500.A15 a 1/324: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, June 24, 1927—7 p. m. 31. Bridgeman stated at this morning's session of the executive committee that he was eager that an early plenary session be held for the purpose of debating the British suggestions regarding battleships and aircraft carriers and asked at what time the other delegates would be prepared to enter upon such debate. In reply I informed him that our instructions did not cover such proposals and were further definitely against any reopening of matters which the Washington treaty had already settled. I added, however, that I had reported fully to my Government which would doubtless instruct me in the premises. Viscount Ishii declared that the position of the Japanese delegates was similar to ours and they were prevented by their instructions from undertaking conversations regarding any revision of the Washington treaty, but that he himself thought certain features of the British suggestions desirable. He had telegraphed to Tokyo accordingly but did not expect a reply within less than a week and until then could not take any stand in the matter. It was proposed by Bridgeman to state in a communication to the press that discussion had been postponed pending receipt of instructions from these Governments but he withdrew the suggestion when opposition thereto developed. Bridgeman expressed the hope to me, after the meeting, that although he realized that no replacement would occur before 1931, we could yet come to an agreement as regards capital ships, since he thought that public opinion would be very favorably influenced if a diminution in maximum tonnages, even if it should only take effect in 1931, were agreed to at this time. He admitted that such a step presented some difficulties and pointed to the fact that the British Navy included two new vessels which considerably surpassed the maximum tonnage which they desired us to accept, but that the possibility of other countries constructing the larger ships had to be reckoned with. He promised to submit to me a proposal which he was engaged in drafting and which he trusted might be acceptable to all concerned. Dulles and Cecil were discussing this matter almost simultaneously. The former felt that it would be unfortunate to engage in a public discussion of the question, inasmuch as we would be forced to give publicity to the fact that under the Washington treaty the British Navy pending replacements had a tonnage considerably superior to the 5-5 ratio and also had more modern battleships and, further, that were their proposals to be adopted this inequality would be continued beyond the space of time stipulated in the treaty. While the British apparently desire to gain public approbation for having advocated this kind of proposition and wish to make us bear the responsibility for blocking measures they have heralded as being prime requisites to economy and peace, they will probably be satisfied with this move and will not insist rigidly on favorable action on their proposals. We think that, subject to your instructions, this question should be treated in accordance with my telegram No. 25, June 23, 7 p. m., and firmly believe that it is highly important to avoid any move at this time which might pledge us in advance to favorable consideration in 1931 of the British proposition. It will take several days for Tokyo to consider the British proposals, according to Ishii; but you may concur with me that the decision of the Japanese Government might be considerably influenced if the possibility of serious consequences arising from reopening the Washington treaty were impressed upon Matsudaira. GIBSON 500.A15 a 1/322: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, June 24, 1927-8 p. m. 49 11. Your No. 27, June 23,9 p. m. In my opinion your opening speech at Conference, and proposals circulated with it, set forth in their minimum figures this country's lowest naval necessities; 4o any revision upward of these figures is due to fact that our needs are relative to sea force which Great Britain and Japan desire to build. Any contention by British that they need large number of cruisers for the protection of their long trade routes carries the implication that they must protect them against some other nation. As the United States and Japan are the only two nations with navies large enough to be a threat to Great Britain, there does not seem to be any logical excuse for excessive tonnage demands. Should the British insist on making an elaborate defense of demand for a high cruiser tonnage, you might, I think, content yourself with making a reiteration in accordance with the suggestion in your telegram. I am further convinced that insistence upon this point would not be misjudged in view of support which the parity with Great Britain has received in this country. The high limit suggested by Jellicoe was, possibly, merely a covert attempt to ascertain whether or not we were sincere on the subject of parity. On that point there can be no question; but it is certain, as well, that we should not care to sign a treaty increasing British cruiser tonnage by about 75 percent and requiring us to triple our effective cruiser strength. Should the British put forward such claims seriously, I think that the public analysis of them would more than justify failure to conclude a treaty, and might even have effect of stimulating zeal of Congress for competitive building. You may in conversation with the British discreetly use any of the foregoing. KELLOGG 500.A15 a 1/322: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Sterling) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, June 25, 1927-1 p. m. 138. We are transmitting to you text of Gibson's telegram No. 27, June 23, 9 p. m., from Geneva: [Here follows the text of the telegram printed on page 52.] We are also repeating to you Department's No. 11, June 24, 8 p. m., to Gibson. Having in mind the repeated assurances of the British, both at time of Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament and since that time, that Great Britain would accept idea of parity with this country in all classes of naval vessels, the Government of the United States is surprised at attitude of British delegates at Geneva as this attitude is outlined in Gibson's telegram under reference. See Chamberlain and inform him that in view of continuous absence of both Sir Esme Howard and Mr. Chilton from Washington there is no way to bring up these views informally here, and you have been requested, therefore, to draw their tenor to his attention in friendly spirit. KELLOGG 500.A15 a 1/327: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, June 26, 1927-9 p.m. 32. There is, in my opinion, no reason for being disheartened even though no specific accord has been reached on any question during the first week. The obstacles with which we are faced can, I believe, be overcome, although they are serious. The two most difficult ones are the elaboration of a formula which, while satisfying Japanese amourpropre, will yet maintain the Washington treaty ratio; and the even more serious wish of Great Britain to have no limitation placed upon the number of small cruisers. Judging from the discussions of the past week, I feel quite certain that there will be no insistence on the part of the British upon the taking up of their suggestions in regard to capital ships. It will ultimately be necessary in this regard to arrive at a satisfactory formula providing for postponement of this matter until 1930 [1931?], reserving at that time complete liberty of action. Subject to the question of ratio, I am of the opinion that technical agreement with Japan, covering submarines and possibly destroyers, can be reached. At the present time, however, there is considerable divergence between us as regards maximum size of destroyers. The matter upon which there are the greatest differences is that of cruisers, and considerable maneuvering with regard to the order of taking up the various questions is being indulged in. In order to make a rupture on the subject of cruisers alone seem unjustifiable should that question be the only one disputed, the British desire to arrive at a speedy agreement with us in respect of submarines, hoping to get concessions in this class at least. Our position that agreements with regard to the various categories of vessels should be interdependent and that all questions of a technical nature should be examined together is being vigorously maintained. We are, furthermore, endeavoring to dispose, as soon as possible, of the British suggestions concerning the Washington treaty. A satisfactory explanation of their having been propounded is difficult to find unless the British desired to justify their possible refusal to agree to limitation of small cruisers by our refusal of their above-mentioned proposals. They certainly must have known how unacceptable we would find these proposals. It is my hope that all questions bearing upon a change of the Washington treaty will be out of the way before the end of the discussion upon cruisers. The disposition on the part of the American press representatives here to support unflinchingly our position without regard to the political color of their papers has been extremely helpful. It is, in my opinion, producing a distinct effect on the British delegation, who appear, judging from their conversations with American newspapermen, to have taken to heart the outspoken criticism of their proposals which has been published in the American press. 500.A15 a 1/329: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, June 27, 1927—3 p. m. 33. Each delegation at the Conference has supplied the others with tonnage figures on the basis of the Washington standard ton, so that all three delegations might be able to begin their studies with the same statistical data concerning authorized programs and the tonnages of existing vessels. The American delegation were rather surprised when considering the British figures to find that the tonnage of the 18 capital ships exceeding the Nelson and the Rodney in age aggregated 49,000 tons more than the figures contained in the tables of the Washington treaty, this being due to the fact that they were based on the tonnage basis theretofore used by the British Navy, and not on the Washington standard-ton basis. The belief was generally held that figures based on Washington standard tonnage would prove less than the figures previously published, and such has proved to be the case as concerns the American figures, but the figures previously published by the British proved to be less than the figures based on Washington standard tonnage. Standard-tonnage figures have not yet been received from the Japanese for their capital ships, but based on the Washington standard ton their figures for destroyers and cruisers aggregate approximately less than previously published figures by 8 percent. After the accession of the Rodney and the Nelson and the inclusion of 18,000 tons for the modernization of six American battleships, the difference in the total standard tonnage between American and British capital ships is about 96,000 tons instead of the 33,000 tons which appear in the tables attached to the Washington treaty. It would thus be 1953 instead of 1942, as agreed upon, before parity in battleships would be reached if the British proposals were put into effect. Also for the period 1934 to 1945, it would give the British an average advantage of 14,000 tons above that under the replacement scheme contemplated by the Washington treaty and between 1945 and 1953, an advantage of about 8,000 tons. The above information is being telegraphed for the information of the State Department and the Navy Department to be used in connection with their comments to the press, and in order to give more force to the views previously expressed that nothing should be done by us to increase the advantage to be gained by the British by postponing |