the necessity of a maximum unit tonnage of at least 8,300 tons. Since the Japanese would have no extra tonnage within which to build this type of cruiser until 1936 we can scarcely expect them to support our position to any great extent, although we believe them to be in agreement with us in principle and think that they would have no objection to the maximum displacement above-mentioned with respect to the smaller type of cruiser. We desire to be instructed regarding the maximum size of the lesser type of cruiser and as to the question of the 8-inch gun. There can be no advantage in discussing any remaining questions until a decision is reached on these two matters. It is, moreover, on these very questions that the British might try to break up the Conference should we be firm in standing on our position. While we interpret our instructions as directing us strictly to maintain, in respect to all future cruisers, our class of armament, your definite corroboration of this is desired. With reference to the retention of obsolete vessels, the British suggestion is clearly a camouflaged means of bringing total limitation to 625,000 tons, which is, however, within a figure which can be discussed by us. Certain factors such as quantity are susceptible of being changed, in order to render the plan more agreeable to us until 1936, but until the points mentioned in the preceding paragraph are settled it is idle to go into these features of the situation and this also applies to the question of the number of 10,000-ton vessels which each country might have. It is seriously within the bounds of possibility that the Conference might be wrecked on any one of these matters, and we accordingly seek your instructions thereupon. While, of course, we are ready firmly to hold our ground, we are of the opinion that the entire subject should be studied by you both in its technical and its political aspects before we take up our final position. GIBSON 500.A15 a 1/448: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, July 18, 1927-12 p.m. [Received July 19-3: 15 a. m.] 107. My No. 106, July 18, 11 p. m. We are now so near to basis of discussion that it may readily be reached provided that either: 1. The British were to renounce their demand for small-type cruisers and their insistence upon restricting the 8-inch gun; or, 2. The Americans were to withdraw demand for liberty of armament, which we do not believe you have any intention of doing. It is our opinion that the British delegation in Geneva is so influenced by Admiralty tenets that it is unable duly to consider the broader suggestions which are not sponsored by some ulterior motive. Therefore, it is thought you may care to consider discussing this problem with the British Ambassador in a very informal and personal way, pointing out to Sir Esme the insistence of the British in thrusting upon the United States a class of cruiser for which our country has practically no use in their endeavor to abolish the 8-inch gun and the resentment that will be engendered in the United States by such a maneuver; that due to previous construction it is plainly to be seen that the British will continue to have a superior strength in cruisers during the existence of the treaty under discussion; that should the United States consent to withdraw her demands concerning the 8-inch gun the British superiority would be definitely increased by reason of the fact that Great Britain has 49 merchant ships and our inferiority would be most evidently accentuated by a strict limitation as to ships concerned. Should the British Government recognize freely our right to decide the type of armament required by us, which in any case would be exercised only in regard to a small part of the tonnage allocated to us, the British Ambassador could judge for himself whether, under ordinary circumstances and without irritation of an artificial nature, the United States would be likely to build a sufficient number of 8-inch-gun cruisers to give Great Britain any serious concern. The disruption of the Conference over this issue, on the other hand, could not fail to give rise to a popular demand for the building of cruisers armed with 8-inch guns to such an extent as to be disagreeable to us and to constitute the contrary of what the British seek to bring about. We naturally could give no undertaking regarding the future actions of Congress in case of agreement, but the British Ambassador should realize that the most sensible manner of dealing with us in the premises is to avoid raising any question as to our freedom in matters of armament which would result only in marked resentment accentuated by the knowledge that, since the Japanese share our views, the British are alone in seeking to limit us to 6-inch guns. If you approve of this, the effect of such action might be increased if you could telegraph Houghton the substance of the conversation for confirmation to Chamberlain and to me so that I might inform Bridgeman in the premises. 500.A15 a 1/447: Telegram The Ambassador in Great Britain (Houghton) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] LONDON, July 19, 1927-noon. [Received July 19-7:51 a. m.] 168. Pursuant to instructions in your telegram No. 165, July 16, noon," I had an interview with Chamberlain and gave him an outline of its contents. He stated that he was fully of the opinion that nothing would be accomplished by a meeting at Geneva between you both. Chamberlain further said that he had only suggested this because he had been told through informal sources in Washington that you had given consideration to such a meeting. He considered that it would be more advisable to allow the delegates at Geneva to discuss any British concessions as regards the size of cruisers or the total tonnage thereof. This telegram has been transmitted to Geneva for delegation's information. HOUGHTON 500.A15 a 1/446: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, July 19, 1927-4 p. m. 55. Your No. 106, July 18, 11 p. m. After discussion of matter with the Secretary of the Navy and with the naval experts, our opinion is outlined as follows: 1. We must adhere to 5-5-3 ratio as qualified by your suggestions in regard to slight concessions should exact ratio be impractical; 2 and 3. After reaching agreement on total cruiser tonnage, we must retain right to construct number and type of cruisers up to 10,000 tons together with liberty to arm such cruisers up to 8-inch guns, within total tonnage agreed upon, or as with new construction our needs may require; 4. We do not understand Japanese delegation's suggestion set forth in your No. 105, July 18, 3 p. m. Please cable explanations and additional figures. We fail to see how the 25 percent of the total tonnage of old vessels would make it possible for us to use destroyer 71 Quoted in telegram No. 50, July 16, 1 p. m., to the chairman of the American delegation, p. 108. tonnage until we should have built up in cruiser tonnage. We should have to scrap these, apparently, and would be unable to build any We do not understand, moreover, why the British proposition has it that we build only twelve 10,000-ton cruisers when the British themselves have larger number if their 9,750-ton cruisers are included. 5. We do not believe that the British actually intend to limit tonnage of cruisers to extent which will be satisfactory, but have in mind to break up Conference on matter of size of guns and cruisers. It is our belief that British should first agree on total cruiser tonnage not to exceed our 400,000 tons. KELLOGG 500.A15 a 1/458: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State GENEVA, July 19, 1927—5 p. m. 108. Meeting this morning with Bridgeman, Cecil, Ishii and Saito to continue discussion memorandum quoted in my 105, July 18, 3 p. m. I pointed out that in my opinion the suggestion of 500,000 tons surface craft and the retention in addition thereto of 25 percent over-age vessels was in effect a camouflage method of increasing total tonnage to 625,000 tons; that while latter figure was within range of figures we had reluctantly indicated a willingness to discuss I felt that it might be more candid to give the total tonnage including so-called over-age ships, particularly if the age limit fixed was to be 16 years for cruisers and 12 for destroyers. I said that it might be different if the age limits were 20 and 16 years. Bridgeman said that their suggestion had been on the bases of 16 and 12 years respectively but that these ages might be open to negotiation. Ishii stated that Japanese delegation had felt that for ships constructed prior to Washington Conference and which had gone through the war the figure of 16 and 12 years might be equitable but that for post-Washington ships they would desire age limits to 20 and 16 years respectively. Ishii also indicated that the idea of a separate class of over-age vessels would be convenient for them, [that they?] could accept a reasonable ratio to 500,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain but could not agree to a ratio to 625,000 tons. (Apparently the camouflage facilitates Japanese position as it would not require new construction on their part to reach approximately 300,000 tons of surface craft other than the 10,000-ton cruisers contemplated.) "Telegram in three sections. I pointed out that except for destroyers and certain decrepit armored cruisers we would have nothing that would go into the over-age class but that if we could reach agreement on other questions I would be prepared to discuss a formula for retention of over-age ships but could not commit myself to it at the present juncture. I then stated that I wished to get down to the real question upon which our whole discussion hinged, namely, the 8-inch gun; that if this question was discussed solely from the technical point of view it was doubtful if a solution could be realized; that the only possible way to reach a solution was through discussing the problem from the point of view of its practical application to the relations of the two countries; that it was nothing more than the question of how we were likely to use a part of our cruiser tonnage and that I wished to present to them the broad political aspects of this question rather than its technicalities. I made it clear that on the basis of 300,000 tons of cruisers and assuming twelve or more 10,000-ton cruisers were constructed and with retention of Omahas we would have available only 100,000 tons or less for other cruiser construction and that as a practical matter during the life of the treaty it was in my personal opinion problematical whether we would avail ourselves of all of this tonnage in 8-inch-gun cruisers in addition to the construction of a given number of 10,000-ton cruisers. In view of Japanese situation which on the basis under discussion would permit no new construction of vessels other than specified 10,000-ton vessels the issue was clearly one between the United States and Great Britain and I asked the British delegates to clearly consider our probable course of action in the way of construction of 8-inch [-gun] vessels; first, if we reached friendly agreement and had a treaty; and second, if our negotiations broke down because of British attempt to impose on us a type of vessel which is unsuitable for us. I said that in my opinion if an attempt were made to deny our liberty of armament within tonnage limitation there was danger they would find they had driven us into an extensive building program. I made it quite clear that in my opinion treaty which deprived us of our liberty of action with respect to arming the proposed second class of cruisers as we saw fit would not be ratified; that Great Britain had assured cruiser supremacy for many years to come, an overwhelming merchant fleet which could be armed; that we could not be expected to accept restrictions as to arming cruisers and that an attempt to deny us our liberty of action would be the best method of arousing popular resentment and driving us into a big building program. Cecil seemed to be considerably impressed by this statement, Bridgeman less so. Latter stated that our insistence upon right to build |
