B

DL

1885.

et

cette Cour, qui représente la valeur du fonds même de Séminaire de l'héritage vendu en cette cause par préférence à la Banque La Banque de de St. Hyacinthe, l'intimée, qui représente le constructeur St. Hyacinthe. Joseph Barbeau qui lui n'avait aucun privilége ni hypo

.

thèque sur le dit héritage mais seulement sur la plusvalue donnée par les constructions qu'il a faites;

"Et considérant qu'il y a erreur dans le jugement rendu par la Cour de première instance le deuxième jour de juin 1884;

Cette Cour casse et annule le dit jugement du 2 juin 1884 et procédant à rendre le jugement qu'aurait dû rendre la dite Cour de première instance, maintient la contestation de l'appelante au projet de distribution et collocation préparé en cette cause, et ordonne qu'avant faire droit il soit nommé des experts sous l'autorité de la Cour Supérieure pour faire une ventilation et établir suivant le cours ordinaire de la loi quelle portion des deniers rapportés devant la dite Cour Supérieure et provenant de la vente de l'immeuble vendu sur le défendeur en cette cause représente la valeur du fonds du dit héritage et quelle proportion représente la valeur des améliorations. que l'auteur de l'intimée le dit Joseph Barbeau y a faites, le tout eu égard aux valeurs respectives du fonds du dit héritage et des dites améliorations à l'époque de la vente qui en a été faite par le shérif en vertu du bref d'exécu tion en cette cause, si mieux n'aiment les parties convenir de telles valeurs et éviter les frais de telle expertise, pour qu'il soit ensuite procédé par la dite Cour Supérieure à distribuer les deniers attribués à l'intimée sur le projet de distribution en cette cause conformément aux droits des dites parties respectivement;

"Et cette Cour condamne l'intimée à payer à l'appelante les dépens encourus tant sur la contestation du projet de distribution et collocation de l'intimée en cette cause que sur l'appel."

(Dissentiente l'Honorable M. le juge Tessier.)

Jugement infirmé.

Lacoste, Globensky, Bisaillon & Brosseau pour l'appelante.
Geoffrion, Dorion, Lafleur & Rinfret pour l'intimée.

(E. L.)

January 27, 1885.

Coram DORION, C. J., RAMSAY, CROSS, BABY, JJ.

RECORDER'S COURT OF THE CITY OF MONTREAL, (Defendant in Court below),

AND

THE CITY OF MONTREAL

(Mis en cause in Court below),

AND

THE HON. J. A. MOUSSEAU,

(Attorney General for P. Q., Intervenant),

RESPONDENTS.

B. N. A. Act, 1867, Sec. 91 no. 27; Sec. 92, no. 8-Local Jurisdiction-37 Vic. (Q.) c. 51, 42 & 43 Vic. (Q.) c. 53— Municipal Institutions-Nuisance-Chimney sending out smoke in hurtful quantity.

HELD:-That while the local legislatures have no jurisdiction to deal with an indictable misdemeanour, that being a matter of criminal law assigned exclusively to the Parliament of Canada, they have authority to legislate for the prohibition of things hurtful to public health, not matter for indictment at common law, such as factory chimneys "sending forth smoke in such quantity as to be a nuisance." The local legislatures possess this power as coming under " municipal institutions" under B. N. A. Act, S. 92, no. 8; and the fact that a term of the criminal law ("nuisance") is used in a local Act to characterize an offence within the jurisdiction of the local legislature does not make the enactment ultra vires when the offence is not per se an indictable offence under the criminal law.

The appeal was from a judgment of the Superior Court, Montreal, DOHERTY, J., August 16, 1883, in the following

terms:

"Considering that petitioners have failed to establish the material allegations of their petition, and more

VOL. I. Q. C.

26

1885.

particularly the want of jurisdiction in the Recorder's Pillow et al. Court of the City of Montreal in the premises, as by

&

City of

Montreal.

them alleged; and considering that to legislate upon the subject matter of the Acts 37 Victoria, Chapter 51, and 42 and 43 Victoria, Chapter 53, is within the competency and jurisdiction of the Provincial Legislature, according to the distribution of legislative powers between the Parliament of Canada and the Provincial Legislatures made by sections 91 and 92 of the B. N.A. Act respectively, and that said acts and legislation and the matter thereof are not ultra vires of the said Provincial Legislature, being acts passed and legislation in relation to Municipal Institutions," and not to "Criminal Law," within the meaning and intent of said section 91;

66

"And considering that said legislation is not of the nature or character of Criminal Law, nor for the suppression or punishment of crime in the sense and intent of subdivision No. 27 of said section 91, but merely to protect the citizens of Montreal from the res noxia, hurt and annoyance of offences not criminal in their nature, and not within the purview and intention of said number 27 of said section 91;

"Considering, therefore, that the By Law No. 130 complained of by the Petitioners as being ultra vires of the mis en cause, the City of Montreal, is intra vires of the said City duly incorporated as a "municipal institution," and was legally passed in virtue of the statutes 37 and 42 and 43 Victoria of the Provincial Legislature;

"I, the undersigned Judge, do quash the writ taken in this cause, and dismiss said petition with costs."

Macmaster, Q. C., for the appellant :

It is clear that whatever is a matter of criminal law, or a matter of criminal procedure, belongs exclusively to the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada-that it is included in the Federal jurisdiction by the strongest affirmative declaration in the Statute, and that it is excluded from the Provincial jurisdiction by equally strong inhibitive declarations. In fact, apart from the direct statement in section 91, that Criminal law and procedure

1885.

& City of

Montreal.

fall exclusively under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada, and the further statement that Pillow et al. they do so fall," notwithstanding anything in this Act," there is the insuperable rider in the last clause of section 91, that the subjects so enumerated (including the Criminal Law and Procedure) fall within the exclusive Legislative jurisdiction of the Farliament of Canada, even when they might appear to relate to a merely local or private matter in the Province. The matters charged against petitioners are that they have committed or permitted the commission of a public nuisance, and they are summoned to a trial therefor before a Municipal Court. The charge made against them is a crime in the eye of the law—a crime for which they are indictable-a crime for which they have been indicted-a crime for which they have been tried and acquitted by a jury of their countrymen, properly instructed by a judge of Her Majesty's Court of Queen's Bench. In Reg. v. Lawrence (1) it was held that a Provincial Legislature cannot legislate with respect to offences of a criminal nature, except where such legislation is required for the direct enforcement of a "law of the Province made in relation to a matter coming within the exclusive jurisdiction." This would be under Sec. 92, Sub-Sec. 15. In legislating in regard to a matter within Provincial jurisdiction, a Provincial Legislature has no power to enforce its law by provisions respecting the trial and punishment of offenders in respect of acts which would be criminal offences at common law. Section 57 of the Liquor License Act of Ontario, R. S. O. ch. 181, by which it was provided that any person who, on any prosecution under that Act tampered with a witness, or induced, or attempted to induce any such person to absent himself, or to swear falsely, should be liable to a penalty of $50.00, was therefore held to be invalid.

The following additional authorities were cited for the appellant:

Severn v. The Queen, 2 Can. Sup. Court Rep., p. 70. (1) 43 U. C. Q. B. 164, 168.

1885.

&

City of

Russell v. The Queen, 7 L. R. Appeal Cases, page 829. Pillow et al. City of Frederickton v. The Queen, 3 Can. Sup. Court Rep., Montreal. p. 505, Overruling:-Regina v. Taylor, 1 Can. Sup. Court Rep., p. 65. Regina v. Kerr et al, 3 Legal News, p. 121. Corporation of Three Rivers v. Sulte, 5 Legal News, p. 330. Citizens Insurance Company v. Parsons, 7 L. R. Appeal cases, p. 96. Regina v. Lawrence, 43 U. C. Q. B., pp. 164 and 168. Hodge v. The Queen, 7 Legal News, p. 18. Poulin v. Corporation of Quebec, 6 Legal News, p. 214. Sir John A. MacDonald's opinions, Confederation Debates, pp. 30, 33, 40 and 41.

R. Roy, Q. C., for the City of Montreal:

La prétention des appelants peut se résumer en deux mots; le statut provincial 42-3 Vict. chap. 53 est inconstitutionnel, partant le règlement fondé sur ce statut est nul et non-avenu, et la Cour du Recorder n'avait aucune juridiction dans la matière. Le raisonnement adopté par les appelants pour soutenir leur thèse est que tout nuisance constitue un crime en droit commun, que le paragraphe 27 de la § 91 de "l'Acte de l'Amérique Britannique du Nord 1867," attribuant exclusivement tout ce qui est de juridiction criminelle au Parlement fédéral, la nuisance commise par les appelants ne pouvait faire le sujet d'une législation locale, ni du règlement qui en est la suite. Il faut donc voir si l'acte reproché aux appelants constitue un crime, ou si, au contraire, c'est un simple fait que la Législature locale pouvait autoriser la municipalité à prohiber. Et d'abord remarquons que le terme nuisance, dont se sert l'acte provincial, n'est pas employé dans le sens technique, et n'a en soi aucun caractère. En attribuant à la Législature locale une juridiction exclusive sur "Les institutions municipales dans la province," l'acte fédéral, dans l'article 92, ne pouvait avoir d'autre intention que de conserver aux municipalités les pouvoirs dont elles étaient revêtues à cette époque là même, et qu'elles avaient alors droit d'exercer pour la protection et la sauvegarde de leurs habitants; elles demeuraient libres de promulguer tout ordonnance de la nature d'un règlement de police, tout mesure essentielle au bien être et au confort