separate and complete article which is not merely the finished material of a further stage. (1902) 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 53.

Apparatus not attached but reshipped in original package. In (1904) 25 Op. Atty.Gen. 125, it appeared that certain brakes, springs, and lighting apparatus were imported into the United States for the purpose of being used as parts of the equipment of certain railroad cars to be manufactured in this country for export. They were not installed in the cars, but were present for inspection and were shipped in their original packages, or were repacked and shipped, with the parts of the cars to which they were subsequently to be attached. It was held that such articles were not used "in the manufacture of articles manufactured or produced within the United States," within the meaning of section 30; and as the articles were removed "from the custody and control of the government," they were within the inhibition of section 3025, Rev. Stat., 2 Fed. Stat. Annot. 733, and were not entitled to drawback under any provision of law.

Blended flour. - A drawback is allowable under this section on blended flour produced by thoroughly mixing and aerating an imported flour ground from Manitoba hard spring wheat, containing a high percentage of gluten, with a domestic flour of medium strength of a high color and great keeping qualities, thus producing a superior flour differing from the imported flour in color, texture, and keeping qualities, and having a distinct commercial designation. (1908) 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 68.

Burlap on cotton bales. - Imported burlaps, on which duty has been paid, when used as coverings on the so-called "round lap " bales of cotton, are not, when re-exported, entitled to drawback under this section, for the reason that the bale is not an article manufactured or produced within the meaning of this section. It is merely a package of ma

Vol. II, p. 514, sec. 33.

Adoption of construction by re-enactment. -Congress by enacting the proviso to this section, which differs from the proviso to the Act of October 1, 1890, sec. 50, only in substituting the word "entry for the word "withdrawal," as the date when the weight of merchandise withdrawn from bonded warehouse is to be taken as the basis of the duty, must be deemed to have adopted the construction given to the earlier proviso by the Attorney-General and followed by the executive officers charged with the administration of the law, viz., that such proviso was general in its application, and not restricted to merchandise imported before the Act took effect. U. S. t. Falk, (1907) 204 U. S. 143, 27 S. Ct. 191, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 411, reversing (C. C. A. 1906) 146 Fed. 484, and affirming (1904) 145 Fed. 574.

Construction of proviso. — In U. S. t. Falk, (1907) 204 U. S. 143, 27 S. Ct. 191, 51 U. S. (L, ed.) 411, reversing (C. C. A. 1906) 146 Fed, 484, and affirming (1904) 145 Fed, 574,

terial peculiarly constructed which may be resolved into covering and contents. (1903) 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 575.

Camel's hair noils. - The separation of imported camel's hair into "tops" and "noils ' by combing, for the purpose of preparing the material for manufacture, does not result in such "noils" becoming a distinct manufactured article and entitled to drawback within the meaning of section 30. (1902) 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 53, following (1895) 21 Op. Atty.Gen. 159, set out in the original note.

Imported corks used in exporting bottled beer. Imported bottle corks hand cut in Spain are not "imported materials used in the manufacture or production of articles entitled to drawback of customs duty when exported," within the meaning of the Act Oct. 1, 1890, 26 Stat. L. 617, though they are sterilized, cleansed, softened, and coated by distinct and peculiar processes so as to adapt them to be used in the bottling of beer for exportation. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Co. v. U. S., (1906) 41 Ct. Cl. 389, affirmed (1908) 207 U. S. 556, 28 S. Ct. 204, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 336.

Tender of entry — change of tariff acts. — In U. S. v. Edwin S. Hartwell Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 1905) 142 Fed. 432, affirming (1904) 128 Fed. 306, it appeared that as to merchandise imported shortly before the Tariff Act of 1897 went into effect. the importers tendered entry before the importation was complete. The tender being rejected by the collector, it was not renewed until said Act became operative. It was held that under section 33, requiring that merchandise previously imported for which no entry has been made shall be subject to the provisions of that Act, the importers' failure to renew,

while the old law stood, brought the merchandise within the provisions of said section.

Time to make entry. As to merchandise imported before but entered after the Tariff Act of 1897 became operative, it was held that R. S. sec. 2785, 2 Fed. Stat. Annot. 641, which allows fifteen days for the entry of merchandise after the arrival of the vessel transporting it is reported, did not have the effect of permitting entry to be made under the Tariff Act in force at the time of importation as against the provision in section 33 that "merchandise previously imported, for which no entry has been made, . . shall be subjected to the duties imposed by" that Act. U. S. v. Edwin S. Hartwell Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 1905) 142 Fed. 432, affirming (1904) 128 Fed. 306.

Effect of Act of Dec. 15, 1902. - The duty on imports withdrawn from bonded warehouses must be assessed on the basis of weight at the time of original entry, as prescribed by the proviso to this section, notwithstanding the addition by the Act of Dec. 15, 1902, of a proviso to section 20 of the Customs Administrative Act of June 10, 1890, 2 Fed. Stat. Annot. 632, that the same rate of duty shall be collected upon such merchandise as may be imposed by law upon like articles imported at the time of withdrawal, since

Vol. II, p. 515, sec. 34.

Effect of offer to entry. Where goods were tendered for consumption entry before four o'clock on July 24, 1897, and on refusal of the tender a warehouse entry was made on

Vol. II, p. 517, sec. 50.

this provision refers to the rate of duty, and not to the date at which the weight is to be taken as the basis of such duty. U. S. v. Falk, (1907) 204 U. S. 143, 27 S. Ct. 191, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 411, reversing (C. C. A. 1906) 146 Fed. 484, and affirming (1904) 145 Fed. 574.

"Entry." In the provision in this section for merchandise previously imported, for which no entry has been made," the word "entry" refers to an entry for consumption. Ellison v. U. S., (1905) 136 Fed. 969, affirmed (C. C. A. 1906) 142 Fed. 732.

"Day." The word "day," as used in this section, refers to the time or moment when the Act took effect; and merchandise imported on that day would not escape the application of the Act, unless it was also entered before the Act became effective. U. S. r. Edwin S. Hartwell Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 1905) 142 Fed. 432, affirming (1904) 128 Fed. 306.

"On and after" day named. The provision in this section that "on and after" that date merchandise previously imported should be subjected to the duties imposed by said Act, is not limited to merchandise imported prior to that date, but applies also to that imported on that day. Ellison v. U. S., (1905) 136 Fed. 969, affirmed (C. C. A. 1906) 142 Fed. 732.

the 26th, they were held to be dutiable under the Tariff Act of 1894, and not under the Act of 1897. U. S. v. Perkins, (1902) 119 Fed. 384.

Vol. II, p. 517, sec. 2517.

Vol. II, p. 525, sec. 2529.

Feb. 11, 1908, ch. 21, sec. 1, 35 Stat. L. 7, 1909 Supp. Fed. Stat. Annot. 106.

Vol. II, p. 567, sec. 2592.

Amendment.

Vol. II, p. 568, sec. 2595.

Vol. II, p. 569, sec. 1.

Vol. II, p. 570, sec. 2599.

Vol II, p. 572, sec. 2601.

Vol. II, p. 608, sec. 2746.

Vol. II, p. 611, sec. 1.

Amendment.

This Act was amended by Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. L. 11, 1909 Supp. Fed. Stat. Annot. 807.

Consignee. Where a railroad company whose line extended across the boundary between Mexico and the United States, pursuant to authority of its directors, appointed two agents to receive and enter at a customs port of the United States all goods imported by or consigned to the company, and one of such agents made the declaration on a consular invoice of goods as agent of the railroad company, and the other as consignee made the entry, paid the duty with money of the company, and received the goods, it was held that the company might be held as importer or consignee for an additional duty assessed on a liquidation, and that it was error to direct a verdict for the company. U. S. v. Mexican International R. Co., (1907) 151 Fed. 545, 81 C. C. A. 61.

Shipment of goods not ordered by consignee. In U. S. v. O'Neill, (1903) 122 Fed. 547, affirmed (C. C. A. 1904) 129 Fed. 909, it appeared that the defendants ordered a consignment of waste by sample, which consisted wholly of cotton from a foreign manufacturer, which was entitled to free entry. The manufacturer shipped waste to fill the order consigned to defendant through certain persons, who were not defendant's agents, at

113.

Suspension Bridge, which bill was indorsed to be delivered to N. When the goods arrived N. declared, without authority, that the goods belonged to defendants, and entered them for consumption. On examination it was found that the waste was cotton and woolen mixed, and was therefore taxable for duty at ten cents a pound. The defendants, on notification, refused to accept the waste under the contract, and it was sold for duty, resulting in a large deficiency. It was held that the defendants were not liable for such deficiency under this section, declaring that all merchandise imported shall be deemed and held to be the property of the person to whom it may be consigned.

Forwarding agents and custom house brokers.-A custom house broker, who makes the sworn declaration for entry of goods, in which he declares himself the consignee, cannot thereafter deny that he is such as against the government, and becomes liable for the duties under the provision of this section that "all merchandise imported into the United States shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed and held to be the property of the person to whom the merchandise may be consigned," including additional duties imposed for undervaluation under section 7 of this Act. U. S. v. Vandiver, (1904) 133 Fed.

252.

Rights of holder of bill of lading. - Under this section it has been held that where a consignee of goods, as appeared from the ship's sworn manifest and from a certified invoice, paid the duty and received the goods from the collector, the latter was not liable to a transferee of the bill of lading, holding the same as collateral for a draft drawn on the consignees for the price of the goods,

Vol. II, p. 611, sec. 3.

which they refused to pay on presentation. Derobert . Stranahan, (1903) 126 Fed. 581.

Estoppel. This section simply provides that the government may act on the faith of the bill of lading, but is not precluded from going behind it to show the facts, in order to determine the forfeitability of importa tions. U. S. r. One Bag Crushed Wheat, (1908) 166 Fed. 562.

Vol. II, p. 612, sec. 4.

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Clerical error in invoice. In Gillespie v. U. S., (1900) 124 Fed. 106, it appeared that the importers of certain sugar in hogsheads made entry on an invoice which included by mistake the value of the hogsheads in that of the sugar, but before the entry was liquidated they produced a corrected invoice, showing the proper deduction for the hogsheads. It was held that it was not, under the circumstances, necessary for the importers to make entry on a pro forma invoice, and give a bond for the production of a corrected invoice, in the method prescribed in section 4,

Vol. II, p. 613, sec. 5.

Goods purchased with right to return. — In U. S. r. Ninety-nine Diamonds, (1904) 132 Fed. 579, affirmed (C. C. A. 1905) 139 Fed. 961, it appeared that on entering an importation of certain merchandise, the importer made "the declaration of owner in cases where merchandise has been actually purchased," which is set forth in section 5, but it later appeared that the importation was made pursuant to an agreement under which the importer might, after examination, retain and pay for, or return, any part or all of the goods, and the importer admitted that he did not consider himself the actual owner but made the entry as an accommodation to the parties who caused the goods to be shipped to him. It was held that as he had full dominion over the property, with the

Vol. II, p. 615, sec. 7.

Notice to importers of advance in value. Where an appraiser who has advanced the value of imported merchandise fails to give notice of the advance to the importer as required by the customs regulations, the importer thus being deprived of the right of appeal for reappraisement, the appraisement is invalid, and does not afford a proper basis for the forfeiture and condemnation of the goods for undervaluation under this section. The Lace House v. U. S., (C. C. A. 1905) 141 Fed. 869.

In U. S. v. Independent Importing Co., (1908) 165 Fed. 63, it appeared that the customs officers sent to the address given by

and that the collector should have made allowance for the hoosheads.

Effect of exception of personal effects.The provision in this section that "except in case of personal effects, no importation of any merchandise" shall be entered without invoice, is equivalent to an exception of articles not personal effects from the provision relative to the declaration of "baggage" in R. S. sec. 2799, 2 Fed. Stat. Annot. 644. U. S. v. One Trunk, (1909) 175 Fed. 1012.

right to sell or otherwise dispose of it without accountability to any one, he should be considered the "owner," and might properly make the declaration aforesaid.

section.

False certification. Under this providing that on the entry of imported merchandise the importer shall make certain sworn statements in regard to the importation, it has been held that the practice of having such declarations signed in blank by an importer, to be filled in later by a customs broker, and the practice of notaries public in falsely certifying such declarations as having been made and sworn to in their presence, are illegal, and to be condemned in law as in morals. U. S. v. Cohn, (1904) 128 Fed. 615, affirmed (C. C. A. 1905) 145 Fed. 1.

the importer in his entry a notice of an advance on the invoice value as made by the appraiser. It was held that due diligence had been shown in this regard, and that the importer could not object to the assessment of duty on the basis of the advance, on the ground that he had not received the notice by reason of an error in the address.

Definiteness of additional entry. In making an addition to the invoice value at the time of the entry, in order to equal market value, as permitted by this section, the importer should state the added value with sufficient definiteness to enable the customs officers to ascertain its amount; but refer