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ated crimes, exists between the United States and a foreign government, a "request" by the foreign government for the surrender of a fugitive is a sufficient "demand" for the surrender. Er p. Charlton, (1911) 185 Fed. 880.

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Translation of depositions. Where certain depositions attached to extradition papers were in the German language, and the translator testified before the commissioner that he had dictated the translation to a typewriter, that he had examined and compared it as written out, and that the translation was correct, there being no claim by petitioner that the translation was in any respect inaccurate, it was held to be no objection to the translation that the typewriter did not also testify with reference thereto. Zentner, (1910) 188 Fed. 344.

Ex p.

Ulterior purpose in securing extradition. Evidence of malice or an ulterior purpose on the part of the prosecuting witness at whose instance a criminal prosecution was instituted in a foreign country will not invalidate a commitment of the accused for extradition from this country. In re Herskovitz, (1901) 136 Fed. 713.

Where extradition proceedings for forgery were in the name of the German government under treaty with the United States, it was held that the attitude or motives of the persons alleged to have been defrauded were immaterial. Ex p. Zentner, (1910) 188 Fed. 344.

Surrender of citizens of the United States for trial in foreign country. The word "persons" in the extradition treaty between the United States and Italy, entered into in 1868, 24 Stat. L. 1001, 7 Fed. Stat. Annot. 654, providing for the surrender of persons charged with enumerated crimes. is suffi eiently broad to embrace citizens and subjects of the contracting parties, and a citizen of the United States, who while in Italy commits an offense, and who then flees to the United States, is within the treaty and may be extradited thereunder, though Italy has always construed the word so as to include its citizens and subjects. Ex p. Charlton, (1911) 185 Fed. 880.

Due process of law. Where an extradition treaty subsists with a foreign government under the Constitution and law of the land, a surrender of an alleged fugitive in pursuance thereof is in accordance with the due process of law requirement of the Constitution. Ex p. Charlton, (1911) 185 Fed. 880.

Review of commissioner's decision on habeas corpus. Under this section, which vests justices of the Supreme Court, circuit

Vol. III, p. 76, sec. 5271.

Authentication of depositions. Under this section, providing that, where depositions are offered in evidence in an extradition case, they shall be admitted if they are properly authenticated to be received for similar purposes by the tribunals of the foreign country from which accused shall have escaped, F. S. A. Supp. - 68

and district judges and commissioners with concurrent jurisdiction to issue warrants and make examinations and commitments in extradition proceedings, the judgment of a commissioner in such a proceeding cannot be reviewed for error by a District Court on a writ of habeas corpus. In re Herskovitz, (1901) 136 Fed. 713.

The court, on habeas corpus for the discharge of an alleged fugitive from the justice of a foreign country, held for removal thereto, may only determine whether the findings of the committing magistrate are based on competent evidence, and whether the foreign government has formally demanded the extradition of the fugitive. Er p. Charlton, (1911) 185 Fed. 880.

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Necessity for certificate of Secretary of State. Under this section a certificate of the Secretary of State that application for the extradition of the person named has been made by the foreign government is not necessary to the issuance of such warrant, even where, as in case of Russia, the treaty provides for such certificate. In re Schlippenbach, (1908) 164 Fed. 783.

Bail. A Circuit Court of the United States has power independently of statute to admit to bail in a case of foreign extradition pending examination, but such power should be exercised only under the most pressing circumstances. However, where the plaintiff in an action in New York involving his whole fortune was arrested on an extradition warrant from Canada the day before the trial of his case was to begin, at the instance of the adverse party, it was held that the hardship was such that the court was justified in enlarging him on bail until the trial of his case could be completed. In re Mitchell, (1909) 171 Fed. 289.

What amounts to a charge of crime. -- For the purposes of extradition, one who, in his absence, has been convicted in contumaciam of a criminal offense in a foreign country, is to be regarded only as charged with, and not convicted of, the offense. Ex p. Fudera, (1908) 162 Fed. 591.

Finality of decision of country on which demand is made. The question whether or not a fugitive shall be surrendered by a country in which he has sought asylum must of necessity be decided by the government of such country, and its decision, approved by its courts, that the offense charged is within the terms of an extradition treaty between that country and the one making the demand, is final, and the question cannot be again raised in the courts of the latter country after extradition. Greene v. U. S., (C. C. A. 1907) 154 Fed. 401, affirming (1906) 146 Fed. 803.

and the certificate of the principal diplomatic officers of the United States in such country shall be proof that the depositions are so authenticated, depositions so authenticated are properly admitted, though some of them are not sworn to. Ex p. Glaser, (1910) 176 Fed. 702, 100 C. C. A. 254.

Vol. III, p. 78, sec. 5275.

Prosecution for subsequent offense. - Immunity from trial for an offense committed by a person after his extradition until he has been afforded an opportunity to return to the country whence he was extradited was not given by the provisions of the treaties with Great Britain of Aug. 9, 1842, 8 Stat. L. 576, Fed. Stat. Annot. 582, and July 12, 1889,

Vol. III, p. 78, sec. 5278.

Federal authority paramount. A state has no sovereign power to surrender fugitives found within its limits to another jurisdiction, and can grant extradition only under the Federal Constitution and statutes. In re Kopel, (1906) 148 Fed. 505.

The power of Congress to extend the extradition laws to all places within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States cannot be denied. In re Gillis, (1905) 38 Wash. 156, 80 Pac. 300.

State governors must rely on federal statutes. - The governor of a state in acting on an application for extradition is bound to follow the procedure specified by this section. Ross v. Crofutt, (1911) 84 Conn. 370, 80 Atl. 90.

Under the Washington statute (Pierce's Code, sec. 2035; Ballinger's Annot. Codes & Stat., sec. 7016) making it the duty of the prosecuting attorney or other prosecuting officer to investigate the grounds of a demand for extradition before the issuing of a rendition warrant, it has been held that the governor is not required to have these officers make such investigation before issuing the warrant, as he acts under the Constitution and laws of the United States. In re Gillis, (1905) 38 Wash. 156, 80 Pac. 300.

State legislation in aid of federal enactments. The extradition of fugitives from the justice of a state is provided for by Const. U. S., art. 4, sec. 2, providing that, where a person charged in any state with crime shall flee from justice and be found in another state, he shall on demand of the executive of the state from which he fled be delivered up to be removed to that state, and by federal statutes enacted in furtherance of the provision, and a state statute in aid thereof need not be complied with. Thus, where a fugitive was arrested by an officer on information furnished him from the sister state, and on hearing the governor issued his warrant, it was held that the fugitive could not complain that he was not arrested in accordance with a state law providing for the arrest of a person charged in another state with crime. Ex p. Bergman, (1910) 60 Tex. Crim. 8, 130 S. W. 174.

The principles governing international extradition have no application to cases of extradition between states. Knox v. State, (1905) 164 Ind. 226, 73 N. E. 255.

Alaska. Under the Washington statute (Pierce's Code, sec. 2035; Ballinger's Annot. Codes & Stat., sec. 7016) providing that when a demand is made upon the governor of

26 Stat. L. 1508, 1509, 7 Fed. Stat. Annot. 603, or of R. S. sec. 5275, under which such immunity as to prior offenses only is secured. Collins v. O'Neil, (1909) 214 U. S. 113, 29 S. Ct. 573, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 933, affirming (1907) 151 Cal. 340, 90 Pac. 827, 91 Pac. 397.

the state by the executive of any state or territory, in any case authorized by the Constitution and laws of the United States, for the delivery over of any person charged with crime, the governor shall, if satisfied that the demand is conformable to law and ought to be complied with, issue his warrant, etc., it has been held that the governor has authority to surrender a fugitive from justice upon the demand of the governor of the district of Alaska, made pursuant to section 393, Act March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. L. 1328, ch. 429, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot. 396, expressly conferring upon the governor of that district power to make such demand. In re Gillis, (1905) 38 Wash. 156, 80 Pac. 300.

Porto Rico. Precisely the same power to issue a requisition for the return of a fugitive criminal as is possessed under R. S. sec. 5278 by the governor of any organized territory, is given the governor of Porto Rico by the provisions of the Foraker Act of April 12, 1900, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 767, 31 Stat. L. 80, ch. 191, sec. 14, that the laws of the United States not locally inapplicable shall be in force and effect in Porto Rico, and of section 17, 5 Fed. Stat. Annot. 768, that the governor of Porto Rico shall have all the powers of governors of the territories of the United States that are not locally inapplicable. People v. Bingham, (1909) 211 Ü. S. 468, 29 S. Ct. 190, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 286, affirming (1907) 189 N. Y. 124, 81 N. E. 773, which affirmed 117 App. Div. 411, 102 N. Y. S. 878; In re Kopel, (1906) 148 Fed. 505.

In the District of Columbia the chief justice of the Supreme Court thereof is charged with the same duties that in similar proceedings are imposed upon the governors of the several states. Hayes v. Palmer, (1903) 21 App. Cas. 450.

Fugitive serving a sentence in asylum state. - The governor, otherwise than by exercising his pardoning power, has no power by virtue of the Federal Constitution, or otherwise, to grant an extradition demand issued by the governor of another state for the return of a fugitive from the justice of that state lawfully held in a penal institution under an unexpired sentence. In re Opinion of Justices, (1909) 201 Mass. 609, 89 N. E. 174.

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Race prejudice as cause for refusing extradition. The mere suggestion that the alleged fugitive from the justice of another state, because of his race and color, will not receive a fair and impartial trial in the court of the demanding state, and will not be adequately protected against violence while in

the custody of that state, does not require the executive of the state in which he may be found to refuse to surrender him on demand made in conformity with the Federal Constitution and laws, nor furnish a ground for his release on habeas corpus. Marbles v. Creecy, (1909) 215 U. S. 63, 30 S. Ct. 32, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 92.

State and federal courts.-The state courts are bound by the construction of the extradition laws adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States. Dennison v. Christian, (1904) 72 Neb. 703, 101 N. W. 1045.

Respective rights of demanding and asylum states. To the same effect as the original note, see In re Opinion of Justices, (1909) 201 Mass. 609, 89 N. E. 174.

Who is "a fugitive from justice." — To the same effect as the first paragraph of the original note. Depoilly . Palmer, (1906) 28 App. Cas. (D. C.) 324; Com. v. Hare, (1908) 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 125.

To be a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the provisions of U. S. Const., art. 4, sec. 2, and R. S. sec. 5278, it is only necessary that the accused, having been in the demanding state when the crime was committed, thereafter leave that state and be found within the territory of another. Appleyard v. Com., (1906) 203 U. S. 222, 27 S. Ct. 122, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 161; In re Strauss, (1903) 126 Fed. 327, 63 C. C. A. 99.

A person indicted the second time for the same offense is none the less a fugitive from justice because, after the dismissal of the first indictment, on which he was originally extradited, he left the state with the knowledge of, or without objection by, the state authorities. Bassing r. Cady, (1908) 208 U. S. 386, 28 S. Ct. 392, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 540.

One who does, within the state, an overt act, which is, and is intended to be, a material step towards accomplishing a crime, and then absents himself from the state and does the rest elsewhere, becomes a fugitive from justice for extradition purposes when the crime is complete, if not before. Strassheim v. Daily, (1911) 221 U. S. 280, 31 S. Ct. 558, 55 U. S. (L. ed.) 735; State v. Gerber, (1910) 111 Minn. 132, 126 N. W. 482.

One convicted of an offense against a state, who, before the expiration of that sentence, was delivered to the federal authorities to serve out a prior sentence, would at the end of such prior sentence be a fugitive from justice under the United States Constitution, and could be taken by the state under the direct provisions of this section. People v. Benham, (1911) 71 Misc. 345, 128 N. Y. S. 610.

Section 364 of the Criminal Code of Nebraska (Cobbey's Ann. Code 1901) does not authorize the extradition of a person charged with crime against the laws of another state without proof that the person so charged is a fugitive from the justice of the demanding state. Dennison v. Christian, (1904) 72 Neb. 703, 101 N. W. 1045.

For other cases on the question as to who is a fugitive from justice under the extradition laws, see People r. Baker, (1911) 142 App. Div. 598, 127 N. Y. S. 382; Coleman v. State, (1908) 53 Tex. Crim. 93, 113 S. W. 17.

Actual presence when crime committed.— A person cannot be a fugitive from justice unless he was in the state from which the demand comes when it is charged that the crime was committed. Farrell v. Hawley, (1905) 78 Conn. 150, 61 Atl. 502; Hayes v. Palmer, (1903) 21 App. Cas. (D. C.) 450; O'Malley v. Quigg, (1909) 172 Ind. 350, 88 N. E. 611; People v. Baker, (1911) 142 App. Div. 598, 127 N. Y. S. 382.

In Ex p. Hoffstot, (1910) 180 Fed. 240, affirmed 218 U. S. 665, 31 S. Ct. 222, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 1201, it was held that the petitioner, a resident of New York, indicted in Pennsylvania for conspiracy to bribe members of the Pittsburg city council, could not be extradited, in the absence of some proof that he had been physically present in Pennsylvania when the offense was committed, as otherwise he could not be a fugitive from justice of that state.

Escaped convict. A person who, after having been convicted of a crime committed within a state, when sought for, to be subjected to the sentence of the court, is found within another state, is a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the extradition statute. Hughes . Pflanz, (C. C. A. 1905) 138 Fed. 980.

The belief of the accused, when leaving the demanding state, that he had not committed any crime against the laws of that state, does not prevent his being a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the provision of U. S. Const., art. 4, sec. 2, and R. S. sec. 5278. Appleyard v. Massachusetts, (1906) 203 U. S. 222, 27 S. Ct. 122, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 161.

The motive of the accused in leaving the state has no bearing upon the question as to whether he is a fugitive from justice. Ex p. Hoffstot, (1910) 180 Fed. 240, affirmed 218 U. S. 665, 31 S. Ct. 222, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 1201; Com. v. Hare, (1908) 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 125.

One found in another state on institution of prosecution against him, who refuses to return voluntarily, is a fugitive within the extradition law, though he left openly, not in flight or with any intent to avoid arrest; the manner of his leaving being immaterial. Taylor . Wise, (Ia. 1910) 126 N. W. 1126.

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Evidence as to flight from justice. pendent proof, apart from the requisition papers, that the accused was a fugitive from justice, need not be demanded by the governor of the surrendering state before issuing his warrant of arrest in extradition proceedings. Pettibone . Nichols, (1906) 203 U. S. 192, 27 S. Ct. 111, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 148.

The statute does not provide for the particular kind of evidence to be produced before the governor, nor how it shall be authenticated, but it must at least be evidence that is satisfactory to his mind. Munsey v. Clough, (1905) 196 U. S. 364, 25 S. Ct. 282, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 515, affirming (1902) 71 N. H. 594, 53 Atl. 1086; Farrell v. Hawley, (1905) 78 Conn. 150, 61 Atl. 502.

Contradictory evidence on the question of the presence or absence of the accused in the state at the time of the commission of the

offense will not require his discharge on habeas corpus to review the issuance of a warrant of arrest in interstate extradition proceedings. Munsey r. Clough, (1905) 196 U. S. 364, 25 S. Ct. 282, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 515.

Where there was specific evidence that the petitioner, a resident of New York, participated there in a conspiracy to bribe members of the city council of Pittsburg to select certain banks in Pittsburg, of one of which petitioner was president, as city depositories, and there was substantial evidence from which a jury would be justified in drawing an inference that petitioner was in Pittsburg on a day when some act or acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were performed, it was held that there was sufficient proof that he was a fugitive from justice to justify his extradition to Pennsylvania. Ex p. Hoffstot, (1910) 180 Fed. 240, affirmed 218 U. S. 665, 31 S. Ct. 222, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 1201.

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In Hayes t. Palmer, (1903) 21 App. Cas. (D. C.) 450, the appellant was charged with keeping a gaming table for gambling" and with keeping and managing "a house for gambling." It was held that he did not overthrow the prima facie case of the state by testimony that he had not been in the state on the date named, but had been there "shortly before" and frequently during the summer without showing the exact dates when he was there.

Warrant is prima facie evidence as to flight from justice. - Bassing . Cady, (1908) 208 U. S. 386, 28 S. Ct. 392, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 540; Marbles v. Creecy, (1909) 215 U. S. 63, 30 S. Ct. 32, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 92; Hayes v. Palmer, (1903) 21 App. Cas. (D. C.) 452; State v. Curtis, (1910) 111 Minn. 240, 126 N. W. 719.

To the same effect as the second paragraph of the original note, see Morrison r. Dwyer, (1909) 143 Ia. 502, 121 N. W. 1064.

It is a question of fact whether the person sought to be extradited is a "fugitive from justice." In re Strauss, (1903) 126 Fed. 327, 63 C. C. A. 99.

Question cannot be raised in demanding state. Where the accused is personally within the jurisdiction of the demanding state, and there applies to the court for his discharge on habeas corpus, he cannot raise the question as to whether or not he has been, as a matter of fact, a refugee from the justice of that state, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution and the Act of Congress authorizing interstate extradition. In re Moyer, (1906) 12 Idaho 250, 85 Pac. 897; In re Pettibone, (1906) 12 Idaho 264, 85 Pac. 902: In re Haywood, (1906) 12 Idaho 264, 85 Pac. 902.

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U. S. 1, 29 S. Ct. 605, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 885, affirming (1907) 152 Ala. 68, 44 So. 685.

Technical sufficiency. The legal sufficiency of the indictment is not to be determined by the officer granting the requisition warrant. Depoilly v. Palmer, (1906) 28 App. Cas. (D. C.) 324.

It is a matter for the determination of the court having jurisdiction of the crime charged. Hayes . Palmer, (1903) 21 App. Cas. (D. C.) 450; People v. Baker, (1911) 142 App. Div. 598, 127 N. Y. S. 382; In re Renshaw, (1904) 18 S. D. 32, 99 N. W. 83.

Where extradition proceedings were instituted by Alabama to prosecute petitioner for an alleged homicide committed in that state. under the laws of which it was not essential that the indictment should charge either the time or venue of the offense, it was held that an indictment omitting such elements was not objectionable for that reason in the extradition proceedings. Coleman r. State, (1908) 53 Tex. Crim. 93, 113 S. W. 17.

To the same effect as the first paragraph of the original note, see Harris v. Magee, (Ia. 1911) 129 N. W. 742.

For other cases see Pierce v. Creecy, (1908) 210 U. S. 387, 28 S. Ct. 714, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 1113, affirming (1907) 155 Fed. 663; Strassheim. Daily, (1911) 221 U. S. 280, 31 S. Ct. 558, 55 U. S. (L. ed.) 735; Ex p. Lewis, (Nev. 1911) 115 Pac. 729.

Burden to show insufficiency. In habeas corpus by prisoners held pursuant to an indictment found in a sister state. the burden is on relators to show that the indictment is insufficient by producing, if necessary, the statute under which it was found; and hence the fact that such statute was not submitted with the requisition papers to the governor under whose warranty relators were arrested will not warrant the presumption that the law of the sister state is the same as that of the forum, under which the indictment would be insufficient. In re Renshaw, (1904) 18 S. D. 32, 99 N. W. 83.

Information. - An information is sufficient basis for extradition. People r. Stockwell, (1904) 135 Mich. 341, 97 N. W. 765.

Sufficiency. It is not necessary that the information charge precisely the same offense named in the original warrant of arrest, so long as it is based on the same transaction. People v. Stockwell, (1904) 135 Mich. 341, 97 N. W. 765.

Affidavit. It is not necessary that extradition proceedings under this section shall be based on an indictment, but that a verified complaint or affidavit charging a person with a crime is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the governor of the state to which the defendant has fled. In re Strauss, (1903) 126 Fed. 327, 63 C. C. A. 99.

Where the requisition is accompanied by a certified copy of an indictment against the fugitive the governor need not consider the sufficiency of the affidavit attached to the requisition. Law v. State, (Ala. 1911) 56 So. 79.

On information and belief. — An affidavit for a requisition in extradition proceedings, made on information and belief, and not

predicated on facts within the knowledge of the affiant, is insufficient. People v. City Prison, (1908) 60 Misc. 525, 112 Ñ. Y. S. 492; Ex p. Cheatham, (1906) 50 Tex. Crim. 51, 95 S. W. 1077.

But a complaint, charging a crime sworn to by the county attorney as true without qualification, is a sufficient affidavit as the basis of an extradition proceeding, as against the objection that the complaint was necessarily on information and belief and insufficient. Morrison r. Dwyer, (1909) 143 Ia. 502, 121 N. W. 1064.

Authority of officer administering oath. In State r. Bates, (1907) 101 Minn. 303, 112 N. W. 260, it was objected that the complaint or affidavit purported to be sworn to before a justice of the peace, but that there was no proof before the court that a justice of the peace in the state of California is authorized to administer an oath, and that the courts of Minnesota cannot presume that the statute law of California is the same as in Minnesota. It was held that it would be implied from the executive authentication that the officer certifying to the jurat of the affidavit was such magistrate as he was therein represented to be.

An affidavit made before a notary public, who under Georgia Code 1895 (vol. 2, p. 982; vol. 3, p. 93) is ex officio a justice of the peace, must be regarded as satisfying the requirement of the provisions of this section, that such affidavit be made before a magistrate, where the governor of Georgia has based his requisition upon such affidavit, and a warrant of arrest has been issued thereon by the governor of the state upon whom the demand for arrest and extradition was made. Compton r. Alabama, (1908) 214 U. S. 1, 29 S. Ct. 605, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 885, affirming (1907) 152 Ala. 68, 44 So. 685.

Record of conviction in lieu of affidavit. Where a charge of crime made against a person in affidavits filed before a magistrate or a court has culminated in a conviction, the record of such conviction is sufficient evidence in proceedings for his extradition from another state, and the question as to the sufficiency of the affidavits becomes immaterial. Hughes t. Pflanz, (C. C. A. 1905) 138 Fed. 980.

A verified complaint is sufficient as an affidavit required by this section. Morrison . Dwyer, (1909) 143 Ia. 502, 121 N. W. 1064; State v. Bates, (1907) 101 Minn. 303, 112 N. W. 260; Ex p. Cheatham, (1906) 50 Tex. Crim. 51, 95 S. W. 1077.

Under 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & Stat. of Washington, sec. 7017, declaring that when any person shall be found within the state charged with an offense committed in another state, any court or magistrate may on complaint issue a warrant for his arrest, etc.. the complaint on which the warrant is issued must show that accused has been legally charged with crime in the demanding state. State v. White, (1905) 40 Wash. 560, 82 Pac. 907.

The question of identity of the person accused cannot be inquired into on habeas corpus where there is no allegation in the plead

State v.

ings that he is not such person.
Bates, (1907) 101 Minn. 303, 112 N. W. 260;
Gillis . Leekley, (1905) 38 Wash. 156, 80
Pac. 300.

Charged with crime. A fugitive from justice is "charged" with a crime, within the extradition law, only when he is charged lawfully by a person who has knowledge of its commission, or is possessed of information, which he states under oath, leading a reasonable and fair mind to infer its commission. People v. City Prison, (1908) 60 Misc. 525, 112 N. Y. S. 492.

It is only necessary to inquire whether a crime has been charged under the statute of the demanding state as construed by the courts of that state. In re Strauss, (1903) 126 Fed. 327, 63 C. C. A. 99.

A finding on extradition proceedings that an indictment upon which they are based does not charge a crime does not preclude a subsequent trial on the merits in the state where the indictment was found after the accused has been found in that state and arrested. - Benson v. Palmer, (1908) 31 App. Cas. (D. C.) 561.

In extradition proceedings, allegations that accused in a specified county and state on a day named obtained a specified sum of money from one named person as agent of another by false pretenses by drawing and delivering to such person a check for that amount on a bank at a specified place, and procured such person as such agent to cash the check by falsely representing that he was financially responsible, and had funds in or credit with the bank, and that the check would be honored, and that such person was deceived thereby, was held to sufficiently charge the offense of obtaining money on false pretenses. Taylor v. Wise, (Ia. 1910) 126 N. W. 1126.

Where an Ohio statute provided that any person who obtained of another anything of value by any false pretense, with intent to defraud, shall be guilty of on offense which, if the value of the property be thirtyfive dollars or more, is punishable by imprisonment, an affidavit charging that accused, on a particular day, in M. county, Ohio, unlawfully and falsely pretended to a certain watch company, with intent to defraud it, that he was the owner of a dry goods store in Y., Ohio, which statement was false and known so to be by accused, and by means of such false statement accused obtained from the company jewelry worth $400, was held to sufficiently state an offense, under the Ohio laws, to sustain extradition proceedings. In re Strauss, (C. C. A. 1903) 126 Fed, 327.

It is a question of law whether the person extradited was substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the state demanding his surrender. Munsey r. Clough, (1904) 196 U. S. 364, 25 S. Ct. 282, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 515, afirming (1902) 71 N. H. 594, 53 Atl. 1086; In re Strauss, (1903) 126 Fed. 327, 63 C. C. A. 99; Depoilly v. Palmer, (1906) 28 App. Cas. (D. C.) 324; Dennison r. Christian, (1904) 72 Neb, 703, 101 N. W. 1045; In re Waterman, (1907) 29 Nev. 288, 89 Pac. 291. To the same effect as the original note, see Com. v. Philadelphia County Prison, (1908)

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