The section was originally as follows: "SEC. 22. That nothing in this act shall apply to the carriage, storage, or handling of property free or at reduced rates for the United States, State, or municipal governments, or for charitable purposes, or to or from fairs and expositions for exhibition thereat, or the issuance of mileage, excursion, or commutation passenger tickets; nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit any common carrier from giving reduced rates to ministers of religion; nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent railroads from giving free carriage to their own officers and employees, or to prevent the principal officers of any railroad company or companies from exchanging passes or tickets with other railroad companies for their officers and employees; and nothing in this act contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies: Provided, That no pending litigation shall in any way be affected by this act." [24 Stat. L. 387.]

Section illustrative and not exclusive. The object of this section was to sanction a discrimination in favor of the persons named, but it does not follow that a discrimination might not be made in favor of other classes of persons without being unjust and illegal. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. 263.

SEC. 23. [Makes appropriation.]
SEC. 24. [When law takes effect

Commutation principle recognized. This section is a legislative recognition of the legality of the commutation principle in making rates. The right to sell tickets at reduced fares is not limited to strict mileage and excursion tickets. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1899) 43 Fed. Rep. 45.

Party-rate tickets authorized. Party-rate
tickets are valid under this section though
they are neither mileage nor excursion tick-
ets. Interstate Commerce Commission 17.
Baltimore, etc., R. Co., (1892) 145 U. S. 275.
Postal officials and employees.
The pro-
visions of the Act do not extend to the postal
service of the United States, nor prohibit the
transportation by railroad companies, free of
charge, of such officers or agents of the gov-
ernment as are employed in that service.
Interstate Commerce Act Postal Service,
(1887) 18 Op. Atty.-Gen. 587.

Families of employees do not fall within
any of the exceptions enumerated.
Ex P.
Koehler, (1887) 12 Sawy. (U. S.) 446, 31 Fed.
Rep. 315.

Effect of reservation of existing remedies. -The reservation of existing remedies in the above section does not confer on a shipper the right to recover overcharges on shipments made prior to the Act upon the ground that it recognizes a common-law or statutory liability therefor. Gatton v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1895) 95 Iowa 113.

[Temporary.]

appointment of Commissioners.] That the provisions of sections eleven and eighteen of this act, relating to the appointment and organization of the Commission herein provided for, shall take effect immediately, and the remaining provisions of this act shall take effect sixty days after its passage. [24 Stat. L. 387.]

An act to amend an act entitled "An act to regulate commerce," approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven.

[Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 382, 25 Stat. L. 855.]

SECS. 1-9. [Amend sections 6, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, set out above.]

SEC. 10. [Mandamus to compel equal facilities to shippers-questions of fact.] That the circuit and district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction upon the relation of any person or persons, firm, or corporation, alleging such violation by a common carrier, of any of the provisions of the act to which this is a supplement and all acts amendatory thereof, as prevents the relator from having interstate traffic moved by said common carrier at the same rates as are charged, or upon terms or conditions as favorable as those given by said common carrier for like traffic under similar conditions to any other shipper, to issue a writ or writs of mandamus against said common carrier, commanding such common carrier to move and transport the traffic, or to furnish cars or other facilities for transportation for the party applying for the writ; Provided, That if any question of fact as to the proper compensation to the common carrier for the service to be enforced by the writ is raised by the pleadings, the writ of peremptory mandamus may issue, notwithstanding such question of fact is

undetermined, upon such terms as to security, payment of money into the court, or otherwise, as the court may think proper, pending the determination of the question of fact: Provided, That the remedy hereby given by writ of mandamus shall be cumulative, and shall not be held to exclude or interfere with other remedies provided by this act or the act to which it is a supplement. L. 862.]

Mandamus not authorized where unjust discrimination is not made out. - U. S. v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., (1889) 40 Fed. Rep. 101.

"The gist of the whole proceeding is an unjust discrimination in favor of one shipper over another similarly situated. It is for the remedy of such a wrong that Congress, by the Act in question, gave the federal courts the power of mandamus, and for such a wrong alone. There must not only be a discrimination, but it must be an unjust discrimina

[25 Stat.

tion; and that character of discrimination must not only be pleaded, but it must be proved by the relator, otherwise the writ of mandamus will be denied him." U. S. v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., (1901) 109 Fed. Rep. 831.

The pendency of another mandamus may be pleaded in abatement of a second mandamus proceeding instituted in the same jurisdiction wherein the parties and the question involved are the same. U. S. v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., (1902) 114 Fed. Rep. 682.

An act to limit the effect of the regulations of commerce between the several States and with foreign countries in certain cases.

[Act of Aug. 8, 1890, ch. 728, 26 Stat. L. 313.]

[Intoxicating liquors shipped in original packages subject to state laws.] That all fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise. [26 Stat. L. 313.]

Object of statute. The purpose of Congress in enacting this statute was to allow state laws to operate upon intoxicating liquor shipped from one state into another notwithstanding it remains in the original package. In re Rahrer, (1891) 140 U. S. 545; Rhodes v. Iowa, (1898) 170 U. S. 412; Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., (1898) 170 U. S. 445; Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. McGillivray, (1900) 104 Fed. Rep. 258; In re Bergen, (1900) 115 Fed. Rep. 339; Jervey v. The Carolina, (1895) 66 Fed. Rep. 1013; Lottery Case, (1903) 188 U. S. 361; Fred. Miller Brewing Co. v. Stevens, (1897) 102 Iowa 60.

Constitutionality of statute. The Act is not an unconstitutional attempt to delegate to the states the power to regulate interstate commerce, but is an exercise by Congress of that power. In re Spickler, (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 653; In re Van Vliet, (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 761; In re Rahrer, (1891) 140 U. S. 545; State v. Fraser, (1891) 1 N. Dak. 425; Com. v. Calhane, (1891) 154 Mass. 116. See Shoshone Min. Co. v. Rutter, (1900) 177 U. S. 508; Shollenberger v. Pennsylvania, (1891) 171 U. S. 23.

Additional state legislation unnecessary. - This statute rendered existing state laws operative upon liquor in the original packages, and it was unnecessary for the states to enact new laws in order to render the statute operative. In re Rahrer, (1891) 140

U. S. 545, reversing (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 556; Emert v. Missouri, (1895) 156 U. S. 321; In re Spickler, (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 653; In re Van Vliet, (1890) 43 Fed. Rep. 761; In re Jordan, (1892) 49 Fed. Rep. 238; Tinker v. State, (1890) 90 Ala. 638; Fred. Miller Brewing Co. v. Stevens, (1897) 102 Iowa 60; Com. v. Calhane, (1891) 154 Mass. 115; Com. v. Gagne, 153 Mass. 205; State v. Fraser, (1891) 1 N. Dak. 425; State v. Lord, (1891) 66 N. H. 479; Starace r. Rossi, (1897) 69 Vt. 303.

Sales before the enactment were not affected by the statute. In re Rahrer, (1891) 140 U. S. 545; Wind v. Iler, (1895) 93 Iowa 316; Carstairs v. O'Donnell, (1891) 154 Mass. 357; Doherty r. Cotter, (1894) 68 N. H. 37; Jones v. Sanborn, (1894) 68 N. H. 602; Durkee v. Moses, (1891) 67 N. H. 115.

Liquors imported before but sold after enactment of statute are subject to state laws. Tinker v. State, (1890) 90 Ala. 638, in which case it was said: "The withdrawal of federal regulations applies to all liquors transported' not such only as shall be transported- into the state or remaining therein for use."

999

In re

to be there passed upon by them.
Bergen, (1900) 115 Fed. Rep. 339; State v.
Hanaphy, (1902) 117 Iowa 15; State v.
Hickox, (1902) 64 Kan. 650, 68 Pac. Rep. 38.
But see Blumenthal v. McWhorter, (1901)
131 Ala. 642.

What constitutes an "original package.". For a full discussion of this subject, not confined to cases since the enactment of the above statute, nor to intoxicating liquor cases, see title Interstate Commerce, 17 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d ed.), p. 34. See also title Intoxicating Liquors, id., p. 294.

An act in relation to testimony before the Interstate Commerce Commission, and in cases or proceedings under or connected with an act entitled "An act to regulate commerce," approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, and amendments thereto.

[Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. L. 443.]

[Self-incriminating disclosures by witnesses in proceedings refusal to testify.] That no person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents before the Interstate Commerce Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of the Commission, whether such subpoena be signed or issued by one or more Commissioners, or in any cause or proceeding, criminal or otherwise, based upon or growing out of any alleged violation of the act of Congress, entitled, "An act to regulate commerce," approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, or of any amendment thereof on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture.

But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said Commission, or in obedience to its subpoena, or the subpoena of either of them, or in any such case or proceeding:

Provided, That no person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.

Any person who shall neglect or refuse to attend and testify, or to answer any lawful inquiry, or to produce books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents, if in his power to do so, in obedience to the subpoena or lawful requirement of the Commission shall be guilty of an offense and upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by fine not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than one year or by both such fine and imprisonment. Stat. L. 443.]

This Act supersedes, in part, that of Feb. 10, 1891, ch. 128, sec. 12, supra [p. 838]. Its object was to obviate constitutional objections held by the Supreme Court (see 142 U. S. 547) to be fatal to previous legislation. A statute compelling a witness to give selfcriminating testimony, "to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates " (142 U. S. 586). Such immunity this statute affords. Compilers' note, 2 Supp. R. S. 80.

Constitutionality of statute. This Act is constitutional and deprives the witness of the

[27

right to refuse to answer or to produce books and papers upon the ground that to do so might criminate him, since it furnishes a protection to the witness as broad as that furnished by the Constitution. Brown v. Walker, (1896) 161 U. S. 591.

No statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution; and therefore R. S. sec. 860, providing that no evidence given shall be in any manner used against the witness, is not coextensive with

[Auditing of Commission's expenses.]

state Commerce Commission shall be audited by the proper accounting officers of the Treasury.

[25 Stat. L. 954.]