IX.

of dollars-a cheap price, Monroe thought, at which to CHAPTER hire France to fight our battles. In that case we might. seize at once the Western posts, and the territory on the 1794. Lower Mississippi occupied by the Spaniards, and trust to French aid to see us out of the war; if, indeed, war should follow-which, considering the rapid successes of the French arms, Monroe hardly thought likely on the part either of Spain or Britain. The infatuated Monroe was wholly unable to perceive that his proposition tended to put the United States in the position of a humble dependent on France, obliged to follow her fortune in war, and liable to be called upon for an indefinite amount of new loans as the consideration for continued protection.

This project of purchasing French aid met with no encouragement whatever from the American government. In Randolph's first letter, after the receipt of these dispatches, while deferring a full examination of the matter to a subsequent opportunity, it was briefly stated that the step which Monroe had taken was "viewed as a very strong one." In another letter, shortly after, Monroe was informed that, notwithstanding the rapid successes of France, the course of the government was still steadily directed to the neutrality which it professed; and, therefore, that his step respecting a loan, the more it was considered, the stronger it appeared. Pending more particular instructions, he was reminded that it was "the invariable policy of the president to be as independent as possible of every nation on earth, a policy not assumed now for the first time, but wise at all times, and certain, if steadily pursued, to protect our country from the effects of commotions in Europe."

The French Convention, having received from Monroe satisfactory, though unauthorized assurances as to

the disposition of the United States, presently repealed Nov. 18.

!X.

CHAPTER the provision order, and also the order for the forced sale of cargoes. The payment of the debts due for provisions 1794. was also promised, and indemnity to the sufferers by the Bordeaux embargo. But all these promises were promises only; for Monroe himself wrote that unless depreciated assignats were accepted, the prospect of immediate payment was but faint. Nor was actual payment made even in assignats.

Notwithstanding all Monroe's devotion to France, on which point he purported to speak for his country as well as for himself, still the mission of Jay to England furnished to the French government cause of anxiety and suspicion. Monroe had been authorized by his instructions to mention, as the "motives" of Jay's mission, the obtaining "compensation for our plundered property and restitution of the posts ;" and also to declare that Jay was "positively forbidden to weaken the engagements between America and France." Upon the strength of these instructions, Monroe undertook to assure the French government that Jay's authority "was strictly limited. to demand reparation for injuries;" whence the implication seemed to follow that he had no authority to conclude any thing on the subject of navigation or commerce. This was venturing somewhat rashly, as Monroe very soon found; for, within two or three weeks after his giving these assurances, a report reached Paris that, besides adjusting the other difficulties, Jay had actually concluded a treaty of commerce. Monroe at first attempted to face down this disagreeable report by reiterating his statements as to Jay's instructions, and declaring such a treaty impossible. Being soon formally called upon by the Committee of Public Safety for informaDec. 27. tion, and having that very morning received a short note from Jay announcing that a treaty had been signed, he

IX.

was forced in his answer to admit that unwelcome fact. CHAPTER But he added a reminder as to the limitation of Jay's instructions, and an extract also from Jay's letter, which 1794. gave assurance of an express clause in the treaty that no part of it should operate contrary to any existing treaties. As to its contents any further, he disclaimed all knowledge. Jay had written that, as the treaty was not ratified, it would be improper to publish it. But Monroe promised, as soon as he obtained any additional information, to communicate it forthwith to the French government.

Monroe now began to be alarmed at the encouragement he had given to the French Committee of Safety to expect a loan from the United States. He was aware, so he wrote to the State Department, that if the adjustment with Great Britain were approved, no such service could be rendered to France. Indeed, if peace continued, he doubted whether the government possessed the constitutional power to render it. He apologized for his former course on the ground of an expected failure of Jay's negotiation, which had, indeed, been suggested in letters from Randolph, and the prospect, as he thought, of obtaining the aid of France, without being obliged to do much in return for it. To relieve himself from embarrassment, he called immediately upon those members of the Committee of Public Safety with whom he had communicated on the subject of the loan. According to the account given in his official letter, he found them. well aware of the consequences of the British treaty in that respect, and ready to give assurances that the new minister about to be sent to America should have instructions not even to mention the subject of a loan, should it be disagreeable to the American government. "So this business stands upon a footing, as, indeed, it

CHAPTER always did, whereby, under a particular state of things, IX. some benefit may be derived from it, and no detriment

1794. under any." Such was Monroe's confident conclusionbut never was diplomatist more lamentably self-deceived. The very circumstance that it went to shut them out from the prospect of an American loan of five millions of dollars to begin with, was quite enough to condemn the treaty in the eyes of the French; and we shall see hereafter with how much pertinacity they adhered to that idea of a loan in which Monroe had so imprudently encouraged them.

Jan. 4.

The danger of treaty arrangements between the United States and Great Britain seems to have reminded the French government of the expediency of a little respect to treaty stipulations on their part. A new decree 1795. speedily made its appearance, giving full force and effect to those clauses of the treaty of commerce with America respecting contraband and the carriage of enemy's goods -articles hitherto totally disregarded ever since the commencement of the war. Monroe was inclined to take the merit of this decree to himself, but Jay's title to it would seem quite as plausible.

The prevalence of hostilities on the ocean had rendered the communication between Europe and America very precarious; nor was it till after he had acted for six months at his own discretion, and had deeply committed his government on several important points, that Monroe Feb. 9. received the first official responses to his earlier letters, containing the criticisms already quoted as to the parade of his reception and the interpretation he had given to his instructions. To these criticisms Monroe made a very elaborate reply, in which he vindicated his fraternization with the French as the only means of preventing an absolute breach, which every thing at the time

IX.

of his arrival had seemed to portend, and as having pro- CHAPTER duced those concessions on the part of France of which mention has already been made. He even took upon 1795. himself the merit of having contributed to the conclusion of Jay's treaty, on the ground that evidences of a good understanding between France and the United States must naturally have operated upon Great Britain to induce a surrender of the Western posts and compensation for injuries, the sole objects, as he presumed, included in that treaty. Independently of that negotiation, so he insisted in this same letter, by his adroitness and success in obtaining the confidence of the French republic, he had secured all that the United States could desire. By accurate penetration" into the "probable policy" of the French government—a government subject to periodical revolutions at intervals of a few months, in which its policy as well as its administration underwent decided changes he had become satisfied that, in case we maintained that government's unimpaired confidence, “there was no service within its power which it would not render us, and that upon the slightest intimation." He had "reason to believe" that, previously to the arrival of the news of Jay's treaty, the French government " contemplated to take under its care our protection against Algiers, the expulsion of the British from the Western posts, and the establishment of our right to the free navigation of the Mississippi, to be secured to us in the mode we should prefer ;" for all which services, the only return expected was "the aid of our credit to obtain a loan from our banks for an inconsiderable sum, to be laid out in the purchase of provisions within our own country, and to be reimbursed, if possible, by themselves." The news of Jay's treaty had "checked" these beneficent intentions, but had not entirely "changed"