drug. Gault v. State, 34 Ga. 533. The court said: "If in fact whiskey was what it has been argued to be, a drug, then we apprehend the payment by an apothecary for a license to vend drugs would have protected him against this indictment. We are old-fashioned, and perhaps ignorant of the expansion of many words in modern use, amongst them the word 'drug.' We have grown up with the idea that drugs were compounds, mostly of mineral, animal, or vegetable substances, made by apothecaries and others, and used as medicine in the treatment of disease, and commonly called physic. We cannot well see how whiskey can be, with propriety, included in the term last used. That term carries along with it an idea, inseparable from it, of something repulsive, nauseous-at which the gorge heaves. Whiskey, on the contrary, is inviting, exhilarating. . . . It is certainly sometimes taken medicinally; never as a drug. Nor will whiskey fall within another sense of the term 'drug,' viz., that of being a commodity that lies on one's hands, and is not salable in market; or an article of slow sale and for which there is little demand. If these are the characteristics of a drug, is it not a palpable misnomer to call whiskey one ?"

The selling of peppermint lozenges by a druggist, it was held, must be considered prima facie the selling of drugs and medicines, which was lawful on Sunday. Reg. v. Howarth, 33 U. C. Q. B. 537:

1. Singleton v. Fritsch, 4 Lea (Tenn.), 96, where it was held that the term does not include a merchant tailor.

2. Thomas v. City of Hot Springs, 34 Ark. 557, where it is said "Drummers are, and have been for ages, a large and active class of commercial and business agents.

As to constitutionality of tax on

drummers, see Robbins v. Taxing Dist. of Shelby Co., Tenn., 7 Sup. Ct. Repr. 592; Ex parte Asher and note, 18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 533.

3. Com. v. Whitney, 5 Gray (Mass.), 86, where it is said: The exact degree of intemperance which constitutes a drunkard it may not be easy to define.

.. Whether the word 'common,' as used in the statute, has reference only to the frequency of the offence, it is not easy to determine. If so, it would seem to give it no new force; as 'drunkard' of itself means one who habitually gets drunk. . . . The word 'common' would seem to be used in the sense of public. It seems to be the offence to the public peace and good order which the statute is intended to punish. Common pipers and fiddlers, common railers and brawlers, are persons who are so to the nuisance of the public. Applying the familiar rule of construction, noscitur a sociis, he would seem to be within the statute a common drunkard who not only is an habitual drunkard, but is so to the disturbance of the public peace and good order."

In Com. v. McNamee, 112 Mass. 286, it is said: "The charge of being a common drunkard can be substantiated, without proving that the person accused of it has been constantly drunk during the time covered by the complaint, or even that his drunkenness was a matter of daily occurrence. The law nowhere undertakes to define how many instances of intoxication, in any given time, shall be deemed sufficient to fix upon a man the imputation of being a common drunkard. The use of the word 'common' imports frequency, and it has been held that to convict a man upon such a charge, it must be shown that he is an habitual drunkard."

Evidences of habitual intoxication from the use of chloroform held not to sustain a complaint charging a person with

1. Scudder v. Coryell, 10 N. J. L. (5 Halst.) 345, in construing an affidavit that "the debt was justly due and owing to the plaintiff.” "In the former sense it appears to have been used in the statute, as it is connected with a word of the like signification, 'due and owing.' . . . Moreover, the word 'justly' being connected with the word 'due' shows the true import of the phrase 'justly due." And see Hoyt v. Hoyt, 1 Harr. (N. J.)

143.

So, in construing the rules of an order as to forfeiture of a certificate for nonpayment of "dues" which were in arrears, the court said: "The word 'due,' unlike 'arrears,' has more than one signification, and expresses two distinct ideas, and this distinction is important in relation to its use in these rules and regulations...[quoting the definition given in the text]. It is evidently used in the rules and regulations of this order in the first of these significations, and not at all in the second; and hence there is some confusion of ideas. perhaps, in their interpretation." Wiggin v. Knights of Pythias, 31 Fed. Rep. 125.

In U. S. v. State Bank of N. C., 6 Pet. (U. S.) 36, Judge Story said: 'It [i.e., the term 'due'] is sometimes used to express the mere state of indebtment, and then is equivalent to owed, or owing. And it is sometimes used to express the fact that the debt has become payable. Thus, in the latter sense, a bill or note is often said to be due when the time for payment of it has arrived. In the former sense, a debt is often said to be due from a person when he is the party owing it, or primarily bound to pay, whether the time of payment has or has not arrived. This very clause of the act furnishes an apt illustration of this latter use of the It declares that the priority of the United States shall attach where the estate of any deceased debtor in the hands of executors or administrators shall be insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased.' Here the word 'due' is plainly used as synonymous with 'owing.'. . . Now, if the term 'due,' in reference to the debts of deceased persons, means owing, and includes all debts, whether payable in præsenti or not, it is difficult to perceive how a different meaning can be given to it, in regard to the debt of the United States,

term.

considering the connection in which it stands in the sequel of the same sentence." It was accordingly held that a priority given to "debts due to the United States" extended as well to debts by bonds for duties which are payable after the insolvency or decease of the obligor, as to those actually payable or due at the period thereof.

In a complaint that a sum was "due" from the defendant to the plaintiffs, "due" was held to mean "payable,' Judge Story's definition supra being quoted. Allen v. Patterson, 7 N. Y. 476.

An after-assessed tax was held a " fund due" in Dist. Township of Jasper v. Dist. Township of Sheridan, 47 Iowa, 183. "It is claimed by the defendant that the taxes in question were not then due, and so not covered by the agreement. The question presented is as to the meaning of the word 'due' as used by the parties. It is claimed by the defendant that a fund is due when the time arrives in which payment is enforceable. And it must be admitted that this is the ordinary meaning of the word. But, while that is so, there is certainly another meaning somewhat broader. To determine what the parties meant in this case, we may have reference to the duty which they were attempting to discharge. The statute required them to make an equitable division of the assets. Now assets embrace claims not matured, as well as claims matured. We are not allowed to conclude, therefore, that the parties used the word 'due' in its restricted sense.'

The word "due" in a stipulation contained in a chattel mortgage, providing for insurance for the mortgagee's benefit, in a sum equal to the full amount due on the mortgage, was construed to be synonymous with "owing." Fowler v. Hoffman, 31 Mich. 219. "The judge was clearly in error in holding that the stipulation for insurance, when speaking of the amount due' meant not the whole sum secured, but only the amount that had become presently payable; in other words, the amount overdue. We cannot suppose such to have been the understanding of the parties. The word 'due' is often used in business transactions as synonymous with 'owing' or 'remaining unpaid,' and no reasonable doubt can exist that it was so used here."

So, where a chattel mortgage provided that the mortgagee might seize and sell the goods to reimburse himself for "all such sums and sum of money as may then be due," it was held that the goods might be sold though the mortgage money might not have been payable. Dederick v. Ashdown, 4 Manitoba L. Rep. 139. The court says: "The argument urged for the plaintiffs seems founded upon a misconception of the meaning of the word 'due.' . . . This is to make the amount then due mean the amount which should by that time have been paid-to make, in fact, the word 'due' mean 'overdue.' In the Imperial Dictionary the word 'due' is defined to mean that which ought to be paid or done to another, owed by one to another, and by contract. justice, or propriety required to be paid; that which is owed, that which one contracts to pay to another. The argument used is just the one which was urged, but unsuccessfully, in Hall. Brown, 15 U. C. Q. B. 419. The covenant there was, to pay a sum of money in eight instalments, with interest on the principal sum remaining due at each payment. In the county court this was construed to mean that the covenantor was to pay interest only upon each instalment as it fell due. leaving the interest upon all such portion of the principal as should not at that time be payable to be paid in proportions with the principal as the instalments successively became due. On appeal this was reversed. Robinson, C. J., who delivered the judgment of the court, said: "That a sum may be debitum in præsenti, though solven dum in futuro, is very clear, and it was in this sense that the word 'due' was used in the instrument. We must construe the agreements of parties according to the common acceptation of the words they use; and we know very well that when a man is asked how much is due on his land, he understands well what is meant by the question, namely, how much of the purchase-money he yet owes-which is only a circumlocution for the word 'due.' In a strict sense, and for certain purposes, 'due' is confined to what is payable, as when we speak of a bill or note being due; but that is not its general sense, and certainly not its only

sense.

.

A statement in an affidavit for attachment, that the defendants are indebted to the plaintiffs in a sum named "over and above all legal set-offs, and that the said indebtedness is for a bill of merchandise purchased by said defendants of said plaintiffs," was held not to show that the

sum named was "due." Bowen v. Slocum, 17 Wis. 181. The appellant urges that the words 'due upon contract, etc.,' were intended only to require the party to show that the debt arose upon contract. But although that was clearly a part of the intention, it cannot be assumed to have been the whole. The word 'due' has a well defined meaning when applied to indebtedness, which is, that the day when payment ought to have been made has already arrived."

A contract for the sale of land reserved liens on the land for "all said sums of money due" from the purchaser to the vendors. It was held that "due" was used in the sense of "owing." "The argument that the sum in question was not due, is, we think, without force. The word 'due' was inaccurately used by the scrivener, but no one, we presume, would pretend that it was not intended to refer to the deferred payments to be made to ..., although they were not technically due. The word was manifestly used in the sense of 'owing:' and surely it could with as much propriety be applied to an unascertained sum as to one which was already ascertained and agreed upon. Both were alike parts of the consideration for the land, and one was as much owing or due as the other, and the vendor's lien was, in our opinion, reserved for both." Carr v. Thompson, 67 Mo. 475.

Where, by the articles of association of a company, it was provided that the company should have a first lien on, with power to sell, the shares of a member for any money "due" to the company from him, "due" was held to mean due and payable." In re Stockton Co., 2 Ch. D. ΙΟΙ. "It was said 'moneys due' included moneys owing, but not at present payable. To that I answer, adopting the criticism of Lord Justice Mellish in Ex barte Kemp, L. R. 9 Ch. 383, on the words in the Bankruptcy Act, that the word 'due' may mean either owing or payable, and what it means is determined by the context. Now there is a context here which, to my mind, puts the thing out of all argument whatever. . . . It is absurd to suppose that the company may sell the shares of a man, and apply the proceeds in payment of a bill of exchange which he has given, but which is not yet due, that is not yet payable; for that must be the meaning of the word 'due' in that article. In the seventh article, then, the word 'due' means payable, and the words 'such debtor' mean a man who owes a debt presently payable.' And see Ex parte Kemp, L. R. 9 Ch. 383, cited in the above opinion.