sive leaders, such as Mr. Gompers, of the Federation of Labor, are constantly urging their associates to put the shorter work day in the forefront of their demands. Organize and control your trade and shorten your hours, is their position, and wages will take care of themselves. The idea that a man will produce as much in 8 hours as in 10 may occasionally be advanced by labor leaders, but it is not their general position; and even if one does advance it he is likely to bring forward in the next paragraph ideas that are entirely inconsistent with it. The argument which really carries weight with them is based on the opposite idea. It is that the reduction of hours will diminish the supply of labor power in the market, and so will raise its price. It will make room for the unemployed, and so will remove the depressing influence of their competition. "Whether you work by the piece or work by the day, is a constantly reiterated expression of the current creed of the union leaders. Overtime work and work on Sundays and holidays are special cases of extension of the hours of labor. The position of the labor leaders logically requires that all work outside of regular hours be abolished. This is in fact the desire of all the more progressive union men, and the desire which is almost universally expressed in the collective action of the organizations. When overtime becomes systematic, it is said, it does not give any actual increase of wages; the nominal regular wages are certain to be cut down so that the workman's earnings will be no greater than they would be if the normal day were not exceeded. Even temporary overtime is regarded as injurious to the interests of the workers as a whole. There is a tendency to increase the hours of labor when times are bad, and so to spread the interest on the cost of the plant over more hours of work. The result is that when social conditions cause less work than usual, of a certain kind, to be demanded, some men do more than usual of it. When there would be at the best an increase of unemployment, unemployment is made greater yet by the overwork of those who are employed.1 Only a few unions have, however, felt themselves strong enough to forbid overtime absolutely. The German-American Typographia does not permit it; but this union is peculiarly situated in that its work, the production of German printed matter, tends to diminish in the United States, and the union has, therefore, a special interest in dividing the waning employment among all its members. It has even gone so far in some places as to introduce the five-day week. The Mule Spinners have in some places refused to permit their members to work overtime or to work at night. The Metal Polishers forbid their members to work overtime until all vacant places have been filled, and do not permit it then unless it is absolutely necessary. The Watch-case Engravers threaten a fine of $50 or more on any member who works overtime without the sanction of the shop committee, except in case of absolute necessity. The Pattern Makers also forbid it except in case of absolute necessity, and the Wood Carvers direct their local unions to prohibit it. The constitutions and resolutions of various other organizations, as, for instance, the Machinists, urge the locals to discourage overtime as much as possible. The stronger organiza 1 Compare the testimony of Mr. Gompers, Reports of the Industrial Commission, Vol. VII, Testimony, pp. 613, 614. tions usually secure a higher rate of pay for work outside of regular hours. The building trades in particular get time and a half, and sometimes double time. The Lithographers and the Core Makers have national rules requiring time and a half, and similar rules are enforced by the local unions in many trades. A curious indication of the feeling against overtime is furnished by the Wood Workers. They insure their members against loss of tools by fire or accident, but they pay no loss which is incurred while the member is working on Sunday or after regular working hours. Several unions recite in detail the days which are to be observed as holidays, and either forbid work upon them or require that holiday work be paid for as time and a half, or even as double time. The extra pay for holidays is often even higher than that for overtime. Thus many local regulations in the building trades require time and a half for extra hours on regular working days, but double pay for holidays. Labor Day is held especially sacred by all American trade unionists. It is not unusual to levy a fine of $2, $3, or even $5 upon any member who works. Sometimes a member is fined even for not joining in the Labor-Day parade. Of course these special regulations have a motive beyond the economic motive which prompts the observance of other holidays and the disapproval of overtime. Labor Day is sacred to the working class, and to fail to do it honor is a sort of profanation. The Flint-glass Workers, the Glass-bottle Blowers, and the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers always take a summer stop, usually of from a month to two months. One reason for it is the excessive heat in which their work is carried on, and another is the need of overhauling and repairing the working plants. The glass-working unions, however, apparently insist upon the summer stop for the same economic reasons which lead to the shortening of working time in other ways; and the same is probably true of the Amalgamated Association. COMPREHENSIVENESS. Every labor organization, as soon as it acquires the power, sets a definite choice before the nonunion men of its trade—they may join the union or they may leave the occupation. The feeling of the unionist toward the nonunionist does not often appear in formal rules, but now and then a rule appears which illustrates it. Thus the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers forbids its members to lend tools or render any assistance to a workman who persistently refuses to become a member. The Chain Makers have the following rule: "No member in any shop shall render assistance to, speak to or associate with, or lend his tools to any chain maker who deliberately refuses to become a member of the organization, or refuses to pay the arrearages or fines or assessments to the same, or uses his influence to disorganize his fellow-workmen." The universal policy of trade unions in this respect, and the appearance which that policy wears to the average man outside the wage-earning class, can hardly be better stated than it is stated in the following paragraphs by Mr. and Mrs. Webb. The particular unions which they refer to are, of course, British organizations; but the general spirit, both in the unions and outside of them, is the same here as in Great Britain. In the best organized industries indeed, whether great or small, such as the boiler makers, flint glass makers, tape sizers, or stuff pressers-the very aristocracy of "old unionists"-the compulsion is so complete that it ceases to be apparent. No man not belonging to the union ever thinks of applying for a situation or would have any chance of obtaining one. It is, in fact, as impossible for a nonunionist plater or riveter to get work in a Tyneside shipyard as it is for him to take a house in Newcastle without paying the rates. This silent and unseen, but absolutely complete compulsion, is the ideal of every trade union. It is true that here and there an official of an incompletely organized trade may protest to the public, or before a royal commission, that his members have no desire that any workman should join the union except by his own free will. But, however bona fide may be these expressions by individuals, we invariably see such a union, as soon as it secures the adhe sion of a majority of its trade, adopting the principle of compulsory membership, and applying it with ever greater stringency as the strength of the organization increases. Whatever we may think of these various forms of compulsion, it is important to note that they are in no way inconsistent with the old ideal of "freedom of contract"-the legal right of every individual to make such a bargain for the purchase or sale of labor as he may think most conducive to his own interest, and that they are, in fact, a necessary incident of that legal freedom. When an employer, or every employer in a district, makes the sliding scale a condition of the engagement of any workman the dissentient minority are "free" to refuse such terms. They may, in the alternative, break up their homes and leave the district, or learn another trade. The wageearners can not be denied a similar freedom. When a workman chooses to make it a condition of his acceptance of employment from a given firm, that he shall not be required to associate with colleagues whom he dislikes, he is but exercising his freedom to make such stipulations in the bargaining as he thinks conducive to his own interest. The employer is "free" to refuse to engage him on these terms, and if the vast majority of the workmen are of the same mind, he is "free" to transfer his brains and his capital to another trade, or to leave the district. But to anyone not obsessed by this conception of "freedom" it will be obvious that a mere legal right to refuse particular conditions of employment is no safeguard against compulsion. Where practically all the competent workmen in an industry are strongly combined, an isolated employer, not supported by his fellow-capitalists, finds it absolutely impossible to break away from the "custom of the trade." * Wherever the economic conditions of the parties concerned are unequal, legal freedom of contract merely enables the superior in strategic strength to dictate the terms. * * * If, indeed, we examine more closely the common arguments against this virtual compulsion, we shall see that the customary objection is not directed against the compulsion itself, but only against the persons by whom it is exercised, or the particular form that it takes. The ordinary middle-class man, without economic training, is wholly unconscious of there being any coercion in an employer autocratically deciding how he will conduct "his own business." But the very notion of the workmen claiming to decide for themselves under what conditions they will spend their own working days strikes him as subversive of the social order.1 It is hardly to be expected that the average man, outside the wage-earning class, will consider this universal policy of trade unions sufficiently justified by the argument that the workingmen have as much right to manage their "own business" as the employer has to manage his. He is likely even to have some difficulty in seeing that to work or not to work with such companions as the workingmen may happen for any reason to fancy is their "own business." As is shown elsewhere,' courts have often held that such a policy toward nonunion men is unlawful conspiracy; although several late American decisions, as well as the recent authoritative utterance of the British House of Lords, decide that men may quit work, or threaten to do so, for any cause they see fit, including the objection to working with a nonunion man. If, however, the right to choose one's working mates is granted, and if it is in some sort a justification of the union policy, it is in no wise an explanation. Men do not quarrel with their companions nor risk their livelihood in strikes merely because they have a right to do it. The universal adoption of a policy, wherever the organization of labor has progressed so far as to make it possible, must be based on a need which the organized workers universally feel. If union and nonunion men work side by side, the nonunion men either do or do not receive the full union rate of wages. In either case the union feels that it has a grievance against them. If nonunion rollers are permitted to work in a steel mill for which a scale has been signed by the Amalgamated Association, their rate of pay is fixed by the action of the organization. They receive, the unionists hold, many more dollars every month than they would receive if the members of the union did not spend time and trouble and money in maintaining the organization and formulating and enforcing its demands. They make a gain, therefore, strictly at the expense of their organized companions. Simply as a matter of share and share alike, the union men feel that the nonunion men ought to join the organization, and that if they have not enough sense of fairness to do it of themselves they ought to be compelled to do it. 1 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, pp. 213–217. I C-VOL XVII-01-IV On the other hand, argues the unionist, if nonunion bricklayers are permitted to be introduced at the will of the employer, side by side with the members of the union, there can be no possible guaranty that they do receive the union rate. The union has no jurisdiction over them and no means of knowing what they get. There is a constant probability, therefore, that the employer will introduce as many nonunion men as possible, will hire them below the union rate, and will, as opportunity offers, discharge the members of the organization. Those who are in the union will be tempted to get out of it and work for lower wages in order to retain their employment. The presence of the nonunion men is a menace to the existence of the organization and to the wages and other working conditions of the craft. The same menace exists even in those exceptional occupations, like the steel industry, in which, because of their very magnitude, uniformity of conditions can more easily be obtained. Even there, as the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers has recently complained, there is a tendency to give work to nonunion mills at the expense of union mills when the same company owns both; and if nonunion men are permitted to enter union mills at all, the union can have no guaranty that the number of them will not be gradually increased until they can be made a means of destroying the union altogether. The union is conceived as a means of bettering the condition of its members by united action. If this action is to be thoroughly effective, it must be taken by or on behalf of all the members of the craft. It is by the establishment of an absolute monopoly of labor power of a particular kind that the union hopes to raise the market price of that sort of labor power and to ameliorate the conditions under which it is sold and used. The trade-unionist conceives the members of his craft as a corporate body whose interests it is the duty of every member to further. More than that, he conceives the whole wage-earning class as a larger unity, to the welfare of which every member of it is in duty bound to contribute. The workingman who refuses to contribute to the support of the union of his craft, who stands aloof and gives aid and comfort to the enemy, is regarded as a traitor to his own trade and to the working class as a whole. His mind is to be enlightened, if it can be, by argument and persuasion; but if he refuses to be persuaded, any legal means of bringing him to conform his action to right rules are legitimate and praiseworthy. EXCLUSIVENESS. Two sorts of monopoly, which a trade union may seek for, ought to be carefully distinguished. The first is that which has just been discussed. It consists in so complete an inclusion of all workers at a trade that the union is able to take, before the employers, the position of the sole seller of that kind of labor power which its members offer. The other consists in the exclusion of candidates for membership in the union, or the placing of difficulties in the way of joining it, coupled with control of employment at the trade. In the first case a monopoly exists only so far as the relation of the union to the employers is concerned. In the second case, a monopoly is maintained by the actual members against their fellow-workmen. Complaints are sometimes made that certain unions are close corporations, and that men who desire admission to them are without good cause rejected. In other cases the money cost of joining is made high. When a local union of longshoremen is able to control the loading and unloading of vessels at a given port, the fixing of an initiation fee of $25 has an evident tendency to lessen the competition in their employment. Some locals of the Garment Workers have made their initiation fees excessively high in the hope of getting more work in union shops for existing members. The national officers repeatedly censured them for it, and the national union finally restricted the initiation fee to a maximum of $5. The same spirit which leads to the exclusion of men from the union, and thereby from employment, appears in the restriction of the number of apprentices. The restriction of apprenticeship is not so evidently futile and shortsighted, however, and it is not so directly contrary to the spirit of craft brotherhood which labor organizations universally proclaim, and which, no doubt, to a considerable extent, they feel. Something of the same spirit, applied to foreigners, appears both in the advocacy of measures to restrict immigration by law, and in the placing of especially high initiation fees on foreigners. The monopoly against fellow-workmen is in some degree inconsistent with the monopoly against employers. That against employers is founded on universal inclusion; that against fellow-workmen on exclusion. The attempt to establish a monopoly of the second sort will make it impossible permanently to maintain one of the first. If men are not permitted to join the union they will still be able in most occupations to make themselves felt as competitors, and their competition will be severer and more injurious than it would be if they were admitted to the union. It is possible that in a few closely controlled trades, like those of the glass industry, the selfish interests of the existing members of the union will be promoted by this exclusive policy. In the great majority of occupations it is believed that such a policy is shortsighted, even if nothing is considered but the interest of the union itself and its existing members. The union which adopts it, while working with one hand for the complete organization of its industry, cultivates a new crop of nonunionists with the other. It is undoubtedly true that many of the officers and leaders of the unions conceive the mission of the organizations with no little idealism, and would be sorry to see lines drawn by which the unions should be made agencies for the creation of a privileged class among the workers. The broadest-minded union leaders unquestionably desire that all wage earners be brought into the ranks of organized labor. Such a desire is not necessarily inconsistent with an exclusive policy for their particular trade unions, since it might mean only a desire to organize the great residuum of the unskilled by themselves; yet the opinions of the most advanced leaders seem to be opposed to the harsher restrictions upon apprenticeship, and to the more severe of the other means by which some skilled workers have undertaken to prevent the accession of new members to their trades. It is probable that the great body of the rank and file and many of the leaders would take any action which should seem likely to further their own interests. When a union has established its monopoly against employers it is exceedingly likely to go on, if it feels strong enough, to a monopoly against outside workers. But whether this tendency is chiefly restrained by ethical considerations, by lack of strength, or by farsighted considerations of policy, the actual restraint upon it, up to the present time, has been tolerably effective. No such policy is attempted on any broad scale, except in those modified forms in which it is applied to foreigners and to the discouragement of learners. APPRENTICESHIP. Considering how thoroughly the modern conditions of production have destroyed. the old apprentice system in most trades, it is surprising to see how many unions not only look back to it with longing, but retain expressions of desire for it in their written constitutions. A considerable number of national organizations urge their members to strive for some action of the State which shall promote the formal indenturing of apprentices. It is believed that such indenturing hardly anywhere appears.1 Some of the stronger unions are able, however, to maintain something like it by their own power. They provide that an apprentice shall agree to stay with an employer for a fixed term, and that if he leaves before the term is up he shall not be permitted to work at the trade under the jurisdiction of the union. It is 1See, however, the assertion of a witness that apprentices in stove foundries are usually articled. Reports of the Industrial Commission, vol. vii; Testimony, p. 866. |