Opinion of the Court.

exceptional class from commissioners appointed by the judges of that court after that date, and hold office until they are removed for causes prescribed by existing law, or until Congress passes a law defining such causes. The latter view may be rejected at once, for the words "causes prescribed by law," manifestly relate to causes prescribed when the act was approved, or at least when the removal was made. Not only is there nothing here to give them any other meaning, but it cannot be presumed that Congress intended to forbid the exercise by the judges of their power in the matter of these appointments in the instance of these particular commissioners, or to provide that they should hold office during life, or until Congress should specify causes subjecting them to removal, while all other commissioners were removable at the will of the power appointing them.

The proviso was enacted apparently out of abundant caution lest the legislation in respect of the United States Court in the Indian Territory might operate in itself to turn the then commissioner out of office, and if Congress had intended in addition that they should hold office free from the rule applicable to others, we think that the intention would have been plainly expressed.

The inquiry is therefore whether there were any causes of removal prescribed by law, March 1, 1895, or at the time of the removal. If there were, then the rule would apply that where causes of removal are specified by constitution or statute, as also where the term of office is for a fixed period, notice and hearing are essential. If there were not, the appointing power could remove at pleasure or for such cause as it deemed sufficient.

The suggestion that the proviso refers to such causes as courts might recognize as just will not do, for "prescribed by law" is prescribed by legislative act, and removal for cause, when causes are not defined nor removal for cause provided for, is a matter of discretion and not reviewable.

It does not appear that any causes for removal of these court officers were ever affirmatively specified by Congress; but it is said that Congress had prescribed such causes by the adoption

Opinion of the Court.

in the Indian Territory of certain laws of Arkansas. By section thirty-one of the act of May 2, 1890, some of those laws were put in force in the Indian Territory, and by section thirtynine the commissioners were authorized to exercise all the powers conferred by the laws of Arkansas on justices of the peace within their districts, and the provisions of chapter ninetyone of those laws regulating the jurisdiction of and procedure before justices of the peace were extended to that Territory. By the act of March 1, 1895, these were reëenacted, and chapters forty-five and forty-six of Mansfield's Digest, treating of criminal law and criminal procedure, were also put in force there.

The argument is that the effect of these provisions was to put the commissioners in the place of justices of the peace in Arkansas, and that consequently the causes prescribed by law for the removal of justices of the peace must be taken as prescribed by law as causes for the removal of commissioners.

In our opinion this conclusion does not follow. In order to clothe the commissioners with the powers pertaining to justices of the peace, this was conveniently accomplished by reference, but that did not convert these officers of the United States Court in the Indian Territory into justices of the peace or change the relations between them and the judges of that court. Justices of the peace in Arkansas by state constitution and laws hold office for two years, and cannot be removed except for cause, and on notice and hearing. The commissioners hold office neither for life, nor for any specified time, and are within the rule which treats the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment, unless otherwise provided. By chapters forty-five and forty-six, justices of the peace on conviction of the offences enumerated are removable from office, but these necessarily do not include all causes which might render the removal of commissioners necessary or advisable. Congress did not provide for the removal of commissioners for the causes for which justices of the peace might be removed, and if this were to be ruled otherwise by construction, the effect would be to hold the commissioners in office for life unless some of those specially enumerated causes became applicable to them.

Statement of the Case.

We agree with the Court of Claims that this would be a most unreasonable construction and would restrict the power of removal in a manner which there is nothing in the case to indicate could have been contemplated by Congress.

If causes of removal had been prescribed by law before the removal of appellant that would have presented a different question, but as there were then none such, the proviso did not operate to take him out of the rule expounded in Ex parte Hennen, and the mere fact that in that particular this part of the proviso was inoperative as to him did not change the result. Judgment affirmed.

SIMON v. CRAFT.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA.

No. 191. Argued March 12, 1901.-Decided May 27, 1901.

The essential elements of due process of law are notice and opportunity to defend, and in determining whether such rights are denied, the court is governed by the substance of things and not by mere form.

A person charged with being of unsound mind is not denied due process of law by being refused an opportunity to defend, when, in fact, actual notice was served upon him of the proceedings, and when, if he had chosen to do so, he was at liberty to make such defences as he deemed advisable.

The due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution does not necessitate that the proceedings in a state court should be by a particular mode, but only that there shall be a regular course of proceedings, in which notice is given of the claim asserted, and an opportunity afforded to defend against it.

This court accepts as conclusive the ruling of the Supreme Court of Alabama that the jury which passed upon the lunacy proceeding considered in this case was a lawful jury, that the petition was in compliance with the statute, and that the asserted omissions in the recitals in the verdict and order thereon were at best but mere irregularities which did not render void the order of the state court, appointing a guardian.

THIS is a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme

Statement of the Case.

Court of Alabama affirming a judgment in favor of John N. Craft, the defendant in error herein. The judgment thus affirmed was entered by a lower state tribunal upon a verdict rendered on the second trial of an action in ejectment, wherein Jetta Simon, plaintiff in error herein, was plaintiff.

In brief, the facts are as follows: In 1889, Jetta Simon, a widow, resided in Mobile, Alabama, with several minor children. She lived at that time in a house of which she was the owner, being the real estate affected by the action of ejectment heretofore referred to. On January 30, 1889, Ralph G. Richard filed in the probate court of Mobile County, Alabama, a petition for an inquisition of lunacy as to Mrs. Simon. In this petition it was represented that Richard was a friend of Mrs. Simon and of her family; that she was of the age of forty-nine years, a resident of Mobile, of unsound mind and incapable of governing herself or of conducting and managing her affairs. Upon this petition an order was entered for a hearing on February 6, 1889, and that a jury "be drawn, as the law directs, for the trial of this issue." The order also provided that a writ issue to the sheriff, " requiring him to take the said Jetta Simon, so that he have her in this court to be presented at said trial, if consistent with the health and safety of said Simon." The writ issued. Therein was stated the substance of the allegations of the petition, and that the order had been entered appointing February 6, 1889, “for hearing said petition and for the due trial thereof." The command of the writ was that

"If it be consistent with the health and safety of said Jetta Simon, you are hereby required to take her body, so that you may have her in said court, to be present at said trial, and before the jury then to be empanelled to make said inquisition. "And have you then and there this writ with your return thereon as to how you have executed the same."

The writ was duly returned with the following endorsement: "Received January 31st, 1889, and on the same day I exe cuted the within writ of arrest by taking into my custody the within-named Jetta Simon and handing her a copy of said writ, and as it is inconsistent with the health or safety of the within-named Jetta Simon to have her present at the place

Statement of the Case.

of trial, and on the advice of Dr. H. P. Hirshfield, a physician, whose certificate is hereto attached, she is not brought before the honorable court.

"W. H. HOLCOMBE, Sheriff.

"Mobile, February 5th, 1889. By WM. H. SHEFFIELD, D. S."

The certificate referred to reads as follows:

"MOBILE, ALA., Jan. 30th, 1889.

"To the Sheriff of Mobile County, Ala.:

“I, H. P. Hirshfield, a regular physician, practicing in Mobile County, Ala., hereby certify that I am acquainted with Mrs. Jetta Simon, and have examined her condition on yesterday and find that she is a person of unsound mind, and it would not be consistent with her health or safety to have her present in court in any matter now pending.

"H. P. HIRSHFIELD, M. D."

One Vaughan was appointed by the probate court the guardian ad litem of Mrs. Simon "in the matter of the petition to inquire into her lunacy." The appointment was accepted, and the guardian filed in said proceeding an answer averring "that he wholly denies all the matters and things stated and contained in said petition, and requires strict proof to be made thereof according to law." Thereupon a hearing was had before a jury, who returned a verdict that Mrs. Simon was "of unsound mind." The probate court then entered the following order or decree :

"STATE OF ALABAMA,

Mobile County.

"JETTA SIMON, Lunatic.

Probate Court of said County,

"February 6th, 1889.

"This being the day appointed, by reference to an entry thereof made upon the minutes of the court on the 30th of January, 1889, for the hearing of the petition of Ralph G. Richard, filed, alleging the lunacy of the said Jetta Simon and praying an inquisition thereof, and it being shown that it would not be consistent with the health and safety of said lunatic to bring her into court at this time, and it appearing that due process