equipment for the transportation of traffic over the carrier's own road. U. S. v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., (1889) 40 Fed. Rep. 101.

Similar and dissimilar circumstances and conditions. Equal facilities are not required where the circumstances are dissimilar. Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., (C. C. A. 1894) 63 Fed. Rep. 775; Oregon Short-Line, etc., R. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (1892) 51 Fed. Rep. 465, citing Kentucky, etc.. Bridge Co. r. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 624; Little Rock, etc., R. Co. r. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1894) 59 Fed. Rep. 403; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Denver, etc., R. Co., (1883) 110 U. S. 667.

Discrimination may be justified by dissimilar circumstances and conditions. Augusta Southern R. Co. v. Wrightsville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 522.

A connecting through line may be preferred to a connecting local line. Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1891) 47 Fed. Rep. 771, 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 23.

Right of equal facilities reciprocal. — The right and duty to furnish equal facilities are reciprocal. Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1891) 47 Fed. Rep. 771.

Only at terminal points. The duty to furnish equal and reasonable facilities for the interchange of traffic is limited to furnishing such facilities at terminal points. U. S. v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., (1889) 40 Fed. Rep. 101.

A road making a physical connection with an established line at other than a terminal point must itself first furnish facilities for the interchange of traffic, before it has a right to demand an interchange of traffic at such point. Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1894) 59 Fed. Rep. 403, citing Kentucky, etc., Bridge Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 567. See also Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Denver, etc., R. Co., (1883) 110 U. S. 667.

Discrimination in rates and charges. — Discrimination in rates and charges as between connecting carriers under substantially similar circumstances and conditions is unlawful. Cutting . Florida R., etc., Co., (1887) 30 Fed. Rep. 663; Augusta Southern R. Co. v. Wrightsville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 522.

Through tickets. The statute does not require a carrier to sell through tickets over its own and connecting lines. This is a right which arises only out of private contract between the carriers. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., (1887) 1 Int. Com. Rep. 357, 1 Int. Com. C. Rep. 86. Applied in Kentucky, etc., Bridge Co. r. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 567.

Line, etc., R. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (C. C. A. 1894) 61 Fed. Rep. 158.

The meaning of this clause is clear. It simply declares that the preceding provision of the section shall not be deemed to give the right to one carrier to use the tracks or terminal facilities of another carrier in the like business. It has reference to the effect of the Act of Congress, and nothing else. If the defendant company, by a contract with the city of Dubuque, has bound itself to allow other companies to use part of its tracks or terminal facilities, this clause of the Act of Congress does not affect such a contract, or the enforcement thereof. So, also, if the state of Iowa has provided by proper statute that different companies may have a joint or common use of certain terminal facilities the rights of the several companies to such joint use are not affected by the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, but the same must be measured and determined by the statutes of the state." Iowa v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1887) 33 Fed. Rep. 396.

It is not a violation of the statute for a carrier to allow a connecting carrier the use of its tracks or terminal facilities and to refuse to allow a similar use by other connecting carriers. Oregon Short Line, etc., R. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (1892) 51 Fed. Rep. 475; St. Louis Drayage Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1894) 65 Fed. Rep. 39; Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., (C. C. A. 1894) 63 Fed. Rep. 775; Kentucky, etc., Bridge Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1889) 37 Fed. Rep. 571. See also infra, this note, Duty to arrange for joint through transportation.

The burden of proof is upon the complaining carrier to show a discrimination within the statute. Oregon Short Line, etc., R. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (1892) 51 Fed. Rep. 465.

Duty to arrange for joint through transportation. The duty to furnish equal and reasonable facilities for the interchange of traffic with connecting lines does not require connecting carriers to enter into an arrangement between themselves for joint through transportation, and they cannot be compelled to do so. Such arrangements are left solely to the voluntary action of the carriers themselves. Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1890) 41 Fed. Rep. 559; Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1889) 3 Int. Com. C. Rep. 1; Interstate Commerce Commission . Western, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1899) 93 Fed. Rep. 83; St. Louis Drayage Co. t. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1894) 65 Fed. Rep. 41; Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1894) 59 Fed. Rep. 405; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 184; Chicago, etc., R. Co. r. Osborne, (1892) 10 I. S. App. 430, 52 Fed. Rep. 912; Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., (C. C. A. 1894) 63 Fed. Rep. 778; Central Stock Yards Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1902) 118 Fed. Rep. 113.

This construction of the statute is based largely upon the fact that the Act was modeled upon the English Traffic Acts, and

road company, but the joint use of the same track does not create the same line, so as to compel either company to graduate its tariff by that of the other." Chicago, etc., R. Co. 1. Osborne, (C. C. A. 1892) 52 Fed. Rep. 912, 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 18, reversing (1891) 48 Fed. Rep. 49, 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 12; quoted with approval in Interstate Commerce Commission . Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925.

Charge may violate each of first four sections. A greater charge for a shorter than for a longer haul may be illegal not only under the above section, but also under section 1, as being unreasonable or unjust; and under section 2, as constituting an unjust discrimination; and under section 3, as constituting an undue and unreasonable preference or advantage. See notes to sections 1, 2, and 3, passim.

The principle of the third and fourth sections is the same. Interstate Commerce Commission v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1893) 85 Fed. Rep. 107.

Equal charge for longer and shorter hauls. -The above section only prohibits a greater charge for a shorter than for a longer haul. An equal charge does not violate this section of the statute, and is not illegal unless it amounts to an unjust discrimination or an undue preference or advantage within the prohibition of the second or third sections of the act. Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 803, 43 U. S. App. 308; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, (1894) 154 U. S. 417.

Equality of charges for a longer and a shorter haul is legal only when the circumstances and conditions are so substantially different as to justify the discrimination. Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 803, 43 U. S. App. 308; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197; Interstate Commerce Commission Brimson, (1894) 154 U. S. 447.

v.

It has been said that an equal charge can be justified only by circumstances which would justify a greater charge for a shorter than for a longer haul. Detroit, etc., R. Co. t. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 863, 43 U. S. App. 308.

Group rates. Charging equal rates to or from stations of a longer and shorter haul included in a single group for the purpose of making rates is not a violation of the above section. Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 803, 43 U. S. App. 308, affirmed 167 U. S. 639, citing Imperial Coal Co. v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., (1888) 2 Int. Com. C. Rep. 618. As to the legality of group rates under other sections of the act, see notes to previous sections.

Local and joint through rates. rate between two points on the same road may be higher than the joint through rate for a longer haul, including in part the road between the local points. Parsons v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1894) 63 Fed. Rep.

903, citing Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Osborne, (1892) 10 U. S. App. 430, 52 Fed. Rep. 912, 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 18, reversing (1891) 48 Fed. Rep. 49, 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 12; Tozer v. U. S., (1892) 52 Fed. Rep. 917, 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 14; U. S. v. Mellen, (1892) 53 Fed. Rep. 229; Interstate Commerce Commission r. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1895) 69 Fed. Rep. 227.

A combination of carriers for through transportation constitutes a new "line which is independent of the component lines, and hence the charges made by the througa line do not constitute a violation of the statute by the local and component lines and vice versa. Interstate Commerce Commission r. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 937; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Osborne, (1892) 52 Fed. Rep. 912, 10 U. S. App. 430, reversing (1891) 48 Fed. Rep. 49; Junod v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1891) 47 Fed. Rep. 290. See also supra, this note, as to meaning of word "line."

The joint rate established over a joint through line may be less than the sum of the local rates, or even less than the local rate of either company over that part of its road constituting a part of the joint line, without violating the long and short haul clause found in the fourth section. Parsons r. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1894) 63 Fed. Rep. 903, citing Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Osborne, (1892) 10 U. S. App. 430, 52 Fed. Rep. 912.

Two or more connecting carriers cannot make a joint rate from one point to another point which is less than the joint rate to an intermediate point, but they may make a joint rate to a point without the local rates of either company to intermediate points being affected thereby. The local rate might be greater than the joint rate without this being a violation of the fourth section. U. S. v. Mellen (1892) 53 Fed. Rep. 229, quoted with approval in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925.

Free cartage not within statute. This section has in view only the transportation of passengers and property by rail, and when property transported as interstate commerce reaches its destination by rail at lawful rates, having regard to rates charged upon similar transportation to other points on the line, it does not concern the Interstate Commerce Commission whether the goods after arrival are carried to their place of deposit j vehicles furnished by the railway company free of charge, or in vehicles furnished by the owners of the goods; and the same rule applies to the transportation of passengers. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., (1897) 167 U. S. 633.

tially dissimilar, this section of the statute has no application. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Texas, etc., R. Co., (1887) 31 Fed. Rep. 862; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Behlmer, (1900) 175 U. S. 648; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 173, (1895) 69 Fed. Rep. 227; Interstate Commerce Commission r. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1897) 167 U. S. 479; Interstate Commerce Commission . East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1898) 85 Fed. Rep. 117; Interstate Commerce Commission . Western, etc., R. Co., (1898) 88 Fed. Rep. 192; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 184; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925; Junod v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1891) 47 Fed. Rep. 290; Interstate Commerce Commission V. Nashville, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1903) 120 Fed. Rep. 934.

Degree of dissimilarity. According to the best considered cases any substantial dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions renders the above express provision as to long and short hauls wholly inapplicable. Interstate Commerce Commission . Western, etc., R. Co., (1898) 88 Fed. Rep. 195, citing with approval Matter of Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1887) 1 Int. Com. C. Rep. 57; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., (1892) 50 Fed. Rep. 300; Behlmer v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 71 Fed. Rep. 839; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 144; and disapproving Interstate Commerce Commission v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1898) 85 Fed. Rep. 107, wherein it was held that the decision in the Alabama Midland railroad case did not go so far as this, but that even under that decision the dissimilarity in conditions must be proportionate to the difference in rates; and criticising the views of the commission in Savannah Bureau of Freight, etc., v. Charleston, etc., R. Co., (1897) 7 Int. Com. Rep. 479.

It has been held, however, that the mere existence of dissimilar circumstances and conditions does not render this section inoperative unless the dissimilarity is so great as to justify the discrimination involved in charging a greater sum for a shorter than a longer haul. Interstate Commerce Commission v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1898) 85 Fed. Rep. 107, distinguishing Interstate Commerce Commission r. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 144. But see Interstate Commerce Commission v. Western, etc., R. Co., (1898) 88 Fed. Rep. 186, wherein this case is disapproved.

This conflict of opinion is, perhaps, not very material, for if the discrimination of a greater charge for a shorter than a longer haul is not in proportion to the dissimilarity of conditions the rate may be declared illegal under section 1, as being unjust or unreasonable, or under section 2, as being an unjust discrimination, or under section 3, as being an undue preference or advantage. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Western, etc., R. Co., (1898) 88 Fed. Rep. 186; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Behlmer, (1900) 175 U. S. 648.

Similarity of conditions a question of fact. Missouri Pac. R. Co. r. Texas, etc., R. Co., (1887) 31 Fed. Rep. 862; Osborne v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1891) 48 Fed. Rep. 49; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 144; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 184.

Presumption and burden of proof. Where a greater charge is made for a shorter than a longer haul, there is no presumption against the carrier that the circumstances are substantially similar and hence that the charge is unlawful, but on the contrary the burden of proof is upon the party complaining to show that the circumstances and conditions are substantially similar. Junod v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1891) 47 Fed. Rep. 290; Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (C. C. A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 839, citing Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., (1892) 50 Fed. Rep. 295; and Osborne . Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1891) 48 Fed. Rep. 49, reversed (1892) 52 Fed. Rep. 912, 10 U. S. App. 430, but upon other points..

In cases of doubt, the doubt should go in favor of the application of the statute, and the conditions should be taken as substantially similar. Missouri Pac, R. Co. v. Texas, etc., R. Co., (1887) 31 Fed. Rep. 862, 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 76, followed in Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Racer, (1892) 5 Ind. App. 209, and quoted in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925.

Circumstances to be considered. In determining the legality of a greater charge for a shorter than a longer haul, the interests of the public, shippers, consumers, and carriers must all be considered. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Behlmer, (1900) 175 U. S. 648; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197. See also similar cases under other sections of act.

That the smaller charge for the longer haul is of great importance to the longer distance point, in enabling its merchants to build up a great trade that would otherwise be lost, is no justification for such discrimination. Behlmer v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1897) 83 Fed. Rep. 898.

Competition between rival carriers. — Competition between rival carriers affecting rates to the further but not the nearer point must be considered in determining the similarity of circumstances and conditions, and it may be sufficient to justify a greater charge for the shorter than the longer haul. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Denver, etc., R. Co., (1883) 110 U. S. 683; Ex p. Koehler, (1887) 12 Sawy. (U. S.) 446, 31 Fed. Rep. 315; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Texas, etc., R. Co., (1887) 31 Fed. Rep. 862; Junod v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1891) 47 Fed. Rep. 290; Interstate Commerce Commission Atchison, etc., R. Co., (1892) 50 Fed. Rep. 295, 50 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 93; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925; Behlmer v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 71 Fed. Rep.

v.

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835; Interstate Commerce Commission Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. 409; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern R. Co., (1902) 117 Fed. Rep. 741; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Behlmer, (1900) 175 U. S. 667; Interstate Commerce Commission v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1898) 85 Fed. Rep. 107, affirmed (1901) 181 U. S. 1; Brewer v. Central of Georgia R. Co., (1898) 84 Fed. Rep. 258; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Western, etc., R. Co., (1898) 88 Fed. Rep. 186; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 144; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Behlmer, (1900) 175 U. S. 648, reversing (1897) 42 U. S. App. 581, which reversed (1836) 71 Fed. Rep. 835; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. 263; Wight . U. S., (1897) 167 U. S. 512; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 197; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern R. Co., (1900) 105 Fed. Rep. 703; Foreman v. Great Eastern R. Co., (1875) 2 R. & Can. T. Cas. 202; Harris v. Cockermouth, etc., R. Co., (1858) 1 R. & Can. T. Cas. 97; Denaby Main Colliery Co. v. Manchester, etc., R. Co., (1885) 11 App. Cas. 97; Phipps v. London, etc., R. Co., (1892) 2 Q. B. 248.

Competition of a railroad not subject to the Interstate Commerce Act has always been regarded as a dissimilarity justifying discriminating rates. Trammell v. Clyde Steamship Co., (1892) 5 Int. Com. C. Rep. 327, cited in Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (C. C. A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 832.

Carriers are not justified, however, in conducting long haul competitive business at a loss, and then recouping such loss by excessive charges upon short haul noncompetitive business. Interstate Commerce Commission v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1898) 85 Fed. Rep. 107.

Competition must be real and substantial. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Western, etc., R. Co., (1898) 88 Fed. Rep. 186; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Behlmer, (1900) 175 U. S. 648.

Character immaterial if rates are affected. -Louisville, etc., R. Co. r. Behlmer, (1900) 175 U. S. 648.

In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 167, in order to guard against any misapprehension of the scope of the decision, the court said: "We do not hold that the mere fact of competition, no matter what its character or extent, necessarily relieves the carrier from the restraints of the third and fourth sections, but only that these sections are not so stringent and imperative as to exclude in all cases the matter of competition from consideration in determining the questions of undue or unreasonable preference or advantage, or what are substantially similar circumstances and conditions." Quoted with approval in Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Behlmer, (1900) 175 U. S. 648.

Competition not originating at initial point. - Substantial competition, although not originating at the initial point of traffic, may also be considered. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Behlmer, (1900) 175 U. S. 648. Water competition. - Water competition is to be especially considered. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., (1892) 50 Fed. Rep. 295.

Mere po

Potential water competition. tential water competition must be considered although but little actual water competition exists. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (C. C. A. 1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 715.

When carriers are competitors. - Carriers are competitors only where one could and would transport the traffic if the other did not. Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (1897) 83 Fed. Rep. 249; Behlmer v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (Č. C. A. 1897) 83 Fed. Rep. 898.

Competition of markets is a circumstance to be considered. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925.

APPLICATION TO COMMISSION FOR RELIEF.

Necessity of prior application. Where the circumstances and conditions are substantially dissimilar, a carrier may make a greater charge for a shorter than a longer haul without first applying to the commission for authority to do so. But in such case the carrier acts at its peril, and if the circumstances are not substantially different, the charge is illegal. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., (1892) 50 Fed. Rep. 295, 50 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 93, appeal dismissed in (1893) 149 U. S. 264; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Behlmer, (1900) 175 U. S. 648, disapproving (1894) 4 Int. Com. Rep. 520; East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1901) 181 U. S. 1; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 144, quoting with approval Matter of Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1887) 1 Int. Com. C. Rep. 31, per Cooley, J.; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 946; Brewer v. Central of Georgia R. Co., (1898) 84 Fed. Rep. 258; Behlmer v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1896) 71 Fed. Rep. 835; Interstate Commerce Commission v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., (1898) 85 Fed. Rep. 107; Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 74 Fed. Rep. 803, 43 U. S. App. 308; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Western, etc., R. Co., (1898) 88 Fed. Rep. 186. But see Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 193.

Several decisions have taken a contrary view and held that a greater charge for a shorter than a longer haul was illegal, regardless of the circumstances, unless made with the prior sanction of the commission. Osborne v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1891) 48 Fed. Rep. 49; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., (1893) 56 Fed. Rep. 925; Behlmer v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1897) 83 Fed. Rep. 898.