relations between Great Britain and the United States, but disastrous to all the world as an example that the two leading naval powers are unable to come to any agreement as to limitation, and will make any agreement in the future, even in 1931, perhaps impossible. The moral effect of such a failure, in my judgment, is out of all proportion to the material interests involved. I do not suggest that we can accept British proposition, but wish to suggest for your consideration and immediate suggestions whether it would not be better to abandon the plenary conference on Monday and take an adjournment of this conference for a few months to permit time for reflection. After a plenary conference and the position of both governments stated it will be all the more difficult if not impossible to effect any reconciliation between divergent points of view. I should wish time to consult President about this move, but while I am convinced that no treaty could be ratified on the British basis I view with great alarm a final break-up in this conference." This of course is simply asking for their views. We feel here that perhaps a reasonable adjournment would be better than a complete break-down but would like your opinion before proposing it definitely. KELLOGG 500.A15 a 1/519c: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) WASHINGTON, July 29, 1927-4 p. m. 71. The President at his press conference this afternoon said: "I think the Press has all the information that has come to me relative to the Naval Conference at Geneva. The proposals that have been made by the representatives of Great Britain seem to us to call for the building of a much larger Navy than we think is necessary, so that we haven't been able to agree. Now, whether these proposals may be modified as the result of conference and discussion, I don't know. The proposals that have been presented, as I understand them, call for the building of a larger Navy than we should wish to agree to. I think that is the main obstacle. There are some other collateral questions about the tonnage of ships and the calibre of the guns, but I think the main difference is in the size of the Navy. We called this Conference, thinking that it might result in placing a limitation on Armaments which would perhaps help the countries interested to reduce some as years went by the size of their Navies, which would result in making economies, and secondly, what I thought was of even more importance, the promotion of a spirit of peace and good will and better understanding. I have placed that, of course, as the main object in view. The matter of the removal of the burden of taxation and the economic benefits would be the natural consequences of peace and good will among the Nations. But up to the present time the expressed desire on the part of representatives of the British Government is for so large a Navy that our representatives and our government haven't been able to agree. As I said before, I want to emphasize that discussion may modify it to such an extent that we can agree." KELLOGG 500.A15 a 1/510: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, July 30, 1927—1 p. m. [Received July 30-10: 10 a. m.] 137. Your No. 69, July 29, 2 p. m.85 The delegation is in complete agreement with you on disastrous consequences of final break, with public statements made of the differing positions. Delegation feels very strongly, however, that it would be equally as disastrous were we to let it appear that after having reached a deadlock over a clear-cut question we had avoided issue with inference that we lacked confidence in our position. Any initiative on our part for an adjournment would inevitably leak out and would be interpreted as admission by us that there would be possibility of making concession to British on question where on one hand there is nothing but surrender of a principle and on the other its maintenance. We understand that our position has the almost unanimous backing of the American press. We question if this backing may not be jeoparded for first time if we take the initiative to adjourn. If we were to accept a proposal for adjournment, clearly emanating from another government, however, this difficulty would be avoided; it would, in fact, be obvious that our acquiescence in such a proposal would be only reasonable. If you desire, suggestion can be made to Japanese delegation (not revealing our initiative) that they propose an adjournment to us and to the British. We believe the latter would be very glad to accept such proposal; we should have to make clear, however, that adjournment and plenary session are mutually exclusive. Once a public stand had been taken an adjournment would be of no purpose. On other hand, if adjournment be agreed on, it is obviously not desirable to prejudice further discussion by making definite public statements. Please instruct without delay. GIBSON 85 Quoted in telegram to President Coolidge, July 29, p. 138. 500.A15 a 1/510 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) WASHINGTON, July 30, 1927-7 p. m. 76. I wired the President our No. 69 to you reference to adjournment 8 and said: "We feel here that perhaps a reasonable adjournment would be better than a complete breakdown but would like your opinion before proposing it definitely." The President replied as follows: "Adjournment probably means continuing recriminations with little prospect of better result. Have clear, firm statement made of our position. Ask for time to prepare it." This morning I wired to the President your reply, No. 137, July 30, 1 p. m. Have not yet had any further word from the President.87 If either of the other countries makes suggestion of adjournment, cable us and we will consider it. Have not heard from you about postponement of meeting on Monday. If Bridgeman insists on making his speech at that time you should go ahead with yours, as they should both be made at the same time. KELLOGG 500.A15 a 1/519f: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) WASHINGTON, July 31, 1927-4 p.m. 82. New York Times this morning has despatch from London that a new naval holiday plan is understood to be the result of the hastily called Cabinet meeting yesterday and that the deep concern of the Cabinet meeting was how to avoid and check propaganda in Great Britain, the United States and Japan if present conference is doomed. The article further states that the main point of the British plan will be to impose a limit during an agreed provisional period during which building of big fighting cruisers should not go on. British Navy would undertake not to lay down further 10,000 ton cruisers during the period in exchange for an American agreement not to exceed the British number and a Japanese undertaking said to be already obtained not to exceed three-fifths proportion in that category of warships. If the American delegation would accept such a temporiz Quoted in telegram to President Coolidge, July 29, p. 138. At 9:20 p. m., a telegram from the President was received reading: "Message relative to adjournment received. Use your own discretion as to instructions. Calvin Coolidge." (File No. 500.A15 a 1/516.) ing agreement an effort would be made during the period of grace to organize a second attempt to obtain a treaty of naval limitation. It is the British view that conferences ought to be continued persistently even though the gathering of admirals and diplomats at Geneva disbands. [Paraphrase.] Any suggestion for a naval holiday during a provisional period should be given careful consideration before breaking up Conference. [End paraphrase.] KELLOGG 500.A15 a 1/512: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, July 31, 1927—7 p.m. 139. I received a call from Ishii this morning; he informed me that he had had an interview with Bridgeman last night in an endeavor to learn whether there was not some way to find a basis of discussion so that we might proceed with our conversations. He said it was quite apparent that Bridgeman did not believe the American delegation was serious in saying that it would accept no transgression of the principle of freedom of armament and that he was confident that at the last moment some radical concession would be granted by the United States. The views expressed by the American delegation, Ishii said, he was firmly convinced were those of the American Government and that he did not believe unless I knew them to be those of my Government that I would have been presumptuous enough to state definitely that the proposals made by the British, concerning cruisers large enough to mount 8-inch guns, were totally unacceptable to the United States. I paid Bridgeman a visit after Ishii's call on me and told him that I considered that I should inform him that I was in receipt of a full confirmation from my Government of the opinion I had given him that the British proposals concerning the armament of cruisers were absolutely unacceptable to the United States. He was further informed by me that I considered it necessary to request a delay of the next plenary meeting, so that I might be fully informed as to the views of the American Government before a final session of the Conference, and I said most emphatically that should such a plenary session be held it must be looked upon as the end of the Conference at Geneva. In reply Bridgeman said that on the contrary he considered that it would be favorable if a full statement of our opposite opinions was "Telegram in four sections. expressed, after which a final appeal to the public might be made by Cecil and that we could then have a private meeting at which a final endeavor could be made to reconcile the views of the different delegations. The American delegation, I said, was ready to accept any means of accomplishing an agreement and that it was only too willing to give all its efforts and ingenuity to this end, but if any real success was to come from such a private meeting the endeavor should be made before another plenary session was held; that it would be useless to begin negotiations all over again after we had stirred up public opinion by stating in a positive manner our divergent opinions. The political clause proposed by us,s Bridgeman said, was entirely unsuited to British needs as they were of the opinion that Governments would procrastinate in assuming the rights allowed them by such a clause. If the United States would consent not to construct more than a small number of cruisers capable of carrying 8-inch guns, say two or three, besides the 10,000-ton vessels to be specified, Bridgeman said he thought some solution might be found, or, if the United States should incorporate in the treaty a statement to the effect that it was not our intention at present to construct any cruisers capable of carrying 8-inch guns besides those 10,000-ton vessels to be decided upon, but that ample notice would be given should we decide later to construct these cruisers. In reply I stated that I thought such a statement, which could only be a conjecture, would be subject to serious opposition and really had no proper place in a treaty. I said I saw no objection concerning the provision for giving advance notice and that as far as that provision alone was concerned it seemed entirely proper. (The United States would doubtless notify the other parties to a treaty of any new construction undertaken by it. See Washington treaty, part 3, section 1 (b).") The above was not deemed to be sufficient by Bridgeman. The question was then raised by Admiral Jones whether the British intended, when discussing 10,000-ton cruisers, to include any craft of sufficient size to allow the mounting of effective 8-inch-gun batteries. In reply Bridgeman stated that such was his intention and that the maximum class could include even 8,000-ton vessels carrying 8-inch guns. At this juncture, I stated that the whole question seemed to have very little relation to realities, as the only question seemed to be whether any construction we might undertake within the limits of tonnage allowed us would be of interest to the British Empire and that considering our present and past policy we were absolutely sure that this was not so. The reply made by Bridgeman, in a very dry "See telegram No. 115, July 23, 2 p. m., from the chairman of the American delegation, p. 131. "Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. 1, p. 258. 258346-42—vol. I- -15 |