taken to their separate docks, that they should be considered as in the port of Chieago, for the purpos of fixing the time their cargoes became dutiable, though the arrival

Vol. II, p. 638, sec. 2774.

Open gasoline launch.

had not been reported at the barge office. Hartwell Lumber Co. v. U. S., (1904) 128 Fed. 306, affirmed (C. C. A. 1905) 142 Fed. 432.

Vol. II, p. 641, sec. 2785.

Innocent buyer of smuggled merchandise. -The innocent buyer of smuggled merchandise is under no liability to enter it for the payment of duty. Such payment would not relieve a forfeiture already incurred, nor would failure to pay revive it when once barred. U. S. t. One Dark Bay. Horse, (1904) 130 Fed. 240.

Time of entry. In Ellison v. U. S., (1905) 136 Fed. 969, affirmed (C. C. A. 1906) 142 Fed. 732, it appeared that certain merchandise was imported at the port of New York July 24, 1897, and there entered for immediate transportation to the port of Philadelphia; and before the Tariff Act of that date had become operative the importer sought to enter the merchandise under the Tariff Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. L. 509, and tendered an entry in due form

Vol. II, p. 641, sec. 2787.

Amendment. This section was amended by Act of March 2, 1905, ch. 1306, 33 Stat. L. 826, 10 Fed. Stat. Annot. 78.

General bonds of sufficiently large an amount may, in special cases, be lawfully accepted by collectors of customs, in lieu of the special bonds of $1,000 each required by this section from agents making entries of imported merchandise for others, requiring them to produce the declaration of the owner in every case where goods may thereafter be

Vol. II, p. 642, sec. 2788.

to the collector at the latter port, which was refused on the ground that the goods had not reached that port. It was held that the action of the collector was justified.

Refusal of tender — estoppel. — Where, at the time of tendering entry of merchandise, there is no existing right on the part of the importers to have it accepted, nor duty on the part of the collector of customs to accept, no estoppel against the government arises through the fact that the collector's refusal may have been on wrong grounds, the statement of which may have misled the importers into failing to renew the tender on the proper occasion. U. S. r. Hartwell Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 1905) 142 Fed. 432, affirming (1904) 128 Fed. 306.

imported without the same during a specified period. (1904) 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 177.

Penal bond of agent. This section requires collectors of customs to take from an agent or person other than the owner making an entry of imported merchandise, a bond in the penal sum of $1,000, with condition that the actual owner or consignee of the merchandise shall deliver a full and correct account thereof according to the terms and specifications of that section. (1903) 25 Op. Atty.-Gen. 66.

Vol. II, p. 642, sec. 2789.

was imported by a passenger arriving in the United States, but which was not attempted to be concealed by dressing it up as baggage. U. S. v. One Trunk, (1909) 174 Fed. 1012.

False statement as to articles not baggage. - Inasmuch as articles for sale which accompany a person arriving in the United States are not required to be declared at the same time as the passenger's personal baggage, an intentional misstatement of the value of such articles does not make the articles forfeitable, because the importer was under no obligation to enter them or declare their value at that time, under section 2799, relating to "baggage." U. S. v. One Trunk, (1909) 175 Fed. 1012.

Vol. II, p. 645, sec. 2802.

--

Sufficiency of declaration. In U. S. v. One Pearl Chain, (C. C. A. 1905) 139 Fed. 513, it appeared that a person coming into the United States and having in possession a valuable pearl chain, silk wearing apparel, and other articles, had made a declaration on board the vessel as to certain "wearing apparel, value not known," had proceeded to the portion of the dock adjacent to the vessel that had been roped off for convenient examination of passengers' effects, and was there awaiting opportunity to give the information necessary for completing the entry; but before this opportunity had been given, the pearl chain was seized as illegally imported. It was held that the phrase wearing apparel," as used in the declaration, was a sufficient mention of the chain within the meaning of section 2802, and that the seizure was illegal.

In U. S. v. One Trunk, (C. C. A. 1911) 184 Fed. 317, affirming (1909) 171 Fed. 772, it appeared that at the time of the arrival of claimant at the port of New York as a passenger from a foreign country, a Treasury regulation provided that merchandise intended for sale and of the value of $500 or over could not be examined on the pier, but must be regularly entered at the custom house and appraised. Claimant in her declaration made on landing listed certain articles and one trunk for public stores; " that being the place where imported merchandise goes for examination and appraisal. Later she filed a regular written entry at the custom house, and with it a duplicate consular invoice of the contents of the trunk, which consisted of dutiable merchandise of over $500 in value. It was held that the description in the claimant's declaration was sufficient, and that her filing of the invoice at the custom house later was a compliance with R. S. sec. 2802.

A passenger arriving in the United States, on filling out the printed form furnished by the customs officers for the declaration and entry of baggage, struck out the clause referring to the itemized description that is required of the various articles of baggage, and inserted instead a description of the pieces of baggage he had, as consisting of certain numbers of trunks, valises, etc., and said nothing as to what articles were contained therein.

Jewelry worn upon the person. - Where a passenger on a steamer purchased a pear! necklace before her departure from Paris, and by reason of its value wore the same about her neck when she made her declaration for duty, instead of having the same among her baggage, and the necklace was visible on her person, it was held to be subject to declaration under the statutes and rules regulating passengers' baggage, and not under the regulations providing for the importation c2 merchandise. One Pearl Chain v. U. S., (C. C. A. 1903) 123 Fed. 371.

Merchandise for sale is not baggage within the meaning of this section. U. S. v. One Trunk, (1909) 175 Fed. 1012.

It was held that this was not sufficient to put the customs officers on inquiry as to the dutiable character of the contents of the packages, so as to constitute a sufficient "mention" of the articles, within the requirement of section 2802, that dutiable articles in imported baggage shall be “mentioned" on making the customs entry. Harts r. U. S., (C. C. A. 1905) 140 Fed. 843, affirming (1904) 131 Fed. 886.

Entry after accrual of forfeiture.

- In U. S. r. One Purple Cloth Costume, (1907) 158 Fed. 899, it appeared that dutiable articles in the baggage of a person arriving in the United States from abroad became forfeitable under this section because not mentioned to the collector of customs at the time of entry; but before they were seized their owner was permitted to make a lawful entry and pay the proper duty. It was held that such occurrences subsequent to the accrual of the right of forfeiture could not waive such right, nor estop the United States from asserting it.

Entry of "trunk" covers contents. — Though a passenger's baggage declaration specifies only a "trunk," without any mention of its contents, it sufficiently complies with section 2802, requiring that if such baggage contains any dutiable article it shall be mentioned." The specification of the "trunk" is equivalent to mention of its contents. U. S. r. One Trunk, (1909) 171 Fed. 772.

66

Fraudulent intent is not necessary to a forfeiture. Under this section it is not necessary that there should have been an intent to defraud the revenue in order to incur the penalties there prescribed. U. S. v. Harts. (1904) 131 Fed. 886, affirmed (C. C. A. 1905) 140 Fed. 843.

Appraisement of forfeited baggage. — The statute does not contemplate that in an action to enforce the forfeiture or penalty prescribed by this section the court shall be required to make an appraisement of the value of such articles for the purpose of ascertaining what portion would have been entitled to admission free of duty if a proper declaration and entry thereof had been made. U. S. r. Harts, (1904) 131 Fed. 886, affirmed (C. C. A. 1905) 140 Fed. 843.

Vol. II, p. 647, sec. 2809.

Remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures. The Treasury Department has jurisdiction of the remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed by this section and of

Vol. II, p. 662, sec. 2864.

Sufficiency of petition. — The petition in a proceeding by the government for the forfeiture of goods imported into the country contrary to law, which alleged that the goods were imported without being invoiced or entry made with any collector of customs, and without declaration to the proper revenue officer, and that some person fraudulently brought into the country from a foreign country goods which should have been invoiced, declared,

Vol. II, p. 664, sec. 2865.

Acts by importer. In U. S. v. 646 HalfBoxes Figs, (1908) 164 Fed. 778, it was alleged that an exporter had caused a false and fraudulent invoice to be made out, signed, verified, and left with a consul to be transmitted to the collector of customs at an American port, and had then caused the merchandise covered by the invoice to be shipped to said port; but it was not charged nor shown that he had been concerned in importing the goods. It was held that the case was not brought within section 2865, forbidding any person to "make out or pass, or attempt to pass, through the custom house any false, forged, or fraudulent invoice."

and entered according to the law, with intent to defraud the government, sufficiently charged a violation of section 2851 et seq., providing that all merchandise imported into the country must be invoiced, which invoice shall be produced to the consul, and requiring that a declaration shall be filed with the collector of the port at the time of the entry. Six Parcels Placer Gold v. U. S., (1904) 8 Ariz. 389, 76 Pac. 473.

at all, and that he was guilty of smuggling, was justified under the rule that a person becomes guilty of that offense by avoiding the first opportunity given to make a customs' declaration and pay the duty. Rogers v. U. S., (1910) 180 Fed. 54, 103 C. C. A. 408.

Smuggling is the actual passage of dutiable goods through the lines of the customs house without paying or securing the payment of the duties thereon. (1903) 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 583.

Illegal entry. This section does not include a case where merchandise is fraudulently entered at a custom house. U. S. v. 646 Half-Boxes Figs, (1908) 164 Fed. 778.

66

Indictment sufficient. An indictment for smuggling, charging that defendant did 'bring into the country clandestinely" certain dutiable goods, was held to be synonymous with the provision of this section making it an offense to "clandestinely introduce" dutiable goods into the country with intent to avoid payment of duty. Rogers r. U. S., (1910) 180 Fed. 54, 103 C. C. A. 408.

An indictment alleging that accused at Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., "did unlawfully, knowingly, and fraudulently import and bring

into the United States certain merchandise, to wit, 3 yards of black woolen suiting cloth of the value of, to wit, $10, contrary to law; that is to say, clandestinely and without entering the same at the United States customs office and port of entry with the United States collector of customs . . . and paying the duty

thereon the same being foreign merchandise subject to an import duty as provided in Act July 24, 1897, ch. 11," 30 Stat. L. 151. was held to sufficiently charge “smuggling,” denounced by section 2865. Rogers v. U. S., (1910) 180 Fed. 54, 103 C. C. A. 408.

Vol. II, p. 668, sec. 2871.

Amendment.

Vol. II, p. 679, sec. 2899.

Amount recoverable on bond.-U. S. v. Dieckerhoff, (1906) 202 U. S. 302, 26 S. Ct. 604, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 1041, reversing (1905) 136 Fed. 545, 69 C. C. A. 255, and affirming (1900) 103 Fed. 789, set out in the original note.

Validity of redelivery bond. The authority of the collector under this section to require a bond from an importer for double the value of the merchandise imported, to be forfeited for the nonreturn unopened of any package of the invoice upon demand, includes the right to take a less stringent undertaking, such as a bond which provides for the return of any required package unopened or the payment of double its value as a condition of being discharged from the full penalty of the bond. U. S. v. Dieckerhoff, (1906)

202 U. S. 302, 26 S. Ct. 604, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 1041.

Enforcement of redelivery bond. -The enforcement of the penalty prescribed in a redelivery bond taken by a collector under the authority of this section for the nonreturn unopened of any required package of an invoice of imported merchandise, is not precluded by the provision of R. S. sec. 961, 4 Fed. Stat. Annot. 604, that in suits to recover the forfeiture annexed to a bond or other specialty where the forfeiture, breach, or nonperformance appears by default or confession of the defendant, or upon demurrer, the court shall render judgment for the plaintiff for so much as is due according to equity. U. S. r. Dieckerhoff, (1906) 202 U. S. 302, 26 S. Ct. 604, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 1041.

"paintings," where it appeared that the invoice value was sufficient to include the frames, and that it was customary so to describe paintings with frames. U. S. v. Hensel, (1906) 158 Fed. 645.

valued goods, but that all the glassware was chargeable with the same rate of duty, and similarly with regard to a number of cases of pickles imported at the same time which were also placed on one invoice though of different values, but subject to the same rate of duty. (1907) 26 Op. Atty.-Gen. 119.

case is brought within the provisions of Schedule K, paragraph 356. Stone, etc., Co. v. U. S., (1906) 147 Fed. 603,

Vol. II, p. 687, sec. 2926.

Modification of section.

Act May 1, 1876, ch. 89, 19 Stat. L. 49, 2 Fed. Stat. Annot. 664, permitting the entry of packed packages without the production of an invoice, modified section 2926, prescribing that merchandise may be stored at the expense of the Owner, when an "incomplete entry has been made, or an entry without the specification of particulars, either for want of the original invoice or for any other cause," and the latter provision does not apply to such packages. U. S. v. American Express Co., (1907) 154 Fed. 996.

Vol. II, p. 689, sec. 2930.

Fees on packed packages. —A fee charged by a collector of customs on packed packages to defray expense incurred in administering the law relative to such packages is not such as is authorized by section 2926, prescribing that merchandise of which incomplete entry has been made shall be conveyed to and stored in a warehouse "at the expense and risk of the owner." U. S. v. American Express Co., (1907) 154 Fed. 996. See also under this title, vol. 2, p. 632, sec. 22.

Vol. 11, p. 693, sec. 2950.

Necessity for certificate of appraisement. Under this section and Act June 10, 1890, ch. 407, sec. 13, 26 Stat. L. 136, 2 Fed. Stat. Annot. 622, relating to certificates of officers appraising imported goods, it is intended that the appraisement should be reduced to writ

ing. The certificate of the appraising officer is the legal evidence of appraisement, and if it is not made the appraisement is illegal. The Lace House v. U. S., (C. C. A. 1905) 141 Fed. 869.

Vol. II, p. 698, sec. 2970.

Change of Tariff Acts. In U. S. v. Amsinck, (1905) 140 Fed. 96, it was held that merchandise imported while Tariff Act Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. L. 567, was in

Vol. II, p. 701, sec. 2977.

Drawback on fuel coal. This section and sections 2978 and 3025, R. S., 2 Fed. Stat. Annot. 702 and 732, relate exclusively to drawback or return of duties on exported

Vol. 11, p. 702, sec. 2979.

Treasury regulations. In U. S. v. Ehrgott, (1910) 182 Fed. 267, it was held that since by Treasury Department Articles 834, 838, 841, and 842, providing a system of li censed truckmen to whom a limited custody of the goods is intrusted for the purpose only of transfer from warehouse to hold, the

Vol. II, p. 704, sec. 2982.

Vol. II, p. 704, sec. 2984.

Authority of the Secretary of the Treasury. -Under section 2984, the secretary may not refuse to allow the refund arbitrarily or

capriciously. Where all the facts enumerated in said section are presented to him undisputed, it would be assumed that that would