To this letter Napoleon made the following reply.*

• Paris, January 16, 1813.

My brother, I received your letter of the 1st January, and observe with pleasure the sentiments which animate you. I have already given you to understand that your duty towards me, your country, and your children, exacted your return to France. Return then without delay, and I will receive you, not as a brother whom you have offended, but as a father who educated you. As to the ideas you have of the situation of my affairs, they are false. I have a million of men on foot, and two hundred millions in my coffers to maintain the integrity of the territory of the confederation, and of that of my allies, and to procure the success of the project I have conceived for the happiness of my people. Holland is French forever, she is the emanation of our territory, the embouchure of our rivers. She could not be happy but with France, and she feels it well. By remaining in France you will not separate yourself from Holland. If, by separating yourself from it, you mean ceasing to govern it, it was yourself that quitted it by your abdication, &c.

After the battle of Leipsic, Louis made a new attempt of the same kind, and even thought of returning to Holland by way of France, provided his brother should agree it it. When he arrived at Paris he was quite astonished to find, that instead of accepting his proposal, Napoleon would not even allow him to enter the city. Upon his return to Switzerland he found letters from his brother, in which the latter, with great candor and kindness, admitted that he would rather Holland should return to the government of the prince

Paris, 16 Janvier, 1813.

* Mon frère, je recois votre lettre du premier Janvier et je vois avec plaisir les sentimens qui vous animent; je vous ai déjà fait connaitre que vos devoirs envers moi, la patrie et vos enfans, exigaient votre retour en France. Vos enfans grandissent et ont besoin de leur père. Revenez donc sans plus de retard, et je vous recevrai, non comme un frère que vous avez offensé, mais comme un frère qui vous a élevé. Quant aux idées que vous avez de la situation de mes affaires elles sont fausses; j'ai un million d'hommes sur pied, et deux cents millions dans mes coffres, pour maintenir l'intégrité du territoire de la confederation et de celui de mes alliés, et faire réussir le projet que j'ai concu pour le bonheur de mes peuples. La Hollande est Francaise à jamais; elle est l'émanation de notre territoire; embouchure de nos rivières elle ne peut etre heureuse qu'avec la France, et elle le sent bien. En restant en France, vous ne vous séparez pas de la Hollande; mais si vous entendez par vous en séparer, renoncer à la gouverner, c'est vous même qui l'avez quittée en abdiquant, etc. etc.

of Orange, than to that of Louis. The following extract contains the narration of his journey to Paris.

"After the battle of Leipsic, the king of Naples came to Switzerland and proceeded to Basle, where his brother-in-law [Louis] was, and they had an interview. The king of Naples had returned to endeavour to preserve himself, in the event of the existence of the French government's being menaced. He advised his brotherin-law to return to Holland with the assistance of the allies. The latter replied, that he never could do it; for it would not be permitted to Holland to remain entirely neutral, and for no throne in the world would he make war on his own country. "If France is successful," said he, "what reproaches should I not merit for having drawn its vengeance on the kingdom? if she is unsuccessful, the allies, in the end, would certainly give the preference to the prince of Orange."

However, after the departure of the king of Naples, Louis reflected maturely on the singular situation in which he found himself. He saw very well, that it was a favourable moment to endeavour to reenter Holland, that it was advantageous for the French government to renounce a country which was about to escape from her, and to establish in it a French dynasty. He sent an officer of his guard to Mayence, with orders to wait there for the Emperor, and give him a letter, in which he endeavoured to persuade his brother not to lose the opportunity of pursuing the only course, which remained to France at this moment.

'As he could not doubt that Napoleon would willingly cede to him a country which was about to fall into the hands of the allies, and as it was of urgent necessity not to lose time, he resolved to repair directly to Amsterdam, if the French Government consented, and would permit the Hollanders at Paris to follow him. He advanced towards that capital, after having written to the Empress Regent and to the Prince Cambacérés. But he was very much astonished, on arriving at Pont sur Seine, to learn that they refused to receive him at Paris. He returned then to Switzerland, where he found the answer of the Emperor, by letters from Prince Berthier and the duc de Vicence, and from the speech of the Emperor to the officer who had been sent to him. These answers were exactly conformable to each other. "I should prefer that Holland should return to the power of the prince of Orange, than to that of my brother," said the Emperor; "if he has a hundred thousand men to oppose to me, he may attempt to take it from me," &c.

Louis also made a direct address to the magistrates of Amsterdam, which seems to have been intended as an invi

tation to them to call him to the chief magistracy. Although this document is of some length, we venture to insert it.

· Soleure, November 29, 1813.

TO THE MAGISTRATES OF AMSTERDAM.

'Gentlemen, the new circumstances, in which Holland is placed, oblige me to return from my retirement; they will either complete the obligations which have attached me to your country for eight years, or free me from them entirely.

It is, then, to understand the sentiments of the nation with respect to myself, sentiments which shall guide my final conduct, that I address myself to you, not only as to the capital of the United Provinces, but as to their natural representatives, since there is no other general representation of the country.

When Providence permitted that I should mount the throne of your country, without having sought or desired this honor, I did not decide upon it except upon the following considerations.

1. That the last Stadtholder had died without ever resigning the stadtholderat, or accepting any indemnity or compensation. 2. That his son, the hereditary prince, on the contrary, had formally renounced, and received the principality of Fulda in

return.

'S. That the princes of this illustrious house, to which your country owes so many obligations, were not at this time the sovereigns of Holland.

4. In fine, I thought that relations of friendship, and of conformity of interests with France, would contribute more than any thing else to establish a state of peace and neutrality, the first base and object of the policy of your country.

'After my arrival, I discovered very soon that to act conscientiously, it was necessary to act as the prince of an independent nation, created to be its defender and its first magistrate, and to forget entirely that accident had had the greatest share in my elevation. This I attempted to do. If the nation suffered under my reign, it would have suffered incomparably more without it. Its situation since 1810, that of Poland, Saxony, and Hamburgh prove this sufficiently.

The years 1806, 1807, 1808, 1809, and 1810 were the most painful which can be found in the history of the interior administration of any country. When it was thought that Holland could not sustain for three months the enormous weight of its finances, which was constantly rendered more onerous by the state of its foreign relations, she resisted five years a blockade by sea and land, forced armaments, restraints and snares, obstacles of all sorts for a man entirely a stranger till then to your country, and

entirely isolated among the snares of the policy which ought to have been his guide and support, and those of the enemies of the new order of things in Holland, and the enemies of France. I made every effort possible for man. I alone know what I have done for Holland in silence and solitude. I struggled without ceasing and with perseverance, consenting to inevitable innovations with the utmost possible delay, and endeavouring to accelerate the epoch of a general peace or of a genuine independence. My object was on the arrival of this event, to consult the nation, freely assembled, and to do, without exception, whatever it should judge necessary, and for its interest.

When, in consequence of the descent of the English at Walcheren, I was obliged to repair to Paris, as at the epoch of my abdication, my object was to resist violence, all powerful as it was, but divested of every other argument; to dispute inch by inch the approach of the catastrophe of Holland with him who had conquered all the great powers of Europe; to preserve inviolate the rights of the country, in spite of the plots and the opinions of Hollanders, secretly perverted, and, when it was necessary to yield, to abdicate only to my children, not to hesitate to sacrifice my personal interests to the preservation of the rights and the hopes of the country, continued by my abdication and the elevation of a minor to the throne, whom the constitution would place under the guarantee, and almost the regency of France, of whom the incapacity for thirteen years would take away even the smallest pretext against Holland, and to relieve her thus from the power of a king, whom France appeared to have chosen by her influence, merely to act as the unwilling instrument of union.

If adopting, as I had almost done, another course of conduct, I had remained at Amsterdam, merely a machine, or even if we had been in a state to make war, the fate of Holland would have been that of Poland, Saxony, and Hamburg. You would not have been able, as you are now, to claim of all your powerful neighbours perfect neutrality and independence, and avoid the inevitable consequences of hostility. I could not be so useful to your country as the house of Orange; any other Dutch prince under the same protection would have been, to say the least, useless, even if I had allowed myself to be involved in a defence which would have served but for the plausible pretext of conquest I ought not and I could not be useful to you, but in retaining myself independent of France, but never its enemy.

Since my abdication, then, I have remained at Gratz in Austria; and after three years' residence in that city, I came to live in the Swiss cantons: 1. not to place myself in a state of war with France: 2. to be more ready to be of assistance to Holland, should circumstances permit.

New Series, No. 4.

34

Already in 1812, after the retreat from Russia, I made at Gratz all the efforts in my power for the liberty of Holland; they were fruitless in spite of all my care.

6

After my arrival in Switzerland three months had hardly elapsed when I learned, the 27 of last October at Basle, the retreat of the French armies on the Rhine, and the evacuation of Germany, and I anticipated that Holland would either rise, or be occupied by the allies."

6

Faithful to my opinion, which experience has too well confirmed, I wished to profit by the only opportunity offered of establishing a counterpoise in Germany, and of the approaching evacuation of Holland, to place that country in a state of real independence and strict neutrality, the only state which is proper for Holland, without which it will be ruined sooner or later; an object equally at heart with all the belligerent powers. I sent to Mayence to the Emperor of the French, and to the Empress Regent at Paris; I demanded with the evacuation of Holland my free passage across France. If this had taken place, sure from my journey through France of her not being inimical, and of her consent, tacit but certain, I would have convoked the nation on my arrival, I would have told you my opinion, and you should have done what you judged most proper, in regard to your political situation, and that your constitution ; ready to retire, had you preferred the house of Orange to me, but not before I had fulfilled my last duty to you.

of

'I arrived the third of November at Pont-sur-Seine, near Paris, where I received very unfavourable answers to some of my requests, and none to the most essential. I learnt there that it was not decided to evacuate Holland; I returned to my retreat in Switzerland, where at length I received an indirect answer at Mayence, more than negative.

In this situation I wrote to M. de Byland Hatt, one of the last presidents of the legislative body; to Messieurs Roell and Krayenhoff, former ministers; to William Willink, counsellor of state; and Professor Van Lennep, whose intelligence, and patriotism, and character are known to me. I do not know if these letters have arrived, but as I send duplicates of them with this letter, you will be able to understand their contents. My object, as you will see, is to have my conduct and sentiments known in Holland. Since, I have learned all that has passed, and in this state of things I have considered that since three years and a half, I have been isolated, wandering in strange places; that I have renounced my native country wholly and absolutely, to remain faithful to the system which I have thought would be most useful to your country; that if my adopted country for eight years escapes me, I shall find myself without country, without friend, without any bond; that in the meantime, in the important circumstances of