in an action on the bond of an Indian agent, the transcript of the books and proceedings in the Treasury Department contained a debit and credit statement of the account and a showing of the items in dispute, it was held not to be objectionable because it also contained explanatory memoranda showing the ground of the rulings of the accounting officers concerning the items rejected, and, in some instances, the evidence on which they relied. U. S. v. Pierson, (C. C. A. 1906) 145 Fed. 814.

Secretary of the Treasury, as required by Amendatory Act of March 2, 1895, ch. 177, sec. 10, 28 Stat. L. 809, enacted after the transcript was filed as a part of the record, and in force at the time of the trial, but providing expressly that it related to certificates thereafter made. U. S. v. Pierson, (C. C. A. 1906) 145 Fed. 814.

partment comes within this statute. U. S. v. McCoy, (1904) 193 U. S. 593, 24 S. Ct. 530, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 805.

1866, and that the land had not been returned or denominated as swamp or mineral land, was held to be competent evidence under this section, on the question of the title of one claiming as grantee from the railroad company. Howard v. Perrin, (1906) 200 U. S. 71, 26 S. Ct. 195, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 374.

Attestation by clerk. -In Henry Invest. Co. v. Semonian, (1909) 45 Colo. 260, 100 Pac. 425, it was held that a transcript of the proceedings of a court of another state, to which was appended a certificate of the judge alone that the foregoing was a complete transcript of the proceedings of the County Court in a certain county, and in a case specified, was not admissible in evidence.

By deputy. To the same effect as the original note, see Edwards v. Smith, (Tex. 1911) 137 S. W. 1161.

Certificate of judge or magistrate. To the same effect as the first paragraph of the original note, see Hagan v. Snider, (1906) 44 Tex. Civ. App. 139, 98 S. W. 213; Wolf v. King, (1908) 49 Tex. Civ. App. 41, 107 S. W. 617; Edwards v. Smith, (Tex. 1911) 137 S. W. 1161. To the same effect as the third paragraph of the original note, see Dusenberry v. Abbott, (1901) 1 Neb. (unofficial) Rep. 101, 95 N. W. 466.

As to sufficiency of certification, see Bohlander v. Heikes, (C. C. A. 1909) 168 Fed. 886.

Sufficiency of authentication. - See Seymour v. Du Bois, (1906) 145 Fed. 1003; Nadel v. Campbell, (1910) 18 Idaho 335, 110 Pac. 263; Brown v. Baxter, (1908) 77 Kan. 97, 94 Pac. 155, 574; Halfhill v. Malick, (1911) 145 Wis. 200, 129 N. W. 1087.

Mode of authentication not exclusive. — To the same effect as the first paragraph of the original note, see Tomlin v. Woods, (1904) 125 Ia. 367, 101 N. W. 135.

To the same effect as the second paragraph of the original note, see Sullivan v. Kenney, (Ia. 1910) 126 N. W. 349.

Records and proceedings of United States courts. To the same effect as the first paragraph of the original note, see Jordan v. MeDonnell, (1907) 151 Ala. 279, 44 So. 101; Edwards v. Smith, (Tex. 1911) 137 S. W. 1161.

It seems that this section is not applicable where judicial records of a federal court are offered in evidence in a state court, especially where the federal judgment is of the state in whose court it is offered as evidence. Edwards v. Smith, (Tex. 1911) 137 S. W. 1161.

But in Harmon v. Best, (Ind. 1910) 91 N. E. 19, it appeared that a federal Circuit Court appointed a receiver for a railroad, and thereafter entered an order in the receivership proceeding appointing a commissioner to hear garnishment suits against employees of the railroad, and providing how such claims could be adjudged. A railroad employee was garnished before the commissioner, and the receiver, pursuant to the order, reported the

prove the genuineness of due execution of the original assignment. Eastern Dynamite Co. r. Keystone Powder Mfg. Co., (1908) 164 Fed. 47.

amount of the wages due, and the garnishment was satisfied. The employee then sued the receiver in the state court without leave of the federal court, and the order of the federal court, properly authenticated, was introduced in evidence. It was held that under this section the order was entitled to be given full faith and credit in the state court and could not be collaterally attacked, and should have been treated by the state court as conclusive against its jurisdiction.

Records of state courts offered in federal courts. This statute does not apply to judicial records of state courts where offered in evidence in a federal court. Edwards v. Smith, (Tex. 1911) 137 S. W. 1161.

State courts must give full faith and credit.

The effect of the provision regarding full faith and credit is that in the courts of other states the judgment of a court of one state is not impeachable except for fraud or want of jurisdiction; is indisputable proof that it rests upon an unanswerable cause of action; is conclusive evidence that the right to its enforcement is wholly unaffected by a laches or lapse of time which preceded its rendition; and gives a right of action for its enforcement subject to limitation and other laws of the forum which regulate, but do not deny, unreasonably restrict, or oppressively burden the exercise of the right. Lamb v. Powder River Live Stock Co., (1904) 132 Fed. 434, 65 C. C. A. 570.

In Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. McGrew, (1903) 188 U. S. 291, 23 S. Ct. 375, 47 U. S. (L. ed.) 480, it was held that a decision of a state court cannot be reviewed in the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground that by it full faith and credit were denied to an Hawaiian judgment, in violation of U. S. Const., art. 4, sec. 1, as carried out by R. S. sec. 905, where the judgment of the trial court was rendered prior to the Act of April 30, 1900, providing a government for Hawaii, and such contention was not brought to the attention of the highest state court in any form.

In Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., (1903) 191 U. S. 373, 24 S. Ct. 92, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 225, it was held that full faith and credit was not denied an Illinois judgment by N. Y. Code Civ. Pro., sec. 1780, which, as construed by the New York courts, precludes the maintenance of an action on such judgment by one foreign corporation against another, because it is not upon a cause of action which arose within the state.

A judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States to the effect that a policy of fire insurance could not be recovered upon as it stood nor be helped out by any doctrine of

the common law is not denied full faith and credit by an adjudication of a state court that such judgment is not a bar to a suit in equity to reform the policy so that it will express consent to concurrent insurance, and to recover upon such policy as reformed. Northern Assur. Co. r. Grand View Bldg. Assoc., (1906) 203 U. S. 106, 27 S. Ct. 27, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 109.

In Fauntleroy v. Lum, (1908) 210 U. S. 230, 28 S. Ct. 641, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 1039, it was held that the Mississippi courts cannot deny to a judgment of a Missouri court, based upon an award in arbitration proceedings in Mississippi, the full faith and credit secured by U. S. Const., art. 4, sec. 1, to the judgments of sister states, because the original controversy grew out of a gambling transaction in futures in Mississippi, which is made a misdemeanor by Miss. Annot. Code 1892, secs. 1120, 1121, 2117, which further provide that contracts of that character shall not be enforced by any court.

In order that a judgment or decree shall be conclusive in an action brought thereon in another state, it must not only be conclusive in the jurisdiction where rendered, but also final in character, and establish a fixed and certain liability, and therefore a decree for alimony and costs will support an action in another state in so far as it is for a sum due at the time of its rendition, and which is absolutely awarded, but not with respect to future payments, for which it provides, but as to which it remains subject to modification at any time in the discretion of the court. Israel v. Israel, (C. C. A. 1906) 148 Fed. 576, 8 Ann. Cas. 697.

In Tilt r. Kelsey, (1907) 207 U. S. 43, 28 S. Ct. 1, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 95, it was held that the full faith and credit due the probate proceedings of the New Jersey courts do not require that the courts of New York shall be bound by the adjudication of the New Jersey courts on the question of domicile.

In Andrews v. Andrews, (1903) 188 U. S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237, 47 U. S. (L. ed.) 366, it was held that the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution is not violated by the refusal of the Massachusetts courts, acting in accordance with Mass. Pub. Stat., ch. 146, sec. 41, to give effect to a decree of divorce rendered by a court of another state in a suit instituted by one who temporarily left the state of Massachusetts, where he was domiciled, for the purpose of obtaining a divorce for a cause which occurred in that state while the parties resided there, but which was not a ground for divorce in that state.

Rule of evidence. This section providing that the record of a judgment after due notice in one state shall be conclusive evi dence in the courts of another state or of the United States of a matter adjudged, etc., prescribes a rule of evidence rather than one of jurisdiction. Israel. Israel, (1904) 130 Fed. 237; Clifford r. Williams, (1904) 131 Fed. 160; Beauchamp . Bertig, (1909) 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75; De Vall t. De Vall, (Ore. 1910) 109 Pac. 755.

Limitations. Under this section it was

held that the question whether a judgment dismissing an action on a note in New York on the ground that it was barred by limitations of that state was a determination on the merits of the case, and therefore barred another action on the note in Kentucky, depended on the effect which would be given to such judgment by the courts of New York, and that where under the decisions of New York a judgment based solely on the statute of limitations is held to affect the remedy only, and not the cause of action, such judgment was no bar to the plaintiff's action in Kentucky, where a different statute of limitation prevailed. Brand v. Brand, (1903) 116 Ky. 785, 76 S. W. 868.

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Completeness of transcript. In Montgomery v. Consolidated Boat Store Co., (1903) 115 Ky. 156, 72 S. W. 816, it was held that a transcript of the judgment of a sister state on which execution had been issued and certified, as required by sections 905-909, so as to entitle the judgment to full faith and credit, would be deemed to contain a complete copy of the judgment, though it differed in form from the form of judgment used in Kentucky.

Conclusiveness as to jurisdiction. Neither the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution (Const., art. 4, sec. 1) nor this section passed in conformity therewith prevents an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court of a sister state by which a judgment rendered therein is offered in evidence, and a copy of the record, though duly authenticated, may be contradicted as to the facts necessary to give jurisdiction, or where it appears in a collateral proceeding in another state that such facts did not exist, the record is a nullity, though it may contain recitals that the facts did exist. De Vall v. De Vall, (Ore. 1910) 109 Pac. 755.

Not applicable to courts of limited jurisdiction. Strecker v. Railson, (1907) 16 N. D. 68. 111 N. W. 612.

Probate of will. On proceedings to probate a will which had been admitted to probate in Illinois, where the copy of the will and of the record showing the admission to probate were not authenticated by the attestation of the officer having charge of the record, nor certified by him to have been com. pared with the original, and to be a true copy thereof, as required by this section, it was held that the County Court of another state had no jurisdiction to admit the will to probate. In re Box, (1906) 127 Wis. 264, 106 N. W. 1063.

In

Orders in supplementary proceedings. Orient Ins. Co. v. Rudalph, (1905) 69 N. J. Eq. 570, 61 Atl. 26, it was held that as supplementary proceedings in the state of New York are not considered special proceedings before a court or officer of limited jurisdiction, but as a new remedy in an action in which the court has general jurisdiction, the production and proof in a New Jersey court of an order by a court of New York appointing a receiver in supplementary proceedings there, and reciting the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction, furnishes conclusive evidence of the regularity and validity of the

order, and prima facie evidence of the jurisdictional facts.

Record of deeds, etc. - Copies of the record of deeds and other similar private writings made in a sister state are admissible in evidence in the courts of other states when properly certified and authenticated. But they

Vol. III, p. 39, sec. 906.

Validity of statute. Congress had the power to enact this section, under which territorial legislation must be given, by every court within the United States, the same faith and credit which it has by law or usage in the court of the territory enacting it. Atchison, etc., R. Co. r. Sowers, (1909) 213 U. S. 55, 29 S. Ct. 397, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 695. Evidentiary value of copy. In the absence of a state statute defining the evidentiary value or effect of a copy of a record from another state, this section is binding upon the courts of the state, at least to the extent of defining the evidentiary value of such a copy. Milwaukee Gold Extraction Co. v. Gordon, (1908) 37 Mont. 209, 95 Pac. 995.

Proof of incorporation. In Milwaukee Gold Extraction Co. v. Gordon, (1908) 37 Mont. 209, 95 Pac. 995, it was held that as there is no common-law rule for granting charters to corporations, which are the creatures of law, and authorized by private statutes or general laws, and as courts of Montana do not take judicial notice of the statutory law of Arizona, a certified copy of the record of incorporation of a company in Arizona is not evidence in a Montana court of its lawful incorporation in Arizona, in the absence of proof that the laws of Arizona authorized its incorporation.

will be given such force and effect only as is given thereto by the law of the state from which they are taken, and it must appear that the record was one which was authorized and provided for by the statutes of that state. Wilcox v. Bergman, (1905) 96 Minn. 219, 104 N. W. 955.

Full faith and credit to state statutes. In Atchison, etc., R. Co. r. Sowers, (1909) 213 U. S. 55, 29 S. Ct. 397, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 695, it was held that the full faith and credit demanded by this section is given by the Texas courts to the New Mexico Act of March 11, 1903, providing that an action for personal injuries received in that territory will not lie unless certain requirements as to the making of an affidavit and the bringing of suit within a specified time are observed, where a recovery is permitted in those courts subject to such restrictions, although the statute also undertakes to make the suit maintainable only in the District Court of the territory.

But in El Paso, etc., R. Co. v. Gutierrez, (1909) 215 U. S. 87, 30 S. Ct. 21, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 106, it was held that the full faith and credit demanded by this section is not given to the New Mexico Act mentioned in the preceding paragraph, where a recovery is permitted in a state court on such a cause of action, with no showing of a compliance with the preliminaries of notice and demand prescribed by the territorial statute.

Sufficiency of authentication. See Milwaukee Gold Extraction Co. v. Gordon, (1908) 37 Mont. 209, 95 Pac. 995.

Vol. III, p. 46, sec. 988.

Construction. This section gives a right of stay in a federal court only when the defendant has property upon which the judg ment. if in a state court, would be a lien, and who by reason of such lien would be entitled under the state law to a stay of such judgment. Thus where a state statute makes judgments liens on real estate, but not on personal property, and gives a right of stay to a defendant owning sufficient real estate without other security, and also a right of stay to other defendants on their giving bail, a judgment defendant in a federal court who has no real estate cannot obtain a stay by virtue of section 988 by giving bail. Island Queen, (1907) 152 Fed. 470.

The

In Petrified Bone Min. Co. v. Rogers, (1908) 159 Fed. 1019, it appeared that the Pennsylvania codifying statute of June 16, 1836, P. L. 762, secs. 3 and 4, 2 Purd. Dig. (Stewart's ed.) 1517, pars. 9 and 10, provides that certain judgment defendants may give

security for the sum recovered, with interest and costs, and thereupon be entitled to a stay, to be computed from the first day of the term to which the action was commenced, from six to twelve months, depending upon the size of the judgment. Act Pa. 1873, P. L. 60, 1 Purd. Dig. 1519, par. 16, changed the time from which the stay is to be computed to the return day of the writ by which the action was commenced. No term of state court in Pennsylvania lasts six months. 1 Purd. Dig. (Stewart's ed.) 629, 630, pars. 59, 60. It was held that so far as a stay of execution is concerned, defendants in the federal courts in Pennsylvania have the same privilege as those in the state courts, and upon the same conditions, except that the stay cannot last longer than one term, and that either the Pennsylvania Act of 1836 or that of 1873 fixes the time when the stay begins in the federal courts, as well as in the state courts.

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Statute mandatory. This Act, prescribing the manner in which "all real estate or any interest in land sold under any order or decree of any United States court shall be sold," etc., is mandatory and devests such courts of the discretion which theretofore existed of making sales otherwise than by public auction as therein prescribed, and a sale otherwise made is illegal and void and does not bind the purchaser even after confirmation, who cannot be required to pay for and accept a title which might be subsequently impeached for palpable legal defect in the proceeding itself under which the sale was made. Cumberland Lumber Co. v. Tunis Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 1909) 171 Fed. 352. Sale of street railroad under mortgage.

In Provident L., etc., Co. v. Camden, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1910) 177 Fed. 854, it was held that the fact that the method of advertisement of the property of a street railroad company to be sold under a foreclosure decree did not conform to the method designated in the mortgages was immaterial, as such foreclosure was governed by the provision of this Act.

Bankruptcy. A court of bankruptcy is not limited in its sales of assets of bankrupts by this Act; but the Bankruptcy Act confers upon such courts full equitable powers in the administration of estates, and they may, for good cause shown, order either real or personal property sold at private sale. Edes, (1905) 135 Fed. 595.

In re

Vol. III, p. 58, sec. 161.

Form. The regulations mentioned in this section need not be promulgated in any set form, nor in writing, but may consist of established usages and practices which have become a kind of common law of the department. Haas v. Henkel, (1909) 216 U. S. 462, 30 S. Ct. 249, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 569, affirming (1906) 167 Fed. 211.

Regulations of postmaster-general. — Under this section, pursuant to which the postmaster-general intrusted the determination of matters pertaining to the second class mailing

privilege to the third assistant postmastergeneral, it was held to be immaterial to the right of a publisher to have an order excluding his publication from the mails as secondclass mail matter reviewed by the courts that the hearing was before the third assistant postmaster-general, if the order was made by the postmaster-general. Lewis Pub. Co. v.

Wyman, (1907) 152 Fed. 787.

In Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, (C. C. A. 1910) 182 Fed. 13, it was held that the postmaster-general was authorized to limit the