belonging to the said Emerson, who, by opposition to the sale on pretence of certain irregularities in the seizure, caused a further sum of $35.25 for costs to accrue. This opposition being dismissed with costs, on writ of Venditioni Exponas, the lot of land in question was sold and adjudged to appellant for the sum of $700. This sum of money having been brought into Court in the ordinary course, a report of collocation and distribution of the proceeds of said sale was prepared by the prothonotary and posted in the ordinary way. By this report, the respondents were collocated for the two above-mentioned sums. The appellant, who was an hypothecary creditor of Emerson to the amount of $1200, not getting the whole of his claim, as appeared by the Registrar's certificate, but only a small part thereof, contested the 5th item of the report the collocation in favor of respondents for the $154.40, being their costs of suit. In his contestation, Tansey says that respondents were wrongfully and illegally collocated in preference to himself and to his prejudice, inasmuch as, by law, and specially by Art. 606 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the costs of judgment in favor of a defendant and of a defendant's attorney have no privilege against and do not rank before a hypothecary claim existing against the immoveable sold, the only costs ranking before a hypothecary creditor being those of the plaintiff. This pretension of appellant was set aside by the judg ment below. It was held by the learned judge that the privileges for costs, frais de justice, were not fixed by the Code of Civil Procedure but by articles 1994 and 2009 of the Civil Code, in which were to be found none of the restrictions alleged by the contesting party, and that, in law, all the law costs and all expenses incurred in the interest of the mass of the creditors were privileged; also that Art. 606 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, applied only to the order in which such law costs should come in, and was not to be taken as a restriction of the privilege granted for costs 1884. Tansey & Bethune. case. by the above-cited articles of the Civil Code: That the costs incurred and claimed by respondents had been made "afin de procurer la réalisation du gage commun des créanciers," and therefore Messrs. Bethune could not be deprived of the privilege given to them by law. I may say, at once, that the majority of this Court takes the same view of the The costs claimed by respondents, as privileged, have been incurred, undoubtedly, in the interest of the mass of the creditors, as the claim thereof on the plaintiff had the effect of bringing the property to a sale. But, says appellant, the privilege for costs is granted to plaintiff's attorney and not to the defendant's. This is playing upon words; all that is required by law for the costs to be privileged is that they should be incurred in the interest of the mass of the creditors, and by the word interest is meant the bringing to sale of the gage commun of the creditors. Who here caused the lot of land in question to be brought to sheriff's sale and the proceeds thereof divided among the hypothecary creditors? Respondents, nobody else, as already remarked. The creditors benefited thereby, and the position of the respondents cannot be assimilated to anything but that of plaintiffs on the seizure, which they are in fact. This is the only interpretation that can be given to the articles hereinabove mentioned, notwithstanding what may be laid down to the contrary in the Roman Law or the principles which may have governed the matter in times past. The decision is altogether in accordance with the universal practice and jurisprudence followed in the Province of Quebec since the Civil Code has become law. Previously, there was a difference between the practice followed in the District of Montreal and the one held in that of Quebec. In the latter, a certain amount of costs was considered privileged whilst in the former, the costs of the execution and seizure alone were reputed so. But under the new law, all differences have disappeared, the practice has become uniform, and all costs incurred to bring the property to a sale have been considered to be privileged, and ranked, accordingly, on the collocation an sheet. I am free to admit that, as the law stands now, The judgment is, therefore, confirmed with costs. J. Calder, for appellant. Bethune & Bethune, for respondents. (S. B.) 19 novembre 1884. Coram DORION, J. C., MONK, TESSIER, CROSS & BABY, JJ. Dime-Action du curé contre acheteur après la récolte-Privilége. JUGÉ: Que la dîme est due par celui qui a récolté le grain, et non pas par celui qui l'a simplement fait battre et vanner. 2. Que le privilége du curé pour la dîme existe sur les récoltes qui y sont sujettes tant que le grain reste en la possession de celui qui l'a récolté, mais se perd dès que ce grain passe sans fraude entre les mains d'un acquéreur de bonne foi pour valable considération. DORION, C.J.: Le demandeur appelant, curé de la paroisse de St-Valentin, a poursuivi le défendeur, cultivateur et commerçant de grains, de la paroisse de St-Cyprien, pour la somme de 1884. Tansey & Bethune. 1884. Gaudin & Ethier. $10.52 qu'il prétend lui être due comme représentant la dîme sur une certaine quantité de grains que le défendeur a acheté d'un nommé Edouard Chouinard, cultivateur de la paroisse de St-Valentin, qui avait lui-même cultivé, récolté et engrangé ce grain. Le défendeur après avoir acheté ce grain l'a fait battre et vanner, et la prétention de l'appelant est que le défendeur doit la dîme sur ce grain. La Cour Inférieure a renvoyé cette action (1), et nous sommes tous d'opinion de confirmer ce jugement. L'appelant avait en effet un privilége pour sa dîme sur le grain en question, mais seulement en autant qu'il restait en la possession de celui qui l'avait récolté, et qui devait la dîme. Du moment que le grain a changé de mains par la vente ou autre transmission de propriété, ce privilége du curé est détruit, comme tout autre privilége de cette nature. L'appelant a cité un arrêt de la Cour du Banc du Roi rendu le 16 septembre 1808, à Montréal, dans une cause entre Messire Pierre Robitaille, demandeur, et Ignace Lamarre, défendeur, qui a maintenu l'action du curé pour la dîme contre le défendeur qui avait acheté une récolte en partie sur pied et en partie en grange. Quant à la portion achetée sur pied il n'y a pas de difficulté; le défendeur ayant récolté ce grain devait en payer la dîme; mais il est difficile de comprendre le jugement à l'égard du grain acheté par le défendeur après qu'il avait été mis en grange. Les faits de cette cause ne sont pas exposés d'une manière tout à fait satisfaisante, mais nous sommes portés à croire qu'il y avait une question de fraude, qui a déterminé cette partie du jugement. Dans l'espèce actuelle, qui ne présente aucune fraude, nous ne sommes pas disposés à étendre le privilége du curé sur le grain qui a passé entre les mains d'un tiersacquéreur de bonne foi pour valable considération. La dîme existe sur le grain seulement et non pas sur la paille. (1) Voir l'opinion de Son Honneur M. le juge Chagnon rapportée au 6e vol. du Legal News, p. 165. et le curé n'a aucun droit de suite ou de revendication qui lui permette de saisir les gerbes entre les mains d'un tiersacquéreur. Jugement confirmé. Pagnuelo, Taillon & Lanctot, pour l'appelant. 1884. Gaudin & Ethier. (E. L.) March 27, 1884. Coram DORION, C.J., MONK, RAMSAY, CROSS, & BABY, JJ. Procedure-Inscription for enquête. Held, that is not competent to any party in a cause to inscribe for the adduction of evidence at length, without the consent of all the parties. Semble, that any party may insist upon proceeding at enquête and merits at the same time. DORION, C.J.: An application was made in this case for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the Superior Court, granting the plaintiff's motion to reject the defendant's inscription for the adduction of evidence at length. The real question in the case is whether a party can be forced to go to enquête at length. Article 243 of the Code of Procedure says: "Any party may, either in his declaration or in any other pleading, or by a notice served upon the opposite party, declare his option that the case shall be inscribed at the same time for proof and for final hearing immediately after proof." This was not done here. Article 234 says: "When the case is not to be tried by a jury either of the parties may inscribe it upon the roll for the adduction of evidence." The defendant contends that under this article he had the right to inscribe for enquête generally; that is, if the other party did not make the option under article 243, the defendant had the right to inscribe under article 234. Article 236, which has |