such charges on like carload shipments for February 28, 1920, became effective. Di- carload freight, while refusing to absorb rector General of Railroads v. Viscose Co. 254 U. S. 499, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151, 65: 372 2. The Interstate Commerce Commission must be deemed to have had initial jurisdiction, exclusive of the Federal district courts, of a controversy presented by the contention of a shipper that an amendment or supplement to the appropriate freight tariff schedule, authorized by the Director General of Railroads, which became effective after the adoption of the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, and by which the published classification and rates on silk were canceled and the freight classification rule amended so as to include silk among the articles that would not be accepted for shipment as freight, was invalid, in view of the provisions of the Act of February 4, 1887, §§ 1, 3, 6, 13, 15, as amended by the Acts of June 29, 1906, and June 18, 1910, which make it the duty of carriers to establish, observe, and enforce reasonable classifications of property, make it unlawful for any carrier to subject any particular description of traffic to any undue and unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, require carriers to print and file with the Interstate Commerce Commission schedules showing freight classifications, and rules or regulations changing, affecting, or determining the value of the service rendered to the shipper, give to any person or corporation the right to apply to the Commission for relief on account of anything done or omitted to be done by a carrier in contravention of the provisions of the act, and declare that whenever a new classification or regulation or practice is filed the Commission shall have power to suspend the operation of the same pending investigation, and, if found to be unreasonable or otherwise in violation of the act, the Commission may find what will be just and reasonable, and require the carrier to conform to its finding. Director General of Railroads v. Viscose Co. 254 U. S. 499, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151, 65: 372 3. An amendment to the carrier's tariff so as to correct the unreasonable rate which was complained of, under § 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act, in a petition to the Interstate Commerce Commission, removed any occasion for further suspension of action by the Commission by reason of an undisposed-of application for relief by the carrier, under § 4, as amended by the Act of June 18, 1910, which provides that no rates or charges lawfully existing at the time of the passage of the amendatory act shall be required to be changed in any case where such an application shall have been filed until a determination of such application by the Commission. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. v. Anderson-Tulley Co. 256 U. S. 408, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524, 65: 1020 Orders. Venue of suit on reparation order, see 4. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission directing railway carriers entering a specified city to desist from absorbing switching charges on certain interstate Court, see Appeal and Error, 42. By foreign ambassador, see Admiralty, 12. See also Judgment, 14. 1. Forfeiture of automobile used in removal or deposit and concealment of distilled spirits, see Constitutional Law, 46. Federal taxation of, see Internal Revenue, 2. Forfeiture of automobile used in re moval of liquors upon which the tax had not been paid, see Internal Revenue, 25. Implied repeal of revenue laws by Na tional Prohibition Act, see Internal Revenue, 26. Uniformity in license tax, see Taxes, 2. 1. There is nothing in the Volstead Act of October 28, 1919, which makes it unlawful for a warehouse corporation to permit the storage in its warehouse after the effective date of such act of liquors theretofore lawfully acquired, which are so stored solely and in good faith for the purpose of preserving and protecting them until they shall be consumed by the owner and his family or bona fide guests,-uses declared by § 33 of that act not to be unlawful. Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. 254 U. S. S8, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31, 65: 151 2. The declaration in § 25 of the Vol facie evidence that such liquor is kept for 8. An intention to confiscate private stead Act of October 28, 1919, that it shall, liquors by any person "not legally permitbe unlawful to have or possess any liquor ted" under the act to possess liquor prima intended for use in violating such act, obviously does not apply where the uses to which it is admitted that the owner in tends to devote his liquor are those which § 33 of the act declares not to be unlawful. Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. 254 U. S. 88, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31, 65: 151 3. Kept for sale or barter or other commercial purpose is what is meant by the word "kept," as used in § 21 of the Volstead Act of October 28, 1919, which declares that any room, house, building, or place where intoxicating liquor is manufactured, sold, kept, or bartered, in violation of the act, and all intoxicating liquor and property kept and used in maintaining the same, are a common nuisance, and provides penalties for the maintaining of such a place. Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. 254 U. S. 88, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31, 65: 151 4. A warehouse corporation which has leased a room in its warehouse for the storage of intoxicating liquors that are in the lessee's exclusive possession and control does not "possess" such liquors within the meaning of § 3 of the Volstead Act of October 28, 1919, which provides that "no person shall on or after the date when the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States goes into effect, manufacture, sell, barter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish, or possess any intoxicating liquor except as authorized in this act, and all the provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented." Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. 254 U. S. 88, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31, 65: 151 5. A warehouse corporation, by permitting the owner of intoxicating liquor lawfuly acquired before the effective date of the Volstead Act of October 28, 1919, and stored in its warehouse, to have access to such liquors to take them to his dwelling for lawful use, would not be delivering them, within the meaning of § 3 of such act, which provides that "no person shall on or after the date when the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States goes into effect, manufacture, sell, barter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish, or possess, any intoxicating liquor except as authorized in this act, and all the provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented." Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. 254 U. S. 88, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31, 65: 151 6. Nothing in the Volstead Act of October 28, 1919, makes it unlawful to transport to the home of the owner, for lawful uses, intoxicating liquors lawfully асquired by him before the effective date of that act, and stored in a warehouse. Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. 254 U. S. 88, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31, 65:151 7. The implication is plain from the provision in § 33 of the Volstead Act of October 28, 1919, making the possession of INVENTION. Patent for, see Patents. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. JOINT CREDITORS AND DEBTORS. JUDGES. 1. The filing of an affidavit of personal bias or prejudice of the judge who is to preside at the trial, conformably to the Judicial Code, § 21, leaves such judge no duty other than to pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit (subject to appellate review) to show the objectionable inclination or disposition, and, if legally sufficient, compels his retirement from the case without passing upon the truth or falsity of the facts affirmed, the section declaring that whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be designated to hear the matter, that every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, that no party shall be entitled in any case to file more than one such affidavit, and that no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel that such affidavit and application are made in good faith. Berger v. United States, 255 U. S. 22, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 230, 65: 481 2. An affidavit upon information and belief satisfies the provisions of the Judicial Code, § 21, that whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such, tract relations between the coal company judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be designated to hear such matter, and that every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists. Berger v. United States, 255 U. S. 22, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 230, 65: 481 and the sales company which would serve in any manner to prevent the sales company from extending its business of buying and selling where and from and to whom it chooses with entire freedom and independence must be enjoined, so that the sales company may in effect, as well as in form, become an independent dealer, free to act in competition with the coal company or railway company. United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 254 U. S. 255, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 104, 65:253 use and benefit of the railway companies, are entitled to have surrendered for cancelation a majority stock interest in such terminal company, acquired by persons who were and still are acting in a fiduciary relation to the trust, and, until surrendered, to an injunction against any sale, assignment, or transfer of such stock, or any part of it, and against the exercise of any voting power thereon, but upon terms that the railway companies shall repay to such stockholders the amount which they paid for the stock, with interest. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Des Moines Union R. Co. 254 U. S. 196, 3. An affidavit by defendants charged with violating the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, which avers upon information and belief that the Federal district judge before whom they are to be tried has a personal bias or prejudice against them be- 2. Proprietary railway companies whose cause of the German nativity of some of predecessors have been adjudged to have such defendants, and that the grounds for created a terminal company to carry out such belief are certain hostile and derog- a trust to maintain an operate the teratory utterances of such judge concerning minal property, and exercise all its corthe attitude of German-Americans during porate powers for the common the progress of the World War, and which is accompanied by a certificate of defendants' counsel that the affidavit is made in good faith, satisfies the requirements of the Judicial Code, § 21, that whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be designated to hear the matter, that every such affidavit shall state 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 81, the facts and the reasons for the belief 3. A decree denying injunctive relief to that such bias or prejudice exists, that no the state of New York against the discharge party shall be entitled in any case to file by the state of New Jersey of a large volume more than one such affidavit, and that no of sewage into the waters of upper New such affidavit shall be filed unless accom- York bay, which, it is alleged, will cause panied by a certificate of counsel that such such pollution of the waters of New York affidavit and application are made in good bay as to amount to a public nuisance faith; and the filing of such affidavit neces- which will result in grave injury to the sitates the retirement of such judge from health, property, and commercial welfare the case without passing upon the truth or of the people of the state and city of New falsity of the facts affirmed. Berger v. York, should be without prejudice to a reUnited States, 255 U. S. 22, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. newal of the application for an injunction 230, 65: 481 if the operation of the sewer shall result in conditions which the state of New York may be advised require the interposition of the court. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 492, 65: 937 JUDGMENT. On appeal, see Appeal and Error, VIII. peal, see Appeal and Error, I. a. Form. 1. A combination effected through intercorporate relations between an interstate railway carrier, an anthracite coal com pany, and a sales company, which is found to violate both the Sherman Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890, and the commodities clause of the Act of June 29, 1906, must be so dissolved as to give each of such companies its entire independence, and all con 65: 219 4. A court of equity must set aside. at the instance of minority stockholders, a sale of all the corporate property, authorized by the owners of a majority of the stock, if the consideration for the sale is found to be inadequate, and may not confirm such sale upon condition that no higher price be obtained at public sale, where, under the pleadings, the court had power to confirm the sale if it was found to have been lawfully made, but only upon the terms make it, and neither the offer to purchase on which the parties had contracted to nor the acceptance contemplated any public offer of the property, or a sale at a higher price if offered. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209, Conclusiveness. 65: 425 Federal question respecting, see Certiorari, 4. of determination of alien property custodian, see War, 5. Collateral attack on judgment of court- same parties or their privies, but upon a martial, see Courts-Martial, 8-10. different cause of action, the question Conclusiveness of judicial sale, see Ju- whether the matter decided on the former dicial Sale. occasion was within the issues then proper Conclusiveness of confirmation of priv- to be decided, or was presented and actual ate land claim, see Private Land ly determined in the course of deciding Claims, 3. those issues, is open to inquiry, and, unless Conclusiveness it be answered in the affirmative, the matter is not res judicata. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U. S. 70, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 420, 65: 831 10. What is involved and determined in a former suit between the same parties of action, is to be tested by an examination or their privies, but upon a different cause of the record and proceedings therein, including the pleadings, the evidence submitted, the respective contentions of the parties, and the findings and opinion of the court, there being no suggestion that the case is a proper one for resorting to extrinsic evidence. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U. S. 70, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 420, 65: 831 5. A decree of the Federal Supreme Court which, on the ground that the averments of the bill were not sustained by the proofs, reversed a decree below enjoining the enforcement of an order of a state railroad commission fixing maximum freight rates, challenged by a railroad company as confiscatory, and remanded the cause with directions to dismiss the bill without prejudice, does not prevent such railway company from showing that such order is invalid when an attempt is made to enforce it at a subsequent period. Vandalia R. Co. v. Schnull, 255 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 65: 539 6. A final decree upholding an ordinance limiting gas rates, which is attacked as confiscatory, and ordering repayment of overcharges to the consumers, which were collected pending a suspension of the ordinance by injunction, subject to repayment of the overcharges if the ordinance should be held valid, extends to overcharges after the date of the decree, and precludes a further hearing in the case as to whether the rates may not have become noncompensatory since the decree, because of changed conditions, since the ordinance, being presumptively valid, is of continuing force until set aside by judicial decree as the result of an investigation in which the burden of proof is upon the company, although the decree, having been made "without prejudice," permits a new suit for that purpose. Ex parte Lincoln Gas & E. L. Co. 256 U. S. 512, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 588, 65: 1066 11. A final decree of the Federal Sutween the United States and the state of preme Court in a boundary controversy beTexas, by which it was adjudged that, by the treaty with Spain of February 22, 1819, art, 3, the boundary, where it follows the Red river bordering upon Greer county, was fixed at the south bank of said river, rather than the middle of the main channel, is a final and conclusive adjudication, binding upon the parties to a subsequent suit between the states of Oklabetween these states, where it follows the homa and Texas, that the true boundary course of the Red river from the 100th de gree of west longitude to the easterly boundary of Oklahoma, is the south bank of said stream. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U. S. 70, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 420, 65: 831 interest to cancel conveyances made by 12. The United States, suing in its own heirs of a Creek Indian, of land allotted to him as a homestead out of the Creek tribal lands, is in no wise concluded by any mat7. Land south of the middle of the ter, whether of fact or law, that may have South Fork of the Red River cannot be been adjudged in a former suit (to which deemed to have been excluded from the is-it was not a party) between the heirs and one claiming under such conveyances. Privsues involved in the boundary suit authorized by the Act of May 2, 1890, § 25, be- ett v. United States, 256 U. S. 201, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 455, tween the United States and Texas merely because the act authorizes suit to determine title to the tract "lying between the North and South Forks of the Red river," and that phrase is repeated in the amended bill. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U. S. 70, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 420. 65: 831 65: 889 13. A decree of a Federal district court which dismissed the bill in a suit against a fraternal benefit association and its officers, all citizens and residents of the state, tion plan, brought and prosecuted by a -attacking the association's reorganizaof benefit certificate holders, for the benelarge number, all nonresidents, of a class fit of all the members of the class, must be held to bind citizens and residents of the 8. A question of fact or of law distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a ground of recovery or defense in a suit or action between parties sui juris is state who were in the class for whom the conclusively settled by the final judgment suit was prosecuted, but were not otheror decree therein, so that it cannot be fur-wise parties to the bill, in view of Equity ther litigated in a subsequent suit between Rule 38, which, as promulgated in 1912, the same parties or their privies, whether the second suit be for the same or a different cause of action. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U. S. 70, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 420, 65: 831 9. In a subsequent suit between the provides that when the question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole, omitting the clause formerly contained in such rule, "but in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of the absent parties," notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 39, that "in all cases where it shall appear to the court that persons who might otherwise be deemed proper parties to the suit cannot be made parties by reason of their being out of the jurisdiction of the court, or incapable otherwise of being made parties, or because their joinder would oust the jurisdiction of the court as to the parties before the court, the court may, in its discretion, proceed in the cause without making such persons, parties; and in such case the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights of the absent parties," since the latter rule cannot be regarded as applicable to a subject al ready specifically covered in the preceding rule. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct, Rep. 338, Of Federal Supreme Court, see Supreme JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT. JURY. Question for, see Trial, 1-4. Right to jury trial. See also Constitutional Law, 47. to the Federal district courts by the provi1. The exclusive jurisdiction granted sion of the Lever Act of August 10, 1917, § 10, where a person is dissatisfied with the President's award of compensation for war supplies requisitioned by him under that section, is to be exercised in accordance with the law governing the usual procedure of the district court in actions at law for money compensation in which the right to 14. A suit seeking the sale of land cordance with the provisions of the law a jury trial is an incident, and not in acwhich a municipality holds as trustee to governing the exceptional jurisdiction consecure drainage warrants is not a proceed-current with the court of claims where it ing in rem to which all persons having an interest in the land are deemed parties Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. sits without a jury. United States with the right to intervene. Its only pur- 569, 65: 673 pose was to secure the sale and transfer of such right and title as the municipality held. Rights of third parties were not subject to adjudication therein. New Orleans Land Co. v. Leader Realty Co. 255 U. S. 266, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259, 65: 621 V. 65: 1084 committed by persons subject to military 2. Trial by court-martial for murder law does not infringe the constitutional guaranties as to jury trial and presentment or indictment by grand jury. Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224, 65: 469 3. Temporary emergency legislation, like the Act of October 22, 1919, tit. 2, § 109, giving a tenant in the District of Columbia the privilege of holding over after the expiration of the lease, subject to regulation by the commission appointed by that act, so long as he pays the rent and performs the conditions as fixed by the lease or as modified by the commission, is not invalid merely because landlords and tenants are deprived by it of a trial by jury on the right to possession of the land. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458, 65: 865 Endeavor to corrupt. 4. Experimental approaches to the corruption of a petit juror in the discharge of his duty, though before he was selected failure, within the provision of the Crimor sworn, are, without regard to success of inal Code, § 135, for the punishment of anyone who corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, shall endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any petit juror in the discharge of his duty. United States v. Russell, 255 U. S. 138, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 260, 65: 553 |