Opinion of the Court. Court of the United States equitable defences are not permitted. So, also "if the defendant," this court has said, " have equitable grounds for relief against the plaintiff, he must seek to enforce them by a separate suit in equity." Northern Pacific Railroad v. Paine, 119 U. S. 561, 563. See also Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How. 669; Thompson v. Railroad Companies, 6 Wall. 134; Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106; Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 512. We must not be understood as expressing any opinion upon the question whether the defendant could have been discharged from liability as a shareholder if the facts stated in his answer by way of defence had been established in a separate suit in equity. Whether a decree based upon the facts set forth in the answer, even if established in a suit in equity brought against the bank and the receiver after the appointment of a receiver, would be consistent with sound principle or with the statute regulating the affairs of national banks and securing the rights of creditors, is a question upon which we do not now express an opinion. We mean at this time only to adjudge that the facts set forth in the answer present grounds of relief which cannot be made available by way of defence in this action at law, and if sufficient to protect the defendant against the liability attaching to him as a shareholder, must be alleged and proved in a suit in equity to which the bank and the receiver are made parties. Some of the observations made in Scott v. Deweese, 181 U. S. 202, are quite applicable to the present case. That was an action at law to enforce the individual liability imposed by section 5151 of the Revised Statutes. The defendant in that case sought to escape such liability upon the ground, in part, that he had been induced by false representations of the bank's officers to accept a certificate for a certain amount of its increased capital stock. No suit had been instituted to cancel the certificate or to rescind the subscription of stock. The court said: "The present suit is primarily in the interest of creditors of the bank. It is based upon a statute designed not only for their protection but to give confidence to all dealing with national banks in respect to their contracts, debts and Opinion of the Court. engagements, as well as to stockholders generally. If the subscriber became a shareholder in consequence of frauds practiced upon him by others, whether they be officers of the bank or officers of the Government, he must look to them for such redress as the law authorizes, and is estopped, as against creditors, to deny that he is a shareholder, within the meaning of section 5151, if at the time the rights of creditors accrued he occupied and was accorded the rights appertaining to that position." Whether the defendant in that case could have been relieved from liability as a shareholder and had his subscription of stock cancelled, if he had in good faith and in due time before the suspension of the bank instituted proceedings to obtain relief, was not decided. The defendant, however, contends that the present suit is not embraced by the rule just announced because, he insists, the purchase by the bank of its stock-which he was induced thereafter by its fraud to purchase from it-was not simply voidable but was absolutely void; consequently, the sale to him of such stock was void and he did not by his purchase and by taking a certificate of stock become a shareholder within the meaning of section 5151. It is true that the statute declares that no national bank shall be the purchaser or holder of any of its own shares of capital stock. Rev. Stat. § 5201. But will a violation of this provision by the bank relieve from liability one who holds a certificate of its stock and enjoys the right of a shareholder? The statute forbids a national bank to lend money upon real estate as security. Rev. Stat. § 5137. Nevertheless, this court has frequently held that the borrower cannot escape liability for the repayment of the money so borrowed, nor dispute the right of the bank to enforce the security taken in violation of the statute; that it was for the Government and not for the borrower to complain of the bank's departure from the rule prescribed by statute. Scott v. Deweese, 181 U. S. 202, and authorities there cited. In National Bank v. Stewart, 107 U. S. 676, 677, it appeared that a bank had loaned money on the security of its shares of stock held by the borrower. The debt not having been paid, Opinion of the Court. the bank sold the stock and applied the proceeds to the payment of an equal amount of the debt. The stockholder then sued the bank to recover the value of the stock, relying on section 5201 of the Revised Statutes forbidding a national bank to make any loan or discount on the security of the shares of its own capital stock. The trial court held that as the statute forbade the bank to accept its own shares of stock as security for money loaned, the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The judgment was reversed by this court, which held that the statute imposed no penalty, either on the bank or borrower, if à loan was made in violation of its provisions; and that if the prohibition could be urged against the validity of the transaction by any one except the Government, it could only be done while the security was subsisting in the hands of the bank. So in Scott v. Deweese above cited, which involved a construction of section 5205 providing that no increase of a bank's capital stock shall be valid until the whole amount of such increase shall have been paid in, and until the Comptroller certifies that the amount of the increase has been duly paid in as part of the capital of the association. This court said: "The statute does not, in terms, make void a subscription or certificate of stock based upon increased capital stock actually paid in, simply because the whole amount of any proposed or authorized increase has not in fact been paid into the bank. That the bank, after obtaining authority to increase its capital, issued certificates of stock without the knowledge or approval of the Comptroller and proceeded to do business upon the basis of such increase before the whole amount of the proposed increase of capital had been paid in, was a matter between it and the Government under whose laws it was organized, and did not render void subscriptions or certificates of stock based upon capital actually paid in, nor have the effect to relieve a shareholder, who had become such by paying into the bank the amount subscribed by him, from the individual liability imposed by section 5151.” In view of these decisions it cannot be held that the purchase by the bank of its own shares of stock was void. It was of course a matter of which the Government by its officers could Opinion of the Court. take cognizance; and it may be that it was a matter of which stockholders, having an interest in the proper administration of the affairs of the bank, could complain in a proceeding instituted by them to restrain the bank from violating the statute. But, when the violation of the statute has occurred, it is not a matter of which a shareholder can complain in order that he may be relieved from the liability attaching to him as a shareholder and which the receiver seeks to enforce under the orders of the Comptroller. In the present case Judge Thayer, delivering the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, well said: "In considering the second defence which was interposed by the defendant, it is important to bear in mind that the two hundred shares of stock which he purchased from the bank was not void stock, but was stock which, according to the averments of the answer, had once been issued to other persons and had been reacquired by the bank by purchasing it from such other persons to prevent them from throwing it on the market at ruinous prices. It is necessary to infer from the averments of the answer that this stock had once passed the scrutiny of the Comptroller, and had been outstanding and had been held by other persons since the organization of the bank in the year 1891. The purchase of this stock by the bank under the circumstances disclosed by the answer was doubtless ultra vires, but the purchase in question did not render the stock void. In purchasing it the bank made an unlawful use of its funds, for which the officers concerned in the transaction could have been held responsible, as for any other unlawful act, if the corporation had sustained damage; but in point of fact, by the sale of the stock to the defendant that portion of its capital which had been dissipated by the purchase was restored by the resale, and no loss seems to have been incurred. We are at a loss to understand how this transaction on the part of the bank can operate to relieve the defendant from his liability as a stockholder in a suit brought by the receiver to recover a stock assessment which was levied solely for the benefit of corporate creditors. The sale of the stock to the defendant after the bank had purchased the same was not unlawful, since it operated to restore that part of the capital that had been retired, and to that ex Opinion of the Court. tent repaired the wrong which might otherwise have been done to the bank's creditors." 97 Fed. Rep. 865, 868. It only remains to inquire whether, in any view of the case, the cross-petition or counterclaim can be sustained. We think not. The receiver sued in this case for the benefit of creditors who, it must be assumed upon this record, knew nothing of the circumstances under which the defendant became a shareholder. They trusted the bank and those who appeared on the list of shareholders required to be kept by section 5210 of the Revised Statutes, which list, that section declares, "shall be subject to the inspection of all the shareholders and creditors of the association." Referring to that section, this court, in Pauly v. State Loan & Trust Co., 165 U. S. 606, 621, 622, said: "Manifestly, one, if not the principal, object of this requirement, was to give creditors of the association, as well as state authorities, information as to the shareholders upon whom, if the association becomes insolvent, will rest the individual liability for its contracts, debts and engagements." Pullman v. Upton, 96 U. S. 328, 330, 331; National Bank v. Case, 99 U. S. 628, 631. "It is true that one who does not in fact invest his money in such shares, but who, although receiving them simply as collateral security for debts or obligations, holds himself out in the books of the association as the true owner, may be treated as the owner, and therefore liable to assessment, when the association becomes insolvent and goes into the hands of a receiver. But this is upon the ground that by allowing his name to appear upon the stock list as owner he represents that he is such owner; and he will not be permitted, after the bank fails and' when an assessment is made, to assume any other position as against creditors. If, as between creditors and the person assessed, the latter is not held bound by that representation, the list of stockholders required to be kept for the inspection of creditors and others would lose most of its value." We perceive no ground whatever upon which the defendant can have a judgment upon his cross-petition or counterclaim against the receiver. That officer had nothing to do with the fraudulent transactions of the bank prior to its suspension. His duty was to take charge of its assets, and have them admin |