the second decree, and brings error. Af place between Danson and the officer, durfirmed. ing which the officer informed him that he must get the people out of the saloon and John E. & Julian Hartridge, for plaintiff close it up, else he, the officer, would "go in error. Park Trammell, Atty. Gen., for the State. SHACKLEFORD, J. Harry Danson was indicted for murder in the first degree, tried and convicted of murder in the second degree, and seeks relief here by writ of error. [1, 2] The first three assignments, which are argued together, are severally based upon the introduction in evidence, over the objection of the defendant, of section 65 of the "Acts of incorporation of the city of Jacksonville," as it is designated in the transcript, and of sections 351 and 354 of the ordinances of such city. These sections relate to the duties and powers of the police force, designate certain crimes, and provide for the punishment of those convicted there of. We find that the sole grounds of objection urged against the introduction of these respective sections were that "the same were irrelevant, and not pertinent to the issues in the case." We have held again and again that general objections to evidence proposed, without stating the precise grounds of objection, are vague and nugatory, and are without weight before an appellate court, unless the evidence objected to is palpably prejudicial, improper, and inadmissible for any purpose or under any circumstances. See Putnal v. State, 56 Fla. 86, 47 South. 864, and McKinnon v. Johnson, 57 Fla. 120, 48 South. 910. We have also repeatedly held that the trial court is authorized to regulate the order of the introduction of evidence, and its discretion in this matter will be interfered with by an appellate court only when a clear abuse thereof is made to appear. Putnal v. State, supra, and McMillan v. Reese, 61 Fla. 360, 55 South. 388. We might well declare that, applying these two principles, these assignments have not been sustained; but, in view of some of the other assignments which have to be treated and in order to make this opinion more readily understood, we will give a brief statement of what the evidence had developed at the stage of the trial when this documentary evidence was proffered. Hese kiah Hires, with whose murder the defendant stood charged, was a member of the police force of the city of Jacksonville, and was in the discharge of his duty as such at the time that he was killed. Dan Danson, the father of the defendant, was engaged in the saloon business in the city of Jacksonville, and on the night the tragedy occurred Lieut. James P. Morgan, of the police force, in passing by such saloon, about 2 o'clock, noticed that some people were in it, rapped at the door, had Dan Danson come and unlock it, and informed him that he must not have people in there so late, but must get get the wagon and arrest all of you," Danson agreed to do what the officer had de manded, and the officer waited there until Danson had put the people out and locked the door, when the officer passed on. Very shortly thereafter, the officer met Hires, the deceased, and informed him that he had made Danson put some negroes out of his saloon and closed it up. Hires then asked the officer if he wished him to go up there, to which he replied: "No; no use to go down there now. I stood there and seen them all out, seen it closed up." Charles R. Ammons had testified that he was a member of the police force, and on the night of the tragedy a man came to him in a hack and told him that he had been assaulted at Danson's saloon, and requested such policeman to go up there with him. As such saloon was on the beat of Policeman Hires, the deceased, and was about two blocks away from the beat of Policeman Ammons, he telephoned to police headquarters for instructions, and was told to go up to Danson's saloon and see about the matter, which he proceeded to do. When he reached the saloon, he found it open, and found Dan D'anson and two or three others there. Upon the policemen asking Danson what the trouble was there, explaining to him that he had been telephoned from police headquarters to come there and make an investigation, Danson talked boisterously and insolently refused to give any information, also refused to let the policeman go into his saloon, and use his telephone to report the situation to police headquarters. Thereupon Ammons asked Danson to go with him to another telephone, so that he could make his report, but Danson also refused to do this, when Ammons took hold of his arm and started off with him. Prior to this he had begun to abuse Ammons, which he continued, swearing at him, calling him opprobrious names, indulging in the grossest profanity, and making threats against Ammons. Finally he began striking at Ammons, who defended himself and struck Danson on the shoulder or arm with a light summer club, which the policemen were then carrying. Just about the time Danson was making his third pass at Ammons, some one fired a shot, which struck Ammons in the head. About that time Hires, the deceased, came up and asked: "Here, what's all this about?" Another shot followed the first in almost immediate succession, which struck and killed Hires. Ammons drew his pistol after the second shot was fired and discharged it six times, killing Dan Danson. The testimony had further developed that Dan Danson was considerably under the influence of liquor at the time, that Harry Danson, the defendant, ployed in his father's saloon, and shortly | not and could not know what further proafter officer Morgan had been to the saloon ceedings would be had in the trial, it is and ordered it closed the defendant took a obvious, without further comment, that no pistol out of a drawer in the saloon and put error was committed in admitting such docuit in his pocket. The testimony had fur-mentary evidence as against the grounds of ther developed the fact that the defendant objection urged. In addition to the authoriwas standing in front of the saloon with a ties previously cited, see Atlantic Coast Line pistol in his hand just before the first R. R. Co. v. Partridge, 58 Fla. 153, 50 South. shot was fired and at the time Ammons was 634, wherein we also held that "the mere talking to Dan Danson, and, finally, that the fact that proffered evidence is not full and defendant fired the first two shots, the first complete within itself but forms only one one of which struck Ammons and the sec- link in the chain, so that it would have to ond struck and killed Hires. Much other be supplemented by other evidence in order testimony had also been introduced, the to avail the party offering it, may not rengreater portion of which was of little ma- der such evidence incompetent or inadmisterial consequence, and threw but little light sible." If, by reason of what subsequently on the tragedy. We have set forth what we occurred in the trial, the defendant conceivconceive to be the most important portions, ed that such documentary evidence had not though necessarily in a very condensed form. been sufficiently connected by other evidence At this stage of the trial, the documentary to make it admissible or that for any other evidence was offered and admitted in evi- reason it was incompetent or improper, the dence over the objection of the defendant. proper way to have removed it from the Section 65 of the charter of the city of Jack-consideration of the jury was by a motion sonville, the first of such instruments, con- to strike it out. Rentz v. Live Oak Bank, tains the following provision: "The police 61 Fla. 403, 55 South. 856, and McMillan v. force shall have power and authority to im- Reese, 61 Fla. 360, 55 South. 388. mediately arrest, without warrant, and take Before taking up any of the other assigninto custody any person who shall commitments for treatment, we think it advisable or threaten, or attempt to commit in the to state that, after introducing the docupresence of a member of it, or within his view, any breach of the peace or offense directly prohibited by act of the Legislature, or by ordinance of the city council." Section 351, the second of such instruments, provides for the punishment of "any person convicted of endangering or disturbing the public peace, or violating public decency by using any abusive, obscene or profane language, or by making any threats, of violence, to or against any other person or persons, or by using profane, obscene or indecent language or by being drunk or by being noisy or disorderly, in or upon any street, square, or other public place, within the city limits," and then proceeds to designate certain other offenses. Section 354, the third of such instruments, makes it unlawful for any person owning or conducting a saloon within the limits of the city of Jacksonville "to keep the same open or any door or aperture thereof which could or might be used as a means of ingress or egress to such premises * on the Sabbath day," requires that all saloons "shall be closed from 12 o'clock at night until 5 o'clock in the morning," and provides that "any person or persons violating any of the provisions of this section be, and the same is hereby declared to be disorderly persons, dangerous to the peace and morals of the city, and he, she or they shall on conviction before the municipal court, be punished as provided in section 348." [3, 4] In view of the evidence which had already been adduced, the salient features of which we have given above, as well as mentary evidence in question, the state proceded to prove by four different witnesses certain conversations had with the defendant, after he was arrested, the substance of which was that he admitted he had shot Ammons because Ammons and his father (Dan Danson) "were having trouble, and it looked like he (Ammons) was going to club his father." The defendant then went on to say: "After I shot Ammons, I turned to walk back to the corner. I seen this other policeman. I didn't know his name, but I seen this other policeman, and I shot him because I was afraid he might hurt me." It is not contended here that the testimony of the witnesses as to these admissions or confessions of the defendant was erroneously admitted, though it was objected to in the trial court and exceptions noted to the rulings thereon. We have examined the transcript, and are of the opinion that a proper and sufficient predicate is clearly shown to have been laid for the admission of such confessions. We would add that the only thing which Hires, the deceased, said or did, after he reached the scene of the tragedy, which is disclosed by the transcript, was to ask the question which we have copied above. Almost immediately thereafter he met his death at the hands of the defendant. The defendant introduced no testimony whatever. [5, 6] In a long line of decisions this court has held that, "upon a writ of error, the respective parties litigant are presumed to have had their day in court and to have had the points at issue between them fairly and ance with the law of the land. The final judgment is presumed to be correct, and this presumption must be met in the appellate court and overcome by the plaintiff in error." See the discussion therein and prior decisions cited in McKinnon v. Lewis, 60 Fla. 125, 53 South. 940, and Baker & Holmes Co. v. Indian River State Bank, 61 Fla. 106, 55 South. 836. As was also said in McKay v. Lane, 5 Fla. 268, text 276: "This court has uniformly proceeded upon the practice not to reverse a judgment, however errone ously an isolated point may have been ruled by the judge below, when it is clearly apparent that the party complaining had been in no way injured by the improper ruling." To the like effect is our holding in Southern Home Insurance Co. v. Putnal, 57 Fla. 199, 49 South. 922, and Pensacola Electric Co. v. Bissett, 59 Fla. 360, 52 South. 367, wherein still other decisions of this court will be found collected. As we further held in McKinnon v. Lewis, supra: "Upon a writ of error, the plaintiff in error becomes the actor in the appellate court, whether he occupied the position of plaintiff or defendant in the court below, and upon him rests the burden. It is incumbent upon him to show that the different rulings of the trial court of which he complains, or some of them, are so infected with error as to call for and compel a reversal of the judgment. mere fact that technical error was committed in the trial court in some of its rulings may not be sufficient. The errors must have been harmful or prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff in error." The These principles will prove of material assistance to us, we think, in disposing of such of the other assignments that in our opinion merit treatment. [7] The fourth assignment is based upon the following portion of the charge given by the court: "Gentlemen of the jury, the police force of the city of Jacksonville have the power and authority under the laws of the state of Florida to immediately arrest without warrant, and take into custody, any person who shall commit or threaten or attempt to commit in the presence of the arresting officer, or within his view, any breach of the peace or offense directly prohibited by the act of the Legislature or by the ordinance of the city council of said city." This assignment is discussed by the plaintiff in error together with the first three assignments, which we have already disposed of, but we prefer to treat it separately. It is contended that there was no evidence adduced of an arrest. Therefore such charge was uncalled for, unwarranted, and violative of the established principle that charges and instructions should be confined to the evidence in the case. In reply to this contention, it may be admitted that the evidence may not show, technically speaking, that Dan mons, but it does show that such policeman had seized and taken hold of Dan Danson by the arm. In the light of the evidence adduced, it can hardly be contended that the policeman was not authorized to arrest Dan Danson without a warrant, whether he actually did arrest him or not. See Robertson v. State, 42 Fla. 223, 28 South. 424, and Robertson v. State, 43 Fla. 156, 29 South. 535, 52 L. R. A. 751. The portion of the charge complained of would seem to have stated the law correctly, especially when taken in connection with the entire charge and instructions given. Be all this as it may, we feel that we can say affirmatively from a consideration of the entire record that the defendant was not and could not have been injured by the giving of such portion of the charge. See Starke v. State, 49 Fla. 41, 37 South. 850, and Cross v. Aby, 55 Fla. 311, 45 South. 820. The ninth assignment is as follows: "The court erred in refusing to charge the jury, upon the request made by the jury through Deputy Sheriff Williamson, on the law as to what constitutes a legal arrest." We find that the showing made in the bill of exceptions upon this point is as follows: "And afterwards the said jury did send down to the said judge, by and through one Ed. Williams, a deputy sheriff, who was then in charge of and having custody of said jury during their deliberation, and who was duly appointed deputy to R. F. Bowden, sheriff of Duval county, Fla., a request to the said judge that he, the said judge, instruct the jury and charge them on the law as to what constituted a legal arrest. But the said judge, upon receiving said request made deliberations, did decide and refuse because as aforesaid by the said jury during their there was no evidence before them that there was an arrest, to which decision and refusal the defendant did then and there except." inconsistent and misleading in charging upIt is urged strenuously that the court was on the power of the police to make arrests and in stating that there was no arrest, but we find no such inconsistency. The duties of the police were described to the jury, that it might be made plain why Hires appeared as he did upon the scene. Danson was not on trial for shooting Ammons, who may or may not have been within his official rights in the seizure of the elder Danson-an issue not now material-but the law so laid down clearly and correctly charged that Hires was in his line of duty, and there was no question before the jury as to an actual arrest, lawful or unlawful. We shall not undertake to discuss the other assignments, though we have given them all our careful examination. See Hin son v. State, 56 South. 674, decided here at this term, and prior decisions of this court therein cited, especially Gee v. State, 61 We are clear that no reversible error has been made to appear to us. Therefore the judgment must be affirmed. WHITFIELD, C. J., and COCKRELL, J., concur. Fred T. Meyers and Nat R. Walker, for plaintiff in error. Parl Trammell, Atty. Gen., for the State. SHACKLEFORD, J. Eddie Andrew was convicted of murder in the first degree, with a recommendation to the mercy of the court, TAYLOR, HOCKER, and PARKHILL, JJ., and seeks to have the judgment reviewed and concur in the opinion. (62 Fla. 10) ANDREW v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Florida, Division A. Nov. 21, 1911.) (Syllabus by the Court.) reversed by writ of error. [1, 2] Twenty-two errors are assigned, all of which, with the exception of the last, are based upon the admission or exclusion of evidence. The last assignment is predicated upon the denial of the motion for a new trial. We shall not treat the assignments separately. In our opinion no extended discussion of 1. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 681*)—TRIAL-RECEP- any of them is called for, since practically TION OF EVIDENCE-PRELIMINARY PROOF. The general grounds of irrelevancy and impertinency to proffered testimony are properly overruled, especially when the party offering such testimony promises to introduce other evidence showing the relevancy and materiality of such proffered testimony. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. 88 1611, 1612; Dec. Dig. § 681.*] 2. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 824*)-TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS NECESSITY FOR REQUESTS. Where evidence offered by the state in a prosecution for murder is properly admitted, and the defendant conceives that the jury should be instructed as to the effect of such evidence, he should request the court to give such instructions as he may deem appropriate or necessary. Where he fails to do this, he will not be permitted to complain of such omission on the part of the court. they present no points of law for determination. It would be fruitless to set forth the evidence or even to give a résumé thereof. It seems sufficient to say that the first witness introduced by the state was the widow of the deceased, with whose murder the defendant stood charged. Among other things, she testified that she had caused a prosecution to be instituted against the defendant for committing the crime of rape upon her. The defendant objected to the introduction of this testimony upon the general grounds of irrelevancy and impertinency, whereupon the state announced that later on it expected to introduce evidence showing its relation to and connection with the crime for which the defendant was then on trial. Such general grounds of objection were properly over [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1996-2004; Dec. Dig. ruled, especially after the state had prom824.*] 3. WITNESSES (§ 269*)-EXAMINATION-CROSSEXAMINATION-SCOPE AND EXTENT. While it is competent for a party on trial for alleged crime to propound on cross-examination of a state witness questions tending to elicit the motives, interest, animus, or bias of such witness, a wide range of cross-examination being allowed for such purpose, yet questions on cross-examination of such witness having no possibility of relevancy to the examination in chief may be excluded, even though they may tend to contradict the witness upon new and irrelevant matters brought out on the cross-examination. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. 88 949-954; Dec. Dig. § 269.*] 4. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 1160*)-WRIT OF ERROR REVIEW-QUESTIONS OF FACT. In passing upon an assignment questioning the correctness of the ruling of the trial court in denying a motion for a new trial, which is based upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the question thereby presented to an appellate court is whether or not the jurors acting as reasonable men could have found such verdict from the evidence adduced. If this question can be answered in the affirmative, the action of the trial court upon such motion should not be disturbed. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3084; Dec. Dig. § 1160.*] Error to Circuit Court, Wakulla County; J. W. Malone, Judge. Eddie Andrew was convicted of murder in the first degree, and brings error. Affirmed. ised to make the necessary connection. See Danson v. State, 56 South. 677, decided here at the present term, wherein prior decisions of this court will be found cited. We find that the state kept its promise so made, subsequently introducing the indictment which had been found against the defendant, at the fall term of the circuit court for the county of Wakulla for such crime of rape, which was alleged therein to have been committed by the defendant upon the wife of the deceased on the 17th day of September, 1910. The killing of the deceased by the defendant was alleged to have taken place on the 14th day of April, 1911. The defendant also objected to the introduction of the indictment against him for rape, which objections were overruled, and an assignment of error predicated upon such ruling. In his brief the defendant abandons this assignment, saying that the indictment was permissible to show in he is of the opinion that "the introduction of connection with circumstantial evidence that the defendant, by reason of the fact that the deceased was one of the state's witnesses as shown by the indorsement on the indictment, had a motive for removing the deceased." In this statement we think that the defendant is eminently correct. He proceeds to contend, however, "that the court should have given directions to the jury as to the In short, we have given all the assignments predicated upon the admission and exclusion of evidence our careful consideration and no reversible error has been made to appear to us. [4] We now reach the last assignment, based upon the overruling of the motion for a new trial, and which questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. The evidence is almost entirely circumstantial in its nature; and, while upon some points it may not be altogether as clear and satisfactory as we would like, yet, when we proceed to ask our usual question, could the jurors as reasonable men have found and rendered such verdict from the evidence adduced? we are constrained to answer in the affirmative, as did the trial judge. See Wilson v. Jernigan, 57 Fla. 277, 49 South. 44; Williams v. State, 58 Fla. 138, 50 South. 749; Bexley v. State, 59 Fla. 6, 51 South. 278; Pensacola Electric Co. v. Bissett, 59 Fla. 360, 52 South. 367; Hinson v. State, 56 South. 674, decided here at the present term. Judgment affirmed. When an attorney represents both or all the parties to a transaction, conversations and transaction between such parties in the presence tions, and such attorney may be required to tesof the attorney are not privileged communicatify to such conversations and communications; but where one of the parties went alone to such and made statements to him, in the absence of attorney, because he was his retained attorney, the other party, which were apparently confidential, he should not be permitted to testify as to such statements. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. 88 749-751; Dec. Dig. § 199.*] 2. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 979*)-REVIEW-DIS CRETION OF COURT-GRANT OF NEW TRIAL. Where a new trial is granted, and there is such a conflict in the evidence that this court cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion in granting such new trial, his ruling will not be disturbed. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3871; Dec. Dig. § 979.*] Error to Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; J. B. Wall, Judge. Action by E. Dominguez against the Citizens' Bank & Trust Company. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order granting a new trial, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. MacFarlane & Chancey, for plaintiff in error. F. M. Simonton, for defendant in error. HOCKER, J. Plaintiff in error sued defendant in error in the circuit court of Hillsborough county to recover $1,000, which the plaintiff alleges he deposited with defendant bank on the 22d of September, 1910. The bank denied indebtedness, and in May, 1911, a trial was had, resulting in a verdict for plaintiff for $900, with interest at 8 per cent. from the commencement of the suit. A motion for a new trial was made on nine grounds, the substance of which may be stated to be that the verdict was contrary to the law, the evidence, and the weight of evidence, that there is no credible testimony on which the verdict can be sustained, and that the court erred in not permitting E. R. Gunby to testify that the plaintiff stated to him that the $900, claimed as having been deposited, consisted of a certain check for $800, on a bank at Tarpon Springs, which fact the defendant was prepared to rebut. [1] As to the last assignment, it appears WHITFIELD, C. J., and COCKRELL, J., that when Gunby was introduced as a wit concur. ness by defendant the jury were withdrawn, and the facts were all presented to the court TAYLOR, HOCKER, and PARKHILL, JJ., in their absence. Mr. Gunby stated, in subconcur in the opinion. stance, that the plaintiff came to consult |