aries for public officers; and when it declared that for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the act of 1882 the Secretary of the Treasury "shall appoint officers to be designated as special inspectors of foreign steam vessels, at a salary of two thousand dollars per annum each," it was not for the Secretary to make the required appointments under a stipulation with the appointee that he would take any less salary than that prescribed by Congress. The stipulation that Glavey, who was local inspector, should exercise the functions of his office of special inspector of foreign steam vessels " without additional compensation" was invalid under the statute prescribing the salary he should receive, was against public policy, and imposed no legal obligation upon him. And the mere failure of the appointee to demand his salary as such officer until after he had ceased to be local inspector, was not in law a waiver of his right to the compensation fixed by the statute.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BROWN, MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM and MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA dissented.
Decisions announced without Opinions.
DECISIONS ANNOUNCED WITHOUT OPINIONS DURING THE TIME COVERED BY THIS VOLUME.
That "time" was only two days, May 27 and May 28, and the "decisions announced" are all stated in Volume 181, viz.: No. 389 on page 616, and Nos. 671, 674, 665, 678, 683, 581, 635, 672, 680, 694, 697 and 703, on pages 621, 622 and 623.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR OCTOBER TERM, 1900.
Number of cases disposed of,
Leaving undisposed of
Number of cases at close of October Term, 1899,
Number of cases docketed at October Term, 1900,
Number of cases disposed of at October Term, 1900,
1. Vessels engaged in trade between Porto Rican ports and ports of the
United States are engaged in the coasting trade in the sense in which
those words are used in the New York pilotage statutes; and steam
vessels engaged in such trade are coastwise steam vessels under Re-
vised Statutes, section 4444. Huus v. New York & Porto Rico Steam-
ship Co., 392.
2. The statutes of New York impose compulsory pilotage on foreign ves-
sels inward and outward bound to and from the port of New York by
way of Sandy Hook. Homer Ramsdell Transportation Co. v. La Com-
pagnie Générale Transatlantique, 406.
3. In an action at common law the ship owner is not liable for injuries in-
flicted exclusively by negligence of a pilot accepted by a vessel com-
pulsorily. Ib.
1. Frank Brothers were adjudged bankrupts in February, 1899. For a long
time prior to that Pirie & Co. had dealt with them, selling them mer-
chandise. Within four months prior to the adjudication of bankruptcy
Pirie & Co. received from them $1336.79, leaving a balance still due
and unpaid of $3093.98. When this payment was made Frank Brothers
were hopelessly insolvent to the knowledge of Frank Brothers, but
Pirie & Co. and their agents had no knowledge of it, and had no rea-
sonable cause to believe that the bankrupts by such payment intended
to give a preference, nor did they intend to do so. Pirie & Co. proved
their claim against the estate, and received a dividend thereon, which
they still hold. Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 438.
2. The provisions in the Bankrupt Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 60, that "a
person shall be deemed to have given a preference if, being insolvent,
he has procured or suffered a judgment to be entered against himself
in favor of any person, or made a transfer of any of his property, and
the effect of the enforcement of such judgment or transfer will be to
enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his
debt than any other of such creditors, of the same class," means that
a transfer of property includes the giving or conveying anything of
value, anything which has debt paying or debt securing power; and
money is property. If the person receiving such preference did not
have cause to believe that it was intended, he may keep the property
transferred, but, if it be only a partial discharge of his debt, cannot
prove the balance. Ib.
3. When the purpose of a prior law is continued, its words usually are, and
an omission of the words implies an omission of the purpose. Ib.
4. The object of a bankrupt act is, so far as creditors are concerned, to se-
cure equality of distribution among all, of the property of the bankrupt.
Ib.
5. Subdivision c of section 60 of the bankrupt act is applicable to the cases
arising under subdivision b, and allows a set-off, which might not be
otherwise allowed. Ib.
CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED.
De Lima v. Bidwell, ante, 1, followed by reversing the action of the gen-
eral appraisers. Goetze v. United States, 221.
Dooley v. United States, ante, 222, followed.
Armstrong v. United States,
Lantry v. Wallace, ante, 536, followed. Hood v. Wallace, 555.
The distinction between Halderman v. United States, 91 U. S. 584, and
United States v. Parker, 120 U. S. 89, shown. Jacobs v. Marks, 583.
CONCURRENCE IN JUDGMENT, BUT NOT IN OPINION.
In announcing the conclusion and judgment of the court in Downes v.
Bidwell, MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered an opinion. MR. JUSTICE
WHITE delivered a concurring opinion which was also concurred in
by MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS and MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA. MR. JUSTICE
GRAY also delivered a concurring opinion. The Chief Justice, MR.
JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE BREWER, and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM
dissented. Thus it is seen that there is no opinion in which a major-
ity of the court concurred. Under these circumstances the reporter
made headnotes of each of the sustaining opinions, and placed before
each the names of the justices or justice who concurred in it, as fol-
lows:
I. By MR. JUSTICE BROWN, in announcing the conclusion and judgment of
the court.
1. The Circuit Courts have jurisdiction, regardless of amount, of actions
against a collector of customs for duties exacted and paid under pro-
test upon merchandise alleged not to have been imported. Downes v.
Bidwell, 244.
2. The island of Porto Rico is not a part of the United States within that
provision of the Constitution which declares that "all duties, imposts,
and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Ib.
3. There is a clear distinction between such prohibitions of the Constitu-
tion as go to the very root of the power of Congress to act at all, irre-
spective of time or place, and such as are operative only throughout
the United States, or among the several States. Ib.
4. A long continued and uniform interpretation, put by the executive and
legislative departments of the Government, upon a clause in the Con-
stitution should be followed by the judicial department, unless such
interpretation be manifestly contrary to its letter or spirit. Ib.
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