500.A15/450: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chief of the American Representation on the Preparatory Commission (Gibson) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, March 25, 1927-5 p. m. 98. Owing to late arrival of your telegrams on statement you propose to make, it is impossible for me to examine matter carefully and advise you tonight. I think, however, that in main it is too much an endorsement of League supervision, as our argument has always been not only that such supervision could not be accepted by us but that it is vicious in principle as its only effect will be to create distrust and suspicion between nations. In addition I do not think that we are justified in saying that we have no intention at present of materially increasing our land forces. Your draft will be considered and reply sent some time tomorrow. KELLOGG 500.A15/453: Telegram The Chief of the American Representation on the Preparatory Commission (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, March 26, 1927-11 a. m. 199. Department's 98, March 25. The statement could not, I am confident, be interpreted as a departure from the consistently maintained American position. Throughout the discussions, as you will recall, the statement by us that we deemed supervision vicious in principle and declined to accept it for ourselves was coupled invariably with the statement that no objection would be offered by us if others wished to apply it among themselves. If we are not to be illogical, we must take an occasion to reiterate our position either now or as soon as the question of supervision comes up. Should all the other powers consider that supervision by the League, applied to themselves but not to the United States, does not create suspicion but is, on the contrary, the only method to allay their mutual suspicions, opposition by us would not be consistent and would make our position untenable. The whole delegation, however, believes the statement in my 195, March 24, 11 a. m., or something like it, should be made promptly. Three courses remain open to us: 83 Telegram in two sections. (1) Make such a statement, thus removing any pretext for charging us with obstruction. This would leave us free to concentrate on trying to obtain in a separate convention what we regard to be essential. Also, this would clearly reveal our sincere desire for the promotion of achieved results. (2) Await the same proposal from France or Belgium (see my 196, March 24, 4 p. m.). Unless we anticipate them, they intend to make it in a day or so, thereby creating the impression of going to extreme limits of concession in order to make the convention acceptable A refusal would be difficult, and agreement would make it appear that we accepted a favor conferred upon us. to us. (3) Refuse the proposal in (2) above and fight for a general convention which would be acceptable to us. This course, in our opinion, is not to be considered. Most of the other delegations favor the use of League machinery to a greater or lesser extent, and most of them wish to apply supervisory measures among themselves. The best possible pretext to accuse us of rendering disarmament measures impossible would be afforded them if we oppose this course. It should be kept in mind that the prospect of success for the Conference is problematical at best and that, if we do meet the situation handsomely, we shall leave to others the shouldering of their share of responsibility for the failure. Should we advance this proposal, the clearest indication will have been given that we are not fighting them politically, though we may not agree with them on technical matters. 34 Another consideration is that some indecision is evident among the French regarding their reply to our last naval invitation. Should we remove, in a conspicuously friendly way, what they consider to be the chief present obstacle in the way of their extreme League program, this may help in convincing them that, though on technical questions we have opposed them, no hostility to France was involved and we are anxious to treat with them in a friendly and generous way. Although this is pure conjecture, their decision regarding naval matters might be affected thereby. Nolan 35 approves as accurate the statement that we do not intend a material increase of our land forces, but this I do not deem of any consequence in comparison with the main point developed by me. If you prefer, therefore, this, sentence could be omitted without the value of the statement being affected. A general statement has been made by each delegation, except those of Argentina and Colombia. Owing to the special position of the United States respecting the League, it is felt that, until our views become known, no general discussion can profitably begin. While awaiting our statement, the Conference now marks time. Yesterday, "See pp. 1 ff. * Maj. Gen. Dennis E. Nolan, military expert with the American delegation. however, I was informed by the Conference that it would be difficult to wait later than Monday. Although I do not desire to seem unduly insistent or nervous, I cannot conceal the whole delegation's feeling that the situation is the most crucial developed so far during the Conference and that this factor has, under the circumstances, become of the utmost importance. Therefore, I trust that I may be enabled to make a general statement no later than Monday morning. The delegation has most earnestly studied the entire problem but has not been able to evolve an alternative course. I cannot see how any other course than the one proposed by me will prevent the United States from incurring the odium of blocking the Conference. If the present recommendations are not approved, I beg to be furnished with the earliest instructions possible regarding the attitude I am to adopt in case another delegation proposes the double convention idea and also with specific instructions regarding the delegation's future course. 500.A15/447: Telegram GIBSON The Secretary of State to the Chief of the American Representation on the Preparatory Commission (Gibson) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, March 26, 1927—4 p. m. 99. Your No. 195 has been considered with all care possible in short time given, and I do not think that your suggested statement contained therein should be made to plenary conference. (1) Fundamental objection is that other powers are deliberately encouraged to set up scheme of international supervision and control; and (2) very definite impression is given that only reason this Government cannot join is that the United States is not a member of the League. Perhaps you do not really intend statement to have that effect, but certainly that is impression made on my mind, and I fear that the other delegations and the public as well would receive it the same way. (3) One of our principal objections to both the French and British drafts is the provision they carry for international supervisionin your words, based on punishment of an aggressor state or for international inspection and armament control. Military action or economic boycott is only punishment that could be inflicted, and each is not only impractical and unacceptable to this country, but, in my opinion, very likely to be rejected by other countries. We have insisted constantly that control of armaments as far as this country is concerned must be left to the good faith of nations. (4) I think that the American delegation should put diplomatically before the plenary conference the arguments set forth in section 3, report of subcommission A, by the delegates representing the "Report of Sub-Commission A, p. 167. 36 Governments of the British Empire, Chile, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the United States. I cannot see why these nations should not urge upon plenary conference the arguments advanced in the report. (5) I do not think that we impliedly should advocate a plan even for other nations which we would be unwilling to accept for ourselves. (6) I cannot go over your statement in detail, but in many passages it seems to me that idea of approval of international supervision for other countries is conveyed. In section 2, for instance, you state that if in the reasoned opinion of the Preparatory Commission complete League control will accomplish purpose for which it was convened, the Government of the United States would not wish its special position to be looked upon as obstacle to general agreement; and that it is fully realized that a treaty utilizing to fullest extent the machinery and authority of the League of Nations could best be calculated to meet problem, even should the United States not be able to be party to it. Our point is that we do not wish to be put in position of saying that international supervision is good thing for other nations but not for ourselves. I have no objection to offer to your making conciliatory and diplomatic statement within limits here set forth and stated already in our instructions. The position of this Government, reduced to its lowest terms and stated in language which perhaps can be modified and put in more conciliatory form may be described thus: The Government of the United States cannot agree, for its part, to any form of international supervision or control of armaments. This Government holds that, as far as it is concerned, sole sanction for execution and enforcement of any convention for reduction and limitation of armaments lies in the good faith of all nations involved, naturally obligating them to a scrupulous observance of their treaty obligations. The United States would have no concern, therefore, in what other powers may decide to do toward establishment of an international supervision or control applicable to themselves. Principle involved here is of broader significance than any question having to do with efficacy of League machinery or of our nonmembership in League of Nations. The Government of the United States is unable to find itself in accord with proposals for any form of supervision or control of armaments by any international body, whether League of Nations or any other organization. We do not object, of course, to plan of publicity proposed in section 1, part 3, Washington Disarmament Conference.37 Do not construe this message as an instruction to make no statement at all. We think you should use your own judgment as to that, but any statement which you may make on international supervision by League of Nations or any other body should conform to lines indicated above. KELLOGG Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, ch. II, pt. 3, sec. 1, par. (b); Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. 1, p. 258. 500.A15/454: Telegram The Chief of the American Representation on the Preparatory Commission (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, March 27, 1927-5 p. m. 201. Your No. 99 sets forth six main objections to statement I proposed in my No. 195. We understand and are in agreement with them as they tend to make our original intention clearer. Objection No. 1. We shall amplify statement so as to make it clear beyond doubt that our Government adheres fully to position set forth in declaration to which you refer published in section 3 of subcommittee A report; we shall state that we thoroughly disapprove, as wrong in principle and not workable in practice, of international supervision and control of armament; that not under any conditions will we accept it; and that we are convinced that it is upon the good faith of nations and respect for treaties that the execution of any international agreement for the limitation of armaments must depend. Objection No. 2. This objection will be obviated by statement as amplified under No. 1. Objection No. 3. Amplification of statement will make clear that we will not accept sanctions of nature indicated. Objection No. 4. We are adhering fully to declaration published in section 3 of Subcommittee A report. Our adherence will be made clearer in statement when rewritten, and when discussions reach subject of control will be dealt with more fully. On this issue Germany, Italy, and some of the other powers will continue to oppose the French; the better part for us is to state our position and leave it to them to protect their own interests. Objection No. 5. We are not impliedly advocating a plan "even for other nations which we would be unwilling to accept for ourselves". We are adhering strictly to statements made repeatedly in pursuance of your written instructions which make it clear that should other powers desire to apply to themselves a regime of inspection or control, this is not a matter which concerns the United States. Statement I proposed will not in any way go beyond this position repeatedly taken and is merely logical development of that position. My No. 199, March 26, 11 a. m. indicated urgent necessity of this course from strategical point of view, and our position will be very greatly strengthened if we adopt it and will be seriously impaired if we do not. Objection No. 6. Your quotation from my proposed statement read "machinery and authority of the League of Nations could best be calculated to meet problem"; my statement read "might" instead of "could" but nevertheless this portion will be omitted. The above changes in the proposed statement seem in large measure to meet your views and at same time to carry out our original intent. The Preparatory Commission has begun a detailed discussion on the |
