any possibility which now exists of debt settlement revision as far as Great Britain is concerned would be definitely and finally ended. Of course I should merely indicate such arguments as outlined and keep my interview as personal as possible, and I should endeavor to give impression that interview came about because of my personal anxiety over situation. If you approve please advise. As I have said, it is my own belief that the British are working towards a well-matured plan which both Cabinet and Admiralty have already approved and the essentials of which will not be modified. It seems to me that under these circumstances we have but two alternatives: either accept British proposal and content ourselves with insisting upon parity, or try to postpone all action until 1931 when the entire question of naval armament can once again be brought up. If first alternative be chosen I suppose the larger the British demands are the more reasonable will our position appear before the world. I have no doubt that at present the British Government can put the matter before their people in such a way as to obtain acceptance of their program. If you wish, I shall repeat to Geneva. HOUGHTON 500.A15 a 1/381: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Houghton) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, July 7, 1927-4 p. m. 151. Your No. 156, July 7, noon. It would be useful, I think, for you to try to see either Baldwin or Chamberlain and discuss entire situation in accordance with your six suggestions, except that I should deplore any mention of the debt settlement as open to serious misinterpretation. It seems to me that you also should add that public opinion in the United States is unanimously opposed to idea conveyed by the very extensive British cruiser program and that public opinion here is likely to see in that program a threat to this country, as there can be no other power against whom Great Britain would feel necessity of protecting herself to the extent she seeks, and as any projected treaty would include safeguard clause which would make possible examination of treaty for revision in the event of threatening building programs by any other powers. 258346-42--vol. I-11 KELLOGG 500.A15 a 1/383: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, July 7, 1927-11 p. m. 68. Mr. Saburi, of the Japanese delegation, called on me this evening to inform me that Viscount Saito intended to submit to the executive committee meeting on Friday the Japanese proposals reported in my telegram No. 64 of July 6. He wished to impress on me the fact that the Japanese were entirely sincere in their desire to arrive at an agreement that would approximate the lower figures for tonnage contained in the original American proposals; that substantial increases from those figures would necessitate large building programs, and that Saito, with the approval of his Government, had decided to abandon the Conference rather than go back to Japan with any agreement which would add to the burden of taxation. He stated that the Japanese delegation would make this aspect of the situation absolutely clear. Should the Japanese delegation remain inflexible, I doubt very much that the British would be willing to reduce their figures to a degree sufficient to enable any agreement to be brought about. GIBSON 500.A15 a 1/384: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, July 7, 1927-midnight. [Received July 8-3:38 a. m.55] 69. Should there be absolute inability to agree and consequent breaking up of the Conference in spite of our sincere endeavors to arrive at an agreement, it is important that we should not be unprepared to deal with the situation thus created; and should this eventuality occur, we have, after careful study, worked out the following line of action which we beg to submit for your consideration: Should the closing of the Conference become inevitable as a result of the uncompromising stand of Great Britain in the matter of vastly increased cruiser tonnage, we would suggest, in the first place, a private Telegram in two sections. conversation with the chief delegates in order to bring out strongly the fact that the promotion of good understanding between Great Britain, Japan, and ourselves constituted the basic object of the President in convening the Conference; that such an understanding was to the highest interests of all of us and that no other factors should permit us to forget this; that therefore a public session be held to give out frankly and impartially the news of the breaking up of the Conference; and that each delegation should be free to set forth in any manner it pleased its own particular difficulties and the reasons which rendered the agreement impossible. Should this procedure be acceptable, I would, with your approval, repeat in the strongest terms the basic wish of the United States to foster amity between the three powers and our disinclination to permit our friendly relations to be in any way diminished by the failure to reach an accord at Geneva; that if our respective viewpoints were published in an amicable way so that the questions could be studied in the coming four years by public opinion which might assist in finding an answer thereto, the Conference would not have been held in vain; that the opinion of our delegation was that a basic divergence in our concept of maritime armaments and not a mere difference of opinion as to technical matters was the cause of our inability to agree; that we believe the naval necessities of one country to be conditioned upon the strength of other nations, whereas the British consider maritime requirements to be absolute and not proportioned upon the armaments of other powers; that no Conference would in our view be necessary should the British conception be correct, since, according to it, each nation would decide upon its own absolute requirements and no abatement or reconsideration of these needs could be entertained; that our view, however, of relative naval requirements, in which the Japanese concur, permits a mutual downward revision so far as possible with proper regard to the fleets of those powers not party to the treaty and that it was upon the cruiser tonnage level that our insistence lay. The strength maintained by any one of the three powers concerned would necessitate readjustments by the other powers in corresponding measure; that viewed from this standpoint, the insistence of the British delegation upon high levels of tonnage in cruisers would revise our needs automatically upward to such an extent that no real limitation would be achieved but, rather, should a treaty result, a program of naval expansion would be legalized; that while the American delegation would be glad to sign a treaty which could be defended as providing for limitation, it was our opinion that it would be more honest to the American people and to the world, and more likely to promote intelligent consideration of naval questions, to dissolve the Conference without arriving at an accord rather than to reach an agreement providing for a limitation which would not be genuine. We should be able in conclusion to evidence a proper appreciation of the attitude maintained by the different delegates during the Conference and could indicate the hope that those views which all of them had set forth would in any event bring about the stimulation of our different nations to view in a friendly manner each other's problems and to work out some equitable and sensible limitation or reduction of naval armaments before the 1931 Conference. GIBSON 500.A15 a 1/384: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, July 8, 1927-2 p.m. 30. Your No. 68, July 7, 11 p. m., and No. 69, July 7, midnight. 1. Department approves suggested conversation with the chief delegates with view of impressing on them in every reasonable way fact that disruption of Conference would be disastrous for all parties and would inevitably be the beginning of a competitive building program which would make any agreement in 1931 more difficult to reach. 2. If you finally come to point where agreement seems impossible, I think you should adjourn for a week at least and give Department results of your final conferences together with figures of limitation on which British insist, as the Department would wish to submit entire matter to the President. A week of adjournment might afford opportunity for mature consideration of existing proposals as well as for sober reflection on part of all the Governments concerned. 3. If Conference fails and public meeting is called for purpose of permitting each delegation to state its position, or, should no public meeting be called and each delegation is left to make its position public, the Department believes you should make full statement of position of this Government. General statement you propose is well enough as far as it goes, but the Department believes that you should emphasize point that the President called Conference for purpose of limitation of armament, not to lay foundation for worldwide naval expansion. It is all right to lay emphasis on fact that a favorable outcome of Conference would enhance good feeling among the three countries parties to it and would create favorable impression throughout world, but I do not think that this was fundamental purpose back of calling Conference, which was, rather, to obtain a reasonable limitation on naval construction and to prevent competition. If the only powers which have considerable navies are willing to make reasonable limitations, the United States is not able to understand why the British Government finds it necessary to create so large a sea force when the United States and Japan are the only countries against which there is any necessity for building large navies. Neither British safety, nor British trade routes, nor British foreign possessions could possibly be endangered by navy of any other power, and should any other power start a building program of proportions to constitute a danger, the treaty would contain clause protecting not only Great Britain but any other signatory power. I suggest also that you consider wisdom of including in your statement mention that the British accepted Secretary Hughes' proposition at Washington Conference in 1921 for limitation of 450,000 tons on both cruisers and destroyers (Proceedings of Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, pp. 86 and 100). The Department is utterly unable to understand why, five years later, there is any justification for a cruiser tonnage which alone exceeds this combined figure. If result of Conference cannot be fairly interpreted by world opinion as self-denying ordinance entered into freely by the great naval powers, it then possesses no value whatever and will do endless harm. If the three great naval powers are unwilling to make concessions in order to stop competitive construction in sea forces, what can be expected of the other countries? The example to the lesser powers would certainly be very unfortunate. Great stress is being laid by British press on view that Great Britain has proposed great economies through reduction of size and extension of life of battleships; but no mention is made of fact that no economy can result from any agreement on that score before 1931. I offer suggestion that it might be well to state that the United States had been willing to discuss with the other two powers at this Conference a program of reduction in size and of extension of life of battleships in 1931, but that as all the parties to the Washington treaty are not present and as no country can build any new battleships until after 1931, it would be useless to hold Conference for that purpose at present. Certainly, the increased building program of cruisers and the cost of their maintenance would more than offset any possible economies in battleships. If regrettable position is reached that Conference must be abandoned, careful consideration should be given to any statement to be made and time allowed for its consideration at Department and by President. The foregoing is to assist you in preparing a statement to be submitted here for approval. KELLOGG |