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render service dissimilar. - U. S. v. Tozer, (1889) 39 Fed. Rep. 369.

Guaranty of large amount justifies reduced rates. — But it is not an unjust discrimination for a company to carry at a lower rate in consideration of a guaranty of large quanti. ties and full train loads at regular periods, provided the real object of the company is to obtain a greater remunerative profit by the diminished cost of carriage, although the effect may be to exclude from the lower rate those shippers who cannot give such guaranty. Interstate Commerce Commission 1. Texas, etc., R. Co., (1892) 52 Fed. Rep. 187, citing Nicholson v. Great Western R. Co., (1858) 5 C. B. N. S. 366, 94 E. C. L. 366.

Local and through rates. — A through rate lower than the intermediate local rate 'does not constitute unjust discrimination. U. S. 1*. Tozer, (1889) 39 Fed. Rep. 369; Interstate Commerce Commission 1. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 37; Union Pac. R. Co. v. U. S., (1886) 117 U. S. 355 ; Interstate Commerce Commission V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. 281; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197. See also Harris Cockermouth, etc., R. Co., (1858) 1 R. & Can. T. Cas. 97, 3 C. B. N. S. 693, 91 E. C. L. 693; Hozier v. Caledonian R. Co., (1855) 1 R. & Can. T. Cas. 27, 17 Sess. Cas. 302 (decided under the English Traffic Act).

The circumstances and conditions of through traffic are substantially different from those of local traffic. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 V. S. 197; Union Pac. R. Co. v. U. S., (1886) 117 U, S. 355.

The mere fact that in any particular case the disparity between through and local rates was considerable will not warrant the circuit court of appeals in finding that such disparity constitutes an undue discrimination, especially where the disparity was not complained of by any one affected thereby. Texas, etc., R. Co. 1. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197.

If the local rates are reasonable, it does not constitute unlawful discrimination for a carrier to accept business from other carriers on through rates which, when divided among them, will give to any one of them less for its division than its own local rates. Kentucky, etc., Bridge Co. 1'. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 567.

A connecting carrier operating wholly within one state may carry foreign through freight at less than its local rates for traffic originating upon its own line, Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Osborne, (1892) 10 U. S. App. 430, distinguished in Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. 1. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 ('. S. 181.

Passes constitute unlawful discrimination. - Ex p. Koehler, (1887) 31 Fed. Rep. 315; In re Charge to Grand Jury, (1895) 66 Fed. Rep. 146.

Party-rate tickets not unlawful. -- Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. 263, affirming (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 37, and followed in Foster v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 434; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 165.

The transportation of ten persons on single ticket is not substantially identical with the transportation of one person.

Interstate Commerce Commission V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. 263.

But such party-rate tickets must be available to the public generally. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. 263.

Round-trip tickets at reduced rates do not constitute unjust discrimination. Interstate Commerce Commission 1. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. 263.

Rebates. — Giving rebates to one shipper and denying them to others under similar conditions constitutes unjust discrimination. Wight 1o. U. S., (1897) 167 U. S. 512; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 144; Bullard v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (1890) 10 Mont. 168, 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 234. Generally as to what constitutes a rebate, see Willoughby v. Chicago Junction R., etc., Co., (1892) 50 N. J. Eq. 656.

A rebate, drawback, or special rate is not, of itself, unjust discrimination; for it does not necessarily follow that a like rebate, drawback, or special rate has not been extended to all the patrons of the carrier.” U. S. v. Hanley, (1896) 71 Fed. Rep. 673.

Greater charge to forwarding agents. -- It is not an unlawful discrimination to charge a greater carload rate upon carloads shipped by forwarding agents and made up by combining the shipments of several small shippers than is charged for a carload shipped by a single owner, as the circumstances and conditions of the two shipments are substantially different. Lundquist Grand Trunk Western R. Co., (1901) 121 Fed. Rep. 915.

Free cartage equivalent to unlawful rebate. -Hezel Milling Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1891) 3 Int. Com. Rep. 701, 5 Int. Com. C. Rep. 57. See also Stone v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., (1890) 3 Int. Com. Rep. 60, 3 Int. Com. C. Rep. 613; Wight v. U. S. (1897) 167 U. S. 513. But see Detroit, etc., R. Co, 1. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 803, 43 U. S. App. 308, affirmed 167 U. S. 633.

Compressing cotton in transit in accordance with a recognized custom available to all shippers does not constitute unjust discrimination against shippers at intermediate points. Cowan v. Bond, (1889) 39 Fed. Rep. 54.

v.

Sec. 3. [Undue preferences prohibited-equal facilities except in terminals, to connecting lines.] That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject

to the provisions of this act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.

Every common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in their rates and charges between such connecting lines; but this shall not be construed as requiring any such common carrier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business. [24 Stat. L. 380.]

UNDUE OR UNREASONABLE PREFERENCE OR ADVANTAGE.
IN GENERAL.

rnreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any Language and construction of English Traffic

respect whatever. U. S. v. Delaware, etc., R. Act adopted. - This section was taken sub

Co., (1889) 40 Fed. Rep. 101. stantially from the English Traffic Act, and

Preference or advantage not necessarily

unlawful. — The mere existence of a preferhence the construction put upon that Act by

ence or advantage in a particular case is not the English courts must be regarded as in

enough to bring it within the prohibition af corporated in the Act. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892)

this section. Denaby Main Colliery Co. 1. 145 U. S. 284; McDonald v. Hovey, (1883)

Manchester, etc., R. Co., (1885) 11 App. Cas.

97; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Com110 U. S. 619. And see Hozier v. Caledonian

merce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197; InR. Co., (1855) 1 R. & Can. T. Cas. 27, 17

terstate Commerce Commission V. Alabama Sess. Cas. 302; Jones v. Eastern Counties R.

Midland R. Co., (C. C. A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. Co., (1858) 3 C. B. N. S. 718, 91 E. C. L. 718;

715. Ransome v. Eastern Counties R. Co., (1857)

This section does not prohibit all discrimi1 C. B. N. S. 437, 87 E. C. L. 437; Oxlade v. North Eastern R. Co., (1857) 1 C. B. N. S.

nation, but only such discrimination as is un454, 87 E. C. L. 454; Texas, etc., R. Co. v.

due or unreasonable under the circumstances

of the case. Interstate Commerce Commis. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162

sion v. Texas, etc., R. Co., (1892) 52 Fed. Rep. U. S. 197. Relative fairness and impartiality required.

187; Oregon Short Line, etc., R. Co. v. North

ern Pac. R. Co., (1892) 51 Fed. Rep. 465; - The purpose of this section was to prevent

Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. partiality and discrimination between persons

Co., (1894) 59 Fed. Rep. 402; Oregon Shortin the same relative situation, and in this re

Line, etc., R. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (C. spect it changes the common law which did

C. A. 1894) 61 Fed. Rep. 158; Little Rock, not prohibit discrimination. Interstate Com

etc., R. Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., merce Commission v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co.,

(C. C. A. 1894) 63 Fed. Rep. 775; Interstate (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 37; U. S. v. Delaware,

Commerce Commission 0. Alabama Midland etc., R. Co., (1889) 40 Fed. Rep. 101.

R. Co., (1895) 69 Fed. Rep. 227; U. S. v. NorReasonable charge may create unlawful

folk, etc., R. Co., (1901) 109 Fed. Rep. 836. preference. A charge may be perfectly rea

Substantially similar circumstances and sonable under section 1 of the Act and may

conditions must exist in order to render a create an unreasonable preference or ad

preference or advantage illegal. Cowan v. vantage under section 3 of the Act. Inter

Bond, (1889) 39 Fed. Rep. 54. state Commerce Commission 1. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. 263.

A preference to be undue must be a preference of a person similarly circumstanced and

bringing a similar profit to the company. InWHAT CONSTITUTES UNDUE PREFERENCE OR

terstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore,

etc., R. Co., (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 37. Definition. — The Act itself nowhere de Question of fact and not of law. --fines what constitutes an undue preference “Whether, in particular instances, there or advantage. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Inter has been an undue or unreasonable prejustate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. dice or preference, or whether the circumS. 197; Interstate Commerce Commission v. stances and conditions of the carriage have Alabama Midland R. Co., (C. C. A. 1896) 74 been substantially similar or otherwise, Fed. Rep. 715.

are questions of fact, depending on the matUnjust discrimination under section 3 con ters proved in each case." Interstate Comsists in giving any undue or unreasonable merce Commission 1. Alabama Midland R. preference or advantage to any particular Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 170, (C. C. A. 1896) 74 shipper or subjecting him to any undue or Fed. Rep. 715; Denaby Main Colliery Co. v.

ADVANTAGE.

66

Manchester, etc., R. Co., (1880) 3 R. & Can. Fed. Rep. 715, affirmed (1897) 168 U. S. T. Cas. 426; Phipps v. London, etc., R. Co., 144. (1892) 2 Q. B. 229; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. Mileage. — Relative mileage is a circum0. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) stance to be considered in fixing rates, but it 162 U. S. 184; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate is not alone the test of undue preference or Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197; advantage. Interstate Commerce Commission Palmer 1'. London, etc., R. Co., (1866) L. R. 1 v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. C. P. 593; Interstate Commerce Commission 409, citing with approval Phipps v. London, v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. etc., R. Co., (1892) 2 Q. B. 242. 409.

Charges need not be fixed solely upon a Whether a difference of twelve cents per mileage basis. Interstate Commerce Commishundred pounds between a local rate and the sion v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. carrier's proportion of a through rate is an Rep. 409. undue and unreasonable preference or advan

Differences in population and tonnage may tage as against a local shipper is a question justify what would otherwise be an unjust for the jury. U. S. v. Tozer, (1889) 39 Fed. preference or advantage as between two cities Rep. 369

or towns similarly situated. Detroit, etc., R. Criminality of unreasonable charge. - A Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (C. conviction for the violation of the undue C. A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 832. preference” clause of the Act cannot be sus Welfare of respective localities to be contained where the criminality of the Act is sidered. - The welfare of the locality of demade to depend on whether the jury think livery or consumption must be considered as a preference reasonable or unreasonable. To well as that of the locality of production and constitute a crime, the Act must be one the shipment. Interstate Commerce Commission criminality of which the party is able to V. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. know in advance. Tozer v. U. S., (1892) 52 165, citing with approval Texas, etc., R. Co., Fed. Rep. 917, 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 14, V. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) quoting Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dey, (1888) 162 U. S. 197. 35 Fed. Rep. 866.

Joint through rates are not the standard The burden of proof rests upon the party by which to determine the legality of locai alleging the existence of an undue preference rates of the same carriers. Tozer v. U. S., or advantage. Interstate Commerce Commis (1892) 52 Fed. Rep. 917, 53 Am. & Eng. R sion 1. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1890) 43 Fed. Cas. 14; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Osborne, (C. Rep. 37; Interstate Commerce Commission v. C. A. 1892) 52 Fed. Rep. 912; Allen v. Oregon Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. R., etc., Co., (1899) 98 Fed. Rep. 17. 409; Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, The Act does not expressly authorize the etc., R. Co., (1885) 11 App. Cas. 97.

si arate carriers to contract with reference Circumstances to be considered. -- Differ to through routes and joint tarifis, because ence in rates, convenience of the public, the the carriers already had that authority. But interests of the carrier, the relative volume sections 3 and 6 necessarily imply the recog. of the traffic involved, its relative cost and nition that that authority did exist and that profit to the carrier, the situation of the re it could be exercised after the passage of the spective customers with respect to each other Act, in the same manner and to the same as competitive or otherwise, are all circum extent as before. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Miami stances which must be considered in deter Steamship Co., (C. C. A. 1898) 86 Fed. Rep. mining the existence or non-existence of an 418. undue preference or advantage. Interstate The proportion in which freight earned by Commerce Commission v. Baltimore, etc., R. two connecting railroatls under a joint tariii Co., (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 51, afwo od (1892) schedule is divided between them is a matter 145 U. S. 284; Interstate Commerce Commis for their consideration alone, and a court cansion v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. not hold that the share received by one conRe 409; Interstate Commerce Commission stitutes an unjust or discriminate rate. Allen v. Southern R. Co., (1900) 105 Fed. Rep. 703. v. Oregon R., etc., Co., (1899) 99 Fed. Rep. 16. See Oxlade v. North Eastern R. Co., (1857) The making of a group rate to several 1 C. B. N. S. 454, 87 E. C. L. 454.

points does not preclude a carrier from disBusiness considerations which would nat criminating in other respects between points urally affect the action of the carriers in in the same group, if the circumstances and hependently of the Act are entitled to con conditions otherwise justify such discriminaIderation in determining the existence of an tions. Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Comandue preference or advantage. Texas, etc., merce Commission, (1896) 43 U. S. App. 308. R. Co. 1. Interstate Commerce Commission, Competition between rival carriers, exist(1896) 162 U. S. 197; Interstate Commerce ing at one point and not at another, must be Commission 1. Alabama Midland R. Co., (C. considered in determining whether or not the C. A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 715.

carrier is giving one of such points an undue Mathematical calculation not the test. or unreasonable preference or advantage over The question cannot be determined by a mere the other. Interstate Commerce Commission mathematical calculation. Phipps v. London, 1'. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. etc., R. Co., (1892) 2 Q. B. 238, quoted with 409; Texas, etc., R. Co. 1. Interstate Comapproval in Interstate Commerce Commission merce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197; Inv. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. terstate Commerce Commission 1. Alabama 409; Interstate Commerce Commission Vidland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 144, (C. C. Alabama Midland R. Co., (C. C. A. 1896) 74 A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 715; Interstate Com.

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merce Commission 1. Western, etc., R. Co., Conditions for benefit of carrier. - Carriers (C. C. A. 1899) 93 Fed. Rep. 83, affirming may impose conditions for their own benefit, (1898) 88 Fed. Rep. 186; Phipps v. London, though such conditions may incidentally etc., R. Co., (1892) 2 Q. B. 242; Mansion favor a particular class or locality. InterHouse Assoc. 1. London, etc., R. Co., (1895) state Commerce Commission v. Baltimore, 1 Q. B. 932; Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. etc., R. Co., (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 37. Manchester, etc., R. Co., (1885) 11 App. Cas. Self-preference not unlawful. Carriers 97; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cin may lawfully prefer themselves in their own cinnati, etc., R. Co., (1903) 124 Fed. Rep. business. llwaco R., etc., Co. 1. Oregon Short 624; Interstate Commerce Commission Line, etc., R. Co., (1893) 57 led. Rep. 673, 15 Nashville, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1903) 120 U. S. App. 173; Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Fed. Rep. 934.

East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1891) 47 Fed. The reason why competition must be con

Rep. 771. sidered is that a trader is as much entitled Carrier may protect itself against physical to the advantage of a situation where rival disadvantages. – Detroit, etc., R. Co. 1'. Incarriers are competing for his traffic, as an terstate Commerce Commission, (C. C. A. other trader is entitled to the advantage of 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 832, holding that the locaa situation nearer the market requiring a tion of a carrier's station at a much greater shorter haul. Interstate Commerce Commis distance from the centre of traffic than the sion v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. stations of rival carriers will justify the carRep. 409; Interstate Commerce Commission rier in furnishing free cartage at that point V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. in order to obtain and preserve its traffic. 283; Ransome v. Eastern Counties R. Co., This case was affirmed by the Supreme Court (1857) 1 C. B. N. S. 437, 87 E. C. L. 437. in an opinion confined to a consideration of

The nature and extent of competition section 4 of the Act, the questions arising must be considered in determining whether a under sections 2 and 3 having been withparticular discrimination is thereby justified. drawn from consideration. See (1897) 167 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Western, U. S. 644. etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1899) 93 Fed. Rep. 83; Free cartage. — The furnishing of free cartInterstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama age by a carrier at some point and not at Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U, S. 167.

others may or may not constitute an unlawAll competition, provided it possesses the ful preference or advantage. It is not unattribute of producing a substantial and ma lawful, if, under the existing circumstances, terial effect upon traffic and rate making, is such discrimination is reasonable and necesproper, under the statute, to be taken into

sary for the benefit of the carrier, and esconsideration. The fact that the competition pecially where there is no competition beis wholly between carriers who are subject to tween the two points. Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. the Act is not material. Interstate Commerce Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 71 Commission 1. Southern R. Co., (1900) 105 Pred. 1.(?). $13, 43 U. S. App. 308, affirmed on Fed. Rep. 704

other points in (1897) 167 U. S. 644. The fact that a railroad company has ac These English cases abundantly establish quired the ownership of the only road which three propositions in relation to this subject: previously competed with its own for busi (1) That the collecting and delivery of ness at a certain point cannot affect the ques goods is a separate and distinct business, nottion whether its rates unjustly discriminate withstanding the confusion to which we have against such point in favor of another point adverted; (2) that the railroad companies, where competition exists, where it aflirma undertaking to do for themselves this sepatively appears that the rates to the noncom rate business, cannot, by consolidating the petitive point have not been increased since

compensation for each, avoid the restrictions the purchase of the competing road. Inter that have been imposed upon them in respect state Commerce Commission v. Southern R. of unlawful discriminations, and it is amply Co., (1902) 117 Fed. Rep. 741.

within the power of the railway commissions Potential water competition, although there and the courts, according to the facts of each is at the time but liiile actual competition, particular case, to separate the two, in order is a circumstance to be considered. Inter

to prevent such an unlawful combination; state Commerce Commission v. Alabama (3) that, notwithstanding the separable and Willand R. Co., (C. C. A. 1336) 74 Fed. Rep. independent character of the two services, 715.

both, whether in the hands of the same or Competition in ocean freights. -- In deter separate carriers, are subject to the rules and mining questions of the reasonableness of

regulations prescribed by law to prevent unrates and of discrimination in regard to lawful discriminations.” Detroit, etc., R. Co. traffic originating in foreign countries, the V. Interstate Commerce Commission, (C. C. courts may and should take into considera A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 812, citing Pickfo 1 v. tion as constituting dissimilar conditions, Grand Junction R. Co., (1842) 10 M. & W. circumstances existing beyond the scaboard 399; Parker 1. Great Western R. Co., (1844) of the United States (such as competition by 7 M. & G. 253, 49 E. C. L. 253; Parker v. ocean freights) as well as conditions prevail. Great Western R. Co., (1856) 6 El. & Bl. 77, ing within the l'nited States., Texas, etc., R. 88 E. C. L. 77; Baxendale v. North Devon R. Co. Interstate Commerce Commission, Co., (1857) 3 C. B. N. S. 324, 91 E. C. L. 324; (1896) 162 U. S. 197, cited and followed in Baxendale v. Great Western R. Co., (1858) 5 Interstate Commerce Commission 1. South C. B. N. S. 309, 336, 94 E. C. L. 309, 336; orn R. Co., (1900) 105 Fed. Rep. 703.

Garton v. Great Western R. Co., (1859) 5 C.

U.

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B. N. S. 669, 94 E. C. L. 669; Garton v. Bris tage. In re Charge to Grand Jury, (1895) 66 tol, etc., R. Co., (1859) 6 C. B. N. S. 639, 95 Fed. Rep. 146. E. C. L. 639, (1861) 1 B. & S. 112, 101 E. C. "The subject of the preference' or ' prejuL. 112; Pegler 1. Monmouthshire R., etc., Co., dice' is transportation of either persons or (1861) 6 H. & N. 644; Baxendale 1. Bristol, property. The Act nowhere in terms proetc., R. Co., (1862) 11 C. B. N. S. 787, 103 E. hibits the mere issuing of free tickets or free C. L. 787; Baxendale v. Great Western R. Co., passes. A free ticket or a free pass not used (1863) 14 C. B. N. S. 1, 108 E. C. L. 1, (1864) is not transportation; it is not a preference 16 C. B. N. S. 137, 111 E. C. L. 137; Palmer or advantage to the holder, nor any prejuv. London, etc., R. Co., (1866) L. R. I C. P.

dice or disadvantage to others." In re Hunt588, (1870) L. R. 6 C. P. 194; West v. London, ington, (1895) 68 Fed. Rep. 882, citing Griffee etc., R. Co., (1870) L. R. 5 C. P. 622; Parkin v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., (1888) 2 Int. Com. son r. Great Western R. Co., (1871) L. R. 6 C. Rep. 301. C. P. 554; Evershed v. London, etc., R. Co., Lower joint through rates not a discrimina(1877) 2 Q. B. D. 254, 3 Q. B. D. 134; London, tion against local shippers. — Pa ons etc., R. Co. 1. Evershed, (1878) 3 App. Cas. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1894) 63 Fed. 1029; Manchester, etc., R. Co. v. Denaby Main Rep. 903, citing Tozer v. U. S., (1892) 52 Fed. Colliery Co., (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 674, 14 Q. B. Rep. 917. D. 209; Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Man Greater charge for shorter haul may conchester, etc., R. Co., (1885) 11 App. Cas. 97; stitute undue preference or advantage. Liverpool Corn Trade Assoc. v. London, etc., Interstate Commerce Commission v. Western, R. Co., (1891) 1 Q. B. 120.

etc., R. Co., (1898) 88 Fed. Rep. 186; InterIt cannot be said that a railroad company

state Commerce Commission 0. East Tenmay not reasonably and without undue pref nessee, etc., R. Co., (1898) 85 Fed. Rep. 107; erence or advantage, or unlawful discrimina Interstate Commerce Commission v. Western, tion, collect and deliver, at its own expense,

etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1899) 93 Fed. Rep. 83. goods at one city and not at another, where Under the English Traffic Acts a provision the difference in population is as seventy substantially like the third section of the thousand to six thousand and in traffic one Interstate Commerce Act against undue prefmillion tons to fifty-five thousand tons. De erences an advantages is made to serve subtroit, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce stantially the same purpose as the fourth Commission, (C. C. A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. section of the American act with respect to 832.

long and short hauls. Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Guaranty of arrival on time not an unlaw Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 74 ful discrimination. — Foster v. Cleveland, etc., ied. Rep. 803, 43 U. S. App. 308. R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 434.

In Jones 1. Eastern Counties R. Co., (1858) Discrimination in rates. — Discrimination 3 C. B. N. S. 718, 91 E. C. L. 718, the court in rates may constitute an unlawful prefer refissed an injunction to compel a railway ence or advantage under this section, as well company to issue season tickets between Coi. as discrimination in facilities furnished. U. chester and London upon the same terms as S. v. Tozer, (1889) 2 Int. Com. Rep. 422, citing it issued them between Harwich and LonDenaby Main Colliery Co. 1o. Manchester, etc., don, upon the mere suggestion that the R. Co., (1880) 3 R. & Can. T. Cas. 426, (1885) granting of the latter, the distance being con11 App. Cas. 97.

siderably greater, at a much lower rate than But it is not the purpose of the statute to the former, was an undue and unreasonable prevent competition in rates between differ preference of the inhabitants of Harwich over ent points on different lines of road. Allen those of Colchester. 0. Oregon R., etc., Co., (1899) 98 Fed. Rep. 17. The charging of a greater sum for a shorter

A contract by which a carrier undertakes than for a longer haul is specifically dealt to carry the lumber of a certain shipper to a with in the fourth section of the Act. (See point beyond the state at a stipulated rate, infra.) If such a charge is not illegal under which is less than the lumber could be the fourth section it cannot be held illegal shipped for over the carrier's line without loss under the third section. Interstate Commerce to the carrier, and therefore less than the Commission 1. Western, etc., R. Co., (1898) carrier will give to others shipping lumber 88 Fed. Rep. 194; Interstate Commerce Comunder the same conditions, is void under the mission 1. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Interstate Commerce Act making it unlawful Fed. Rep. 925. for a carrier to give any undue or unreason The same circumstances which will justify able preference or advantage to any particular a greater charge for a shorter than a longer person. Kizer 1. Texarkana, etc., R. Co., haul under section 4, will prevent such rato (1899) 66 Ark. 348.

from constituting an illegal preference or adParty-rate tickets not an undue preference vantage under section 3. Interstate Comor advantage. --- Interstate Commerce Com merce Commission 1. Nashville, etc., R. Co., mission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) (C. C. A. 1903) 120 Fed. Rep. 934; East Ten168 U. S. 144; Interstate Commerce Commis nessee, etc., R. Co. 1. Interstate Commerce sion v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. Commission, (1901) 181 U. S. l. S. 263, affirming (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 37; “In a supposed case when, in the first inFoster r. Cleveland, etc., .R. Co., (1893) 56 stance, upon an issue as to a violation of the Fed. Rep. 434.

fourth section of the Act, it is conceded or Passes. — The giving of free passes to per established that the rates charged to the sons not enumerated in section 22 of the Act shorter distance point are just and reasonable constitutes an illegal preference or advan in and of themselves, and it is also shown

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