1885. Wylie & City of Montreal This conclusion is further supported by the analogy to be drawn from the authority given to the Superintendent of Education to apportion monies from the income fund as directed by sec. 6, of said cap. 15, of the Consolidated Statutes for Lower Canada, which reads as follows: The said income fund or such part thereof as the Governor in Council may from time to time direct, shall be annually apportioned by the Superintendent of Education for Lower Canada in such manner and to and among such Universities, Colleges, Seminaries, Academies, High or Superior Schools, Model Schools and Educational Institutions other than the ordinary Elementary Schools, and in such sums or proportions to each of them as the Governor in Council approves. This would seem to indicate that the term "Educational "Institutions" was used in the Statutes in a very general sense. Those of them who received appropriations would certainly be considered as falling within the description, but that fact could not of itself give them the rank, unless entitled to it by the characteristics they possessed of a nature to bring them within the description, and these characteristics would have the effect of doing so whether they got an appropriation or not; therefore Educational Institutions existed, or could exist, in contemplation of these Statutes, altogether outside of Institutions organised or recognised by the Government. The case of Chegary v. Jenkins, 3 Sandford, 413, is not applicable, it was determined by express statutory provisions inapplicable here. As to the difficulty suggested of determining what was and what was not an Educational Institution, none of a serious character could occur, at least in cases like the present, and if a fraud in this respect were attempted, it could be easily detected and put down. I remember an earlier stage of our educational laws when money raised by subscription for a common school enabled it to obtain an equivalent grant from the Government. In my opinion the judgment of the Superior Court in this case should be reversed and the action of the City dismissed. MONK, J. (diss.): I am also compelled to enter my dissent from the judg ment about to be pronounced in this case. The whole question is whether the establishment of the appellant is an educational establishment. The appellant is a lady, highly respectable, and her school is a very respectable institution. She has no assistance from the Government or from the municipality. If, then, this be an institution. for the education of youth, I do not see how it is possible, under the statute, to impose a tax upon it. It is either an educational institution or it is not. If it is not an educational institution, it is a mere private dwelling, a sham. Is that pretension urged by any one in the present case? It is called a speculation, but is there any proof of that? It is said, it is of a temporary character. But so is everything in this world. I think it would be a great hardship, and more than a hardship, an injustice, and more than an injustice, an illegality, to impose a tax upon an institution such as that of the appellant, upon the pretence that it is merely temporary. RAMSAY, J This case offers a good deal of difficulty. The statute exempts "every educational institution" from the payment of municipal and school taxes. The appellants keep a school described as "a private boarding and day school for girls," and it is the municipal taxation on the property so used which it is sought by this action to recover. In some sense this is an educational institution, but the real question is whether this is an educational institution within the meaning of the Act. I think it is not. I think it is not. The object of the law is to protect against taxation those educational institutions which have no other raison d'être than the purposes of education. The instant they have another object they cease to be solely educational institutions; their revenues may be employed in other ways from which the community derives no benefit, and to protect these revenues from taxation would simply be to further a private speculation at the public cost. For these reasons I am to confirm. 1885. Wylie & City of Montreal. 1885. Wylie & City of DORION, C. J. :— I concur in maintaining the judgment appealed from in Montreal. the present case. In 1845, when this law came into force, it applied only to school taxes. It was in these terms: All buildings set apart for purposes of education, or of religious worship, parsonage houses, and all charitable "institutions or hospitals incorporated by Act of Parlia ment, and the ground or land on which such buildings "are erected, and also all burial grounds, shall be exempt " from all rates imposed for the purposes of this Act:" C. S. L. C. c. 15, s. 77. In 1878, an amendment was made, the effect of which was to exempt "educational institutions" from municipal and school taxes. The question arises, are the educational institutions mentioned in the amending Act the same as the buildings set apart for purposes of edu cation under the original statute? Was it the intention of the legislature to exempt from municipal and school taxes only those institutions which formerly were exempt from school taxes? The clause gives rise to considerable difficulty; but we have to put some interpretation on it. It would appear from the terms of the amending act that only such institutions as might receive a municipal grant, and which do not receive such grant, are exempt. Now there is nothing in the municipal law of this country that would authorize a municipality to make a grant to a private school; yet it is only in lieu of a grant that exemption from taxation is accorded. That a private school is an educational institution is doubtless true in a sense, but if we hold that a private school in which eight or ten children are instructed is exempt from taxation, it would follow that a father who has his children instructed in his own house would be exempt, because his house would be an educational institution. So, too, a lawyer's office in which three or four students are being instructed would be exempt, for it would be an educational institution. You might come down to the dancing master, for he would perhaps make a similar claim to exemption. It will be observed that only hospitals incorporated by Act of Parliament are exempt. Why should not private hospitals be 1885. Wylie & City of exempt if private schools are to be exempt? The clause undoubtedly gives rise to great difficulty from the way in which it is drawn, but I cannot think that the amendment Montreal. of 1878 was intended to exempt, from both municipal and school taxes, any institutions which before were not exempt from school taxes. I therefore think the judgment should be confirmed. Judgment confirmed. Kerr, Carter & Goldstein, for the Appellant. (J. K.) September 24, 1885. Coram SIR A. A. DORION, C.J., MONK, RAMSAY & CROSS, JJ. ARCHIBALD A. DICKSON ET AL. (Defendants in the court below) AND APPELLANTS; THE HON. SIR A. T. GALT, (Plaintiff in the court below) RESPONDENT. Motion to quash appeal-Acquiescence-Art. 1130 C. C. P.— HELD-1. That a letter written by one of the defendants in an hypothe 2. That the other defendant was not bound by this acquiescence as it did not appear that any partnership existed between him and his codefendant (beyond the joint ownership of the immoveable in question), or that he had authorized the writing of the said letter. 1885. Dickson & Galt. DORION, C. J. :— The appellants (defendants in the court below) were condemned as joint undivided owners of an immoveable to make a délaissement or pay the respondent's hypothecary claim. This judgment was rendered on the 29th November 1884. Some time after the rendering of the judgment, and before the entering of the appeal, there appears to have been an interview between the respondent's agent, Mr. Joseph Rielle, and the two appellants, Dickson and Wanless, at which the latter asked for delay in order to protest their garans the Jacques-Cartier Building Society, and to make them settle the claim. What the appellants said at this interview is not very clearly established, as the affidavits filed are somewhat contradictory. Mr. Rielle says that Dickson and Wanless asked for delay to enable them to induce the Building Society to pay the judgment, and promised that they (appellants) would settle it if the society did not. Dickson and Wanless, on the other hand, say that they merely asked for delay to get the Building Society to pay, but deny that they ever agreed to settle if their garans did not. With these conflicting accounts before us we can hardly say that an acquiescence on the part of the appellants can be inferred from these verbal negociations. The appellant Dickson, however, on the 19th January, 1885, wrote a letter to the respondent's attorneys, in answer to one written by the latter to Dickson's attorneys threatening execution, in which he renewed his application for delay, and explicitly promised to settle with the plaintiff if his garans did not. The letter is in the following terms: MESSRS WOTHERSPOON & LAFLEUR, Montreal, January 19th, 1885. Advocates, &c., City. Dear Sirs, GALT & DICKSON. I have just received a letter from you addressed to Messrs Greenshields & Co. You must remember I purchased the property from the Building |