III. freedom alone constitutes for the white man a sufficient CHAPTER distinction, and still leaves the number of electors comparatively small, if contrasted with the total population. 1790. But, notwithstanding this show of liberality in relation to the right of voting, it was wealth, not numbers, that determined, and still determines in South Carolina, the balance of political power. The old election districts, forty-three in number, were continued as before, consisting in the lower part of the state of the former parishes; but the hundred and twenty-four members, biennially elected to compose the Lower House of Assembly, were distributed among these districts with such regard to their respective wealth, that a decided majority of the House was, and still is, returned by a decided minority of the free white inhabitants. To be eligible, the candidate must be a free white man, three years a citizen of the state, and legally seized and possessed in his own right" of a settled freehold estate of five hundred acres of land and ten negroes, or of a real estate of the value of six hundred and sixty-six dollars and sixty-six cents clear of debt;" or if a non-resident in the district, his estate must be of the value of two thousand two hundred and twenty-two dollars. These provisions, at least the property qualification in the case of residents, had been contained, or implied rather, in the two former Constitutions; but instead of any open mention of the possession of slaves, those Constitutions had merely referred to the old colonial Election Act, by which that qualification had first been established. The Senate was to consist of thirty-six members, chosen by thirty-four districts, two of the districts choosing two members each. These districts were generally the same with the representative districts, but the number was diminished by the union in several cases of two CHAPTER or more of the poorer ones as a single senatorial district. III. At present the number of senators is forty-three, one be1790. ing allowed to each representative district; but, as in case of the House, a minority of the whole number of electors chooses a majority of the senators. Elected for four years, the senators are divided into two classes, one half going out biennially. Every senator must be a free white man, thirty years of age, a citizen of the state for five years, and possessing a settled freehold estate of the value of one thousand three hundred and thirty-two dollars and thirty-two cents, or four thousand four hundred and forty-four dollars and forty-four cents in case of a non-residence in the district. The governor and lieutenant governor, chosen by joint ballot of the Legislature for two years, must be thirty years of age, ten years citizens and residents, and possessed in their own rights of settled estates of the value of six thousand six hundred and sixty-six dollars and sixty-six cents clear of debt. They can hold office only two years out of six. Yet the power of the governor is limited to the command of the militia, the calling of extra sessions of the Legislature, the granting of reprieves and pardons, and the remitting of fines and forfeitures. The choice of judges, and all other civil officers, was vested in the Legislature in joint ballot, and to that body, also, entire control was given over the constitution of the judiciary. A carefully-limited Bill of Rights, in six short articles, secured trial by jury and liberty of the press, and guarded against ex post facto laws and laws violating the obligation of contracts. All power is declared to be originally vested in the people, but nothing is said about the natural equality of mankind. All the religious tests, and the provisions for an estab III. lished church, contained in the Constitution of 1778, CHAPTER were now dropped, the "free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship" being secured to "all 1790. mankind;" but this liberty was not to justify "acts of licentiousness or practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state." Clergymen, being "by their profession dedicated to the service of God and the cure of souls," were excluded from seats in the Legislature, or from holding the offices of governor or lieutenant gov. ernor. The rights of primogeniture were abolished, and an equal distribution was directed of the lands of intestates among all the children or next of kin. Amendments might be made by a convention, in the call of which two thirds of both branches of the Legislature should concur; or by acts passed by like majorities of two successive Legislatures, the proposed amendments being published for three months in the interval. Though this Constitution contained some concessions to the growing spirit of political liberality, it still contrived to secure, under democratic forms, the complete control of the affairs of the state to a select minority, to whom superior wealth and intelligence might have given advantage enough without these legal provisions in their favor. It also had the same fault which Jefferson imputed to the Constitution of Virginia. There was no balance or distribution of powers; but the whole political authority of the state, even to the extent of making alterations in the Constitution, was concentrated in the hands of the Assembly, who held the executive and judicial departments in complete subjection, thus constituting what Jefferson denounced in the case of Virginia as little better than "an elective despotism." Pennsylvania, in her first Constitution, formed in 1776, had adopted the policy of a single legislative as CHAPTER Sembly and of a plural executive, the nominal chief III. magistrate being in fact only president of the Executive 1790. Council, but with no more authority than any other member of it. As a sort of substitute for a senate, and to prevent the inconvenience of hasty determinations, all bills of a public nature were required to be printed for the consideration of the people before their final passage; nor, except on occasions of public emergency, were they to be passed till a succeeding session. But, in practice, this provision had been almost entirely dispensed with, every act which a majority could be found to pass being considered a matter of emergency. Another peculiarity was the provision for a Council of Censors, to be composed of two members from each county, to meet once in seven years, with authority to investigate all breaches of the Constitution, and to recommend changes in it. That violence of party spirit for which Pennsylvania had been distinguished, almost from the first day of her settlement, found ample scope in the attack and defense of this frame of government. The Republicans, as they had called themselves, including most of the distinguished men in the state, objected to the Constitution its want of checks and balances, and of a proper distribution of authority; objections regarded by the other party as indicating an aristocratical tendency, the Constitution as it stood being, in their eyes, the true model of a democratic government. About the time of the ratification of the Federal Constitution, the Republican party having acquired the control both of the Assembly and of the Executive Council, a project, already two or three times defeated, was again revived, of a Convention for amending the state Constitution, which was said, indeed, to require certain modifications to adapt it to the new federal system. Any action in this matter on the part of III. the Assembly was opposed by the Constitutionalists, who CHAPTER insisted that, by an express provision of the existing Constitution, the sole power of calling such a convention 1790. was vested in the Council of Censors, whose constitutional period of meeting was now fast approaching. But to this the other party objected the unequal representation of the people in that body, each county, large and small, being allowed two members; also the restriction upon any effectual action in the requirement of two thirds of the whole number for calling a convention. The Constitutionalists also relied upon an oath imposed by the first Constitution upon all persons holding office, "not to do or say any thing, directly or indirectly, that should be prejudicial or injurious to the government as established." But this very oath was denounced by the Republicans as inconsistent with the rights of freemen, and was represented as in itself an additional reason for revising the Constitution. An act having passed for calling a Convention, the opponents of the existing Constitution, all of whom, in national politics, professed to be Federalists, succeeded in securing a small majority. The most distinguished leaders on that side were Wilson, Mifflin, and Chief Justice M'Kean; and among the younger members Ross, Addison, and Sitgreaves. The chief leaders on the other side, anti-Federalists in national politics, were Findley, Smilie, and Snyder, of all of whom we shall have occasion hereafter to speak. Gallatin also co-operated with them; but he was yet undistinguished, and his share in the debate was not conspicuous. By the new Constitution as adopted, the representa- Sept. 2. tives chosen annually, never less than sixty nor more than a hundred, were to be distributed among the counties in proportion to the taxable inhabitants, to be ascer |