CHAPTER sembly and of a plural executive, the nominal chief III. magistrate being in fact only president of the Executive 1790. Council, but with no more authority than any other member of it. As a sort of substitute for a senate, and to prevent the inconvenience of hasty determinations, all bills of a public nature were required to be printed for the consideration of the people before their final passage; nor, except on occasions of public emergency, were they to be passed till a succeeding session. But, in practice, this provision had been almost entirely dispensed with, every act which a majority could be found to pass being considered a matter of emergency. Another peculiarity was the provision for a Council of Censors, to be composed of two members from each county, to meet once in seven years, with authority to investigate all breaches of the Constitution, and to recommend changes in it. That violence of party spirit for which Pennsylvania had been distinguished, almost from the first day of her settlement, found ample scope in the attack and defense of this frame of government. The Republicans, as they had called themselves, including most of the distinguished men in the state, objected to the Constitution its want of checks and balances, and of a proper distribution of authority; objections regarded by the other party as indicating an aristocratical tendency, the Constitution as it stood being, in their eyes, the true model of a democratic government. About the time of the ratification of the Federal Constitution, the Republican party having acquired the control both of the Assembly and of the Executive Council, a project, already two or three times defeated, was again revived, of a Convention for amending the state Constitution, which was said, indeed, to require certain modifications to adapt it to the new federal system. Any action in this matter on the part of III. the Assembly was opposed by the Constitutionalists, who CHAPTER insisted that, by an express provision of the existing Constitution, the sole power of calling such a convention 1790. was vested in the Council of Censors, whose constitutional period of meeting was now fast approaching. But to this the other party objected the unequal representation of the people in that body, each county, large and small, being allowed two members; also the restriction upon any effectual action in the requirement of two thirds of the whole number for calling a convention. The Constitutionalists also relied upon an oath imposed by the first Constitution upon all persons holding office, "not to do or say any thing, directly or indirectly, that should be prejudicial or injurious to the government as established." But this very oath was denounced by the Republicans as inconsistent with the rights of freemen, and was represented as in itself an additional reason for revising the Constitution. An act having passed for calling a Convention, the opponents of the existing Constitution, all of whom, in national politics, professed to be Federalists, succeeded in securing a small majority. The most distinguished leaders on that side were Wilson, Mifflin, and Chief Justice M Kean; and among the younger members Ross, Addison, and Sitgreaves. The chief leaders on the other side, anti-Federalists in national politics, were Findley, Smilie, and Snyder, of all of whom we shall have occasion hereafter to speak. Gallatin also co-operated with them; but he was yet undistinguished, and his share in the debate was not conspicuous. By the new Constitution as adopted, the representa- Sept. tives chosen annually, never less than sixty nor more than a hundred, were to be distributed among the counties in proportion to the taxable inhabitants, to be ascer CHAPTER tained once in seven years, the same basis prescribed in III. the first Constitution; but the restriction contained in 1790. that Constitution, to serve no more than four years in sev en, was dropped. The only qualifications required were citizenship of the state for three years, and residence in the district for one year. The senators, never more than one third nor less than one fourth the number of representatives, were to be apportioned on the same principle among districts to be formed by the Legislature; but no district was to choose more than four senators. The senators must be twenty-five years of age and four years citizens of the state. They were to serve four years, and to be divided into four classes, one class to go out annually. As the want of a senate had been one chief objection to the first Constitution, the provisions on this subject were objects of special interest. The committee appointed to report a draft of a new Constitution, in order to make the distinction between the two houses as marked as possible, had proposed to imitate the Maryland plan— long persevered in, but since abandoned by that stateof a choice of senators not directly by the people, but by the intervention of a body of electors specially chosen for that purpose. This, it was argued, would secure a Senate more respectable and select than if the choice were made directly by the people. Much to the surprise and disgust of many of his political friends, and generally of the party with which he acted, this idea was vehemently attacked by Wilson. With that vein of strong good sense and clear appreciation of the actual constitution of society in America, of which he had given so many proofs in the Federal Convention, he pronounced this contrivance no less illusory than it would be unpopular. The longer term assigned to senators, their choice III. by larger districts, their sitting as a separate body, and CHAPTER the esprit de corps which would thus be produced, would render the two houses a sufficient check upon each oth- 1790. er without any difference in the method of choice. Wilson carried only a small portion of his party with him; but, as he was supported by the whole body of the opposition, his views prevailed. The executive power was vested in a governor, to be elected by the people for the term of three years, but disqualified to hold the office more than nine years out of twelve. It had been proposed that the choice of governor should be made through the medium of electors, but the eloquence of Wilson prevailed to give it directly to the people. In the extensive authority bestowed upon this officer, the model of the Federal Constitution was closely followed. Like the President of the United States, he had a qualified veto on all acts of the Legislature, the granting of reprieves and pardons, and the appointment to all offices the filling of which was not otherwise provided for. The old colonial method was still continued of the nomination by popular vote of two persons in each county as candidates for the office of sheriff, and two others for the office of coroner, the governor to fill the offices respectively by selecting one of those thus nominated. The election of state treasurer was to be by joint ballot of the two houses, and the appointment of the other treasury officers to be regulated by law. With these exceptions, the appointment to all civil offices of every description was in the sole gift of the governor, whose patronage was thus very extensive, far exceeding that possessed by any other state governor, and superior, indeed, at this time, to that of the President of the United States. Mifflin was chosen the first governor under this CHAPTER Constitution, St. Clair, the opposing candidate, receiving III. 1790. but few votes. Every tax-paying citizen, two years a resident, and the sons of such citizens between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-two, were entitled to vote. All elections, except those in a representative capacity, to be by ballot -provisions substantially copied from the first Constitution. The old judicial system was also continued, with this alteration, that the judges of the higher courts were to be appointed, not for seven years, as the first Constitution had directed, but for good behavior. They were to receive an adequate fixed compensation, not to be diminished during their continuance in office; but, by a judicious provision, no part of it was to consist in fees or perquisites. The unstable tenure and the dependence of the judiciary had been one chief objection urged against the first Constitution. The Bill of Rights re-enacted the old colonial provision, copied into the first Constitution, respecting freedom of worship, the rights of conscience, and exemption from involuntary contributions for the maintenance of any ministry. The recognition of a God, and of a future state of rewards and punishments, seemed still to be required as a qualification for holding office; but the subscription which the first Constitution had demanded from the members of Assembly of their belief in the divine inspiration of the Old and New Testament was now dropped. The Legislature were directed to provide "as soon as conveniently may be" for the establishment of schools throughout the state, in which the poor might "be taught gratis;" but a long period elapsed before this provision was carried into effect. By an important republican modification in the English law of libel, since |