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had previously contrary to decisions of the federal Supreme Court. Rubenstein v. Hackfeld, (1906) 18 Hawaii 126.
The words “ amount involved," as used in this section, mean the actual amount in dispute between the parties. Thus where there was a dispute as to the proper assessment for purposes of taxation it was held that the amount involved was the taxes on the difference between the assessment as made and the assessment as claimed by the taxpayer. In re Ewa Plantation Co., (1908) 19 Hawaii
Final judgment. — The mere entry upon the minutes by the clerk of the Supreme Court of the territory of a decision overruling exceptions taken under Rev. Laws Hawaii 1905, sec, 1862 et seq., which did not bring up the whole case, and called upon the reviewing court merely to pass upon specific questions raised by the bill, was held not to make such decision a final judgment, so as to be subject to review in the federal Supreme Court. Cotton r. Hawaii, (1908) 211 U. S. 162, 29 S. Ct. 85, 53 U. Š. (L. ed.) 131.
Not applicable to case determined before Act passed. — In Notley v. Brown, (1908) 208 Ū. S. 438, 28 S. Ct. 385, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 559, it was held that a writ of error directed on its face to the supposed judgment of the Supreme Court of the territory of Hawaii, disposing of exceptions on nonfederal grounds prior to this Act enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of the federal Supreme Court over the territorial court, could be sustained on the theory that a final judg ment in the case was not rendered until after the passage of that Act, when judgment on the verdict was entered in the trial court in connection with a nunc pro tunc entry, since such judgment must necessarily have been entered after the judgment which the writ sought to review. It was also held that jurisdiction of a writ of error directed, on its face, to a supposed judgment of the Supreme Court of the territory of Hawaii, disposing of exceptions on non-federal grounds prior to this Act, could be taken by treating the writ
as addressed to a later judgment of that court, quashing a writ of error to the trial court, which judgment was not formally entered until long after the writ of error from the federal Supreme Court was sued out, where to regard the entry as relating back to the time when the opinion of the court was announced would, if the same rule be applied to the nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment of the trial court, require an affirmance of the judgment of the territorial Supreme Court on the ground that the writ of error to the trial court was not sued out in time.
Effect of rehearing after passage of Act. — A judgment of the Hawaiian Supreme Court did not become final before the enactment of the Act of March 3, 1905, and hence not reviewable in the federal Supreme Court under that Act, where, although the opinion was filed prior to that enactment, a petition for rehearing was duly filed and entertained by the court, and was not denied until after the passage of such statute. Bierce v. Waterhouse, (1911) 219 U. S. 320, 31 S. Ct. 241, 55 U. S. (L. ed.) 237. Compare Harrison v. Mogoon, (1907) 205 U. S. 501, 27 S. Ct. 577, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 900.
Order not appealed from. — The order of a territorial Supreme Court, reversing the order of the court below, granting a new trial, cannot be reviewed by the federal Supreme Court on a writ of error directed alone to a later decision in the same case, overruling exceptions, the record of which cannot be regarded as embracing the proceedings had below in respect to the matter of a new trial. Cotton v. Hawaii, (1908) 211 U, S. 162, 29 S. Ct. 85, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 131.
Jurisdictional amount. - A writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to the Hawaiian Supreme Court, to review a judgment sustaining an assessment for taxation, will not lie under this section where the amount of the tax assessed is less than the jurisdictional amount prescribed by the section. Honolulu Rapid Transit, etc., Co. v. Wilder, (1908) 211 U. S. 145, 29 S. Ct. 46, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 124.
Vol. III, p. 229. [Holidays with pay for government employees.]
Not applicable to Philippine Islands. — (1904) 25 Op. Atty.-Gen. 127.
Vol. III, p. 230. (Holidays for per diem government employees.] Not applicable to Philippine Islands. — (1904) 25 Op. Atty.-Gen. 127.
Vol. III, p. 231, sec. 5339.
Crime committed on land ceded for federal building. - In Battle v. U. S., (1908) 209 U. S. 36, 28 S. Ct. 422, 52 U, S. (L. ed.) 670, affirming (1907) 154 Fed. 540, it was held that a murder committed upon land bought by the United States in the city of Macon, Georgia, on which it was building a post office and courthouse, and over which the state had ceded jurisdiction, was made an offense against the United States, justiciable in the federal courts, this section making it a capi. tal offense to commit murder within any fort, arsenal, dock yard, or in any other place or district of country under the exclusive juris. diction of the United States.
Crime in Honolulu harbor. - A murder committed on board a ship lying in the har. bor of Honolulu is cognizable in the District Court of the United States for the territory of Hawaii, under this section, as committed in a haven or arm of the sea within the ad. miralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and “out of the jurisdiction of any particular state.” Wynne v. U. S., (1910) 217 U. S. 234, 30 S. Ct. 447, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 748.
Effect of Organic Act of Hawaii. — There is nothing in the Hawaiian Organic Act (Act of April 30, 1900, ch. 339, 31 Stat. L. 141, 3 Fed. Stat. Annot. 186) which expressly or impliedly deprives the federal courts of their jurisdiction under section 5339, to punish a
murder committed on board a ship lying in the harbor of Honolulu. Wynne 0. U. s., (1910) 217 U. S. 234, 30 S. Ct. 447, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 748.
Indian reservation within a territory. The murder of one negro by another within the limits of an Indian reservation in a terri. tory is committed within a place or district under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, within the meaning of this section defining and punishing the crime of murder, as amended by the Act of Jan. 15, 1897, ch. 29, 29 Stat. L. 487, 2 Fed. Stat. Annot. 357, and extended by section 2145 (3 Fed. Stat. Annot. 387) to the Indian country, when not within the exceptions made by section 2146 (3 Fed. Stat. Annot. 388), which by reason of the race of the accused and deceased do not apply. Pickett v. U. S., (1910) 216 U. S. 459, 30 S. Ct. 265, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 566.
Jurisdiction over land not open for settlement. - In Eæ p. Moran, (1906) 203 U. S. 105, 27 S. Ct. 25, 51 U, S. (L. ed.) 105, it was held that land now embraced within the limits of Comanche county, Oklahoma, had become part of that territory on Aug. 4, 1901, so as to make a murder committed therein on that date an offense against the territorial rather than the federal statutes, although the land had not then been opened for settlement.
This section was cited in U. S. 0. Hart, (1908) 162 Fed. 192.
Vol. III, p. 234, sec. 5341.
Wilfully. - The word “ wilfully," as used in this section defining manslaughter, is synonymous with “intentionally " or “designedly.” O'Barr v. U. S., (1909) 3 Okla. Crim. 319, 105 Pac. 988.
Instructions. — An instruction defining manslaughter under this section which omits the word "wilfully” is improper. O'Barr v. U, S., (1909) 3 Okla. Crim. 319, 105 Pac. 988.
In a prosecution for homicide, an instruction that the term “ wilfully" as used in this section, defining manslaughter as the unlawful and wilful killing of another with.
out malice, means a killing done wrong. fully and with evil intent, committed by an act which a person of reasonable knowledge and ability must know to be contrary to duty, and that while that act must be done with evil design and knowingly, a killing under circumstances showing a reckless disregard for the life of another, and the reckless and negligent use of means calculated to take the life of another, would be a wilful killing, as defined, was held to be proper. Roberts o. U, S., (1903) 126 Fed. 897, 61 C. C. A. 427.
This section was cited in U. S. v. Hart, (1908) 162 Fed. 192.
Vol. III, p. 235, sec. 5344.
Sufficiency of indictment. – An indictment held not to be bad because it did not also charging a violation of the statute and rules, charge a failure to supply the requisite numin that, of the life preservers supplied and ber of good life preservers; the furnishing to kept on a steamship for use of passengers a passenger of a useless life preserver being thereon, upward of nine hundred were unsuit as much a viɔlation of the law as a failure to able, inefficient, and useless, and not in ac- furnish him with any. U. S. v. Van Schaick. cordance with the statutory requirement, was (1904) 134 Fed. 593.
Duties created by inspector's rules. — Inspector's rule 5, section 15, requiring masters of steam vessels to keep the fire apparatus thereon in complete working order, and to post station bills and exercise the crew in their duties in connection therewith, is within the power conferred on the board by R. S. sec. 405, 6 Fed. Stat. Annot. 10, and valid. It does not purport to create offenses, but merely to prescribe duties; but a breach of it, resulting from a master's misconduct, negli. gence, or inattention, causing death, is manslaughter, because so provided by Congress in R. S. sec. 5344. U. S. v. Van Schaick, (1904) 134 Fed, 592.
Violation of navigation laws. — While it is not primarily the duty of the master, under the statutes and inspectors' regulations, to equip a vessel with life preservers or fire apparatus, it is his duty before navigating to exercise care to know whether the ship has such equipment, and whether it is apparently sufficient and in accordance with law, and afterwards to exercise some care respecting its maintenance, the extent of such care being dependent on his opportunities to examine the appliance and perceive its con dition; other duties, relating to the posting of station bills for the crew, and their exercise in fire drills and the use of appliances, are imposed directly upon the master by rule 5, section 15, of the inspectors' rules and regulations; and his neglect of any of such duties, whereby the life of any person is destroyed, renders him subject to indictment
and prosecution for manslaughter under section 5344. U. S. . Van Schaick, (1904) 134 Fed. 593.
“ Violation of law." — The owner of a steamship who fails to comply with the stat. ute requiring it to be equipped with life preservers and proper fire appliances, either by supplying none or by supplying those that are unsuitable, inefficient, and useless, and do not conform to the inspectors' rules, is guilty of a "violation of law," and subject to prosecution under this section, where such violation results in the death of a person; and in either case the offense is one which may be aided and abetted by a third person who “caused and procures” the omission, and such person may properly be charged in the indictment as a principal. U. S. v. Van Schaick, (1904) 134 Fed. 592.
Corporation. - A corporation owner of a steam vessel may be guilty of the offense stated in this section, which provides that “ every owner ..through whose fraud, connivance, misconduct, or violation of law the life of any person is destroyed, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, and upon conviction thereof... shall be sentenced to confinement at hard labor," etc., notwithstanding the fact that it cannot be subjected to the punishment imposed; and such fact does not affect the right of the government to prosecute individuals, under said section, who aid and abet the corporation in the com: mission of the crime. U. S. v. Van Schaick, (1904) 134 Fed. 592.
HOSPITALS AND ASYLUMS. Vol. III, p. 252, sec. 4810.
Not limited to places where no hospitals exist. — The authority of the Secretary of the Navy under this section to procure at suitable places proper sites for navy hospi
tals, and to cause necessary buildings to be erected thereon, is not limited to the establishment of hospitals at places where none exist. (1908) 27 Op. Atty.-Gen. 31.
Vol. III, p. 256, sec. 4824.
Authority of governor of home. — Under this section and section 4835, the governor of the Soldiers' Home, to maintain discipline, may promulgate such special orders as he deems proper, including an order forbidding
the inmates to frequent a public place where they are permitted to obtain liquor, or are afforded degrading and immoral amusements, or exposed to improper temptations. Rowan v. Butler, (1908) 171 Ind. 28, 85 N. E. 714.
Vol. III, p. 259, sec. 4825.
Liability to action for tort. — The National and polluting the waters of a spring situated Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, being on lands of another, the power “to sue and a charitable institution engaged as an agency be sued in courts of law and equity” conof the federal government in the discharge of ferred on the corporation by section 4825 a governmental function, is not subject to being limited to matters within the scope of suit in an action sounding in tort to recover the other corporate powers with which it is damages for the alleged unlawful and wrong. vested. Lyle v. National Home for Disabled ful or negligent acts of its officers in diverting Volunteer Soldiers, (1909) 170 Fed. 842.
Vol. III, p. 259, sec. 4826.
Eligibility of managers. - The question whether a congressman can be appointed a member of the board of managers of the Soldiers' Home, and become local manager of one of the homes, is wholly a matter for the decision of Congress itself. There is no con
stitutional objection to the election of a member of Congress as a member of the board of managers of the National Home for Disabled Volunteers, although such an election would seem to be contrary to sound public policy. (1907) 26 Op. Atty.-Gen. 457.
Vol. III, p. 265, sec. 4834.
Authority of governor of home. — See under this title, vol. 3, p. 256, sec. 4824.
Vol III, p. 298, sec. 1.
Contract laborers. – In Botis v. Davies, (1909) 173 Fed. 996, it appeared that the petitioner. who was a Greek boy then sixteen years old, wrote to a distant relative in Chicago to know if the latter would give him employment if he came to the l'nited States, and receiving an affirmative answer he came; his father paying his passage. On his arrival the relative gave him work at fifteen dollars per month and board, where he remained for fourteen months, and then bought a horse and
and started in business for himself as a fruit peddler. He had no contract for em ployment before he came, and no wages were mentioned, and he would have come merely
on the relative's promise to give him a home until he found employment. It was held that he did not come as a “ contract laborer ! within the meaning of this Act.
Farm laborers. The bringing of an alien into the l'nited States under contract to work on a farm as a laborer, under the direction of others, is within the prohibition of this section. I'. S. 1'. Parsons, (C. C. A. 1904) 130 Fed. 681.
No exception in favor of states. — See under this title, 1909 Supp., p. 104, sec. 4.
Effect of Act of March 3, 1903. — See under this title, vol. 3, p. 304, sec. 1.
Vol. III, p. 301, sec. 5.
Learned profession, - Expert accountants are not members of a recognized learned profession within the meaning of the exception in this Act. In re Ellis, (1903) 124 Fed. 637.
Vol. III, p. 304, sec. 1.
Effect of Act of March 3, 1903. — Act Cong. ers in the Act of 1903 did not repeal the March 3, 1903, ch, 1012, 32 Stat, L. 1213, 10 provisions of Acts Cong. Feb. 26, 1885, ch. Fed. Stat. Annot. 102, amending and re 164, 23 Stat. L. 332, and March 3, 1891, ch. enacting the immigration laws pre-existing, 551, 26 Stat. L. 1084, relative thereto. In re and providing for the repeal of all other con: Ellis, (1903) 124 Fed. 637. See also (1907) flicting provisions, re-enumerated all the ex 26 Op. Atty.-Gen, 180. cluded classes of aliens specified in this sec. A native of Porto Rico who was an inhabition, with some additions, but specifically tant of that island at the time of its cession omitted the clause relating to contract labor. to the United States by the treaty with ers excluded under Act Cong. Feb. 26, 1885, Spain, of April 11, 1899, 30 Stat. L. 1754, ch. 164, 23 Stat. L. 332, 3 Fed. Stat. 7 Fed. Stat. Annot. 814, is not, upon her Annot. 298. The Congressional Record (page arrival at the port of New York, an alien 3205), as to the passage of the Act of 1903, immigrant, within the meaning of the Act of showed that the omission was intentional, but Congress of March 3, 1891, providing for the that Congress thereby intended to leave intact detention and deportation of alien immithe contract labor laws as they previously grants likely to become publie charges. Gonexisted. It was held that the omission to zales v. Williams, (1904) 192 U. S. I, 24 S. provide for the deportation of contract labor. Ct. 177, 48 U, S. (L. ed.) 317.
Vol. III, p. 305, sec. 3.
Exception of states. — The only exception made in the contract labor laws in favor of states is contained in this section and section 6 of the Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. L. 1213, 10 Fed. Stat. Annot. 104, in
reference to advertisements printed and published in foreign countries, stating the inducements they offer for immigration. (1907) 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 181.
Vol. III, p. 310, sec. 10.
Immigrants defined. — This section applies only to the entry into the United States of immigrants, who, according to standard definitions of the term, are persons removing into the country for the purpose of permanent residence, and the penalty imposed on the master of a vessel for neglecting to detain on his vessel any “ alien who may unlawfully come to the United States " on such vessel, or to return him to the port from which he came, must be construed in the light of such general purpose, and limited in its application to cases of alien immigrants. Moffitt v. C. S.. (1904) 128 Fed. 375, 63 C. C. A. 117.
Extent of shipowner's duty. - Shipowners who have wrongfully brought aliens into the United States, and have received them back on board the vessel for deportation, are not made absolute insurers of the return of the immigrants to the port from whence they came, by this section punishing as a misdemeanor the "neglect” to detain the persons 60 received, or to return them to that port; but nothing more is required than a faithful and careful effort to carry out the duty so imposed. Hackfeld v. U. S., (1905) 197 U. S. 442, 25 S. Ct. 456, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 826, rerersing (1903) 125 Fed. 596, 60 C. C. A. 428, and overruling Warren Ľ, U. S., (C. C. A. 1893) 58 Fed. 559. Followed in Hackfeld r. U. S., (1905) 141 Fed. 9, 72 C. C. A. 265.
Evidence of violation of section. -- In Mof. fitt 1. U. S., (1904) 128 Fed. 375, 63 C. C. A. 117, it appeared that the defendant was indicted under this section for neglecting to detain on the steamship of which he was master an alien not entitled to land in the United States, by reason of which neglect the alien escaped and landed in the United States. On the trial the following facts were shown by an agreed statement: When defendant's ship was anchored off shore at a Mexican port a number of native peddlers came on board to sell their wares. When one of them came on deck to go ashore he found that the vessel had started and proceeded some dig. tance. Defendant refused his request that he be taken back and landed, but promised to stop and leave him on the return trip, and
thereupon put him at work, but without placing him on the crew list. On arriving at San Francisco an immigration officer notified defendant not to land the Mexican out permission, but the latter stated he did not wish to land, but wanted to be taken back home, and he was not confined. Just before the vessel sailed, however, he left it without the consent or knowledge of defendant or any of his officers, and had not returned when she left the port. It was held that such facts were not sufficient to warrant the defendant's conviction, the alien not being an immigrant within the meaning and intent of the Act, whom defendant was required to put in irons or keep under guard to secure his return on the vessel, and there being no evidence or claim that defendant did not act in good faith.
Habeas corpus. - Whether the executive officers of the government, in deporting an alien immigrant, are proceeding according to law, is a judicial question, which may be inquired into on habeas corpus. Lavin v. Le Fevre, (C. C. A. 1903) 125 Fed, 693.
To what country deported. — Under this and the following section providing that all aliens unlawfully coming into the country shall, if practicable, be immediately sent back on the vessel by which they were brought in, and that any alien unlawfully coming into the country may be returned as provided by law at any time within a year thereafter, where alien immigrants unlawfully came into the country from France, and after being temporarily absent in British Columbia, returned within a year of their arrival from France, it was held that they were properly deported to France. Lavin v. Le Fevre, (1903) 125 Fed. 693, 60 C. C, A. 425.
Remission of fines. - The Secretary of Commerce and Labor has no power to remit a fine imposed by a United States court upon a steamship company for its failure to detain and return to the country whence they came aliens whose deportation has been ordered under this section. (1908) 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 624.
Vol. III, p. 311, sec. 11.
Limitation. -- Where a proceeding for the 11, the proceeding was barred. In re Russodeportation of an alien as authorized by this manno, (1904) 128 Fed, 528. section was not begun by the seizure of the To what country deported. — See under alien within one year next after his last entry this title, vol. 3, p. 310, sec. 10. into the United States, as required by section