Opinion of the Court. of that State failed to provide for notice, and that court assumed in its opinion that no question of that character was presented. As a matter of fact, a copy of the writ which issued and which embodied a notice of the date of the hearing of the proceedings in lunacy is shown by the record to have been actually served on Mrs. Simon. As early as 1870 the Supreme Court of Alabama in Fore v. Fore, 44 Alabama, 478, 483, held that the service of the writ upon a supposed lunatic was the notice required by the statute and brought the defendant into court, and that if he failed to avail of such matters of defence as he might bave, he must suffer the effect of his failure to do so. We excerpt in the margin the portion of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama which dealt with the objection that Mrs. Simon was deprived of opportunity to be heard.1 The contention now urged is that notice imports an opportunity to defend, and that the return of the sheriff conclusively established that Mrs. Simon was taken into custody and was hence prevented by the sheriff from attending the inquest or defending through counsel if she wished to do so in consequence of the notice which she received. It seems, however, manifest -as it is fairly to be inferred the state court interpreted the 1"The second ground of objection is that the appellee had no opportunity to be heard at the inquisition. This objection is based upon the character and wording of the writ directed to the sheriff. The provision of the statute is that the judge must 'issue a writ, directed to the sheriff, to take the person alleged to be of unsound mind, and, if consistent with his health or safety, have him present at the place of trial.' The writ that issued, after setting out the facts averred in the petition, proceeded: 'Now, therefore, if it be consistent with the health and safety of said Jetta Simon, you are hereby required to take her body so that you may have her in said court,' etc. The statute is that the sheriff be directed to take her body, and, if consistent with health, etc. By the statute it is made the duty of the sheriff to take the body without condition, and, if consistent with health and safety, to have her present at the trial. The writ issued, directed to the sheriff, 'if consistent with health and safety, to take her body,' etc. The return of the sheriff shows that the writ was executed in accordance with the statute. It is: 'I executed the within writ of arrest by taking into my custody the within-named Jetta Simon and handing a copy of said writ, and as it is inconsistent with the health or safety . . . to have her at the place of trial . . . she is not brought before the court.' Technically the writ of the judge was not accurately correct. Its meaning, however, is Opinion of the Court. statute that the purpose in the command of the writ, "to take the person alleged to be of unsound mind, and, if consistent with his health or safety, have him present at the place of trial," was to enforce the attendance of the alleged non compos, rather than to authorize a restraint upon the attendance of such person at the hearing. In other words, that the detention authorized was simply such as would be necessary to enable the sheriff to perform the absolute duty imposed upon him by law of bringing the person before the court, if in the judgment of that officer such person was in a fit condition to attend, and hence it cannot be presumed, in the absence of all proof or allegation to that effect, that the sheriff in the discharge of this duty, after serving the writ upon the alleged lunatic, exerted his power of detention for the purpose of preventing her attendance at the hearing, or of restraining her from availing herself of any and every opportunity to defend which she might desire to resort to, or which she was capable of exerting. The essential elements of due process of law are notice and opportunity to defend. In determining whether such rights were denied we are governed by the substance of things and not by mere form. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230. We cannot, then, even on the assumption that Mrs. Simon was of sound mind and fit to attend the hearing, hold that she was denied due process of law by being refused an opportunity to defend, when, in fact, actual notice was served upon her of the proceedings, and when, as we construe the statute, if she had chosen to do so, she was at liberty to make such defence as she deemed advisable. The view we take of the statute was evidently the one adopted by the judge of the probate court, where the proceedings in lunacy were heard, since that court, upon the return of the sheriff, and the failure of the alleged lunatic to appear, either in person or by counsel, in order to protect her interests, entered an order appointing a guardian ad litem "in the matter of the petition to inquire into her lunacy;" and evident. The sheriff's return was complete and regular in every respect. We do not doubt she was brought into the court in the manner prescribed by statute, and that she was subject to its jurisdiction. The second objection cannot be sustained." 118 Alabama, 636. Opinion of the Court. an answer was filed by such guardian denying all the matters and things stated and contained in the petition, and requiring strict proof to be made thereof according to law. It is also urged as establishing the nullity of the appointment of a guardian of the estate of Mrs. Simon that the proceedings failed to constitute due process of law, because: 1, they were special and statutory, and the petition failed to state sufficient jurisdictional facts: 2, a jury was not empanelled as provided by law and 3, there was no finding in the verdict of the jury or the order entered thereon ascertaining and determining all the facts claimed to be essential to confer jurisdiction to appoint.a guardian. But the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not necessitate that the proceedings in a state court should be by a particular mode, but only that there shall be a regular course of proceedings in which notice is given of the claim asserted and an opportunity afforded to defend against it. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S..230, 236, and cases cited. If the essential requisites of full notice and an opportunity to defend were present, this court will accept the interpretation given by the state court as to the regularity under the state statute of the practice pursued in the particular case. Tested by these principles, we accept as conclusive the ruling of the Supreme Court of Alabama that the jury which passed on the issues in the lunacy proceeding was a lawful jury, that the petition was in compliance with the statute, and that the asserted omissions in the recitals in the verdict and order thereon were at best but mere irregularities which did not render void the order of the state court, appointing a guardian of Mrs. Simon's estate. Judgment affirmed. Statement of the Case. PIRIE v. CHICAGO TITLE AND TRUST COMPANY. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. No. 391. Argued January 18, 21, 1901. - Decided May 27, 1901. Frank Brothers were adjudged bankrupts in February, 1899. For a long time prior to that Pirie & Co. had dealt with them, selling them merchandise. Within four months prior to the adjudication of bankruptcy Pirie & Co. received from them $1336.79, leaving a balance still due and unpaid of $3093.98. When this payment was made Frank Brothers were hopelessly insolvent to the knowledge of Frank Brothers, but Pirie & Co. and their agents had no knowledge of it, and had no reasonable cause to believe that the bankrupts, by such payment intended to give a preference, nor did they intend to do so. Pirie & Co. proved their claim against the estate, and received a dividend thereon, which they still hold. The provisions in the Bankrupt Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 60, that “a person shall be deemed to have given a preference if, being insolvent, he has procured or suffered a judgment to be entered against himself in favor of any person, or made a transfer of any of his property, and the effect of the enforcement of such judgment or transfer will be to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such creditors, of the same class," means that a transfer of property includes the giving or conveying anything of value, anything which has debt paying or debt securing power; and money is property. If the person receiving such preference did not have cause to believe that it was intended, he may keep the property transferred, but, if it be only a partial discharge of his debt cannot prove the balance. When the purpose of a prior law is continued, its words usually are, and an omission of the words imply an omission of the purpose. The object of a bankrupt act is, so far as creditors are concerned, to secure equality of distribution, among all, of the property of the bankrupt. Subdivision c of section 60 of the bankrupt act is applicable to the cases arising under subdivision b, and allows a set-off, which might not be otherwise allowed. IN proceedings in bankruptcy in the matter of Frank Brothers, bankrupts, in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the appellants filed a claim for goods, wares and merchandise, sold and delivered to said bankrupt firm for the sum of $3093.98. The claim was allowed, and subsequently a dividend of fifteen per cent was paid thereon. Statement of the Case. On the 31st of August, 1899, the appellee, the Chicago Title and Trust Company, filed a petition for a reconsideration of the claim and its rejection on the ground that Carson, Pirie, Scott & Company had within four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy received from the bankrupts large sums of money as preferences, which preferences had not been surrendered. The recovery of the dividend paid was also prayed for. To the petition, Carson, Pirie, Scott & Company made the following answer: "They admit that they have collected in the usual and ordinary course of their business, from said bankrupts, Frank Brothers, within four (4) months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the sum of one thousand three hundred and thirtysix and dollars ($1336.79). 70% "Further answering, Carson, Pirie, Scott & Company say, that they did not know, or have reason to believe, that the said Frank Brothers were insolvent at the time the payments were made, nor did they have reasonable cause to believe that such payments were made with any intent to give them a preference, nor did said Frank Brothers intend the payments so made to be preferences." The matter came up before Frank L. Wean, referee, and he substantially found the facts, from the stipulation of the parties, as hereinafter stated in the findings of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and that the payments constituted a preference. He adjudged therefore that the claim be reconsidered and rejected, and the dividend paid thereon be given up. On review the District Court also found the facts as the referee found them, and on the 9th of May, 1900, made and entered an order, the conclusion of which was as follows: "It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that said claim of said Carson, Pirie, Scott & Company, heretofore filed herein and allowed, should be reconsidered. "That said claim of Carson, Pirie, Scott & Company should be rejected and expunged. "That said Carson, Pirie, Scott & Company forthwith pay |