Opinion of the Court. Did the evidence justify the trial court in permitting the jury to determine whether or not in allowing the disabled roller to remain at the place referred to, under the circumstances stated, the District negligently and unlawfully obstructed the highway? We shall assume that the period when the steam roller became unserviceable while in use on Park street was the forenoon of the day prior to the accident, as claimed by the plaintiff. The right, however, to use a steam roller upon a public street for the purpose of the repair of such street we think necessarily includes the right to retain the roller upon the street until a reasonable time after the necessity for the use of the machine has terminated, in the meantime exercising due care in the deposit of the machine when not in use and giving due notice and warning to the public of the presence of such machine if travel upon the street is permitted. We can perceive no difference in principle between using and keeping a steam roller on the streets until the completion of a particular work and the maintaining a lawful excavation, such as for the construction of a sewer or of an underground road and the use of an engine, derrick, etc., in connection with the hoisting of earth from an excavation. The appliances used in connection with such excavations, even though calculated to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness not familiar with such objects, undoubtedly may be retained at the place where needed until the necessity therefor has ceased, and the circumstance that such appliances become temporarily disabled cannot, in reason, be held to affect the right of the municipal authorities to keep such machinery on the works until in the ordinary course of events and in the exercise of a reasonable discretion it is found convenient either to there make the needed repairs or to remove the appliances elsewhere for that purpose. Now, the only inference warranted by the record is that when the steam roller in question got out of order it was being used upon the street, and the necessity for its further use continued to exist. Had the machine not broken down, or had needed repairs been made to it at the place where the roller was deposited, it might lawfully have been allowed to remain upon the street while its further use was required, and until it was reasonably convenient to remove it. Under Opinion of the Court. such a state of facts as has been detailed there was nothing either in the circumstance of the disabling of the machine, or in the detention, warranting the inference that the right to leave the roller upon the street over a legal holiday did not exist, and that an illegal use of the highway had originated. It follows that the facts in evidence respecting the keeping of the roller on Park street during the period referred to did not justify the submission to the jury of the question whether the District was negligent in so keeping the machine, as it could not reasonably have been inferred that the employés of the District were negligent in failing to remove the machine before the occurrence of the accident. As respects the notice owing to the plaintiff of the presence of the roller, we agree with the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Lane v. Lewiston, supra, that where a steam roller is allowed to remain upon a municipal highway it is requisite that the municipality causing the obstruction should give reasonable notice to the traveling public of its presence, but that a view of its obstruction itself in time to avoid it without injury amounts to notice. In other words, as stated by the Maine court, "No one needs notice of what he already knows," and "Knowledge of the danger is equivalent to prior notice." 91 Maine, 296. That the plaintiff had notice of the presence of the roller on Park street in ample time to have avoided it, is undisputed. When he turned from Fourteenth street into Park street it was broad daylight, there was nothing to obstruct his view westward, and in fact he testified that the roller was in plain sight. He was not induced or directed by the agents of the District to proceed past the roller. He knew that such objects sometimes frightened horses, but from his acquaintance with the disposition of his horse he believed that he could control the animal and drive safely past the roller, and he voluntarily undertook to do so. Now, it seems clear-particularly as the danger was neither hidden nor concealed-that the District was under no obligation to restrain the plaintiff from attempting to pass, either by closing Park street or by other means. The District was not bound to presume that it would be necessarily hazardous to attempt to drive past the roller, stationary Opinion of the Court. and quiet as it was, and familiar as horses in a large city usually are to the sight and sounds of electric and cable cars and horseless motors. The District, at best, was only chargeable with notice that the roller was an object which might frighten some horses of ordinary gentleness, not that it would inevitably do It was bound to give sufficient warning to drivers of the presence of the roller in time to enable them to avoid passing it, if desired. The District, however, had a right to assume that a driver of mature age was familiar with the habits and disposition of his horse, and was possessed of the common knowledge respecting the tendency of steam rollers to occasionally frighten such animals. The roller being lawfully on the street, the District was not bound to guard against the consequences of a voluntary attempt to drive by this roller. Certainly, if a driver believed that it would not be the natural and proper consequence of such an attempt that his safety would be endangered, the District ought not to be charged with notice that the attempt would be dangerous either to life or to limb. The foregoing observations sufficiently indicate the errors committed by the trial court in the instructions given to the jury and in the refusal to give requested instructions, to which exceptions were noted. It suffices to say in conclusion that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, as requested, that upon the whole evidence in the case their verdict should be for the District. As said by this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Blatchford, in Schofield v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 114 U. S. 615, 618: "It is the settled law of this court that, when the evidence given at the trial, with all the inferences which the jury could justifiably draw from it, is insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff, so that such a verdict, if returned, must be set aside, the court is not bound to submit the case to the jury, but may direct a verdict for the defendant. Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442; Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116; Herbert v. Butler, 97 U. S. 319; Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. S. 16; Griggs v. Houston, 104 U. S. 553; Randall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 109 U. S. 478; Anderson County Comrs. v. Statement of the Case. Beal, 113 U. S. 227; Baylis v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 113 U. S. 316." The judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia is reversed, with instructions to that court to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and to grant a new trial. JACOBS v. MARKS. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS. No. 410. Submitted January 7, 1901.-Decided May 27, 1901. The question whether the record and judicial proceedings in the Michigan court received full faith and credit, in the courts of Illinois is one for this court to consider and determine; and it holds that, upon the facts disclosed in the record, the courts of Illinois did give to the judgment and judicial proceedings of the state court of Michigan full faith and credit, within the meaning of the Constitution. The judgment in question in this case did not necessarily import that the plaintiff had received satisfaction of her claim. The distinction between Halderman v. United States, 91 U. S. 584, and United States v. Parker, 120 U. S. 89, shown. In June, 1896, Dora Marks brought an action in the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois, against Lewis Jacobs, for false representations and deceit whereby the plaintiff had been induced to become a member of a corporation known as the Chicago Furniture and Lumber Company of Escanaba, Michigan, composed of said Jacobs and one Nathan Neufeldt, and to pay into such concern the sum of $5000. The plaintiff sought to recover in this action the money so expended by her, alleging that the shares of stock so taken by her in said company were worthless. The defendant filed a demurrer to the declaration, which was overruled, and thereupon he filed a plea of not guilty, and also several special pleas, in which he set up, in substance, that the Statement of the Case. plaintiff, on or about December 4, 1893, instituted an action in the circuit court of Delta County, Michigan, against the Chicago Furniture and Lumber Company, to recover the sum claimed in the present suit; that service was duly had upon said company, which entered its appearance, and said court acquired jurisdiction of the parties to said cause and the subject-matter thereof; that, afterwards, the said parties came to a settlement of said cause; that, on July 25, 1894, the said court entered the following order: "This cause having been settled, it is hereby discontinued by consent of both parties, without cost to either party;" and that the said plaintiff had, therefore, received full satisfaction of the claim upon which the present suit is based. These special pleas were traversed, and the trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $4000. At the trial of the present case the plaintiff put in evidence a written agreement between the Chicago Furniture and Lumber Company and Dora Marks, in the following terms: "Articles of agreement made and entered into this 14th of July, A. D. 1894, by and between the Chicago Furniture and Lumber Company, a corporation, of the city of Escanaba, Delta County, Michigan, parties of the first part, and Dora Marks of Denver, Colorado, party of the second part. Party of the first part agrees to purchase the twenty thousand dollar ($20,000) worth of stock of the said Chicago Furniture and Lumber Company, which the party of the second part holds, for the sum of $4000, to be paid for as follows: $1000 to Mead and Jennings, attorneys for said party of the second part, as soon as the parties of the first part dispose of their treasury stock to the amount of $1000 or interest other capital in said company to the amount of $1000 and $3000 to said party of the second part, on the day that the plant now occupied by the parties of the first part in said city of Escanaba is turned over to them, and a clear title to the property earned by them. Parties of the first part further agree to discontinue the damage suit now pending against the party of the second part without cost. Said parties of the first part further agree to release said party of the second part from all liability of said second party for the balance due on unpaid stock. Party of the second part agrees to |