under the statute,1 and is punishable by fine and imprison ment. The bare giving of money to another to be distributed among jurors is an offence of the nature of embracery, whether any of it be afterwards actually distributed or not;3 and so also is the giving of money to a juror after verdict without any preceding contract, however it has been said to be otherwise of the payment of a juror's travelling expenses.* An attempt to influence or corrupt a jury or juror is a consummated act of embracery, although the attempt is frustrated, and the object thwarted." Analogous to the offence of embracery is that of persuading, or endeavoring to persuade, a witness not to attend and give evidence, and is an offence punishable with fine and imprisonment. It is not material that the attempt was unsuccessful. sect. I; Co. Litt. 157 b, 369, 369 a; 4 Bl. Com. 140. Bribery. Embracery is a special kind of bribery. Harris, Cr. L. 95. Who riay be guilty of the Offence.. The offence of embracery may be committed by a party to an action or a stranger. Gibbs v. Dewey, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 503. And a juryman himself may be guilty of the offence by corruptly endeavoring to bring over his fellows to his side. Harris, Cr. L. 95; I Russ. on Cr. (5th ed.) 360. Or a witness may be guilty of the crime. A witness has no right to deliver a paper to a jury. Gibbs v. Dewey, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 503. It is said that the law will not suffer a mere stranger so much as to labor a juror to appear and act according to his conscience, but that it seems clear that a person who may justify any other act of main tenance-see Russ. on Cr. (5th ed.) 352 et seq.may safely labor a juror to appear and give a verdict according to his conscience, but that no other person is justified in intermeddling so far. 1 Russ. on Cr. (5th ed.) 360. Hawkins says, that, "The law so abhors all corruptions of this kind that it prohibits every thing which has the least tendency to it, what spacious pretence soever it may be covered with; and, therefore, it will not suffer a mere stranger so much as to labor a juror to appear and act according to his conscience.' Hawk. P. C. (Curw. ed.) 466, 2. Gibbs v. Dewey, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 503; I Hawk. P. C. ch. 85, sect. 1; Harris, Cr. L. 95; Roscoe's Cr. Ev. 721; 1 Russ. on Cr. (5th ed.) 361. 3. I Russ.. on Cr. 360. 4. Hawk. P. C. 85, sect. 3; Roscoe's Cr. Ev. 721. Compensation to Juror. The compensation of the jury in criminal as well as in civil cases is now regulated by statute in this country; and, as Bishop says, 44 consequently there is no room for suffering any other compensation to be given by the parties." 2 Bish. Cr. L. (7th ed.) sect. 386. 5. State v. Sales, 2 Nev. 268; 2 Bish. Cr. L. (7th ed.) sect. 389; 2 Bish. Cr. Proc. (3d ed.) sect. 347. 6. Rex v. Lawley, 2 Str. 904; I Russ. on Cr. (5th ed.) 361; Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 21, s. 15; Roscoe's Cr. Ev. 721. What constitutes Embracery. — Requi sites of Indictment. An allegation that C. B. unlawfully furnished money to one A. R., for the use of P. E., to absent himself from the circuit court of the county at a certain term to which he, P. E., had been summoned as a witness against said C. B. in a trial on an indictment against C. B. then pending in said court, whereby the said C. B. attempted to obstruct and impede the administration of justice, the court held fatally defective in not alleging that A. R. paid, or offered to pay, said money to the witness P. E. to induce him to absent himself as such witness at said time from the circuit court; that without this, the act done by the defendant is not of such a nature as to constitute an attempt to commit the offence mentioned in the indictment, and, therefore, on motion of the defendant, the court ought to have quashed this indictment. State v. Baller, 26 W. Va. 90; s. c., 7 Cr. L. Mag. 796; s. c., 53 Am. Rep. 66. EMIGRANT. An emigrant is one who quits his country for any lawful reason, with a design to settle elsewhere, and takes his family and property with him. (Vattel, b. 1, c. 19, s. 224.1) EMIGRATION.2- See EXPATRIATION. 6. Corporate Property and Franchises, 535. a. Power to authorize Appropriation, 535. b. Uses for which Corporate Property may be taken, 537. c. Railroad Crossings, 537. 7. Rights in Waters and Water-Courses, 538. a. Riparian Rights, 538. (1) Navigable Waters, 538. (2) Non-navigable Waters, 538. b. Surface Waters, 539. c. Wharves, 540. 8. Extent of Appropriation, 540. b. Statutory Limit, 541. c. Part of Tract, 541. 9. Exemptions, 542. VI. What amounts to taking or injuriously affecting Property, 542. 1. In General, 542. 2. Entry for Permanent Occupation, 543. 3. Seizure for Military Purposes, 544. 4. Interruption of Use, 544. 5. Injuriously affecting Property, 544. c. By granting Rival Franchises, 545. f. Noise and Vibration, 547. h. Injury to Residue of Tract, 547. i. Change of Grade, 548. j. Injury to Access, 550. k. Injuries to Crops, 550. 1. Danger of Fire, 550. m. Exposure of Property during Construction, 551. n. Injuries to Fences, 551. emigration being used to signify a simple removal for the purpose of residence from one country to another; while expatriation signifies, in addition to a removal, a renunciation of allegiance. Argument of Counsel in McIlvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, Cranch. (U. S.) 302; 2 Kent, Com. 44. 3. In the preparation of this title the cases and notes on the subject in the American and English Railroad Cases and the American and English Corporation Cases have largely been made use of. o. Injuries from Improper Construction, 552. in 6. Imposition of Additional Burden,552. a. Construction of Railroads Streets, 552. (1) Where Fee in abutting LandOwner, 552. (2) Where Fee vested in Public, 553. (3) Railroad Crossings, 554. b. Construction of Horse-Railways in Street, 555 c. Erection of Telegraph-Poles, 556. d. Use of Highways for Gas- Works, etc., 557. e. Other Instances, 557. 7. User of Another's Property, 557. 8. Appropriation, Diversion, and Ob struction of Waters, 557. a. Appropriation, 557. b. Diversion, 558. c. Obstruction, 559. (1) Water-Courses, 559. (2) Of Surface Waters, 559. d. Destruction of Wells and Springs, 562. 9. Temporary User, 562. a. For Surveys, 562. b. To aid Construction, 562. 10. Taxation, 562. 11. Destruction from Public Necessity, 563. 12. Exercise of Governmental and Police Powers, 563. VII. Damages, 563. 1. Necessity of Provision for, 563. 3. For Improvements made before As- 4. Measure, 567. a. Where Entire Tract taken, 557. (1) Market Value, 567. (2) Uses to which Land is adapted, 569. b. Where Part of Tract taken, 571. (1) Depreciation in Market Value, 57I. (2) Depreciation for Specific Purpose, 573. (3) Injuries affecting Whole Tract, 574. (4) Inconvenience in working Min erals, 577. (5) What is considered a Single Tract, 577. e. Property injuriously affected, 578. d. Property abutting on Street, 579. e. For Running Powers over Another Railroad, 579. f. For Railroad Crossings, 580. g. Limited Estates, 581. (1) Lessee, 581. (2) Life-Tenants, 581. h. Exemplary Damages for Trespass, 581. i. Benefits, 581. 5. Interest on Award, 584. 6. Payment, 585. a. As prerequisite to Entry, 585. (2) Security for Payment, 586. (4) Waiver of Pre-payment, 587. (2) Vendor and Vendee, 588. (4) Married Woman for Right of (5) Mortgagee, 589. (6) Tenants and Lessees, 590. (8) Heir or Administrator, 590. e. Effect of Payment, 591. f. Protection and Enforcement of Right, 591. (1) By Action at Law, 591. (3) Ejectment, 593. (4) Trespass, 594. (5) Mandatory Proceedings, 595. (6) Effect of License to enter, 596. 7. Lien for Damages, 596. 8. Waiver of Damages, 597. VIII. Consequential Damages, 597. IX. Title and Rights retained, 598. X. 1. Fee, 598. 2. Reversion in Cesser of Public Use, 598. 3. Minerals, and Right to work Same, Title and Rights acquired, 599. 2. Rights when Fee acquired, 600. 3. Rights when Easement acquired, 600. XI. Contracts, 601. XII. Transfer of Franchises, 603. XIII. Abandonment of Public Use, 603. XIV. Procedure, 604. 1. How far Statutory Remedy exclusive, 604. 2. Jurisdiction, 606. 3. Commencement of Proceedings, 607. (1) Necessity for, 607. (2) Requisites and Sufficiency, 608. 4. Parties, 608. 5. Pleading, 609. a. Petition or Complaint, 609. (1) Necessary Averments, 609. b. Answers, 611. c. Cross-Petition, 611. d. Amendment, 612. 6. Practice, 612. c. View, 615. 8. Viewers and Commissioners, 616. a. Appointment and Qualification, 616. b. Powers and Duties, 617. 9. Evidence, 618. a. Competency, 618. (1) In General, 618. (2) Sales of Other Lands, 619. b. Declarations and Admissions, 620. c. Opinion Evidence, 620. d. Documentary Evidence, 622. 10. Verdict, Award, and Judgment, 622. a. Verdict, 622. (1) Requisites and Validity, 622. (2) Setting aside, 623. b. Award, 624. (1) Form and Requisites, 624. (2) Exceptions and Confirmation, 625. (3) Conclusiveness and Effect, 626. c. Judgment, 627. (1) Entry and Requisites, 627. (2) Conclusiveness and Effect, 627. d. Interest, 627. 11. Appeal and Review, 627. a. When Appeal lies, 627. b. Who may appeal, 628. c. Notice of Appeal, 629. d. Entry on Lands pending an Appeal, 629. (1) Security required, 629. (2) Withdrawal of Deposit, 630. e. Practice, 630. f. What considered an Appeal, 630. 12. Costs, 632. 13. Limitations, 633. 14. Abandonment, 634. 15. Arbitration, 634. I. Definition. Eminent Domain is that sovereign power vested in the people, by which they can, for any public purpose, take possession of the property of any individual upon just compensation paid to him.1 1. Warren v. First Division St. Paul & P. R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 384; Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R. R. Co., Baldw. C. C. 205; DeVaraigne v. Fox, 2 Blatchf. C. C. 95; I Bouv. Law Dict. (15th ed.) 588. The Theory of Eminent Domain finds its earliest authoritative expression in the great work of Grotius. He says, "We have elsewhere said that the property of subjects is under the eminent dominion of the State, so that the State, or he who acts for it, may use or even alienate or destroy such property, not only in cases of extreme necessity, in which even private persons have a right over the property of others, but for ends of public utility, to which ends those who founded civil society must be supposed to have intended that private ends should give way. But it is to be observed that when this is done the State is bound to make good the loss to those who lose their property, and to this public purpose those who have suffered the loss must, if needs be, contribute." Whewell's trs., book iii., c. 20, §7; cf. iii., c. 19, and ii., c. 14, § 7, 8. Eminent domain, as contemplated by Grotius, is evidently to be exercised for the benefit of the State alone, for the compensation is treated as a charge on the general revenue. The State being thus at once actor and beneficiary in the exercise of this power, it follows that its duty to make compensation is moral rather than legal, for the immunity sovereign from the suit by the subject is generally admitted. Quarterly Review, 316. 3 Law Nature of Power. - The power to take private property for public uses belongs to every independent government. It is an incident of sovereignty, and requires no constitutional recognition. Beeckman v. The Saratoga & S. R. R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 45; Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R. R. Co., 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 13; Buffalo & N. Y. R. R. Co. v. Brainard, 9 N. Y. 100; Wier v. The St. Paul, S., & T. F. R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155; Baring v. Erdman, 14 Haz. Pa. Reg. 129; United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513; bk. 27 L. ed. 1015; Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R. R. Co., Baldw. C. C. 205; Jones v. Walker, 2 Paine, C. C. 688; s. c., 8 Op. Att. Gen. 333. Manner of Exercise. There is nothing, then, in the term "eminent domain" which implies any restriction as to the manner in which this power of the sovereign to take private property for public uses may be exercised. If there are any restrictions as to the manner of its exercise, they must be found, then, in the constitution; for nothing of less authority than the organic and fundamental law, which lays out the very frame of government, could impose on them. But the constitution contains no such restrictions, except as to the matter of compensation, which is not here important. There is no reason, then, why the legislature, representing the state, may not enact laws by which the eminent domain II. Nature of the Right. I. In Whom vested. The power of eminent domain is vested in the several States of the Union,1 and may be exercised by a private corporation. Beekman v. S. & S. R. R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y.), 45; Bloodgood v. M. & H. R. R. Co., 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 13; Buffalo & N. Y. R. R. Co. v. Brainard, 9 N. Y. 100; Boston W. P. Co. v. Boston & W. R. R. Co., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 360. The supreme court of Minnesota say, in the case of Wier v. St. Paul, S., & T. F. R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155, 163, that "there is no reason why the Legislature may not, by a general law, authorize the formation of private corporations for the construction of railroads. Nor is there any greater reason why the Legislature may not, by a general law, provide that any such corporation may for itself select a route upon which to build a railroad, and, having selected it, may proceed to take and obtain land needed for its purposes by an exercise of the power of eminent domain. These propositions follow inevitably from the propositions before established, to wit: that the state possesses the eminent domain, and that the manner of its exercise is, except as to compensation, unrestrained. It is no objection to this conclusion to say that the Legislature cannot do this, because it cannot delegate to another the authority delegated to itself. Its authority is to legislate, to pass laws; and the passage of the general laws spoken of, by virtue of which private corporations are authorized to exercise the eminent domain, is in no sense a delegation of this authority. From the foregoing conclusion it follows that the ques tion as to the manner in which the eminent domain shall be exercised addresses itself to the Legislature as a question of propriety, fitness, expediency, rather than as a question of power." Authority of the State. The right of eminent domain, which is possessed by the State as a necessary attribute of sovereignty, is the right to resume the possession of private property for public use. There is nothing in the term which implies any restriction as to the manner in which this power of the sovereign to take private property for public uses may be exercised. If there are any restrictions as to the manner of its exercise they must be found in the Constitution, for nothing of less authority than the organic and fundamental law which lays out the very frame of government could impose them. Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & N. H. R. R. Co,. 17 Conn. 40; s. c., 42 Am. Dec. 716; Weir v. St. Paul, S., & T. F. R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155 The Right of Taking Property for Public Use is exercised by a State, subject to no power vested in the Federal Government. The proprietary right of the United States can in no respect restrict or modify the exercise of this sovereign power by a State. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U. S. (6 How.) 507; bk. 12 L. ed. 535; United States v. Railroad Bridge Co., 6 McL. C. C. 517; s. c., 3 Liv. L. Mag. 568; 10 L. Rep. Ñ. S. 630; Backus v. Lebanon, II N. H. 19; s. c., 35 Am. Dec. 466; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 745; s. c., 40 Am. Dec. 705. See also Alabama & F. R. R. Co. v. Kenney, 39 Ala. 311; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & N. H. R. R. Co., 17 Conn. 59; Baltimore & H. de G. T. Co. v. Union R. Co. of Baltimore, 35 Md. 231; Northern R. R. Co. v. Concord & C. R. R. Co., 27 N. H. 194; Crosby v. Hanover, 36 N. H. 420; Ash v. Cummings, 50 N. H. 613; Adden v. Railroad, 55 N. H. 415. In re N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. M. G. L. Co., 63 N. Y. 334; State v. S. P. R. R. Co., 24 Tex. 127. In a Proceeding to condemn Property for Public Use there is nothing in the nature of a contract between the owner and a State, or the corporation which the State authorizes to take the property. If just compensation be made to the owner, his property can then be taken without his consent. Garrison v. N. Y. City, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 196; bk. 22 L. ed. 612; Richmond, F., & P. R. R. Co. v. Louisa R. R. Co., 54 U. S. (13 How.) 71; bk. 14 L. ed. 55; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U. S. (6 How.) 507; bk. 12 L. ed. 535 Individual Property is exclusive as against individuals, but not as against society. Individual rights must yield to social ones. Patten v. Northern Cent. R. R. Co., 33 Pa. St. 436; s. c., 75 Am. Dec. 612. The Constitution protects property against arbitrary seizure or divestiture, not against seizure or divestiture by legal process, and on compensation made. But a law cannot authorize the taking of private property for any other public use. Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R. R. Co., Baldw. C. C. 205. 2. Central B. U. P. R. R. Co. v. Atchison, T., & S. F. R. R. Co., 28 Kan. 453; s. c., 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 528; Nichols v. Sommerset & K. R. R. Co., 43 Me. 356; Eastern R. R. Co. v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 111 Mass. 125; s. c., 15 Am. Rep. 13; Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471; s. c., 9 Am. Rep. 94; Leisse v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Mo. App. 105; People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595; Commonwealth v. Erie R. R. Co., 62 Pa. St. 286; s. c., I Am. Rep. 399; Alexandria & F. R. R. Co. v. Alexandria & W. R. R. Co., |