ENFEOFF. To make a gift of any corporeal hereditaments to another.1 See FEOFFMENT. ENFORCE.2 nation is at war with another.' Bouv. L. Dic. Vattel says, 'An enemy is he with whom a nation is at war.' Law of Nations, 387. Adhering strictly to these definitions, the loss here would hardly be covered by too narrow a ground to take. Indemnity is the object of all insurance; and in marine policies the rule seems to be, that, where the loss is of a like nature with the specified peril, or in other words, substantially within its meaning, to sustain the liability of underwriters. . . . I am inclined, therefore, to think that the loss in this case might have been covered by the peril 'enemies,' even if placed alone on that ground by the pleadings, which was not the case here." Monongahela Ins. Co. v. Chester, 43 Pa. St. 491. had been pushed to such an extent within the State of Tennessee, that her power was in fact in the hands and under the control of these conspirators, and the government in their hands, her soil in their possession, the regular course of justice interrupted, an insurance against ‘enemies.' But this is so that loyal courts could not be kept open, nor protection given to loyal men without the interference of military power, and that the Federal Government was marshalling her forces for the purpose of asserting the national sovereignty,-if these insurrectionary combinations existed in the State of Tennessee, a civil war was then pending between the General Government and such unlawful combination; and if the jury find such armed force [as] took the goods out of the possession of the defendant was a recognized part of such unlawful combination, that such force will be regarded as public enemies, and they will find for the defendant." The jury found for the defendant. On an appeal to the Supreme Court, this was held to be a just exposition of the law. Lewis v. Ludwick, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 368. Tramps, thieves, and robbers are not public enemies within the meaning of this rule. State v. Moore, 74 Mo. 413. A bill of lading for goods shipped in a Russian port, on board a Mecklenburgh ship, for a port in England, contained an exception of "the king's enemies." It was held that "the king's enemies" meant, or at all events included, the enemies of the sovereign of the person who made the bill of lading, viz., the Duke of Mecklenburgh; and, consequently, that the exception protected the captain against the consequences of a hostile seizure by the Danes, then at war with Mecklenburgh. Russell v. Niemann, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 164. An Enemy under an Insurance Policy. A steamboat insured against perils by "enemies, pirates, and assailing thieves,' and "all such losses which shall come to the damage of said steamer according to the true intent and meaning of the policy," was captured by an armed force acting under the authority of the so-called Confederate States of America. In an action on the policy it was held that the loss was with out doubt within the general words, "all such losses." It was, however, said by the court, that, if this phrase had been omitted, a recovery might probably have been had under the word "enemies" in the policy. Said Thompson, J., "The term 'enemies,' as used in the policy, means public enemies,' and is defined by writers on national law to be where the whole body of the 6 C. of L.-41 An Enemy under the Act of Congress of March 2, 1799. By this act it is declared "That for the ships or goods belonging to the citizens of the United States, or to the citizens, or subjects, of any nation in amity with the United States, if retaken from the enemy" within a certain time, the owners are to allow a certain part for salvage. In March, 1799, Congress had raised an army, stopped all intercourse with France, dissolved our treaty, built and equipped ships of war, and commissioned private armed ships, enjoining the former and authorizing the latter to defend themselves against the armed ships of France, to attack them on the high seas, to subdue and take them as prize, and to recapture armed vessels found in their possession. It was held that this constituted a public qualified war between France and the United States, and that the French were an enemy within the act. "As there may be a public general war, and a public qualified war, so there may upon correspondent principles be a general enemy and a partial enemy. The designation of 'enemy' extends to a case of perfect war; but as a general designation, it surely includes the less, as well as the greater, species of war. If Congress had chosen to declare a general war, France would have been a general enemy: having chosen to wage a partial one, France was, at the time of the capture, only a partial enemy. But still she was an enemy." Chase, J., Bas v. Tingy, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 37. 1. Bouv. L. Dict. Enfeoff was the technical and proper operative word of a feoffment, so long as a feoffment was in use. I Davidson's Conv. 68; Perry v. Price, 1 Mo. 553. 641 2. A statute of Illinois made it the duty ENGAGE.1 of State's attorneys of the several judicial a trademark is registered," notwithstanding districts to enforce the collection of all the pending negotiations. It seems that fines, etc., imposed or incurred in the courts a patentee is engaged in any business," of record in their several counties. It was etc., so long as he receives royalties under held that the power thus conferred neces- his patent, even though he does not himself sarily included the right to receive all fines, manufacture. In re Ralph's Trademark, etc., and give receipts therefor that should L. J. R. Ch. 188. operate as a full discharge to the party paying the same, as well as the right to receive the amount of any judgment that might have been rendered for any such fine, etc., and to execute an acquittance therefor. The People v. Christerson, 59 Ill. 157. his son. 1. A father signed and delivered to his son therein named, a paper expressed in the following terms: "This [is] to certify that I engage to my son Isaac the farm [on] which he now lives." This was held to be an agreement to convey the farm to "One definition of the word 'engage' is, 'to bind my appointment or contract; and in common parlance it is often used as synonymous with the word 'promise.' I engage to do, or omit to do, an act, is nothing more than a promise to do or omit it." Rue v. Rue, 21 N. J. L. 379. When it is said that a corporation is engaged in business in a foreign state, and for that reason has voluntarily subjected itself to the operation of the laws of such foreign state regulating the service of process on foreign corporations, reference is plainly had to business operations carried on within the state, through the medium of agents appointed for that purpose, that are continuous, or at least of some duration, and to business transactions that are merely casual, such as an occasional purchase of goods or material within the foreign state. St. Louis Wire-mill Co. v. Con. Barb-wire Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 802. See CARRY, note, Carrying on Business. To engage in Shooting. Under an act which imposed a fine upon any person "who engages in shooting" on Sunday, it was held, that, "to engage in shooting does not imply that the shooting should be repeated. One act is enough." Smith v. State, 50 Ala. 159. Engaged in an Unlawful Act. — Where a person who is insured deserts from the army, and is shot by a sheriff who is attempting to arrest him, as alleged, in self-defence, it cannot be held, as matter of law, that he was engaged in an unlawful act, within the meaning of a policy of accident insurance, providing that no claim shall be made "when the death or injury may have happened . . . while engaged in, or in consequence of, an unlawful act." Utter v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 26 Am. L. Reg. 477. To Engage in Business. The English Trademarks Act provides, "The court may, on the application of any person aggrieved, remove any trademark from the register, on the ground, after the expiration of five years from the date of the registry thereof, that the registered proprietor is not engaged in any business concerned in the goods within the same class as the goods with respect to which a trademark is registered." The owner of a patent for a washing-machine applied to it the name of "The Home Washer," and registered that name as his trademark in respect of it. He did not manufacture the machines, or any other goods in the same Actually engaged. — An act of Congress class, but granted an exclusive license to a of the Confederate States exempted persons manufacturing firm, who paid him royalties. engaged in certain occupations from miliAfter the expiration of the patent (six tary service in the armies of the Confederate years from the registration of the trade- States. There was a proviso that declared mark), this firm continued to manufacture "that the exemptions granted under this the machines, and to describe them by the act shall only continue whilst the persons old name, but paid no royalties. The exempted are actually engaged in their former owner of the patent, and the regis respective pursuits or occupations." It was tered proprietor of the name, had not, after contended that this must be construed to a year and nine months from the expiration mean, "that all those persons who are exof the patent, begun to manufacture, though empted shall continually employ their own he had been in negotiation with manufac- personal skill and labor in and about the turers, to get them to do so in conjunction pursuits or occupations on account of with him. It was held that one year and which they are exempted;" so that they nine months was sufficient cesser to bring are also impliedly exempted from State the registered proprietor of the mark militia service. But the court took a difwithin the description of a "registered ferent view of the matter, saying, “When proprietor not engaged in any business we say, in common parlance, of a man, concerned in the goods within the same that he is actually engaged' in farming, class as the goods with respect to which or planting, does it necessarily imply that ENGAGEMENT.1 ENGINE.2 he must give his constant personal supervision to his farm or plantation? Does it mean any thing more than that such a man has a farm or plantation in active operation, on his own account, whether he conducts its daily affairs through an overseer, or in person? The words embrace both cases. And so of many, if not most, other pursuits and occupations. The words 'actually engaged,' in common parlance, mean 'really, or truly engaged,'-engaged 'in fact;' and, according to the same law of common use, are the opposite or antithesis of 'seemingly,' or 'pretendedly,' or 'feignedly engaged.' In the common acceptation of the words, the same man may be 'actually engaged' in two or more pursuits, or occupations, at the same time." State in re Strawbridge & Mays, 39 Ala. 383. 1. In English Practice an engagement is an agreement entered into by a married woman, with the intention of binding her separate estate, that would be a contract, if it were not for the incompetency of a married woman to become a party to a contract. "On principle," says Pollock, "it should seem that a married woman's engagement with respect to her separate estate, while not bound by any peculiar forms, is, on the other hand, bound in every case by the ordinary forms of contract; in other words, that no instrument or transaction can take effect as an engagement binding separate estate which could not take effect as a contract if the party were sui juris. That is to say, the creditor must first produce evidence appropriate to the nature of the transaction which would establish a legal debt against a party sui juris, and then must show, by proof or presumption, as explained above, an intention to make the separate estate the debtor." Poll. Cont. (4th ed.) App. 651. estate which she may happen to have, in that sense, and to that extent, the proposition that her separate estate is not liable to her general engagements is quite accurate." See also Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 DeG. F. & J. 494; Shattuck v. Shattuck, L. R. 2 Eq. 182; Poll. Cont. (4th ed.) 647 et seq. An Engagement is not a Bank Note.— A charter of an insurance company contained the following provisions: "Any policy or engagement signed by the president, and attested by the secretary, when done conformably to any by-laws of the directors, shall be valid against, and effectually bind, the said corporation, without the presence of a board of directors, and as effectually as if under the seal of the said corporation; provided, however, that no policies or engagements whatsoever, which shall, as aforesaid, be entered into, by this corporation, with any individual, body corporate or politic, either without the seal of this corporation or otherwise, shall be transferable, negotiable, or assignable, so as to give to such second holder or assignee a claim on the said corporation, either in his own name or the name of the person originally concerned, unless the consent of this corporation shall have been previously obtained, and indorsed in writing on such instrument, or unless such a privilege form a part of the original agreement, and be expressly granted by this corporation." Under these provisions, it was contended that the insurance company had a right to issue bank notes. Said the court, "It is a very strained construction of the term 'engagement' to suppose it means a bank note. This is not the usual and ordinary acceptation of the term. The word engagement,' as used in the act, may very fairly be considered as synonymous with policy. Yet a more enlarged sense might be given it, and still limit it to contracts in and about the business of insurance, and the transactions expressly authorized by General engagements are defined in Rap. & Law.'s Dic. as follows: "The promises or debts of a married woman which are not expressly charged by her on her separate estate, are sometimes called her 'general the charter." engagements,' and do not bind her separate estate unless made with reference to and upon the faith and credit of that estate." In London Chartered Bank v. Lemprière, L. R. 4 P. C. 593, James, L. J., said, "The term 'general' engagement is an ambiguous and misleading one. If it is meant to say that goods sold to a married woman in the ordinary course of domestic life, that contracts expressed to be made by her in respect of property not her separate estate, e.g., for buying or selling, or letting or hiring, a house, do not necessarily impose a liability to be satisfied out of the separate 2. In Hornblower v. Boulton, 8 Term, 95, which was an action for the infringement of a patent, in which the question of the validity of the patent arose, Lawrence, 7, held that the word "engine," in the act of Parliament extending the term of the patent, signified a contrivance or device. "Some of the difficulties in the case," said he, "have arisen from considering the word ‘engine' in its popular sense, namely, some mechanical contrivance to effect that to which human strength, without such assistance, is unequal; but it may also signify 'device;' and that Watt meant to use it in that sense, and that the legislature so understood it, is evident from the words 'engine' and 'method' being used as convertible terms." The statute 52 G. III. c. 130, makes it a capital offence "if any person .. shall unlawfully, and with force, demolish or pull down, or begin to demolish or pull down, any erection and building or engine which shall be used... in the carrying on... of any trade or manufactory; and provides that the injured person shall be entitled to recover damages from the hundred in which the property may be situated. In an action for damages, under this statute, against a hundred, it was held that movable frames for the manufacture of framework lace are not an engine within the meaning of the act. Said Lord Ellenborough, "The word 'engine,' as it is found in this act, does not apply to all the utensils and tools which afford the means of carrying on the trade, such as are the tools and utensils mentioned in the 52 G. III. c. 16, but is to be accepted in a much more limited sense. . . . The word 'engine' is indeed used in both these acts, and perhaps it is owing to this equivocal use of it that we are engaged with this argument to-day. In the act for the protection of the trade [52 G. III. c. 16], it means the utensil by which the trade is carried on. In the 52 G. III. c. 130, the act with which we are at present concerned, the word 'engine' is also used; but it seems to me to demand a different interpretation from that which it bears in the other act, as much as if it had been a different word. This act [53 G. III. c. 130] constitutes it a felony to demolish or pull down, or begin to demolish or pull down, any erection, building, or engine, which must mean engine ejusdem generis; and there is no remedy against the hundred for damages to engines unless where it is an engine analogous to an erection or building. These frames are, indeed, in some degree, connected with the building; but they are not so necessarily, and only so for a temporary purpose; they are movables, like a bed, although of too large dimensions to be moved away without taking them down; they are not, in their nature, fixed, and therefore not of that description for which this remedy will lie." Orgill v. Smith, 6 M. & S. 1182. was out sporting with the gun, nor where it was taken. The court held, sustaining a demurrer to this plea, that "a gun is not necessarily to be taken to be an engine to kill game, as it does not appear upon this record that the plaintiff killed game with it; he might use it to shoot crows, or destroy vermin; and it is not like nets and pointers, which can only be kept for killing the game." Wingfield v. Stratford, 1 Wils. 315. By 1 & 2 Wm. IV. c. 32, "If any person shall kill or take any game, or use any dog, gun, net, or other engine or instrument of destruction for the purpose of killing or taking any game on a Sunday," he shall, on conviction, be liable to a penalty. It was held that a snare was an engine or instrument within the meaning of the act, and that putting down a snare on a day before Sunday for the purpose of killing game, and keeping it set on Sunday, was using an engine or instrument on Sunday. "The word engine, derived from ingenium, includes a snare, which is a device or contrivance- an engine-for killing game." Allen v. Thompson, L. R. 5 Q. B. 336. Fixed Engine. The Salmon Fishery Act, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109, enacts, “No fixed engine of any description shall be placed or used for catching salmon in any inland or tidal waters; . . . and for the purposes of this section a net that is secured by anchors, or otherwise temporarily fixed to the soil, shall be deemed to be a fixed engine." Three nets were set twelve yards apart, and extended to near the middle of a river: they were fixed at one end to a large stone on the bank, and at the other end they were kept up by corks with lead attached to keep them down. It did not appear whether or not the nets reached to the bottom of the river. Whenever a salmon touched a net, it gave way, gathered together, and entangled and so caught the salmon. It was held that they were not a fixed engine within the act. "It is impossible to say that a net moored at one end of it to a great weight, but so that part of the apparatus gives way when a fish comes to it, is a fixed engine within the statute." Thomas v. Jones, 5 B. & S. 916. By the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121, s. 39, it is further provided that "a fixed engine' shall include any net or other implement for taking fish fixed to the soil, or made stationary in any other way, not being a fishing weir or fishing milldam." Under this section it was held that a "stop net is not a "fixed engine." A "stop-net" is used as follows: "The fisherman fixes his boat athwart the current of the river, by lashing it at each end to a pole driven in the bed of the river. The net, which is thirty feet wide at the mouth, and tapers to a point, is stretched by two poles twenty Engine to kill Game. A gun is not necessarily an engine to kill game. In an action of trover for a gun taken by the defendants from the plaintiff, the defendants, in their plea, alleged that the plaintiff kept the gun to kill game, without being qualified; and they justified the taking on the ground that they were the gamekeeper and servants of J. S., the lord of the manor. But the plea did not state that the plaintiff ENGINEERING PURPOSES.1 ENGLISH.2 ENGRAVING.3 ENHANCED.4 two feet long, which are tied together at the upper end, and kept extended (to the width of the net at the mouth) by a pole lashed across at about seven feet from the upper end. The net is lowered overboard until the two poles rest at about eight feet from the upper end on the side of the boat. The net and poles are thus nearly on the balance, and the fisherman presses slightly on the upper end, and so keeps the net steady at about an angle of twelve degrees; he also holds a string attached to the bottom of the net, and when he feels a fish, he presses down the upper end of the poles with both hands, using the edge of the boat as a fulcrum, and so raises the net out of the water, and catches the fish." Gore v. Commissioners, L. R. 6 Q. B. 561. 1. The legislature of Minnesota granted certain franchises to a railroad company on condition that it would construct a certain portion of its road on its present located line, "except so far as it may be necessary to change the same for engineering purposes." Under this act, it was held that an engineering purpose "can only mean a purpose of constructing the road on that route on which it can be built, operated, or kept in repair, in the best, cheapest, and safest manner." McRoberts v. S. M. R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 108. 2. English Bill. Formerly an ordinary suit in chancery was called a suit by English bill, by way of distinction from suits on the common-law side of that court, which were conducted in Norman-French or Latin. Rap. & Law. L. D. An English Education is an education acquired through the medium of the English language. It is the language employed as a medium of instruction that gives distinctive character to the education, and not the particular branches of learning studied, even though a foreign language be one of the branches. Powell v. Board of Education, 97 Ill. 380. English Information.—A proceeding in the court of exchequer in matters of revenue. See 28 and 29 Vict. c. 104. Rap. & Law. L. D. minutes, viz.,'. State v. Jericho, 40 Vt. 121; s. c., 94 Am. Dec. 387. But the words Anno Domini are English within the statute. State v. Gilbert, 13 Vt. 647. English Marriage. The phrase "an English_marriage" may refer to the place where the marriage was solemnized, or it may refer to the nationality and domicile of the parties between whom it was solemnized, the place where the union so created was to have been enjoyed. Harvey v. Farnie, L. R. P. D. 51. ... 3. A picture on paper, made by the art of photography from a glass "negative," is not an engraving within sect. I of the Copyright Act of Feb. 3, 1831, which provides that "any person .. who shall ... invent, design, etch, engrave, work, or cause to be engraved, etched, or worked, from his own design, any print or engraving, shall have the sole right of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending such print, cut, or engraving," etc. The word engraving," as used in the act, means an engraved plate, or an impression from an engraved plate. Wood v. Abbott, 5 Blatchf. (U.S.) 325. "In Campbell v. Pickford, Guthrie's Sel. Cas. in Sheriffs' Courts, 124, it was said obiter that chromo-lithographs of designs for architecture or decoration are not 'pictures' or 'engravings' within the Carriers' Act of William IV. The court said, 'They can hardly be held engravings, because they are not produced by cutting with sharp tools into a metallic or other plate, and tak ing impressions from it, but are obtained by a different process altogether, stone, on which the design is in the first instance laid down. And, accordingly, engraving and lithography are recognized as different arts. But the decision was put on the ground that a collection of such lithographs, bound in a volume with letterpress descriptions, such as Jones' 'Grammar of Ornament,' is not an 'engraving' or 'picture."" Browne's Jud. Interp. 338. from 4. By an act of the legislature of Oregon, a widow is entitled to dower in "all the lands whereof her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during marriage." But if the husband aliens such lands, and they "shall have been enhanced in value after the alienation," the same "shall be estimated in setting forth the widow's dower according to their value at the time they were so aliened." Under these provisions of the act, it was held, that, English Language. The mark commonly used to denote dollars, viz., $, is not part of the English language within the meaning of the statute of the State of Vermont, that requires declarations and other pleadings to be drawn in the English language. Clark v. Stoughton, 18 Vt. 50. Neither are the signs of degrees and |