220 Pa. St. 401, 69 Atl. 916, affirming (1907) 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 594.

Complaint before committing magistrate. A person against whom a complaint for a felony has been filed before a committing magistrate, who can only charge or hold for trial before another tribunal, is "charged with the crime within the meaning of U. S. Const., art. 4, sec. 2, subd. 2, and of R. S. sec. 5278. Matter of Strauss, (1905) 197 U. S. 324, 25 S. Ct. 535, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 774. Person convicted and sentenced. In Hughes . Pflanz, (C. C. A. 1905) 138 Fed. 980, it appeared that the appellant had been convicted of a crime in Indiana and sentenced under the indeterminate sentence law of that state and had escaped from the state before his sentence expired. It was claimed that he was not "charged with crime" within section 5278. The court said: "The term 'charged with crime,' as used in the Constitution and statute, seems to us to have been used in its broad sense, and to include all persons accused of crime. It would be a very narrow and technical construction to hold that after the accusation, and before conviction, a person could be extradited, while after conviction, which establishes the charge conclusively, he could escape extradition. The object of the provisions of the Constitution and statute is to prevent the escape of persons charged with crime, whether convicted or unconvicted, and to secure their return and punishment if guilty. Taking the broad definition of charged with crime' as including the responsibility for crime, the charge would not cease or be merged in the conviction, but would stand until the judgment is satisfied. It would include every person accused, until he should be acquitted, or until the judgment inflicted should be satisfied. Any other construction would prevent the return of escaped convicts upon the charge under which they had been sentenced, and defeat in many instances the ends of justice. The relator was convicted of the crime of larceny in Indiana, and sentenced, and the term of sentence has not yet expired. That charge of larceny continues to be a charge against him until the sentence has been performed, and he therefore stands charged with crime,' within the meaning of that term as used in the Federal Constitution."

Place of commission. - An affidavit for a requisition, made by the governor of Colorado, alleged that accused obtained from the prosecutor two title deeds purporting to convey lands in Kansas; that she promised to take the deeds to the recorder in the county where the lands described in the deeds were situated, and there record the same, for which purpose the deeds were delivered to her; that she did not record them, but converted them to her own use, to wit, that she left Colorado within a few days after obtaining the deeds for the state of Kansas and there obtained other conveyances to the property and transferred the title to other persons, etc. It was held that the offense stated in the affidavit was committed in Kansas, and was not within the jurisdiction of the courts of Colorado, and hence the affidavit was insufficient to sus

tain the requisition. Ex p. Cheatham, (1906) 50 Tex. Crim. 51, 95 S. W. 1077.

Presumptions. It is presumed that the acts charged in an indictment found in a sister state, under which the extradition of fugitives from justice is sought, are sufficient to constitute a crime under its laws. In re Renshaw, (1904) 18 S. D. 32, 99 N. W. 83.

The words "treason, felony, or other crimes. To the same effect as the first paragraph of the original note, see Com. v. Hare, (1908) 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 125.

The word crime," as used in Const. U. S., art. 4, sec. 2, requiring that a person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, shall be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime, embraces not only misdemeanors, but treason and felony as well, being sufficiently broad to include every possible crime committed within the border of the United States. Ross

r. Crofutt, (1911) 84 Conn. 370, 80 Atl. 90. Where a defendant, after conviction in a sister state, fled from the justice of that state, the mere fact that in the judgment of conviction there was imposed a pecuniary fine and sentence to jail was held not to show that he was not guilty of a felony within Const. U. S., art. 4, sec. 2, and the federal statutes relating to extradition, there being nothing to show that under the law of the sister state accused might not have been imprisoned in the penitentiary. Ex p. Bergman, (1910) 60 Tex. Crim. 8, 130 S. W. 174.

"Certified as authentic.” — Extradition proceedings are sufficiently authenticated where the record of the prosecution is certified by the justice before whom it is pending, the county clerk certifies to the justice's official character, and the attorney-general certifies that the application for requisition is in due form under the laws of that state, while the governor certifies to the authenticity of the records and that by such papers and records the accused stands charged with a crime. Taylor . Wise, (Ia. 1910) 126 N. W. 1126.

The question of the authenticity of the complaint is for the governor's own determination, and his certificate to the fact alone is required. Morrison v. Dwyer, (1909) 143 Ia. 502, 121 N. W. 1064.

Presumptions. The presumption is that one authenticating an indictment, made a part of requisition papers, as governor of the demanding state, was so acting at the time. Kemper . Metzger, (1907) 169 Ind. 112, 81 N. E. 663.

Where a governor's requisition is issued in extradition proceedings, it will be presumed on habeas corpus in favor of the action of the governor that his requisition was attached to the papers and affidavits on which it was based, and that he stated therein that the annexed papers were duly authenticated in accordance with the laws of the demanding state. Ex p. Cheatham, (1906) 50 Tex. Crim. 51, 95 S. W. 1077.

The purpose of requiring a certificate of authentication of the affidavit charging a

crime, attached to a requisition for extradition of a fugitive from justice, is to prevent the governor of the state upon whom the demand is made from being imposed upon by spurious charges of crime, and to advise him of the genuineness of the copy of the indictment or affidavit. State v. Curtis, (1910) 111 Minn. 240, 126 N. W. 719.

Form. The certificate of authentication need not be in any particular form. It is sufficient if it shows that a copy of an indictment or affidavit annexed to the requisition is authentic. A certificate was held to be sufficient which was in these words: "It appears from the annexed papers, duly authenticated according to the laws of this state." State v. Curtis, (1910) 111 Minn. 240, 126 N. W. 719.

In State v. Bates, (1907) 101 Minn. 303, 112 N. W. 260, the certification was as follows: "It satisfactorily appears, by the annexed and accompanying complaint, in form of an affidavit, filed in and issued out of the justice court of Stockton township, county of San Joaquin, state of California, and warrant of arrest issued out of said court, also affidavits of George F. McNoble, Walter F. Sibley, Joseph D. Simpson, and Hayward Reed (which I certify are authentic and duly authenticated in accordance with the laws of the state of California), that in the due and regular course of judicial proceedings under the laws of this state J. H. Grande stands charged with the crime of forgery." Objection was made that the certification related only to the affidavits of McNoble, Sibley, Simpson, and Reed. The court held that the only reasonable construction of the language used was that the governor certified that all of the documents enumerated by him and upon which he based his demand were authentic, and that his certificate was therefore sufficient.

Proceedings before governor Right to hearing before governor. The person demanded in interstate extradition proceedings has no right to a hearing before the governor on the question whether he has been substantially charged with a crime and whether he is a fugitive from justice. Munsey v. Clough, (1905) 196 U. S. 364, 25 S. Ct. 282, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 515; Marbles v. Creecy, (1909) 215 U. S. 63, 30 S. Ct. 32, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 92; Farrell . Hawley, (1905) 78 Conn. 150, 61 Atl. 502.

Sufficiency of requisition papers. - An extradition requisition reciting that the accused was charged by indictment with a specified crime against the laws of the state, and had become a fugitive from the justice of that state, accompanied by a certified copy of the indictment, makes a prima facie case against the accused as an alleged fugitive from justice, and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, authorizes the executive of the surrendering state to issue his warrant for the arrest and delivery of the alleged criminal to the agent of the demanding state. Marbles

. Creecy, (1909) 215 U. S. 63, 30 S. Ct. 32, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 92. See also Ross v. Crofutt, (1911) 84 Conn. 370, 80 Atl. 90.

Scope of governor's inquiry. — When requi

sition is made upon a governor he must determine, first, whether the person demanded is substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the state from whose justice it is alleged he has fled, by an indictment or affidavit properly certified; and, second, whether he is a fugitive from justice from the state demanding him. Dennison v. Christian, (1904) 72 Neb. 703, 101 N. W. 1045. See also Ross v. Crofutt, (1911) 84 Conn. 370, 80 Atl. 90; Harris v. Magee, (Ia. 1911) 129 N. W. 742.

Discretion of executive as to surrender. Whether the warrant of arrest shall be issued or not is an executive consideration, and the duty of the governor is absolute whenever the requisition from the demanding state is presented in due form, with the necessary accompanying papers as required by law, to the governor of the state where the accused has taken refuge. The latter is under obligation to issue a warrant for the surrender of the person accused, if he be a fugitive from justice. If the requisition is in proper form he has no authority to determine whether the charge is true. The constitutional provision for extradition is in the nature of a treaty between the states to which the executive of each is bound to give effect. In re Opinion of Justices, (1909) 201 Mass. 609, 89 N. E. 174; Com. v. Hare, (1908) 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 125; Ex p. Denning, (1907) 50 Tex. Crim. 629, 100 S. W. 401; Coleman v. State, (1908) 53 Tex. Crim. 93, 113 S. W. 17.

Motives of governor. The motives which prompt the chief executive of a state to issue his warrant for the rendition of a prisoner are not proper subjects of judicial inquiry. Such inquiry would be opposed to public policy and the freedom of action of the execu tive department of government. In re Moyer, (1906) 12 Idaho 250, 85 Pac. 897; In re Pettibone, (1906) 12 Idaho 264, 85 Pac. 902; In re Haywood, (1906) 12 Idaho 264, 85 Pac. 902.

The

Motive for proceeding. In Com. v. Philadelphia County Prison, (1908) 220 Pa. St. 401, 69 Atl. 916, affirming (1907) 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 594, the court said: "Assuming that the demanding state has complied with the requirements of the Federal Constitution and the Act of Congress in making the requisition for the accused, it would be equally an unconstitutional exercise of power for the court of the asylum state to inquire into the motives of the prosecution, instituted in conformity with the laws of the demanding state, and release the offender and thereby prevent his extradition for trial in the latter state. only possible effect of permitting the motives of the private prosecutor to be shown on a habeas corpus extradition proceeding would be to show the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a person is guilty of an offense against the laws of a state, it is no defense for him to allege that the prosecution was inspired by improper motives. It very frequently happens that criminals are brought to punishment only by persons who have motives other than the vindication of the violated law; but it has never been held that such reason was sufficient to invalidate a con

viction for a criminal offense. Good faith and courtesy require a state to honor the demand of a sister state for the return of a fugitive from justice."

Executive warrant Conditions precedent. -It is only necessary, as a condition precedent to the issuing of the governor's warrant, to establish two propositions: first, that the defendant was substantially charged with crime against the laws of another state, and second, that he was a fugitive from the jus tice of that state. In re Strauss, (1903) 126 Fed. 327, 63 C. C. A. 99.

Copies of affidavit or indictment. — It is not necessary that the executive warrant in extradition proceedings should be accompanied by certified copies of the affidavit or indictment, or that such affidavit or indictment be set out in the warrant. Ex p. Cheatham, (1906) 50 Tex. Crim. 51, 95 S. W. 1077. Clerical errors. - Where extradition papers showed that the alleged fugitive from justice was charged by affidavit, a recital in the warrant of the governor of the state on which the demand was made that the fugitive was charged by indictment was held to be a mere immaterial clerical error. Er p. Coleman, (1908) 53 Tex. Crim. 93, 113 S. W. 17.

Recitals. It is not necessary that the executive warrant in extradition proceedings recite that the affidavit or indictment from the demanding state was presented to the gov ernor of the asylum state by any legal authority from such demanding state. Cheatham, (1906) 50 Tex. Crim. 51, 95 S. W. 1077.

Ex P.

It is not necessary that the warrant should contain the express statement that the gov ernor has found that the accused is a fugitive from justice. The fact of the issuing of the warrant upon demand made upon that ground is sufficient to justify the presumption that the governor so found, until that presumption is overthrown by proof to the contrary. Dennison v. Christian, (1904) 72 Neb. 703, 101 N. W. 1045.

In Ex p. Thomas, (1908) 53 Tex. Crim. 37, 108 S. W. 663, it was held that in view of the Code Crim. Pro. of Texas 1895, art. 254, subd. 2, which provides that a warrant of arrest "must state that the person is accused of some offense against the laws of the state, naming the offense," an executive warrant in extradition proceedings which fails to name the offense alleged to have been committed in the foreign state, and is neither accompanied by an indictment nor a complaint disclosing the nature of the offense, is fatally defective.

Is prima facie as to legal prerequisites. The warrant of the governor, authorizing the extradition of a person charged with an of fense in another state, is prima facie evidence that all the essential prerequisites have been observed. Ross r. Crofutt, (1911) 84 Conn. 370, 80 Atl. 90; Kemper v. Metzger, (1907) 169 Ind. 112, 81 N. E. 663; People v. Police Com'r, (1905) 100 App. Div. 483, 91 N. Y. S. 760; Ex p. Bergman, (1910) 60 Tex. Crim. 8, 130 S. W. 174; Matter of Gillis, (1905) 38 Wash. 156, 80 Pac. 300.

On habeas corpus to review the issuance of an extradition warrant by the governor of a

state, the accused is concluded by the prima facie case made out by the papers upon which the governor acted, where such accused, upon the hearing in the habeas corpus proceedings. waives the right to introduce further evidence. Munsey r. Clough, (1904) 195 U. S. 364, 25 S. Ct. 282, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 515.

Description of offense. Where a certified copy of an original information on which extradition proceedings in the demanding state were based was attached to the requisition and charged the petitioner with having separated himself from his wife and minor child, they being destitute and depending wholly upon their earnings for adequate support, contrary to the statute, etc., and throughout the papers such offense was designated as desertion" and was made a misdemeanor by Pa. Act March 13, 1903 (P. L. 26), a warrant for the arrest and return of petitioner to answer for the crime of "desertion" was not objectionable as failing to set out an offense known to the laws of the demanding state. Er p. Hose, (Nev. 1911) 116 Pac. 417.

Reviewability after surrender of prisoner. -The warrant of the chief executive of the state surrendering an accused person, whether issued lawfully or unlawfully, has accomplished its purpose and become functus officio as soon as the accused is delivered into the jurisdiction of the demanding state, and the regularity of its issuance thereupon ceases to be a question for the judicial inquiry on application by the prisoner for his discharge. where he is at the time held under due and legal process issued out of a court of compe tent criminal jurisdiction of the demanding state. In re Moyer, (1906) 12 Idaho 250, 85 Pac. 897: In re Pettibone, (1906) 12 Idaho 264, 85 Pac. 902; In re Haywood, (1906) 12 Idaho 264, 85 Pac. 902.

Executive warrant for receiving prisoner. — A governor's warrant empowering a sheriff to receive defendant from the authorities of another state and convey him hither to be dealt with according to law is sufficient to authorize defendant's production in the court of trial. People v. Stockwell, (1904) 135 Mich. 341, 97 N. W. 765.

Review by federal court. - The power of the federal courts to interfere in interstate extradition proceedings should only be exercised in cases of urgency, where the error is plain and the necessity for federal intervention obvious. In re Strauss, (1903) 126 Fed. 327, 63 C. C. A. 99.

After prisoner reaches demanding state. — In interstate extradition, the prisoner is only held under the extradition process until such time as he reaches the jurisdiction of the demanding state, and is thenceforth held under the process issued out of the courts of that state, and it necessarily follows that there is no longer a federal question involved in his detention. In re Moyer, (1906) 12 Idaho 250, 85 Pac. 897; In re Pettibone, (1906) 12 Idaho 264, 85 Pac. 902; In re Haywood, (1906) 12 Idaho 264, 85 Pac. 902.

Review by state court. - The finding of the governor that the person demanded in an extradition requisition should be surrendered is not necessarily final, but may be pronounced

by the courts insufficient to support arrest on conclusive proof that the person demanded was not within the demanding state at the time the crime was alleged to have been com mitted, and that there was no sufficient evidence to the contrary before the governor. Farrell v. Hawley, (1905) 78 Conn. 150, 61 Atl. 502; Ex p. Cheatham, (1906) 50 Tex. Crim. 51, 95 S. W. 1077.

Question of fact. The courts will not review the decision of the governor in extradition proceedings upon a question of fact made before him, which the law makes it his duty to decide, and upon which there is evidence pro and con before the governor. Dennison v. Christian, (1904) 72 Neb. 703, 101 N. W. 1045.

Review of courts of demanding state. The action and conduct of the chief executive of the state in which the accused was found in issuing the executive warrant, and of the executive and ministerial officers acting in aid of his warrant, is a matter for the consideration of the courts of his state, subject to the federal courts in so far as the federal question is involved, and is not a question open to examination or consideration by the courts of a foreign state. In re Moyer, (1906) 12 Idaho 250, 85 Pac. 897; In re Pettibone, (1906) 12 Idaho 264, 85 Pac. 902; In re Haywood, (1906) 12 Idaho 264, 85 Pac. 902.

Questions raised on habeas corpus. On habeas corpus proceedings instituted by one arrested on requisition, evidence as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is inadmissible, being a question solely for the demanding state. Pierce v. Creecy, (1908) 210 U. S. 387, 28 S. Ct. 714, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 113, affirming (1907) 155 Fed. 663; Depoilly v. Palmer, (1906) 28 App. Cas. (D. C.) 324; Taylor r. Wise, (Ia, 1910) 126 N. W. 1126; E p. Denning, (1907) 50 Tex, Crim. 629, 100 S. W. 401. See also under the title HABEAS CORPUS, vol. 3, p. 162.

Scope of inquiry. The purpose of habeas corpus proceedings, challenging the validity of a warrant of extradition issued by the gov ernor on the requisition of the governor of a sister state, is to review the legality of the action of the governor in issuing the warrant, and not to try the question of relator's guilt or innocence. Harris v. Magee, (Ia. 1911) 129 N. W. 742.

The objection that an extradition requisition contains a clause that the demanding state will not be responsible for any expense attending the arrest and delivery of the alleged fugitive is not available to the accused on habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of the extradition proceedings, but is a matter for the consideration of the executive of the surrendering state when he receives the official demand for the surrender of the alleged fugitive criminal. Marbles v. Creecy, (1909) 215 U. S. 63, 30 S. Ct. 32, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 92.

The jurisdiction of the court on a writ of habeas corpus does not involve any executive function. It is limited to the identification of the person demanded; an inquiry whether the record shows that a crime was substantially charged against him; and whether he is a

fugitive from justice. 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 125. (Ala. 1911) 56 So. 79. Presumptions,

Com. v. Hare, (1908) See also Law v. State,

In habeas corpus to se

cure the release of one in custody under an extradition warrant it is presumable that the governor had sufficient ground for believing that the prisoner was present in the demanding state when the crime was alleged to have been committed. Farrell v. Hawley, (1905) 78 Conn. 150, 61 Atl. 502.

The technical sufficiency of the indictment and the question of the procedure under it are not open to inquiry on habeas corpus to review the issuance of a warrant of arrest in interstate extradition proceedings. Munsey r. Clough. (1904) 196 U. S. 364, 25 S. Ct. 282, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 515; People v. Police Com'r, (1905) 100 App. Div. 483, 91 N. Y. S. 760; Ex p. Coleman, (1908) 53 Tex. Crim. 93, 113 S. W. 17.

Bail. - In Connecticut in habeas corpus to secure the release of one in custody under an extradition warrant, it is within the discretion of the Court of Common Pleas, after remanding the prisoner, to refuse to admit him to bail. Farrell v. Hawley, (1905) 78 Conn, 150, 61 Atl. 502.

In Mississippi there is no statute allowing bail in extradition cases, either pending trial or on appeal. Ex p. Wall, (1904) 84 Miss. 783, 38 So. 628; Er p. Edwards, (1907) 91 Miss. 621, 44 So. 827.

How party brought into state not inquired into. To the same effect as the first paragraph of the original note. In re Moyer, (1906) 12 Idaho 250, 85 Pac. 897; In re Pettibone, (1906) 12 Idaho 264, 85 Pac. 902; In re Haywood, (1906) 12 Idaho 264, 85 Pac. 902.

Arranging and carrying out the arrest and deportation of the accused so as to leave him no opportunity to prove before the governor of the surrendering state that he was not a fugitive from justice, or to appeal to some court of that state to prevent his illegal deportation, does not violate the provisions of U. S. Const., art. 4, sec. 2, or R. S. sec. 5278, relating to extradition proceedings. Pettibone v. Nichols, (1906) 203 U. S. 192, 27 S. Ct. 111, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 148.

-

Trial for different offenses. To the same effect as the first paragraph of the original note, see Knox v. State, (1905) 164 Ind. 226, 73 N. E. 255; Taylor v. Com., (1906) 96 S. W. 440, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 714; Rutledge v. Krauss, (1906) 73 N. J. L. 397, 63 Atl. 988.

Civil process. To the same effect as the Minnesota and New York cases cited in the original note, Rutledge r. Krauss, (1906) 73 N. J. L. 397, 63 Atl. 988.

In State v. Boynton, (1909) 140 Wis. 89, 121 N. W. 887, following Moletor v. Sinnen, (1890) 76 Wis. 308, 44 N. W. 1009, 7 L. R. A. 817, 20 Am. St. Rep. 71, cited in the original note, it was held that one who was brought into the state by extradition proceedings on a criminal charge was not subject to arrest for contempt until he had had an opportunity to return to the state from which he was extradited, though he was at the time he absconded a resident of Wisconsin, and had not since

acquired a residence elsewhere, and though the court had prior to his departure from Wisconsin obtained jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit in which the judgment was rendered and of his person.

Where the defendant, who was a bona fide resident of another state, was brought into Iowa by extradition proceedings to answer a criminal complaint, and, after giving bail, voluntarily returned for trial, and was acquitted, and intended to return to his home on the first train leaving the place where his trial was had, it was held that he was priv. ileged from the service of civil process before he could so depart. Murray v. Wilcox, (1904) 122 Ia. 188, 97 N. W. 1087.

Where a person was arrested in another state, where he was residing with the relator's wife, and was returned to Michigan upon a requisition, for nonsupport of his own wife, it was held that he was privileged from arrest upon relator's civil suit for alienation of relator's wife's affections, made upon the day that the criminal action was dismissed, and before he had an opportunity to leave the state. Weale v. Clinton Circuit Judge, (1909) 158 Mich. 563, 123 N. W. 31, 16 Detroit Leg. N. 709.

Extraditing twice for same offense. - A second indictment for the same offense may serve as the basis for the second extradition of a person as a fugitive from justice, without violating any rights secured to him by the Federal Constitution or laws, where the first indictment, on which the accused was origi

Vol. III, p. 90, sec. 5.

Unsworn statements certified by the United States ambassador and the chargé d'affaires to be authenticated properly and legally so as to be received for similar purposes by tribunals of the country from which the accused has fled are, by the express terms of this

Right to appeal to United States Supreme Court. Habeas corpus proceedings on behalf of a person whose interstate extradition is sought pursuant to the Federal Constitution and laws, and who contends that his detention in custody is unlawful because the indictment, which is its only excuse, is not a charge of crime within the meaning of U. S. Const., art. 4, sec. 2, par. 2, regulating extradition, involve the construction of the Constitution of the United States, within the meaning of the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. L. 826, ch. 517, sec. 5, 4 Fed. Stat. Annot. 398, governing direct appeals from the Circuit Courts to the Supreme Court. Pierce v. Creecy, (1908) 210 U. S. 387, 28 S. Ct. 714, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 1113, affirming (1907) 155 Fed. 663.

section, admissible in evidence in extradition proceedings. Elias v. Ramirez, (1910) 215 U. S. 398, 30 S. Ct. 131, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 253, reversing (1907) 11 Ariz. 256, 90 Pac. 323.

several days at the hotel. The prosecutor believed the defendant to be a Free Mason, and took special care of him during sickness on that account, after which the defendant presented a check which he alleged had been signed by his employer in payment of his salary, and obtained seventy dollars thereon from prosecutor. The check was drawn on a bank which did not exist, was returned unpaid, and the prosecutor declared that he cashed the check because he continued to believe defendant was a secret service operative. It was held that such facts were insufficient to sustain a conviction for pretending to be an employee of the United States, and as such knowingly and feloniously obtaining from