Green, 57; the Confederate defen-
sive line from the Mississippi to
the Cumberland Mountains, 57;
Albert S. Johnston in command,
57; Johnston's line extended from
Columbus, his left through Forts
Henry and Donelson, to Bowling
Green and Cumberland Gap, his
right, 58; the Union rendezvous
at Cairo, 58; the naval force of
A. H. Foote, 58; the land force
under U. S. Grant, 58; the Army
of the Ohio, first under Ander-
son, then Sherman, now Buell, 59;
Buell prepares for an advance upon
Nashville and East Tennessee, 59;
the relative situation of the oppos-
ing forces, 59; Grant threatening
Columbus, and Buell Bowling Green
and East Tennessee, 59; Johnston,
by his railway between the two
points, could concentrate at either,
60; the Cairo position and its diffi-
culties, 60; the credit of the initia-
tive plan in the West due both to
Buell and Grant, 61; the Cumber-
land and Tennessee Rivers-neces-
sity for removing obstructions in
them. 61; Forts Henry and Donel-
son held the gateways of these
water lines, 61; they must be
taken, 62; Fort Henry the first
point of attack-its location, 62;
the attack by the fleet, 63; and
surrender by Tilghman, 64; the
Confederate resources at this time
in the West, 64; Johnston's
strength and dispositions, 65;
Beauregard placed in charge of the
Mississippi Valley under Johnston,
65; proposal to concentrate Con-
federate strength at Bowling Green,
66; the fall of Fort Henry prevents
this plan, 66; Johnston resolves to
defend Nashville at Donelson, 66;
Donelson was the key to the Cum-
berland, 66; Johnston sends Buck-
ner, Pillow, and Floyd there; the
force now 16,000 men, 66; retains
14,000 to oppose Buell and cover
Nashville, 66; the topography and
fortifications of Donelson, 67; its
pregnability at the rear, from com-
manding hills, 68; Confederates
construct an infantry line of defense
thereon, 68; Grant approaches-his
force, 68; he invests the defenses,
and makes an assault, 69, arrival

of Admiral Foote's fleet, with 10,000
re-enforcements, 69; a combined
land and water attack made, 70;
the iron-clads forced to retire, 71;
Grant resolves to perfect the in-
vestment, and wait for increased
naval force, 71; Floyd's council of
officers at night, 71; they resolve
to force their way out toward Nash-
ville, 72; Wynn's Ferry road the
only practicable route, 72; the plan
of Confederate attack, 72; Pillow's
attack, 73; the Union extreme
right taken in reverse, and forced
back, 73; the Wynn's Ferry road
now open, 74; critical position of
the whole Union army, 74; Grant
absent at consultation with Foote,
74; Floyd and Pillow, not satisfied,
attempt more and fail, 76; the
army rallies, and repulses Confede-
rate renewed attack, 76; Grant's
arrival, 76, he orders a general
advance, 77; the Confederate's right,
driven from the commanding hills,
retires into the works, and Pillow
also driven in, 78; the investment
thus restored, 78; losses of the
day, 78; Grant prepares for a gen-
eral assault next day, 79; the con-
ference of Floyd, Pillow and Buck-
ner on a surrender, 79; the two
first surrender their commands to
Buckner, 79; Floyd escapes with
1,500 men, 80; Pillow and his staff
escape across the river, 80; Buck-
ner inquires terms of surrender:
Grant proposes to move imme-
diately on his works, 80; results of
Donelson, 80; Johnston evacuates
Bowling Green and moves to
Nashville, 81; then abandons Nash-
ville and retires to Murfreesboro', 81;
Buell pushed to Bowling Green
and Nashville, 81; Columbus now
untenable by Polk, 81; who moves
to Island No. 10, 81; the effect of
these events upon the South, 83;
Johnston's strategic errors in this
campaign, 84; he now resolves on
concentration, 85.

SHILOH-the prelude, 86; Pittsburg

Landing described, 86; the Army
of West Tennessee, 87; it was
unsuspecting danger, 87; Confed-
erate army perdu in Shiloh Woods,
88; the Confederate council of

war, 89; difficulties of the Con-
federate march, 91; wretched
organization of the Confederate
army, 92; Mississippi Valley, the
second line of Confederate de-
fense, 93; Mississippi the line of-
its importance and facilities, 94;
two lines of Union advance de-
veloped by the fall of Donelson,
94; the line through Nashville
to Chattanooga and the ocean,
94; Memphis and Charleston Rail-
road-Johnston's second line of
defense, 95; the Union design to
separate Johnston and Beauregard,
95; its frustration by their junction
at Shiloh, 95; Halleck's original
plan of advance up the Mississippi,
96; subsequent plan, 97; Grant's
command turned over to C. F.
Smith, 97; restored on death of
Smith, 98; Buell's march from St.
Louis to Savannah, 98; Confeder-
ate plan to attack Pittsburg Land-
ing before arrival of Buell, 100;
Beauregard leaves forts with small
garrison, concentrating his main
force in the field, 100; deficien-
cies of the Confederate organiza-
tion, 101; Confederate Army of the
Mississippi, its formation at Corinth,
101; The Confederate march to
Pittsburg Landing, 102; the roads
and the weather, 102; the close
approach of Buell, 102; topography
of the Union position, 103; the
sixth of April, 103; the lines of
Grant's army, 104; something
wrong in the Union front, 105;
Johnston's advance stealthily ad-
vances, 105; Confederate fire drawn
by reconnoitering party, 105;
Hardee's whole force advances,
105; the Union army springs to
arms, 106; the confused conflict
lasts for three hours, 107; Bragg
re-enforces Hardee, 107; the whole
Confederate force up, 108; Prentiss
driven from all his camps, 108; the
first Confederate onset successful,
110; the Union line as now, 111;
the defense of Sherman's left; it is
turned, 110; the rally of Prentiss's
troops, 112; the Union troops
slowly forced back to the Landing,
113; the efforts to pierce the Union
center and left, 114; the confusion
in both Union and Confederate

lines, 114; death of A. S. Johns-
ton; estimate of his character,
116; the Union army a wreck,
117; the rush for the river, 117;
Wallace killed, 117; the Union
gunboats re-enforce the army,
119; Confederate efforts to capture
the Landing, 119; the siege guns
on the bluff turned against the
Confederates, 119; the desperate
final charges of the Confederates,
120; the disorganization by plun-
dering, 120; their position at this
time, 120; Buell's advance arrives,
120; Beauregard decides to with-
draw for the night, 122; Buell's
energetic advance, 123; condition
of the two armies, 123; April 7,
Buell and Grant's advance upon the
Confederates, 125; the losses and
remaining forces, 124-5; the attack
on Beauregard, 126; Beauregard
abandons his right, 128; the final
Union advance, 130; the Confeder-
ate retreat; the battle over, 130;
indecisive character of many bat-
tles, 131; the result of Shiloh, 131;
its indecisive character, 132; the
losses, 132; the great Confederate
possibilities lost, 133; Beauregard's
original plans, and how frustrated,
133; the defense of the Memphis
road, 134; Grant's error in retain-
ing the troops on the left bank, 135;
the second line of Confederate de
fense was lost by the battles of
Shiloh, 136; Buell's zeal even out-
stripped his orders, 136; the evacu-
ation of Corinth, 137; the surrender
of Forts Randolph and Pillow, 137;
Central and Eastern Tennessee now
opened to the Union armies, 138.

ANTIETAM-the prelude, 139; origin of
the campaign, 139; Lee's resolve
to move into Maryland, 139; the
Peninsular campaign and its conse-
quences, 140; the supposed danger
to Washington, 140; McClellan's
unfortunate pause before Yorktown,
141; Johnston's Shenandoah Val-
ley campaign, 142; Fremont and
Banks attacked in succession by
Jackson, 142; the fatuitous division
of the Union forces in Virginia,
142; the Mountain, the Shenandoah,
and the Rappahannock Depart-
ments, 142; Fair Oaks, the battle

of, 143; McDowell hurries to the
Valley to "bag" Jackson, who
slips away, 143; the Potomac Army
on both banks of the Rappahan-
nock, 143; Johnston attacks the
two corps on the right bank, and
fails, 143; Johnston wounded and
succeeded by Lee, 143-4; history
of Robert E. Lee, 144; his plan for
the defense of Richmond, 144; Mal-
vern Hill, the battle of, 145;
Gaines's Mill, the battle of, 145;
Jackson withdrawn to Lee's main
army, 145; Porter compelled to re-
tire to the Chickahominy right
bank; the battle of Gaines's Mill,
145; McClellan's position now,
145; the change of base to the
James, 145; the battle of Malvern
Hill, 146; the armies of Fremont,
Banks, and McDowell formed into
the Army of Virginia, under Pope,
146; Jackson sent against him,
146; Lee's position between te
two armies, 146; Lee retires toward
Richmond, 146; McClellan ordered
by Halleck to Alexandria to cover
Washington, 146; Lee resolves to
attack Pope, 147; the death of
Stevens at Chantilly, 148; the death
of Kearney, at Chantilly, 148; the
second battle of Bull Run and
Pope's defeat, 148; the battle of
Chantilly, 148; Pope's forces reel
back to the fortifications of Wash-
ington, 148; Lee's confidence in
his own powers, 148; his motives
for Maryland invasion, as stated
by himself, 149; the great dan-
ger to Washington, 149; McClel
lan restored to command, 150;
Lee concentrates at Frederick,
Md., 151; fails to excite enthusi-
asm, 151; and moves westward
beyond the mountains, 151; the
Confederate intended attack on
Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry,
152; McClellan finds a copy of the
plan of attack, 152; and advances,
152; Longstreet and Hill wait west
of the South Mountains for the
reduction of Harper's Ferry, 153;
McClellan suddenly discovered ap-
proaching, 153; Lee covers the
siege of Harper's Ferry by holding
Turner's and Crampton's Gaps,
154; Harper's Ferry hopelessly
environed, 154; McClellan's duty

to relieve the garrison, 155; Mc-
Clellan forces his way into Pleasant
Valley, 155; Longstreet and Hill
retire to Sharpsburg, 155; Harper's
Ferry surrendered, with McClellan
within six miles, 155; Jackson's
account of the surrender, 156; the
Valley of the Antietam, 157; Lee
posts himself on the west bank of
the Antietam, 158; McClellan ar-
rives on the east bank of the stream
with two divisions, 160; the whole
army except Franklin's corps ar-
rives, 161; position of Lee's forces,
161; topography of the field, 161: Lee
stood on the defensive, compelling
McClellan to cross the stream, 162;
the bridges across the Antietam,
162; McClellan's plan of attack,
163; Hooker and Mansfield crossed
toward Lee's extreme left, 163; the
17th of September, 163; Hooker
attacks, 164; Ewell is thrown back,
164; Jackson's reserves re-enforce
Ewell, 165; Mansfield comes up
and is met by Hill, 165; both sides
retire much shattered, 165; the
losses on this part of the field as
stated by Jackson, 165; Sumner
attacks the Confederate shattered
left with Sedgwick's division, 168;
Hood beaten and commenced re-
tiring, 169; Sedgwick assailed by
McLaws, 169; McLaws' account of
his attack on Sumner, 169; Burn-
side's orders to carry the lower
stone bridge, 171; how he was
held in check, 171; consequence of
Burnside's delay, 172; arrival of
A. P. Hill, 172; he sweeps Burn-
side back, 172; the battle over,
173; Lee retreats on the night of
the 18th, 173; result of Antietam,
173; losses in the battle, 174; the
real value of the battle to the North
and what had preceded it, 174; it
was a signal defeat, and a crowning
victory, 176; consequences of a
Union defeat, 175; the issue of the
Emancipation Proclamation, 176;
Lincoln, President, his account of
the issue of the Emancipation Proc-
lamation, 176.

MURFREESBORO--the prelude, 178; Buell,
with the Army of the Ohio, to move
against Chattanooga, 179; Grant
to operate in the Mississippi Valley,

179; the relation of the battle to
Shiloh and Chattanooga, 179; the
adoption of the Chattanooga line
by both combatants after the occu-
pation of Corinth, 179; Memphis
and Charleston Railroad now in
Union possession, 179; Bragg
concentrates upon Chattanooga,
180; Price and Van Dorn left to
oppose Grant, 180; particulars of
Buell's march, 180; the Memphis
and Charleston road as a line of
advance on Chattanooga, chimeri-
cal, 181; Buell's total force, 181;
Florence, Decatur and Cumberland
Gap occupied, 181; the problem of
Buell's advance, 181; Bragg arrives
at Chattanooga, 182; his force and
dispositions, 182; Kirby Smith at
Knoxville, with 13,000 men, 182;
raids of Forrest and Morgan on
Buell's line of advance, 182; Kirby
Smith advances into Central Ken-
tucky, routs Gen. Nelson at Rich-
mond and pushes toward the Ohio,
183; Bragg crosses the Tennessee,
into the Sequatchy Valley and
turned Buell's left, 184; Bragg's
advantages in holding the Cumber-
land range, 184; the inadequacy
of Buell's force to hold his commu-
nications, 184; Halleck's whole
scheme of the Chattanooga cam-
paign chimerical, 185; Buell com-
pelled to retreat and concentrate at
Murfreesboro, 185; then at Nash-
ville-then to cover Louisville, 185;
the position of the two armies, 186;
Bragg reaches Munfordsville and
finally captures it, 186; Bragg now
directly on Buell's line of retreat,
186; Bragg diverges east from
Louisville, his objective, and moves
to Frankfort, 186; Buell then occu-
pies Louisville, 187; result of Bragg's
operations thus far, 187; reasons
for his changed movement, 187;
the Union force at Louisville, 187;
Bragg's error as to the political
reconstruction of Tennessee and
Kentucky, 188; Buell's retreat
marked by great skill, 189; his
task now, 190; his army re-
organized and ready to move,
190; relieved of command and
George H. Thomas appointed, 190;
Thomas refuses to supersede him,
190; Buell advances toward Frank-

fort and Bardstown, 190; Bragg's
retreat to Perryville, 191; the battle
of Perryville or Champion Hills, 191;
Bragg withdraws south beyond
Loudon, 192; Buell superseded by
Gen. Rosecrans, 192; Rosecrans
committed to an offensive, 192;
Buell was said to have let Bragg
escape, 192; Rosecrans concen-
trated at Nashville, 194; Bragg's
intrenched position at Murfrees-
boro, 194; Rosecrans advances
toward him, 194; arrives in his
front, 195; positions of the two
armies, 195; Rosecrans's plan of
battle and its merits, 196; Bragg's
plan of battle and its merits, 198;
Rosecrans commences crossing his
left over Stone River, 199; Bragg's
left attacks the Union right and
carries its position, 199; the
Union disaster unknown to Rose-
crans, 201; on discovering it, he
withdraws his left and strengthens
his right, 201; Sheridan's left divi-
sion of McCook repulses the fur-
ther attack, 202; Sheridan's maneu-
ver for a new front, 203; his re-
sistance in the new position gains
an hour, 204; his terrible fighting
against an overwhelming force, and
final withdrawal to west of the
Nashville road, 205; he reports to
Rosecrans, 205; Rosecrans's new
dispositions, 206; Palmer's division
the only one on the original front,
207; all of the division swept away
except Hazen's Brigade, 207; Ha-
zen's great service; slackening of
his defense would have lost the
battle, 208; Bragg now makes a
new assault, 209; Rosecrans meets
it with massed artillery and infantry
fire, 209; Bragg, foiled in his
attack on the front, essays the
Union left flank, 210; Bragg's at-
tack fails and the battle is over,
211; the battle was a drawn one,
211; Rosecrans's "Gentlemen, we
fight, or die right here," 211; the
next day Rosecrans again throws a
force to the east of the river, 212;
Breckinridge attacks it; finally driv-
en by artillery fire across the river,
212; Bragg withdraws to Shelbyville
and Tullahoma, 213; results of Mur-
freesboro, 213; the losses, 213; the
battle similar to the battle of Prague,

214; President Lincoln's telegram
of thanks to Gen. Rosecrans and
the army, 215; the advance from
Murfreesboro, 216; Rosecrans's
operations forcing Bragg to Chatta-
nooga, 217; his crossing of the Ten-
nessee, 218; description of the
country between Chattanooga and
the Tennessee, 218; Rosecrans out-
flanks Bragg's position on Lookout
Mountain, 219; Chattanooga evac-
uated by Bragg, his communications
being in danger, 219; Chattanooga
occupied by Crittenden, 219; courses
now open to Rosecrans, 219; one
to occupy Chattanooga and end the
campaign. 219; the other to attack
Bragg, supposed to be at Rome-
this plan adopted, 220; Bragg op-
posite to Rosecrans's isolated
centre, 221; but could not use the
opportunity of attack, 222; and
Rosecrans concentrates, 222: Bragg,
however, only a few miles beyond
Chattanooga, 221; the Union army
compromised by forward movement
-how placed, 221; Rosecrans now

on

west of Chickamauga Creek,
covering Chattanooga, 222; Bragg
receives considerable re-enforce-
ments, 222; and precipitates the
battle of Chickamauga, 222; Rose-
crans defeated at Chickamauga and
falls back to Chattanooga, 222;
Rosecrans's history, achievements,
and strategy. 223.

THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC-pre-
lude to Hampton Roads, 226; moni-
tors and men of war-description of
the former, 226; annals of naval
warfare, 228; the first war screw
propeller, the Princeton, 230;
strength of the Union navy, 231;
the requirements of the blockade,
231, 232; the weakness of the
Confederate navy, 232; Confederate
Navy Department's letter on armored
ships, 233; origin of the Virginia,
or Merrimac, 234; Secretary Welles's
advice to Congress on armored
ships, 233; the frigate Merrimac,
abandoned at Norfolk, selected for
the first armored ship, 234; de-
scription of the work on her, 235;
her armament, 236; completed,
March 5, 1862, 236; U. S. Congress
appoints a Board to procure iron-

clads, 236; the proposals made to
the Board, 237; Ericcson's proposal
to construct the Monitor, 237;
his plan, 237; what Ericcson had
before accomplished for the United
States and foreign Powers, 238;
the principle of the Monitor, 239;
the Union lookout at Hampton
Roads sees a fleet descending the
Elizabeth River, 241; position of
the blockading fleet, 241; the time
and places of her construction, 241;
the battle of Hampton Roads, 241;
"The Merrimac! the Merrimac !"
242; she passes the Congress frig-
ate, and bears down upon the Cum-
berland, 242; the Union broadsides
glance off like peas," 242; she
strikes the Cumberland and sinks
her, 243; the Congress runs aground
for safety, but surrenders and burns,
243; the Minnesota, Roanoke, and
St. Lawrence all grounded, 244;
the Confederate vessels attack the
grounded ships, 245; the close
of a day of cousternation, 245;
the Confederate fleet steam back,
245; the little Monitor arrives that
night, 245; her officers demand to
be laid alongside the Merrimac,
246; the next day, the Merrimac
again appears, 247; the Monitor
lays herself alongside-David to
Goliah, 248; the Yankee cheese-
box is made of iron, 249; the fight
rages from eight till noon, 249; the
ineffective firing on the armor of
both, 250; the Merrimac attempts
to ram the Monitor without effect,
251; Lieut. Worden wounded, 251;
the Merrimac abandons the contest
and returns to Norfolk, 252; the
congratulations upon the Monitor's
exploit, 252; results of the battle,
national and international, 253;
speculation on scientific warlike
appliances, 261.

VICKSBURG-the prelude, 262; the aspi-
ration to open the Mississippi, 262;
what constituted the defensive
tactics of the river, 263; Columbus
the first Confederate position, 263;
Beauregard's theory of defending
the Mississippi, 264; his system of
works at Fort Pillow, 264; the
temporary use of Island No. 10,
264; the fall of Corinth caused that