Opinion, per HOUGH, J. The delay occasioned the contractor for a period of eighteen months, subjecting it to great expense in one way or another, was sufficient cause on the part of the board of control, in an effort to protect the city against probable damage, to annul the contract, if it had the power so to do. A copy of this resolution was sent to council, where it was filed, and no action taken in reference to the subject-matter thereof. This course was taken, so far as it appears, in good faith and without any charge of fraud or collusion on the part of anybody. We are therefore confronted with the question whether or not the board of control had the power to do what it attempted to do. The board of control comes into being by virtue of Section 4402, General Code. Its authority in respect to contracts is conferred by Section 4403, General Code, which is in part as follows: "No contract in the department of public service * * * in excess of five hundred dollars shall be awarded except on the approval of the board of control, which shall direct the director of the appropriate department to enter into the contract." The power to make a contract on behalf of a city is given the director of public service under Section 4328, General Code. These city officials have such power, and only such power, as is given them by the legislature. We find that the director of public service is given the authority to alter or modify a contract by Section 4331, General Code, which reads as follows: "When it becomes necessary in the opinion of the director of public service, in the prosecution of any Opinion, per HOUGH, J. work or improvement under contract, to make alterations or modifications in such contract, such alterations or modifications shall only be made upon the order of such director, but such order shall be of no effect until the price to be paid for the work and material, or both, under the altered or modified contract, has been agreed upon in writing and signed by the contractor and the director on behalf of the corporation, and approved by the board of control, as provided by law." We find, then, that the director of public service, with the approval of the board of control, has the power, during the progress of an improvement, for instance the repaving of a street, to make alterations and modifications in that contract. This power, however, cannot be considered one to absolutely rescind, annul, or wipe out a contract regularly made, and we find no such authority given by the legislature. Then, how about the power of council to rescind a contract? There is no expression of the legislature giving council the power to annul or rescind such a contract. General powers of council are found in Section 4211, which, in part, reads: ever * * "The powers of council shall be legislative only, and it shall perform no administrative duties what*. All contracts requiring the authority of council for their execution shall be entered into and conducted to performance by the board or officers having charge of the matters to which they relate, and after authority to make such Opinion, per HOUGH, J. contracts has been given and the necessary appropriation made, council shall take no further action thereon." It would seem from a reading of this section that after the passage of the ordinance to proceed council would have no further duty to perform in reference to the making or execution of a contract for street improvement. Let us further examine Section 4328, General Code: "The director of public service may make any contract or purchase supplies or material or provide labor for any work under the supervision of that department not involving more than five hundred dollars. When an expenditure within the department, other than the compensation of persons employed therein, exceeds five hundred dollars, such expenditure shall first be authorized and directed by ordinance of council." It is therefore apparent that a contract such as we have here, involving as it does an expenditure of more than $500, before it is made or may be made, must be authorized and directed by ordinance of council. The first contract was authorized and directed by Section 5 of "the ordinance to proceed." Council authorized and directed the execution of a contract, but it did not authorize and direct the execution of more than one contract; that is to say, when the director of public service, with the direction and approval of the board of control, entered into a contract under the authorization and direction of Opinion, per HOUGH, J. council, such director was conciuded from entering into any other contract covering the same subjectmatter, without the affirmative and proper authorization and direction of council to make such other contract; and this position is strengthened by Section 4211, General Code-council must first authorize and direct, and having so done, its duty is completed, on the theory that the contract so authorized and directed is the contract and the only contract authorized and directed. Now, as before stated, there is no authority conferred by statute upon a director of public service or a board of control, or both, to rescind a contract. Neither is there any specific authority for council so to do. There is, however, a general fundamental rule of law that between principals the power to make a contract carries with it the general power to unmake it. This general principle is sound, and we can conceive no reason why it cannot be applied to municipalities; if properly applied. A contract for a street improvement, on the part of the city, must, under the law, be authorized and directed by ordinance of council, and when so directed, and that authorization and direction has been taken advantage of by the making of a contract, the city officials are concluded from making another contract upon the same subject-matter without affirmative and proper authorization and direction therefor. That being true the first contract in question could not legally be annulled and rescinded without affirmative action of council by ordinance in respect thereto. This we do not find to have been done. Opinion, per HOUGH, J. The resolution of the board of control annulling the contract was sent to, received, and filed by council, and that was all that was done by council to annul the contract. The resolution directing republication cannot be construed as an action to rescind the contract upon the grounds set out in the resolution of the board of control. At most, it was an expression of opinion upon the part of council that the first contract was void because of fatally defective publication. It was not in any sense an action joining with the action of the board of control in rescinding the contract, or approving the reasons that prompted the board of control to attempt such rescission, namely, because of unavoidable delays and the impossibility of prompt performance. It took, as we have said, the action of council by ordinance, the action of the director of public service, and the action of the board of control, to effectually make a contract, and, in the absence of specific legislative authority permitting the rescinding and annulling of the contract, it would take the same joint and concurrent action of the same officials, acting with the same formality, to unmake it. The deduction, therefore, is that such a contract, upon good and sufficient reasons, may be rescinded, but that the action taken in this case did not accomplish that end. 3. Was the second contract valid or invalid? The conclusion arrived at in No. 2 has satisfactorily solved this question. The first contract being |