the following facts holding true as regards most of the important national systems in the United States, though there are exceptions to each of the statements:

(1) It is not required that the representatives of the respective parties shall be equal in number.

(2) Action is taken by compromise leading to unanimous agreement rather than by majority vote.

(3) Persons outside the trade are not called in to decide authoritatively general questions as to which the parties can not agree.

(4) The number of conferees is usually quite large, although part of the more detailed work of reaching an agreement is often referred to smaller committees.

It is obvious that the reason why, generally speaking, the above statements apply to the several systems of joint conferences and agreements is, that neither employers nor employees are usually willing to permit the determination of the general conditions of the labor contract in any other way than by negotiation and agreement of the parties in interest themselves. Each side wishes to feel satisfied that the agreement reached represents the best compromise, which, with all its skill in "higgling," it is able to secure. The representatives of employers and employees, respectively, naturally act as a unit in most cases. While individual representatives may differ as to the position to be taken, their differences are largely discussed with their own associates in private rather than made known in open joint conference. Each side is likely to present in the first instance a general proposition supported by all of its members, and the ultimate terms reached represent a compromise between these two extremes. The process is very similar to that by which any bargain is struck between two individuals or corporations approximately equal in economic power.

Even where, as is usual in the glass trades and the stove-foundry trade, pains are taken to have an equal number of representatives from each side in joint conferences, and where nominally action may be taken by majority vote, in practice the representatives of each side still act largely as a unit, and agreements are reached rather by elaborate informal bargaining, by which ultimately a general consensus is reached, than by formal voting on questions at issue. In the bituminous coal trade it has been specifically provided by the rules of each of the four interstate conventions that all formal actions must be taken, both in the general convention and in the smaller scale committee, by unanimous vote. This is, in fact, the practice in several of the other trades having national systems of collective bargaining. There is little doubt that a satisfactory settlement of differences is quite as likely to be reached under such a provision as where the rules nominally permit action by a bare majority.

The fact that none of the systems of collective bargaining above named provides for the reference of general matters, as to which the conferees can not agree, to the decision of impartial arbitrators is but one of many indications of the very widespread feeling among both employers and workingmen in the United States that such important matters as these should not be intrusted to persons unfamiliar with the conditions; that they are matters for bargaining rather than for judicial decision. The same is true, only to a slightly less extent, in Great Britain.

It is obviously desirable that conferences intrusted with a task so complicated and so important as the determination of the conditions of labor in an entire industry should be thoroughly representative of the employers and employees. Only thus can the positions taken by each side in a conference represent correctly the desires of their constituents; or can the terms of the agreements reached and the motives which lead to their adoption be generally understood and approved by the great body of the workingmen. This is the reason why we find that the conferences in all of the trades, in which the system of collective bargaining is conducted on a large scale, are composed of a very considerable number of delegates. The largest of all is the interstate conference in the bituminous coal industry. This is held immediately

after the annual national convention of the United Mine Workers, and practically all of the delegates to that convention from the four States covered by the system are delegates also to the joint conference. On the other hand, any mine operator from these States who sees fit to do so may attend the conference. Usually several hundred persons on each side are present, and there is no attempt to make the number of delegates equal. It is, however, provided that in the actual determination of the terms of the agreements each side shall have four votes from each State represented. The object of this arrangement is merely to equalize the strength of the States themselves, so far as votes may be taken by the employers or the employees separately. It has no significance as regards the relations between operators and miners, since all action must ultimately be taken by a unanimous agreement of both sides. Of course it would be difficult for such a large body as the general conference to act definitely and promptly. It is said especially that no individual delegate, in the presence of all his fellows, is likely to be willing to vote to make concessions from the original demands. Accordingly, a smaller scale committee, composed of 16 members on each side, is constituted, and it is this committee which thrashes out the final agreement and refers it for approval to the general conference. Unanimous agreement is required in the votes of this committee also. The advantage of having a large number of delegates present is that the matters at issue can be discussed fully in open convention, so that the representatives of employers and employees from each locality throughout the four States are enabled to understand the points at issue and to grasp the arguments on both sides. The members of the smaller scale committee are able also, from the speeches in the general conference and from separate meetings of the delegates of their own side, to ascertain just what the spirit and the desires of the great body of their constituents are. The work of the joint convention becomes in a certain sense similar to that of our State legislatures, which are composed of large numbers of representatives from the various localities, and which intrust the drafting of bills and the adjustment of matters of detail to committees, while reserving to the general body the right to guide the actions of the committees and to accept or reject the bills presented by them,

The practice of the International Association of Longshoremen, in its conferences with the various organizations of employers, seems to be very similar to that in the mining industry, although the fact that the number of persons affected by the agreements is much smaller makes it unnecessary that the conferences should be as large as in the mining industry.

In the case of the iron and steel and the glass trades the representative character of the conferences by which the annual agreements are reached is secured largely by the establishment of separate or branch committees for the distinct branches of the trade. These branch committees themselves usually consist of a considerable number of persons, ranging from 5 to 20 or more. They negotiate separately in the first instance as regards matters concerning their respective branches, but usually, if they fail to agree, reference is made to a general committee, which in most cases is composed simply of all the branch committees acting together.

In two trades general agreements have been adopted by relatively small numbers of representatives. Thus in the stove foundry trade the collective bargaining is intrusted to the same "conference board," composed of the presidents of the national organizations of employers and of employees and of three other persons on each, which arbitrates in minor disputes. It is probable, however, that other representatives of the respective organizations also attend the conferences, but with no voting power.

As already pointed out, the conference of the National Metal Trades Association and the International Association of Machinists, which met in May, 1900, besides establishing a system of conciliation as to minor matters, adopted an agreement defining part of the terms of the labor contract throughout the country, but leaving

the settlement of wage scales to the local districts. It seems not improbable that one of the chief reasons why this system broke down so soon was because this agreement was drawn up by a few executive officers of the respective organizations of employers and employees, and not by a widely representative conference. It appears that some of the terms of the agreement were but little understood by many of the local unions, and certainly were by no means approved by them. It is even asserted by the National Metal Trades Association that the officers of the machinists' organization permitted garbled copies of the agreement, omitting some of the unpopular clauses, to be circulated among the local unions, while it has been suggested by representatives of the International Association of Machinists that there was an understanding with the employers that some of the terms of the agreement were to be kept confidential between themselves. If either of these statements is correct, the disastrous results which followed serve to emphasize the desirability, almost the necessity, that collective bargaining regarding the conditions of labor of scores of establishments and thousands of men should be carried on by the most thoroughly representative conferences, with thorough publicity. Had each local union been represented in the machinists' conference of May, 1900, the very same terms of agreement might perhaps have been reached, but they would have been understood and approved generally, and there would have been much less difficulty in carrying them out.

An interesting question as to the conferences between employers and employees regarding the general terms of labor contracts involves the extent to which the committees on each side are granted authority to reach a binding agreement without further reference to the organizations by which they are chosen. As we have pointed out, there are no written permanent agreements prescribing the powers of these joint committees in the trades under consideration. The constitutions of organizations of employers and employees which participate in these systems usually do not definitely authorize their committees to enter into binding agreements directly, and sometimes specifically deny them that power. The constitution of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers indeed grants to the conference committees of the union no power to depart from previous instructions of the annual convention, though the committees may refer back questions to general referendum vote. Practically the same is true in the glass trades. In practice the action of conference committees on each side in these trades is more or less independent. The committees of course act under the instructions of their organizations as to the demands which should be presented, but they are permitted to make concessions in order to reach an agreement. Sometimes, to be sure, no agreement is reached and a strike ensues. It is especially convenient in many ways to have the joint conferences themselves, as in the coal mining and longshore industries, so widely representative of their organizations that reference to other methods of ascertaining the will of the constituents shall be unnecessary. The referendum vote by local organizations is apt to be an especially cumbersome affair, tending to delay the reaching of an agreement.

In some, if not all, of the branches of the glass trade an interesting arrangement has been established for ascertaining the will of the respective organizations as to the terms of the annual agreement. The local unions of employees and the individual manufacturers present to their respective organizations, a considerable time in advance of the adoption of the annual agreements, their various propositions for changes in the conditions of labor. Preliminary conferences are then held between the respective committees, in which these demands are discussed. Often the committees virtually agree as to the modifications which shall be made. In other instances matters of difference are developed. In either case the committees report to the separate conventions of their organizations, held usually in June, and the proposed terms of the new agreement are there discussed. Each organization gives instructions to its

committee either to accept the terms agreed upon in the preliminary conference or to depart from them, and also instructions concerning matters as to which an agreement has not been reached in advance. A final conference is then held between the respective committees. If matters of difference are then found to exist, the discussons of the conference are prolonged until an adjustment, satisfactory to the committees on each side, is reached. It is believed by those in the glass trade that this system of preliminary conferences is especially advantageous in giving ample time for consideration of the terms of the proposed agreements, and in making possible a consultation with the general body of each organization regarding the attitude to be taken. Somewhat similar preliminary conferences are also held at times in connection with the adoption of sliding scales in the iron and steel industry.

NATURE OF AGREEMENTS AS TO CONDITIONS OF LABOR.

In all of the trades under consideration the national agreements reached by the processes of negotiation which we have been describing provide for the conditions of labor for a single year only. The contents of the agreements are similar in a general way to those of the local agreements which were described above. In the bituminous coal industry, where the local conditions in various States and mining districts differ greatly, the interstate agreement covers only a few important points. The 8-hour day has been provided for in each of these annual agreements so far reached. They have also provided for payment of wages on the basis of unscreened or run-of-mine cual in Illinois and part of Indiana, and have established a fixed differential for rates upon screened coal as compared with run-of-mine coal in the other mining districts. Finally, they have established a base price for pick mining in the four States, suited to conditions in certain typical districts, but subject to modifications in accordance with local peculiarities in other districts. One of the prime objects of the system of annual agreements in this industry has been to equalize the conditions of competition as between operators in different sections. The details of wage scales and of the methods of mining are left to adjustment by State and district conferences. Some of these local agreements are very elaborate, particularly the Illinois State agreement, which regulates almost every detail of mining conditions and methods.

In the glass trades, on the other hand, there are no such marked differences in the conditions of business in different localities. For this reason uniform agreements for all factories, where employers recognize the workingmen's organizations, are usually adopted by the general conferences, though in some cases different agreements are made for different districts. These agreements consist chiefly of elaborate piecework scales, providing rates for each of the very numerous articles manufactured, and regulating the hours of labor, apprenticeship, the employment of unskilled labor, and other conditions. The agreements between the International Longshoremen's Association and the Lake Erie Dock Managers provide for uniform hours of labor and uniform rates for performing such classes of work as are covered by the agreement system, especially in the handling of coal and ore at Lake Erie ports and in the handling of grain at Buffalo. An especial feature of these longshoremen's agreements is the form of productive cooperation which is virtually established by them. The local unions practically become contractors for the loading and unloading of vessels. The agreements in other branches of longshore work are similar in a general way.

The agreements between the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers and their employers consist chiefly of piecework wage rates based upon the sliding-scale system. This is the only trade in the United States in which sliding scales have been permanently introduced. As the prices of bar iron, steel, tin plate, etc., vary, the rates paid to different classes of workingmen for producing a ton or other given quantity of the product vary in a definite ratio. Thus, by a recent agree

ment covering the manufacture of sheet steel, fixed rates for doing various classes of work were established on the basis of a price of 24 cents per pound for certain classes of sheet steel. With each advance of one-tenth of a cent (equal to 4 per cent on the base) wages were to go up 2 per cent, and for each decline of one-tenth of a cent they were reduced 2 per cent. Both employers and employees have usually seemed to be well satisfied with the working of the sliding-scale system, although the workingmen insist upon the establishment of a minimum below which wages shall not fall, holding that, while it is possible for an employer to go without profits, it is not possible for a laborer to go without living wages.

The agreements made between the Tin Workers National Protective Association and the tin-plate manufacturers are somewhat similar to those of the Amalgamated Association, but do not provide for the sliding-scale system.

In the case of the Stove Founders National Defense Association and the Iron Molders Union we find the somewhat unusual practice of establishing certain rules regarding the conditions on which labor shall be performed by permanent agreement, while wage scales and other matters are left to the annual agreement. The most important of these permanent provisions relate to apprenticeship and to the tools which shall be furnished workmen by the employers. Others provide for the fixing of piece prices on new articles not covered by the general scale and for other similar matters.

Several of the general agreements in the trades under consideration contain provisions of some sort with reference to the position of union men. In the glass trades and (at least prior to the strike of 1901) in the iron and steel trades, so far as the labor organizations are recognized at all in the establishments, only members of the organizations are employed. In one or two cases a clause to this effect exists in the written agreement, but in other cases apparently this is considered superfluous. The recent great strike of the Amalgamated Association, as is well known, turned in part on the question of the extension of the organization into mills which were previously nonunion. It will not be appropriate in this connection to discuss the propriety of the position taken by either side. It appears, though newspaper accounts differ, that the Amalgamated Association desired to compel the United States Steel Corporation to sign agreements and scales covering uniformly all the plants controlled by the corporation in certain branches of the trade. It is stated that the Amalgamated Association subsequently modified the demand that all the men in the plants hitherto nonunion should be forced to become members of the union, but insisted only that the association should have the privilege of attempting to organize them, and that the scale fixed by the joint agreement should apply to all men, union and nonunion, alike.

The general agreements in the stove foundry and foundry trades contain no provisions regarding the exclusive employment of union men, and as a matter of fact nonunion men are in some instances employed side by side with union men. The agreement of the machinists, adopted in May, 1900, contained a distinct provision that there should be no discrimination against union men, but that the union would not insist on their exclusive employment. The disapproval of this latter provision by many of the local unions was perhaps in part instrumental in bringing about the breaking up of the agreement system in this trade. In the agreements of the longshoremen there are clauses providing that only members of the union shall be employed, unless the union is unable to furnish a sufficient number of competent men. The interstate agreements in the bituminous coal industry have nothing to say about the rights of union men, but the scales provided apply to all employees whether members of the union or not. Apparently in many localities and districts the union succeeds in enforcing the demand that only its members shall be employed as miners, and the Illinois State agreement by implication seems to concede this demand.