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The propositions peculiar to Pennsylvania were, 1st. CHAPTER That Congress should levy no taxes except duties on imports and postage on letters. 2d. That representatives 1789. to Congress should be elected annually. 3d. That no standing armies should be kept up in time of peace. 4th. That the power of organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia should remain with the states, the federal government to have no power to march any militia out of their own state, except by consent of the state authorities. 5th. Congress to have no power to pass game laws. 6th. To keep the executive and legislative powers entirely distinct, a constitution council to be erected, to perform those functions of advising the president, conferred by the existing Constitution on the federal Senate concurred in by the Maryland minority, who proposed also that the federal expenses should be apportioned among the states in proportion to the number of their federal representatives, and that Congress should be allowed to impose no capitation tax: a proposition in which the New York Convention also concurred. The New Hampshire propositions were mainly borrowed from Massachusetts; the only suggestions not already recited were two: one derived in substance from the Pennsylvania minority, that Congress should have no power to disarm any citizens except those who were, or had been, in actual rebellion; the other, that Congress should make no laws touching religion or infringing the rights of conscience: a proposition contained also in the Bills of Rights proposed by Virginia and New York, but a little remarkable as coming from New Hampshire, inasmuch as that state, by an express provision of its own Constitution, excluded all Catholics from office.

North Carolina concurred with Pennsylvania in rec ommending that no treaty in contravention of any law

CHAPTER of the United States should be valid till that law had first

I. been repealed. Suggestions peculiar to that state were, 1789, that Congress should not declare any state in rebellion, nor introduce foreign troops into the United States except by a two thirds vote; nor interfere, either by themselves or the judiciary, with any of the states, as to the redemption of the paper money already emitted and in circulation, or in liquidating or discharging the state debts.

Such is a summary of all the amendments proposed to the body of the Constitution, in any thing like an official shape. It has been thought worth while to insert it here, not only as a curious and authentic exhibition of prevailing political opinions, but as establishing beyond question this remarkable and most important fact, that, with all the clamor raised by the anti-Federalists, and the terror which the new system had inspired or seemed to inspire, not one of the amendments proposed to it was of a vital character, and that the whole of them, if adopted in mass, would not, in all probability, have seriously affected the practical operation of the new government, except so far as they enabled a minority, in certain cases, to control the action of a majority. Nobody proposed to interfere with the great compromises on which the whole system was based, the equal vote in the Senate, or the rule of apportionment for members of the House. Nobody proposed to alter the general distribution of powers as arranged in the Constitution, unless the proposal of a special council to perform the executive functions of the Senate might be viewed in that light. It was not even proposed to curtail the appointing power, the veto, or the extensive authority vested generally in the president, nor seriously to limit the powers of Congress or the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The proposed amendments were of two sorts: first, general restrictions on the legis

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lative and judicial authority, in favor of natural justice CHAPTER and the personal rights of the individual-restrictions set out more at length in the Bills of Rights proposed by Vir- 1789. ginia, New York, and North Carolina; and, secondly, particular restrictions as to some matters of peculiar or local interest, such as the prohibition to levy direct taxes, and the two thirds vote for borrowing money, declaring war, ratifying commercial treaties, and maintaining standing armies. It may hence be concluded, and this is a matter of great importance toward a correct understanding of the subsequent history of the United States, that no question of fundamental principle as to the theory of government was really in debate between the Federalists and anti-Federalists, and that the different views they took of the new Constitution grew much more out of differences of position and of local and personal interest, than out of any differences of opinion as to what ought to be the ends and functions of government or the methods of its administration. The Federalists, anxious to accomplish certain great objects-to consolidate the Union, to uphold the public credit, to aid and encourage the national commerce, navigation, and manufactures, to prevent paper issues, and to enforce the obligation of contracts— were chiefly intent upon securing a government capable of accomplishing those objects; and they appeared, therefore, at the present moment, as the special advocates of power and authority. The anti-Federalists, on the other hand, alarmed at the idea of national taxes, fearful lest the interests of agriculture might be sacrificed to the protection of commerce and manufactures; not over-anxious for the payment of debts either private or public, and more concerned for the interests of debtors than of creditors; looked with alarm upon the extensive powers vested in the new national government, and sought, by

CHAPTER various petty cavils and particular restrictions, to hamI. per an authority the necessity of which they could not

1789. deny, at the same time that they dreaded even its legitimate exercise, not to insist on its possible abuse. "Various and numerous as they appear," said Madison, in a letter to Jefferson respecting the proposed amendments of the Constitution, "they certainly omit many of the true grounds of opposition. The articles relating to treaties, to paper money, and to contracts, make more enemies than all the errors of the system, positive and negative, put together." Jefferson, at first, had been a good deal of an anti-Federalist; but ultimately his objections seem to have been reduced to two, the reelegibility of the executive, and the want of a bill of rights. This latter want was in part supplied by the amendments adopted; the other objection seems not to have been very permanent, since Jefferson not only urged Washington to stand as a candidate for the second time, but even consented to a second term of office in his own person, though to his case but few of the arguments urged upon Washington would apply.

Madison's proposal to take up the subject of amending the Constitution encountered considerable resistance in the House. Some members expressed themselves de-. cidedly opposed to all amendments till experience could be had of the working of the Constitution. Others were disinclined to go into the subject till the government was first completely organized. Madison urged, in reply, the necessity of some speedy action to meet the expectation and to quiet the impatience of the numerous friends of amendments out of doors. He wished by no means to go so far as to open a door for reconsidering the general frame and structure of the government; but he thought it desirable, both from motives of policy and because it

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would be an actual improvement, to incorporate so many CHAPTER of the proposed provisions for the protection of personal rights as might secure the concurrence of two thirds of 1789. both houses, and of the Legislatures of three fourths of the states. He introduced a series of resolutions embodying certain amendments which he thought of that character; and, after some discussion, it was agreed to refer them to a committee of the whole. Previously, July 21. however, to any further discussion, both Madison's resolutions, and the amendments proposed by the various state Conventions, were referred to a special committee of one from each state. The report of that committee Aug. 13 coming up for consideration, the first question that arose was, In what form should the amendments be made? Should they be incorporated into the text of the Constitution, or should they be appended to it, as a series of distinct provisions? Sherman suggested the latter method, the more feasible in the present case, inasmuch as the articles proposed by the committee were mostly in the nature of a mere bill of rights, by no means inconsistent with the Constitution as it stood, but, in fact, for the most part, implied by it. This suggestion, though voted down at first, was ultimately adopted. The report of the committee was debated from time to time, first in Committee of the Whole and afterward in the House, occasionally with a good deal of warmth. It was denounced by Burke as not containing "those solid and substantial amendments which the people expected;" as, in fact, "little better than whipped syllabub, frothy and full of wind, formed only to please the palate; or like a tub thrown out to the whale, to secure the freight of the ship and its peaceful voyage." He noticed that on this

committee of eleven there were no less than five who had been members of the Federal Convention. Gerry, who

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