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be held on a charge afterward preferred against him of forgery, until he had an opportunity of returning to the state from which he was taken. In re Fitton, (1891) 45 Fed. Rep. 471.
Civil process. Whether a fugitive from justice who has been surrendered, tried, and acquitted of the special charge against him can be at once re-arrested and proceeded against in a civil action, has been a somewhat doubtful question. In the following cases it was held that he can be: Reid v. Ham, (1893) 54 Minn. 305; Williams v. Bacon, (1834) 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 636; Browning v. Abrams, (Supm. Ct. Spec. T. 1876) 51 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 172; while in the following cases it was held that he cannot be: Compton v. Wilder, (1883) 40 Ohio St. 130; Moletor v. Sinnen, (1890) 70 Wis. 308, 20 Am. St. Rep. 71.
If, however, the accused is brought within the jurisdiction “in bad faith, for the purpose of a civil arrest,” he cannot be arrested on a civil process by any person who was a
party to the extradition proceedlings. Browning 1. Abrams, (Supm. Ct. Spec. T. 1876) 51 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 172; Williams 1. Bacon, (1834) 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 636; Underwood v. Fetter, 6 N. 1. Leg. Obs. 66.
And where this was the reason for the institution of the extradition proceedings, the party accused will not be given up. Ex p. Slauson, (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. 666.
No review by federal court after conviction.
Where the accused has been tried and convicted of a crime in a state court, and habeas corpus proceedings have been instituted by him thereafter, the legality of his extradition will not be reviewed by a federal court, his ground for discharge being that certain alleged facts which were presented to the state court were decided against him. Eaton 1. West Virginia, (C. C. A. 1898) 91 Fed. Rep. 760, citing Ex P. Royall, (1886) 117 L'. S. 241, discussing the question of interference by federal authorities on writs of habeas corpus. .
Sec. 5279. [Penalty for resisting agent, etc.) Any agent so appointed who receives the fugitive into his custody, shall be empowered to transport him to the State or Territory from which he has fled. And every person who, by force, sets at liberty or rescues the fugitive from such agent while so transporting him, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year. [R. S.]
Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat, L. 302. ings he entertained toward the fugitive or
Agent of demanding state — No personal what result he hoped would ensue. Matter of responsibility. — An agent of the demanding Titus, (1876) 8 Ben. (U. S.) 411. state who, pursuant to his appointment, ob Not a federal officer. - Where a demanding tains the arrest of the fugitive from justice, state has appointed an agent to receive the acts in a ministerial capacity; and he in accused from the state surrendering him, curs no personal responsibility for his acts in such agent is not an officer of the United connection therewith so long as such acts are States, within the principle of former adjudi. within the scope of the authority conferred cations. Robb v. Connolly, (1884) 111 U. S. upon him and justified by the laws of the 624; Ex p. State, (1883) 73 Ala. 503, 49 Am. United States; and it matters not what feel Rep. 63.
Sec. 5280. [Arrest of deserting seamen from foreign vessels.] On application of a consul or vice-consul of any foreign government having a treaty with the United States stipulating for the restoration of seamen deserting, made in writing, stating that the person therein named has deserted from a vessel of any such government, while in any port of the United States, and on proof by the exhibition of the register of the vessel, ship’s roll, or other official document, that the person named belonged, at the time of desertion, to the crew of such vessel, it shall be the duty of any court, judge, commissioner of any circuit court, justice, or other magistrate, having competent power, to issue warrants to cause such person to be arrested for examination. If, on examination, the facts stated are found to be true, the person arrested not being a citizen of the United States, shall be delivered up to the consul or vice-consul, to be sent back to the dominions of any such government, or, on the request and at the expense of the consul or vice-consul, shall be detained until the consul or vice-consul finds an opportunity to send him back to the dominions of any such government. No person so arrested shall be detained more than two months after his arrest; but at the end of that time shall be set at liberty, and shall not be again molested for the same cause. If any such deserter shall be found to have committed any crime or offense, his surrender may be delayed until the tribunal before which
the case shall be depending, or may be cognizable, shall have pronounced its sentence, and such sentence shall have been carried into effect. [R. S.]
Act of March 2, 1829, ch. 41, 4 Stat. L. Order to deliver to ship, in excess of au359; Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 123, 10 Stat. thority. Where, under a treaty between the L. 614.
United States and Great Britain entered into Relator held to be a deserter from foreign in 1892, providing that the British consul navy. — In Tucker 1. Alexandroff, (1902) 183 shall have power to require from the proper l. S. 424 (rerersing U. S. 1. Motherwell, authority the assistance provided by law for (1900) 103 Fed. Rep. 198; and Motherwell v. the apprehension, recovery, and extradition T. S., (C. C. A. 1901) 107 Fed. Rep. 437), it of seamen who may desert from any ship bewas held that the relator was a deserter from longing to a citizen of Great Britain, and a Russian ship of war, and that the case came under sec. 5280, R. S., in force at the time within this section and the treaty of 1832 this treaty was entered into, a commissioner made between the United States and Russia. duly adjudged certain persons to be deserters
No obligation to punish harborer. — “When from a British ship, and ordered them to be the provisions of this statute (sec. 5280) restored and surrendered to such ship under are exhausted, the government of the United the direction of the British consul, it was States has fulfilled its obligations with for held that he had exceeded his authority, eign powers under the commercial treaties which extended only to an order that they providing for extradition of deserting sea should be delivered to the consul, or men; it has not contracted in any such trea one authorized to act for him, which delivery ties to punish the harborer on this soil, nor might, however, be made on board the British has it so provided in its own statutes.” U.S. ship. U. S. v. Kelly, (1901) 108 Fed. Rep. t. Minges, (1883) 16 Fed. Rep. 657.
An act regulating fees and the practice in extradition cases.
[Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 378, 22 Stat. L. 215.]
(Sec. 1.] [Extradition cases to be heard publicly, etc.] That all hearings in cases of extradition under treaty stipulation or convention shall be held on land, publicly, and in a room or office easily accessible to the public. [22 Stat. L. 215.]
SEC. 2. [Relates to fees paid to commissioners in extradition cases. See JUDICIAL OFFICERS.]
Sec. 3. [Subpæna of witnesses for defendant -- costs in such case paid.] That on the hearing of any case under a claim of extradition by any foreign government, upon affidavit being filed by the person charged setting forth that there are witnesses whose evidence is material to his defense, that he cannot safely go to trial without them, what he expects to prove by each of them, and that he is not possessed of sufficient means, and is actually unable to pay the fees of such witnesses, the judge or commissioner before whom such claim for extradition is heard may order that such witnesses be subpænaed; and in such cases the costs incurred by the process, and the fees of witnesses, shall be paid in the same manner that similar fees are paid in the case of witnesses subpænaed in behalf of the United States. [22 Stat. L. 215.] See provision from the Act of June 28,
Adjournment. - In In re Wadge, (1883) 16 1902, ch. 1301, set forth infra, p. 91.
Fed. Rep. 332, it was held that the comThe word
« trial” is confined to such a missioners' refusal to grant an adjournment preliminary hearing as was already allowable to enable the accused to procure depositions under the existing practice, that is, a hearing from England to show an alibi, was, under having reference only to a commitment for the circumstances, a legitimate exercise of future trial.
In re Wadge, (1883) 15 Fed. discretion.
SEC. 4. [Witness fees, costs, etc., certified to and paid by Secretary of State, etc.)
That all witness fees and costs of every nature in cases of extradition, including the fees of the commissioner, shall be certified by the judge or commissioner before whom the hearing shall take place to the Secretary of State of
the United States, who is hereby authorized to allow the payment thereof out of the appropriation to defray the expenses of the judiciary; and the Secretary of State shall cause the amount of said fees and costs so allowed to be reimbursed to the Government of the United States by the foreign government by whom the proceedings for extradition may have been instituted. [22 Stat. L. 216.]
SEC. 5. [Evidence on hearing.] That in all cases where any depositions, warrants, or other papers or copies thereof shall be offered in evidence upon the hearing of any extradition case under Title sixty-six of the Revised Statutes of the United States, such depositions, warrants, and other papers, or the copies thereof, shall be received and admitted as evidence on such hearing for all the purposes of such hearing if they shall be properly and legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received for similar purposes by the tribunals of the foreign country from which the accused party shall have escaped, and the certificate of the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the United States resident in such foreign country shall be proof that any deposition, warrant or other paper or copies thereof, so offered, are authenticated in the manner required by this act. [22 Stat. L. 216.]
When papers purporting to be depositions following In re McPhun, (1887) 30 Fed. admitted. — Papers which purport to be depo Rep. 57; In re Henrich, (1867) 5 Blatchf. sitions, and which are authenticated as re (U. S.) 414; In re Farez, (1870) 7 Blatchf. quired under this section, may be admitted (U. S.) 345; In re Charleston, (1888) 34 on the hearing, notwithstanding that the re Fed. Rep. 531; In re Grin, (1901) 112 Fed. citals in the introductory part show that they
Rep. 790. are not depositions, but only statements. In The certificate of the principal diplomatic re Ezeta, (1894) 62 Fed. Rep. 972.
officer is sufficient if it follows the language Section applies only to papers offered by of the statute, and the adding of the words prosecution. — This section applies only to as evidence” will not vitiate it. Grin v. papers or copies thereof which are offered in Shine, (1902) 187 U. S. 181. evidence by the prosecution to establish the The certificate of the consul, if it be con. criminality of the person apprehended, and formable to the Act, is of itself absolute does not apply to documents or depositions proof that the papers so certified are receivoffered on the part of the accused any more able in the foreign country in proof of crimthan did the provisions of sec. 5271, R. S., inality; but, if not conformable to the Act, either as originally enacted or as amended by resort may then he had to any oral or other the Act of June 19, 1876. In re Cortes, proof competent to show that the documents (1890) 136 U. S. 330.
presented are so authenticated as to entitle Effect of section on mode of authentication. them to be received as evidence of criminality - This section restores in substance the pro in the foreign country. In re McPhun, (1887) visions of the Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 184, 30 Fed. Rep. 57; In re Wadge, (1883) 16 Fed. 12 Stat. L. 84, as to the mode of authenti Rep. 332. cation, and supersedes the provisions on that It need not appear by the consul's certifisubject of sec. 5271, as well as those of the cate that the depositions or documentary eviAct of June 19, 1876, 19 Stat. L. 59, ch. 133. dence would be competent on the trial of the In re Behrendt, (1884) 22 Fed. Rep. 699; accused in the foreign tribunal, if sufficient In re McPhun, (1887) 30 Fed. Rep. 57.
to authorize his arrest. In re Wadge, (1883) When requirements of section complied 16 Fed. Rep. 332. with. - Where the documents were properly By vice-consul. — Where the depositions in authenticated for the purpose of being used an extradition matter were authenticated by in extradition proceedings, and the signature the United States vice-consul, such authentiwas verified by oral proof, and the documents cation was held sufficient under this Act, a would be received in similar proceedings in vice-consul being an acting consul, and not a the demanding country, it was held that the deputy. In re Herres, (1887) 33 Fed. Rep. requirements of this section had been com 165; In re Orpen, (1898) 86 Fed. Rep. 760. plied with. In re Wadge, (1883) 15 Fed. holding that the court will take judicial noRep. 864 [following In re Henrich, (1867) 5 tice that the chargé d'affaires ad interim, by Blatchf, (U. S.) 414; In re Farez, (1870) whom the papers were signed, was, at the 7 Blatchf. (U. S.) 345; Matter of Fowler, time, the principal diplomatic officer in the (1880) 18 Blatchf. (U. S.) 430].
foreign country. The words “for similar purposes
” in this
Certificate insufficient. Where the certifisection must receive the same construction cate of the consul stated that “all and every they received under the Act of June 22, 1860, the certified copies hereunto attached ch. 184, 12 Stat. L. 84, namely, “as evidence properly and legally authenticated and certiof criminality," the same construction hav fied according to the law in force in British ing been given to similar words in prior stat India, so as to enable them to be used in utes. In re Cortes, (1890) 136 U. S. 330 evidence and as proof that the originals were
duly received in evidence
in proof criminality of the accused for the purpose of of the criminality” of the accused, it was extradition cannot be reviewed upon habeas held that such certificate was not sufficient, corpus. Grin v. Shine, (1902) 187 U. S. 191, as the words following the expression “ used following In re Cortes, (1890) 136 U. S. in evidence” were a definition of the pur 330; In re Wadge, (1883) 16 Fed. Rep. 332, poses for which the copies might be received, holding that if the depositions and proofs namely, as evidence that certain originals present a sufficient case to the commissioner were on file, which originals had been duly for the exercise of his judicial discretion, his received in evidence in British India as proof judgment cannot be reviewed. of criminality, which is an entirely different Of the effect of the evidence authenticated thing from what the statute requires. In re according to this Act " it was the judicial McPhun, (1887) 30 Fed. Rep. 57.
duty of the commissioner to judge, and Will supply prior defects. - The final cer neither the duty nor the power to review his tificate of the C'nited States minister will action thereon has been conferred upon any supply defects, if any, in the certificates of other judicial officer. If deems it suffiforeign officials to the same documents. In re cient, the statute prescribes his further action Behrendt, (1884) 22 Fed. Rep. 699; In re in the premises. It then rests with the exKrojanker. (1890) 44 Fed. Rep. 482.
ecutive authority to determine, in the last Proof of allowance of copies. — Proof need resort, what is demanded by justice and the not be given, in addition to the certificate of obligations of the treaty. If it appears to the the consul, that the law of the demanding President, upon a review of all the evidence, country would allow "copies of original de that the charge is not sustained, and that positions taken before a magistrate to be re justice and the obligation of the treaty do ceivel as competent proof against the accused not require the surrender of the prisoners, he for the purposes of commitment.” In re can refuse it, and they can be set at liberty, Charleston, (1888) 31 Fed. Rep. 531.
either under the provisions of section 5273 When no review by habeas corpus. — Where of the Revised Statutes, or in any other approthe evidence has been properly certified under priate manner.” Matter of Vandervelpen, this section, its sufficiency to establish the (1877) 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 137.
SEC. 6. [Repeal.] The act approved June nineteenth, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, entitled "An act to amend section fifty-two hundred and seventy-one of the Revised Statutes of the United States", and so much of said section fifty-two hundred and seventy-one of the Revised Statutes of the United States as is inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed. [22 Stat. L. 216.]
[Fees and costs -- out of what appropriations payable.] ]
Prorided, That from and after June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and three, all the fees and costs in extradition cases shall be paid out of the appropriations to defray the expenses of the judiciary, and the Attorney-General shall certify to the Secretary of State the amounts to be paid to the United States on account of said fees and costs in extradition cases by the foreign government requesting the extradition, and the Secretary of State shall cause said amounts to be collected and transmitted to the Attorney-General for deposit in the Treasury of the l'nited States. [32 Stat. L. 475.] This is from the Sundry Civil Appropriation Act of June 28, 1902, ch. 1301.
R. S. 5435. False Personation of Holder of Public Stocks, 92.
5448. Falsely Assuming to Be a Revenue Oficer, 92. Act of April 18, 1884, ch. 26, 92.
Falsely Pretending to Be United States Officer with Intent to Defraud,
How Punished, 92.
Sec. 5435. [False personation of holder of public stocks.] Every person who falsely personates any true and lawful holder of any share or sum in the public stocks or debt of the United States, or any person entitled to any annuity, dividend, pension, prize-money, wages, or other debt due from the United States, and, under color of such false personation, transfers or endeavors to transfer such public stock or any part thereof, or receives or endeavors to receive the money of such true and lawful holder thereof, or the money of any person really entitled to receive such annuity, dividend, pension, prize-money, wages, or other debt, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, and by imprisonment at hard labor not more than ten years. [R. S.]
Act of March 3, 1825, ch. 65, 4 Stat. L. 120.
Sec. 5448. [Falsely assuming to be a revenue officer.] Every person who falsely represents himself to be a revenue officer, and, in such assumed character, demands or receives any money or other article of value from any person for any duty or tax due to the United States, or for any violation or pretended violation of any revenue law of the United States, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and shall be fined five hundred dollars, and imprisoned not less than six months and not more than two years. [R. S.]
Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, 14 Stat. L. revenue taxation, approved June 13, 1898, as 484.
amended, in the respect of knowingly and wilIndictment sufficient. - The first count of fully buying washed revenue stamps. The an indictment charged that the defendants, second count was like the first, except that it unlawfully and feloniously, falsely repre charged that the defendants had in possession sented themselves to be revenue officers of the washed and restored revenue stamps knowUnited States, and in such assumed character ingly and without lawful excuse, these two demanded and received certain money, to counts being laid under this section. They wit, $200, of one A. I., for the pretended vio were held to be technically sufficient to charge lation by the said A. I. of a revenue law of the offense. U. S. v. Brown, (1902) 119 the United States, that is to say, of section 8 Fed. Rep. 482. of an Act of Congress concerning internal
An act making it a felony for a person to falsely and fraudulently assume or pretend to be
an officer or employee acting under authority of the United States or any Department or any officer thereof, and prescribing a penalty therefor.
[Act of April 18, 1884, ch. 26, 23 Stat. L. 11.]
[Falsely pretending to be United States officer with intent to defraud, how punished.] That every person who, with intent to defraud either the United States or any person, falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee