officers of the internal revenue for a trespass, judgment obtained, and a certificate of probable cause given, the government was not concluded by the judgment, where no department, bureau, officer, or agent of the government had any notice or knowledge of the judicial proceedings; and the fact that the defendants went out of office two or three years before suit was brought shows that there was not even constructive notice. Dunnegan's Case, (1881) 17 Ct. Cl. 247. See Flanders v. Seelye, (1881) 105 U. S. 718. It is not discretionary with the court to give a certificate, but, when the collector has exacted money in the performance of his official duty, under the directions of the secre tary of the treasury, and has paid it into the treasury, it is the duty of the court to grant a certificate to that effect. Cox v. Barney, (1877) 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 289. See dissenting opinion in Lowe v. Kansas, (1896) 163 U. S. 81. The judge who tried the case is not the only person to grant the certificate, but another than the one before whom the verdict was rendered may hear the application and grant the certificate. The statute provides for the making of the certificate by the court and not by any particular judge. Cox v. Barney, (1877) 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 289. But see Faber v. Barney, (1869) 6 Blatchf. (U. S.) 305. A separate finding of probable cause is evidently contemplated. Dissenting opinion in Lowe v. Kansas, (1896) 163 U. S. 91. The accounting officers of the government have no jurisdiction to scrutinize and modify a judgment rendered by a court adjudging the payment by the United States of a certain sum of money with interest. New York Cent., etc., R. Co. v. U. S., (1888) 24 Ct. Cl. 22. Time of application for certificate. Where the practice has grown up of not asking for a certificate of probable cause until the time |